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Dissertation Abstract 
"THE AMERICAN PRESS AND THE RISE OF HITLER, 1923-33"
This Ph.D. study will trace the development of National Socialism in Germany as it was 
depicted by three major American newspapers: the New York Times, the Chicago Daily 
Tribune and the Chicago Daily News. While news stories and editorials will be analyzed 
with respect to scope and bias, particular attention will also be paid to the decision-making 
processes within the newspaper establishments themselves. In attempting to understand the 
"news behind the news", an archival-driven methodology will be used in conjunction with the 
more conventional product-driven one. That is to say, memoranda and cables between 
publishers, editors and foreign correspondents will be examined in addition to the back issues 
o f the newspapers themselves. By adopting this twin-prongedjnethodological approach, the 
scholar will be able to view the Hitlerian phenomenon through the eyes o f the American 
public as well as penetrate the minds of newspapermen.
My choice o f publications is based strongly on the availability of primary source evidence. 
The Newberry Library possesses important internal documents o f the Chicago Daily News. 
Specifically, a great deal can be learned about this newspaper's coverage of the rise o f Hitler 
through an analysis o f the relevant sections o f the Charles H. Dennis Papers, Edward Price 
Bell Papers, Carroll Binder Papers, Edgar Mowrer Papers, Paul Mowrer Papers and Victor 
Lawson Papers, as well as other assorted materials. I will use the data generated from the 
Newberry Library in conjunction with information from the Sigrid Schultz Papers, courtesy 
o f the State Historical Society of Wisconsin (Mass Communications History Center), as well 
as documents from the New York Times Archive. This will provide fresh insights into the 
news and editorial perceptions o f the Chicago Daily News. Chicago Daily Tribune and New 
York Times as they relate to the events in Germany between 1923 and 1933.
A key feature o f this study will be a comprehensive analysis of how the relationship 
between a newspaper's management (which in the upcoming chapters will also be referred to 
as the "Home Office") and its Berlin bureau influenced the publication's news and editorial 
coverage o f Germany. Furthermore, by examining the transatlantic correspondence between 
the Home Offices o f the New York Times. Chicago Daily News and Chicago Daily Tribune 
and their field reporters, the reader will gain insight into issues which transcend the subject 
matter o f this dissertation. These issues include: 1) Who exercised control over the formation 
and presentation o f news -- management or the field reporter? 2) How did each paper's 
coverage o f Hitler's rise to power reflect the journalistic principles o f the day, especially those 
related to accuracy and objectivity? and 3) How did journalists define their role in the 
conduct o f international affairs during the 1920's and early 1930's? Did they view themselves 
as detached recorders o f events or as active participants in the political process, hoping to 
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Introduction
At first glance, a historical study.of the perceptions of the 
press seems like a straightforward research task. The scholar 
need only consult the publications, any relevant secondary works 
and possibly memoirs, in methodological terms.jL_.the result would 
be a product-driven study, the product being newspaper 
headlines, articles, editorials, pictures or even cartoons that 
represent a point of view —  one that is a result of decisions 
made by publisher, editor and correspondent —  within the 
context of a particular period. Many media historians have 
adopted the practice of quantifying data from newspapers; thus, 
press perception studies have become more noted for their 
statistical rather than qualitative analysis. One French press 
historian, Jean-Jacques Becker, even calculated the percent of 
column space and word count devoted to the July Crisis of 1914.1 
The late American press historian, Michael Emery, advised that 
the first step in conducting a press perception study was to 
compile a statistically sound newspaper sample.2 With a few 
notable exceptions,3 most American historians have adopted this 
method to study press perceptions.
Thanks to microfilm, a researcher has greater access to 
larger numbers of publications than ever before. It is 
conceivable that a scholar could complete a Ph.D. press
1Becker,J-J, 1914: Comment les Frangais sont entr£s dans la guerre (Paris 
1977), see also Herrmann, G. "American Press Perceptions of the Death of 
the Weimar Republic" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Carnegie Mellon 1979),
Appendices.
2Michael Emery to the author, April 1994.
3See Liebovich L., The Press and the Origins of the Cold War 1944-1947 
(New York 1988), Heald M., Transatlantic Vistas: American Journalists in 
Europe, 1900-1940 (Kent, Ohio 1988) and Edwards, J. The Foreign Policy of 
McCormick's Tribune, 1929-41, (Reno 1971). For a similar approach with 
the British press, see Cockett. R., Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, 
Appeasement and the Manipulation of the Press (London 1989).
(2 )
perception study within the confines of the local branch 
library.
A product-driven approach allows the historian to determine 
the degree of media consensus on a particular issue. For 
example, after analyzing editorials from seven American 
newspapers, I concluded that despite their different locations 
and audiences, these publications maintained a strongly anti- 
Austrian stance during the July Crisis of 1914.4 Where a 
newspaper's management encourages general autonomy among its 
reporters, a product-driven approach can also allow the 
historian to compare the judgments of field correspondents in 
their news columns with those of management on the editorial 
page. However, this approach can effectively address only two 
general questions: namely, what did a particular article state 
about a particular event and how much attention was devoted to 
that particular event? What is left to speculation are the 
answers to why the publication reported an event the way it did 
and why it took the editorial position it did.
What is missing from a product-driven work is a strong 
qualitative analysis based on archival information. A press 
historian who relies solely on what appears in print cannot 
effectively address the fundamental components of historical 
analysis —  causation, dynamics, judgment and meaning. And only 
by examining the decision-making behind the coverage (or, at the 
very least, the context in which newspaper decisions were made) 
can a press scholar put forth a level of analysis found in other 
branches of history —  hence the need for an archival base.
4Klein, G. "Reaping the Whirlwind: Austria, Germany and the American Press 
July 1914" (University of London, M.A. Thesis 1990).
(3 )
When asked if any archival material existed for a study of 
U.S. press perceptions of the rise of Adolf Hitler, the late 
Michael Emery responded, 'I doubt it highly and you will 
probably waste a lot of time in the process'.5 That he tried to 
dissuade me from even attempting this approach reflects the 
condition of American press archives and historical press 
material in general.
For a variety of reasons, (the most important of which was 
the incremental and informal nature of journalistic decision­
making), American newspaper records of the 1920's and 1930's, 
especially editorial board minutes and internal memoranda, were 
either destroyed or never written in the first place. Poor 
indexing of press records is also an obstacle to the researcher. 
Where extensive holdings do exist, they are often inaccessible 
to the researcher because most are under the ownership and 
discretion of the publisher's descendants.
Despite its difficulties, the merits of an archival-driven 
study are inestimable. Whereas a product-driven study bears 
witness to what journalists wrote, an archival-driven study may 
elicit what journalists were thinking, questioning, wondering 
about or even desiring. By utilizing both methodologies, I will 
provide a fuller, but by no means complete, sense of how the 
mainstream* American press viewed Germany and the Hitler 
phenomenon.6
5M. Emery to the author, April 1994.
6*For the purposes of this study, the terms "mainstream” and "major" press 
are defined as those publications which were generally recognized as 
legitimate news sources whose editorials espoused ideas that fell within 
the two-party American political spectrum of the 1920's and 1930's. Thus, 
a conservative isolationist publication such as the Chicago Daily Tribune 
or a liberal internationalist one such as The Nation would still be 
considered "mainstream", but the Socialist World would not.
(4 )
This thesis will examine how the New York Times, the Chicago 
Daily Tribune and the Chicago Daily News, in particular, 
perceived the decline of the Weimar Republic and the rise of 
Adolf Hitler between 1923 and 1933. Although a moderate amount 
of historical attention has been paid to Hitler and the American 
press7, only three detailed studies, George Herrmann's "American 
Press Perceptions of the Death of the Weimar Republic" (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Carnegie Mellon 1979), Klaus Schoenthal1s 
"American Attitudes Toward Germany, 1918-1932" (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Ohio State 1959) and Michael Zalampas's Adolf 
Hitler and the Third Reich in American Magazines, 1923-39
(Bowling Green, Ohio 1989) focus on the Weimar era.
These pieces represent a point of departure for this 
dissertation. Though Schoenthal devotes only a few pages to 
U.S. press coverage of the rise of Nazism, his conclusions 
provide a useful context for my study by identifying important 
trends in the development of U.S. press sentiment towards 
Germany. Schoenthal argues that the press's views regarding 
Germany went through three distinct stages, eventually coming 
full circle by the end of 1932: 1) hailing the overthrow of the 
Hohenzollern monarchy at the close of World War I; 2) 
sympathizing with the plight of the Weimar Republic over the 
issues of "War Guilt" and reparations; and 3) ultimately 
condemning the German character with the ascension of Adolf
Hitler. Moreover, Schoenthal demonstrates that each shift in
American public opinion coincided with a shift in geographic
7See Lipstadt, D., Beyond Belief: the American Press and the Coming of the 
Holocaust, 1933-1945 (New York 1982). Far less satisfactory is Norden, M. 
"American Editorial Response to the Rise of Hitler: A Preliminary 
Consideration", American Jewish Historical Society Quarterly, Volume LVII 
(October 1968) pp.290-297 because of its lack of depth and glaring 
inaccuracies.
(5 )
arenas: specifically, between 1918 and 1922, U.S. attitudes
toward Germany were influenced primarily by events within 
America itself such as demobilization and the Senate debate over 
the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles; between 1923 and 
1930, by European issues such as reparations, inter-allied debts 
and their link to the 'war guilt' question; and between 1930 
through 1932, by German-based issues, especially after the Nazi 
electoral breakthrough in September 1930.
Whereas Schoenthal's and Zalampas's work are marked by their 
broad chronological and material scope, Herrmann's thesis is 
noteworthy for its much narrower focus. By concentrating on the 
last 15 months of the Weimar Republic, Herrmann sought to 
ascertain exactly how well the American press kept its 
readership informed and accurately apprised of the developing 
Nazi phenomenon. Herrmann conducted extensive quantitative 
analyses, employing twelve newspapers and twenty-one magazines 
reflecting different political, ideological and geographic 
backgrounds. He determined the amount of news and editorial 
coverage devoted to Germany by totalling the number of German- 
related news items, clarifying the subject matter of each item 
and calculating the frequency with which German-related stories 
made the front page. Herrmann also quantified news and 
editorial opinion, although he failed to differentiate between 
the two. He assessed the general tone of press opinion as to 
the stability of the Weimar Republic by placing a newspaper's 
position into one of three categories: a )'Government in a Strong 
Position', b )' Government Barely Hanging onto Power' or 
c)'Republic on the Way Out'.8 As a result of this comprehensive
8Herrmann, "American Perceptions", P. 230.
(6 )
statistical analysis, Herrmann came to three conclusions. 
First, despite its isolationist tendencies, the American press 
provided extensive coverage of German politics. Second, with 
some striking exceptions such as The New Republic, the American 
press was far too optimistic about the future of the Weimar 
Republic and did not grasp the reality of the Nazi phenomenon 
until many weeks after Hitler's appointment as Chancellor. And 
third, the periodical press journalists tended to be more 
accurate than the daily newspaper press in their overall 
commentary regarding Germany's internal situation.9
Except for a short conclusion where he echoed Herrmann's 
praises of the periodical press, Zalampas refrained from 
including any detailed analysis in his work.10 Instead, his book 
was comprised essentially of a series of quotes which were 
connected to form a narrative.
Despite their differences in scope, Schoenthal's , Herrmann's 
and Zalampas's works are essentially product-driven studies. 
None of the authors made substantive use, if any, of press 
archival material and thus all three pieces suffer from a 
distinct lack of qualitative emphasis. For example, despite 
over 250 pages of extensive quotes from U.S. publications, 
Herrmann provided only a cursory explanation as to why the media 
perceived events in Germany in the way it did, stating that the 
American press 'allowed the inherent American faith in democracy 
and progress to shade commentary in an optimistic direction'.11
9Ibid. P.iii.
10Zalampas, M. Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich in American Magazines, 
1923-1939, (Bowling Green University Press, Ohio 1989) Conclusion.
11Herrmann, "American Perceptions", op. cit.
(7 )
The present study will not only compare and contrast the 
attitudes of mainstream American publications towards Hitler^s 
rise but it will also address the reasons why some of their 
coverage took the form it did —  thus seeking to fill the void 
left by Herrmann, Schoenthal and Zalampas. By adding an 
archival dimension, this investigation will illustrate how 
personalities, business and political ideology, as well as 
chance, shaped the news and editorial coverage of the rise of 
Hitler —  even to the point where the actual developments in 
Germany exerted only a marginal influence. Where direct
Ik — — — -
archival material is lacking, this dissertation will attempt to 
provide a fuller understanding of the existing level of product- 
driven analysis by identifying consistencies and inconsistencies 
among and between news and editorial opinions of the New York 
Times, Chicago Daily Tribune and Chicago Daily News. Moreover, 
it will try to explain the origins of these patterns by 
examining primary source documents, which though not discussing 
Germany in particular, will shed light on the general decision­
making processes of each newspaper. Even though this study is 
not designed as a press opinion survey (critics would be correct 
in claiming that three newspapers alone fail to comprise a 
satisfactory press opinion sample), an in-depth analysis of 
these three newspapers, as well as an overview of other major 
American publications, will also give the reader a sense of how 
other segments of the press perceived the Hitler phenomenon.
However, a great deal of political, philosophical and social 
diversity characterized the New York Times, the Chicago Daily 
Tribune and the Chicago Daily News, differences clearly seen at 
the publishing level. Adolph Ochs (New York Times publisher),
(8 )
Robert McCormick (Chicago Daily Tribune publisher) and Victor 
Lawson (Chicago Daily News publisher) each differed as to the 
mission of the modern newspaper. Whereas Ochs saw the Times as 
an all- encompassing record of significant events, McCormick 
viewed the newspaper as an instrument of political and social 
change. Ochs and his managing editor Carr Van Anda stressed the 
principles of journalistic objectivity and thoroughness of 
account; Lawson's correspondents, however, championed the new 
journalism of the 1920's and 1930's: 'not so much to tell what 
has happened as to tell how and why it happened, and what it 
means' .12
The publications also differed in their international 
perspectives, especially on U.S. foreign policy. The New York 
Times and the Chicago Daily News supported the basic tenets of 
Wilsonianism: U.S. participation in the League of Nations and 
world affairs in general, open diplomacy and multilateral 
disarmament. The Chicago Daily Tribune, on the other hand, was 
strongly isolationist; it opposed U.S. participation in the 
League of Nations (as well as in European affairs in general) 
and advocated a buildup of the American military, especially the 
navy.13
All three publications also possessed influence far beyond 
their own readerships because of their syndicated news services. 
Moreover, the plethora of newspaper mergers and consolidations 
in the 1920's reduced the quantity and variety of publications 
for general consumption. Thus, small regional newspapers with
12Desmond, R. Crisis and Conflict: World News Reporting Between the Two 
World Wars, 1920-1940 (Iowa City 1982) and Heald, Vistas P.101.
13"Memorandum on the Press of the United States, 1922-32" prepared by the 
British Library of Information for Whitehall, PRO F0395/459.
(9 )
low operating budgets became dependent upon a handful of large 
foreign news information sources. For instance, despite its own 
relatively low circulation, the New York Times dominated the 
syndicated foreign news circuit along the Eastern seaboard. The 
Chicago Daily Tribune, which in 1930 had the second largest 
nationwide morning circulation, provided syndicated foreign news 
to the New York Daily News, which had the largest nationwide 
morning circulation. And finally, the Chicago Daily News 
syndicated foreign news service was noted for its influence both 
inside and outside the United States, especially in Canada, 
Latin America and even Great Britain.14
A salient feature of this study will be a comprehensive 
analysis of how the relationship between a newspaper's 
management (which in the upcoming chapters will also be referred 
to as the "Home Office") and its Berlin bureau influenced the 
publication's news and editorial coverage of Germany. 
Furthermore, by examining the transatlantic correspondence 
between the Home Offices of the New York Times. Chicago Daily 
News and Chicago Daily Tribune and their field reporters, the 
reader will gain insight into issues which transcend the subject 
matter of this dissertation. These issues include: 1) Who
exercised control over the formation and presentation of news —  
management or the field reporter? 2) How did each paper's 
coverage of Hitler's rise to power reflect the journalistic 
principles of the day, especially those related to accuracy and 
objectivity? and 3) How did journalists define their role in 
the conduct of international affairs during the 1920's and early 
1930's? Did they view themselves as an order of 'dispassionate
14Ibid p.14, London's Daily Telegraph was among the CDN's subscribers.
(10)
monks'15 meticulously recording the events of the day or as 
active participants in the political process, hoping to 
influence the course of events by shaping their coverage to 
conform to a particular ideological agenda?
Given that an archival analysis of communication between the 
Home Offices and their Berlin outposts is the primary thrust of 
this inquiry, the New York Times. Chicago Daily News and Chicago 
Daily Tribune were selected for this study because they 
maintained news bureaus in Germany between 1923 and 1933. 
Although there were other newspapers which fit this criteria 
such as the New York Herald Tribune, Philadelphia Public Ledger 
and the Hearst newspaper conglomerate (courtesy of the 
International News Service {INS}), only the publications listed 
above possessed an accessible and sufficient amount of relevant 
archival material necessary to conduct this type of analysis.
The reader should be forewarned, however, about the specific 
deficiencies within the available archival holdings of the New 
York Times. Chicago Daily News and Chicago Daily Tribune, which 
in a number of instances limit the ability to reach clear-cut 
conclusions. Unexplained chronological gaps in the.
correspondence between foreign-based journalists and their 
respective editors pervade all three newspapers. The amount of 
correspondence between the Chicago Daily News Berlin bureau and 
the Home Office though abundant in the mid-1920's is virtually 
non-existent after 1926. Conversely, although there is a good 
deal of primary source material about the paper's editorial 
decision-making after 1927 (thanks in large part to the Carroll
15This is how Alex Jones and Susan Tifft (authors of an upcoming biography 
of the Sulzbergers) described the reporters of the NYT. Jones and Tifft 
to the author, April 1994.
(11)
Binder papers), there is very little before then. With regard 
to the New York Times, the volume of transatlantic 
correspondence is much greater after 1930, especially 1933. And 
in the case of the Chicago Daily Tribune, the quantitative 
levels of relevant archival material vary from year to year, and 
even month to month.
It is also critical to note that except in the cases where 
the reporter's "proofs" (his or her's unedited original dispatch 
or mail story) are cited, it cannot be known with absolute 
certainty whether the ideas contained in a correspondent1s 
published article were actually his or her's own. Fortunately, 
through an examination of journalists' correspondence, there 
were many occasions where one could reasonably surmise the 
extent to which a reporter's interpretations had been edited.
Despite the aid of the Binder papers, the day-to-day 
editorial decision-making in all three newspapers remains a 
mystery, in part because the editorials of all three newspapers 
were unsigned. Fortunately, there exists enough evidence to 
identify the driving forces behind each paper's editorial views 
on Germany between 1923 and 1933. In the case of the Tribune, 
it was its autocratic publisher, Colonel Robert McCormick; for 
the Times. it was the editorial page editor, Rollo Ogden; and 
for the Chicago Daily News, it was publisher Victor Lawson and 
editor-in-chief, Charles H. Dennis, through the end of 1931 
(approximately), and editor Carroll Binder thereafter.
As a direciL-cnnsequence of thp> uneven nature of the available 
archival evidence,*16 the degree of emphasis placed on each
*Despite repeated attempts, the author was unable to gain access to the 
Chicago Tribune Archive located in Wheaton, Illinois and hence relies 
solely on the Sigrid Schultz papers, housed in the State Historical
(12)
newspaper varies from chapter to chapter, often making direct 
and detailed comparisons among the three newspapers difficult. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the archival material 
analyzed will seek to answer basic questions of causation, which 
most journalist historians of this period have heretofore failed 
to raise or address. Hopefully, this dissertation will at least 
help shift the focus of press perception studies from "what 
newspapers and magazines were saying" to identifying the factors
that influenced the presentation of news. In short, this study
.    _ —
seeks to_ demonstrate theimportance of the "news behind the 
news" as much as the news itself.
Society of Wisconsin, for archival information about the paper. In 
addition, the U.S. Consulate Papers (Berlin) which may contain 
information about the activities of American journalists in Germany were 
unavailable for examination at the time of this writing because they were 
in the process of being transferred from Washington DC to College Park, 
Maryland.
Chapter 1 
The Beer Hall Putsch
On 9 November 1923 Erich Ludendorff, Germany's de facto 
leader during the last years of the Great War, and Adolf Hitler, 
a young upstart who had made a name for himself among the 
elements of the fringe Right, attempted to overthrow the Weimar 
Republic. Their ambitious plan, dubbed the Beer Hall Putsch, 
called for a takeover of the Bavarian government and then a 
march on Berlin. The coup's failure was assured when Gustav yon 
Kahr and Otto von Lossow, (the Bavarian Commissioner and the 
Bavarian Reichswehr chief respectively) defected from the ranks 
of the conspirators. The Putsch ended when the
Hitler/Ludendorff contingent was stopped by gunfire from von 
Lossow's troops outside the capital building in Munich. Hitler 
emerged unharmed, but was captured a short time later and 
charged with high treason.17
In a wider context, the Beer Hall Putsch was just one of many 
attempts by extremists to overthrow, and Separatists to secede 
, from, the Weimar Republic since its birth in 1919. 1923,
however, marked the climax of political chaos. Between 
September and November of that year, Germany witnessed Communist 
uprisings in Hamburg, Saxony and Thuringia, Reichswehr mutinies 
in Kustrin and Spandau, as well as Separatist takeovers in the 
Rhineland.
17For a. discussion of the Beer Hall Putsch, see Hanfstaengl E., Unheard 
Witness (Philadelphia 1957), Gordon, H., Hitler and the Beer Hall 
Putsch (Princeton 1972), Nicholls, A.J., Weimar and the Rise of Hitler 
(New York 1991) pp.89-91, Craig, G., Germany 1866-1945 (Oxford 1975) 
pp.466-67 and Eyck, E. A History of the Weimar Republic (London 1975) 
pp.272-75.
(14)
This political chaos was in large part an outgrowth of 
Germany's defeat in the Great War, a conflict which left Germany 
in massive debt. Not only were the new Weimar governments 
burdened with paying reparations to the Allies, they were 
obligated to reimburse their own people (military salaries, 
widows' pensions, etc.). Between 1919 and 1923 successive 
Weimar ministries avoided implementing unpopular, yet necessary 
austerity measures such as tax hikes and reductions in 
government benefits to put Germany's financial house in order. 
Instead, they implemented policies which worsened the 
predicament.
The most notable of these mistakes was the intensification of 
the wartime practice of inflating the Reichsmark as a means of 
covering costs. When the Allies demanded reparations payments 
in hard currency, Germany defaulted, prompting the Franco- 
Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923. The Cuno and 
Stresemann ministries responded by inaugurating a policy of 
passive resistance, of which inflating the Reichsmark ad 
absurdum was an integral element.18
The scenes of German citizens carting stacks of semi- 
worthless money in wheelbarrows came to symbolize the surreal 
nature of the early years of the Weimar Republic. Though the 
actual economic impact of the hyperinflation remains a topic of
18Nicholls/ Weimar pp. 83-89, Eyck, Weimar, pp.225-251 and Childers, T. The 
Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933 
(Chapel Hill 1983) pp.50-53. For an in-depth discussion of the origins 
and development of the Ruhr crisis, see Kent, B. The Spoils of War: The 
Politics, Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations (Oxford 1989), Marks, S.
The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933 
(London 1976), Trachtenberg, M. Reparation in World Politics: France and 
European Economic Diplomacyr 1916-1923 (New York 1980) and Schuker, S. The 
End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the 
Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Princeton 1978).
(15)
debate,19 historians agree that this period of financial chaos 
severely undermined public confidence in Weimar leaders as well 
as in the system of parliamentary democracy as a whole. 
Weimar's lack of credibility was an essential precondition for 
the political unrest which culminated with Hitler's failed 
Putsch.
The issue of legitimacy haunted the Republic from its 
inception because many Germans blamed Weimar's founding parties, 
[the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the German Peoples Party 
(DDP) and the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum)], for the nation's 
defeat in the Great War. After all, not a single inch of German 
territory had fallen into enemy hands. This scapegoating of the 
"November Criminals" gained additional plausiblity after 
Weimar's representatives signed the humiliating Treaty of 
Versailles. In fact, Hitler was one of many politicians who 
espoused the "stab-in-the-back" theory of Germany's loss of the 
war.
Equally important was that the prestige of the Monarchic 
Right —  particularly that of the army —  emerged from the Great 
War not only intact, but greatly enhanced. The origins of this 
peculiar state of affairs are not important here. Worth noting, 
however, is that the renewed popularity of the Right marked a 
reversal of thirty years of electoral decline. In fact, in the 
last pre-war Reichstag election, the conservative parties 
garnered only 12% of the vote.20 Had the High Command been held
19David Southern et. al. make a strong argument that the impact of the 
hyperinflation was uneven, benefitting some while hurting others. See 
Southern, D. "The Impact of the Inflation: Inflation, the Courts and 
Revaluation", in Bessel, R. & Feuchtwanger, E. Social Change and 
Political Development in Weimar Germany (London 1981).
20Childers, Nazi Voter, P.24.
(16)
responsible for Germany's defeat in the Great War or had war 
been avoided in the first place, support for the Monarchic Right 
might have dwindled into oblivion. Instead, it emerged as a 
formidable opponent of the Weimar Republic.
It would be inaccurate to contend, however, that the problems 
associated with the Weimar Republic were rooted exclusively in 
the events of 1914-1918. German governments since the time of 
Bismarck found themselves increasingly unable to maintain 
popular consensus on issues basic to the functioning of a State 
because of the ever-widening socio-economic rifts resulting from 
the nation's rapid industrialization in the late 19th and early 
20th century. Political parties helped ossify these divisions 
by appealing primarily to their particular natural 
constituencies, (i.e. the SPD courted the blue-collar vote, the 
Zentrum courted the Catholic vote, etc.). Because their leaders 
felt that by appealing to a broad range of the electorate they 
risked alienating their core constitutuencies, political parties 
rarely employed a "big tent"21 electoral strategy. In fact, 
through 1933, only the Nazis sought to transcend Germany's 
socio-economic and religious cleavages.22 Coupled with Germany's 
wide political spectrum, it is small wonder that from 1893 to 
1914, succesive Wilhelmine governments ruled without a popular 
mandate, leading some historians to conclude that had war not
21Term coined by Lee Atwater, who ran George Bush’s successful U.S. 
presidential campaign in 1988. Bush's victory was due in large part to 
his appeal to moderate independents to join the conservative controlled 
Republican Party.
22For an excellent discussion of German political culture, see Childers, 
Nazi Voter, pp.15-26.
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intervened the Hohenzollerns might have found themselves 
deposed.23
The Great War, though ending the lives of millions of 
Germans, did not alter the modus operandi of German political 
culture. Moreover, further fragmentation occurred within the 
Right, among Volkisch groups, the German National Peoples Party 
(DNVP) and small anti-Marxist single-interest parties, as well 
as within the Left, between the Socialists and the Communists 
(KPD), thus reinforcing the practice of single-constituency 
campaigning. This made the formation and longevity of majority 
coalition ministries and the maintenance of Reichstag mandates 
difficult even during periods of relative stability. In fact, 
at no time in its fourteen-year history did the parties loyal to 
the Weimar Republic (the SPD, DDP and Zentrum) receive a 
collective overall majority in any single Reichstag election.
Thus, American journalists based in Germany found themselves 
in a country bedevilled by economic, political and social 
strife. In 1923 the question for these correspondents was 
whether Weimar's leaders could steer Germany onto the path of 
moderate democracy. The failed Beer Hall Putsch seemed to offer 
American journalists reason for hope.
* * *
The Beer Hall Putsch received world-wide media attention. 
Most U.S. newspapers, including those from the nation's smaller 
cities such as Omaha (NE) and Newark (NJ), covered the overseas 
story. Despite Hitler's presence, the American press regarded 
Ludendorff as the abortive coup's dominant figure. The Utica
23This idea is suggested by Berghahn, V. in Modern Germany, 2nd Edition 
(Cambridge 1987) pp.24-25,36.
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Press (NY) described Hitler as 'merely the cover behind whom 
Ludendorff and his monarchist associates organized the Putsch1. 
Fortunately for the Nazi leader, his more prominent co­
conspirator bore the brunt of the American press1s unsparing 
ridicule and mockery. 'Ludendorff may never live down the 
laughter', remarked the New York Herald, also suggesting that 
his movement would have been 'repulsed by "keep off the grass" 
signs'. Political cartoons were also unforgiving. One World 
(NY) sketch entitled "Dictator for a Day" showed a self- 
satisfied Ludendorff toasting himself with beer in hand while 
another cartoon carried by the Bell Syndicate depicted him as a 
down-hill skier who had just crashed headlong into a large tree 
which represented the German government.24 As far as most 
segments of the American press were concerned, 'Napoleon had his 
Waterloo, Ludendorff his Munich' —  both he and Hitler were now 
'down and out and thoroughly discredited',25
However, some U.S. newspapers still believed that the German 
far right would continue to be a chronic concern for the 
advocates of parliamentary democracy. Although the Boston Post 
Dispatch claimed that the failed coup 'showed that Republican 
Germany is stronger than expected', the Springfield Union (MA) 
found it 'difficult to visualize anything except continued 
disorder manifesting itself in some form or other' ,26 H.L. 
Mencken's Baltimore Sun was even more pessimistic:
While neither Hitler nor Ludendorff is of the calibre to 
unite Germany under reactionary control, there can be little
. 24I»iterary Digest, 24 November 1923, pp.14-15.




doubt that the majority opinion throughout all sections of 
the Reich is daily becoming more favorable to the Bavarian 
ideal, which is for a firm dictatorship in the first place, 
with a more effective opposition to follow.27
Although acknowledging the anti-semitic dimension of the 
Hitler/Ludendorff movement, the majority of American newspapers 
associated the German far right with monarchism and autocracy 
rather than with persecution and totalitarianism. This 
misperception of the wide-sweeping goals of the Nazis and their 
fascist allies encouraged many journalists later to 
underestimate the impact of a prospective Nazi-ruled Germany;28
* * *
The Munich Putsch story found its way onto the front pages of 
three newspapers, the New York Times. Chicago Daily Tribune and 
the Chicago Daily News. with three distinct publishing 
traditions. What makes the sustained front page status of the 
story all the more remarkable was that many facets of each 
newspaper's publishing tradition made this level of coverage 
unlikely. That the Beer Hall Putsch succeeded in overcoming 
these obstacles helps us understand how newspapermen 
distinguished between standard and "blockbuster" news.
Adolph Ochs1s attempt to make the New York Times the world1s 
most complete and comprehensive news source may have diminished 
the possibility of sustaining a story's prominence. The Times 
printed more articles and more words than any other newspaper. 
Ochs employed the largest network of national and international 
reporters of any newspaper. Moreover, as a director of the
2 7 Ibid.
2 8For an additional discussion of American press opinion, see 
Schoenthal, "American Attitudes", pp.103-4.
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Associated Press, Ochs utilized this service to supplement (and 
sometimes substitute for) staff-written stories. Thus, the Beer 
Hall Putsch competed for prominence against the world's top 
stories. However, it can also be argued that the sustained 
presence of the Putsch story on the front page of the New York 
Times was consistent with Ochs's philosophy. Unlike his 
contemporaries, who consistently varied their front page format 
among international, national, regional and local events on a 
daily basis, Ochs tended to feature one or two foreign stories 
on the front page, which was permitted by the paper's eight- 
column format. Thus, the image of the New York Times as the 
newspaper of record helped both to enhance and diminish the 
prospects of sustained life for the Putsch and other 
international stories.
* * *
Colonel Robert McCormick never claimed that his Chicago Daily 
Tribune was the "newspaper of the world", only that it was the 
'world's greatest newspaper'.29* Unlike the New York Times. 
which maintained a relatively low circulation primarily among 
the educated and influential elite, the Tribune was a "mass" 
Midwestern daily. In order to establish broad-base appeal 
McCormick aimed to integrate the sensationalist practices of 
William Randolph Hearst with a concentration of exclusive in- 
depth reporting within the framework of his unbridled 
isolationist conservatism. This marketing approach resulted in 
a comprehensive, readable and, above all else, highly 
provocative publication. McCormick offered a unique combination
29*In fact, this claim also served as the inscribed slogan on the 
masthead of the Tribune during his tenure.
(21)
of news, commentary and entertainment which appealed to a 
diverse audience that included Iowa farmers, immigrant Chicago 
meat packers and Midwestern railroad magnates, although the 
middle and upper classes formed the backbone of the paper's 
readership.30 In the cut-throat business of Chicago
newspapering, McCormick wished to position the Tribune between 
Hearst's "yellow" Chicago American and Victor Lawson's intensely 
sober Chicago Daily News. That he accomplished this marketing 
feat explains in large part why the American and the Daily News 
are distant memories while the Tribune continues to thrive.
McCormick's news strategy also underscores the remarkable 
nature of the Beer Hall Putsch story. Unlike the New York 
Times, whose front page was usually composed of six to eight 
headline stories, the Chicago Daily Tribune usually consisted of 
one or two banner headline stories and several lesser articles. 
The Hitler-Ludendorff fiasco enjoyed banner headline status on 
three days of its five-day stint (9,10,12 November), quite 
remarkable for a newspaper which prided itself on fresh 
intriguing news geared towards a Midwestern audience, most of 
whom had never ventured outside the confines of their own state.
* * *
Perhaps most surprising was the appearance of the Beer Hall 
Putsch story on the front pages of the Chicago Daily News (9 and 
10 November). Unlike his Times counterpart, Chicago Daily News 
publisher Victor Fremont Lawson preferred that the paper not 
'unduly deal with foreign news'31 because 'Chicago readers
30Edwards, Tribune, P.33.
31Dennis to Moderwell 14 March 1925, CDN Papers, Newberry Library.
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ordinarily are more deeply interested in local or national
events than they are in events occurring in foreign countries.132
Instead, he reserved the front page for local news, relegating
even important overseas stories, such as the Franco—Belgian
occupation of the Ruhr, to page two. Moreover, when local
political and feature events were lacking, the Chicago Daily
News instead published the results of the city's sports teams in
a banner headline format. When his managing editor suggested
the idea of printing international news on the front page in an
effort to enhance the prestige of the paper's foreign service,
Lawson's response was lukewarm:
Your suggestion of printing some of our short interesting 
cables on the front page is well worth trying out. Of 
course, we must not do it to the extent of displacing good 
local stuff from that page.33
It seems paradoxical that the Chicago Daily News foreign 
service, considered by many as one of the best international 
news organizations in the world, was founded by a man who later 
tended to relegate it to a lower status than that of its local 
reporters. While the answer to the conundrum is by no means 
clear, the archival evidence suggests that Lawson's initial 
decision to create a world-wide syndicated foreign news service 
was based on late 19th century market conditions34 as well as an
32Dennis to E. Mowrer, 4 June 1926, Ibid.
33Lawson to Dennis 17 Feb. 1922, Dennis Papers, Ibid.
34Bekken to the author, 24 September 1996. Bekken took strong 
exception to my theory that Lawson did not express long-term 
interest in his foreign news service. Instead, Bekken argued that 
because Lawson's parsimony permeated all areas of the business as 
well as his personal life, his behavior 'indicated no special 
antipathy to the [foreign] service'. My own feeling, as I discuss 
on the next page, is that Lawson's parsimony fuelled his disinterest 
in, and desire to scale down, his overseas staff. Thus, Bekken's 
contention appears to support, rather than contradict my view.
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impulsive response to the European press backlash against the
United States during the Spanish-American war (1898):
It is no longer desirable, or even safe, for public 
opinion in this country to rely, as it now does, almost 
exclusively on foreign agencies, most of them subsidized 
by foreign governments, for their news of foreign 
countries.35
For this reason Lawson and his successors, unlike Ochs, 
disdained the use of other news agencies (especially foreign 
ones) in Daily News reporting.36 Management prompted their 
overseas reporters to interpret events in a way favorable to the 
"American point of view" —  a perspective synonymous with ’pure 
altruism1.37 'American correspondents must be careful to keep 
their minds from being in some degree colored [sic] against 
their own country's reasonable point of view by the flood of 
spoken and written comment reflecting other points of view', 
wrote Lawson's editor-in-chief, Charles H. Dennis. Dennis 
instructed his European bureau chiefs 'to at all times be right' 
and yet 'at all times be American'. In practice, Chicago Daily 
News reporters should 'give due weight to American policies and 
American interpretations of foreign policies and problems'.38
Quite obviously, management's policy was fraught with 
ambiguity. For example, which 'American interpretation' should 
the correspondent promote, an internationalist or an 
isolationist one? In addition, while this ambiguity afforded 
flexibility to the paper's correspondents to analyze events to 
their own liking, it also led to editorial conflicts between the
35Lawson memo (undated), Box 93, CDN papers, Ibid.
36Dennis to Binder, 13 December 1928, Binder Papers, Ibid.
37Dennis to O'Flaherty, 26 July 1924, Ibid.
38Ibid.
(24)
Home Office and its European service, especially between Dennis 
and his Berlin bureau chief, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, from 1924 on.
After the Great War, Lawson came to view his foreign news
service as a financial liability whose growth and status needed
to be kept in check. Unlike Ochs, who believed in saturating
the American public with overseas news, Lawson believed in
erring on the side of parsimony. He stressed the importance of
acquiring spectacular news, but:
We shall restrain ourselves when we have news approximating 
the border line in the matter of interest to American 
readers.39
By the 1920's it became apparent that Lawson was having 
second thoughts about his turn-of-the-century creation. He 
consistently complained that international dispatches were 
'frequently too long and occupied more space than desirable'. 
From a business standpoint, Lawson believed that foreign news 
would not sell to an American public which longed to return to 
the confines of isolationism. In fact, several months before 
his unexpected death in 1925, the Daily News publisher planned 
to downsize the paper's foreign service operation.40 Ironically, 
the life of the foreign service may have been saved by the death 
of its founder.
Both historians and Daily News personnel credit the 
transformation of the foreign news service into a first-rate 
organization to correspondents Edward Price Bell and Paul Scott 
Mowrer and, to a lesser extent, editors Charles H. Dennis and 
Hal O'Flaherty, but not to Victor Lawson, whom Bell
39Dennis to Moderwell, 14 March 1925, CDN Papers, Ibid.
40Dennis to Moderwell, 12 Sept. 1925, Ibid.
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characterized as a 'half-baked, bombastic provincial'.41 Even 
Dennis, who admired Lawson, admitted that the publisher 
exhibited little interest in the performance of the foreign 
service and its concerns usually remained 'unfinished 
business'.42 The relegation of the Daily News foreign service to 
second-class status within its reporting ranks was a constant 
source of internal friction even after Lawson's death.43
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News coverage of the Beer Hall Putsch in the New York Times. 
Chicago Daily Tribune and Chicago Daily News began on 9 November 
with summaries of the conspiratorial activities at the Munich 
Biirgerbraukeller and culminated with Hitler's arrest on 13 
November. All three newspapers assigned multiple-column, front­
page space and in-depth coverage and analysis in their back 
pages to these events. This coverage included exclusives from 
Tribune correspondent Larry Rue, who provided the paper with an 
on-the-scene story from the Biirgerbraukeller, and from the Daily 
News, which published an article written by Ludendorff himself.
However, the reporting by the New York Times. Chicago Daily 
Tribune and Chicago Daily News illustrates —  with notable 
exceptions —  a general lack of uniformity among the three 
publications regarding the origins, development and implications 
of the abortive coup. This lack of consensus has its roots in 
each paper's separate journalistic tradition, editorial
41Bell to his wife(?), 24 March 1923, Bell Papers, Ibid. See also 
Startt, J. Journalism's Unofficial Ambassador: A Biography of Edward
Price Bell (Athens, Ohio 1974)
42Dennis to P. Mowrer, 11 April 1924, CDN Papers, Ibid.
43For instance, see P. Mowrer to Pryor 18 Sept. 1962, Box 82, Ibid.
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philosophy, mode of operation and calibre of personnel. True to 
form, the Times provided the most comprehensive coverage of the 
crisis and the Tribune, the greatest degree of "on the spot" 
reporting, whereas the Daily News provided the highest level of 
interpretive reporting. This does not mean that one paper was 
necessarily more accurate, objective or informative than the 
others. Though the Times provided the fullest information on 
the crisis, one should not infer that its readership possessed 
a greater understanding of the Putsch than the Tribune1s 
readership. Likewise, the fact that the Tribune provided 
exclusive eyewitness accounts did not necessarily mean that 
these accounts were more accurate than those of the Daily News. 
And finally, that the Daily News provided extensive news 
analyses of the event does not mean that these analyses were 
necessarily objective.
I raise these points to remind the reader that, unlike in 
other press perception studies, my goal is not to play 
historical judge —  praising those newspapers that alerted their 
readers to the Hitler phenomenon while condemning those who 
underestimated the Nazis. My purpose, rather, is to convey a 
sense of how and why news editors and writers behaved in the way 
they did, thus providing the reader with a basis for making 
reasoned judgments about the larger issue of the media's 
responsibility to alert the public about the growth of extremist 
movements in general.
Although examining what the press actually said about the 
coup can be satisfactorily addressed by examining the 
appropriate issues of the newspapers themselves, analyzing the 
reasons why press coverage took the form it did requires an
(27)
abundance of archival evidence. And therein lies the rub —  
Putsch-related press documents are sadly lacking. Specifically, 
among the available private papers of the New York Times, 
Chicago Daily Tribune and Chicago Daily News, there is a dearth 
of internal memoranda regarding the Putsch not only between the 
Berlin bureaux and the Home Offices but also within the Home 
Offices themselves (whose records are indispensable for studying 
editorial analysis). What we are left with is evidence that 
often hints at, but does not fully elucidate, each paper's
behind-the-scenes proceedings. The following paragraphs will 
attempt to reconstruct a historical jigsaw puzzle with many key 
pieces missing. Nevertheless, even this somewhat speculative 
analysis highlights many previously ignored facets of 
international reporting and commentary.
* * *
The Beer Hall Putsch editorials of the New York Times.
Chicago Daily Tribune and the Chicago Daily News reflected
managements' general stance towards the Weimar Republic and the 
Versailles settlement as a whole. The New York Times and the 
Chicago Daily News condemned the Putsch and expressed unreserved 
support of the Weimar Republic while the Chicago Daily Tribune, 
although failing to mention the Putsch, took the opportunity to 
castigate what it saw as the left-wing tendencies of the Weimar 
regime. An editorial analysis also reveals that press coverage 
of Germany's internal politics was shaped within the context of 
the overall debate between internationalists and isolationists: 
a positive portrayal of the Weimar regime was thought to 
legitimize future American involvement in European affairs while
(28)
a negative presentation would reinforce U.S. aloofness. This 
interpretation probably explains why the New York Times and the 
Chicago Daily News lauded the character and fortitude of the 
Weimar Republic in its Beer Hall Putsch editorials whereas the 
Chicago Daily Tribune did not. Moreover, this interpretation 
might also explain why the Times and the Daily News subsequently 
exalted the Weimar Republic even when such praise was completely 
unwarranted.
The editorials of the New York Times and the Chicago Daily 
News tended to mirror each other. The Times echoed the 
sentiments of President Ebert, stating that the 
fascist/monarchist plot was the 'work of lunatics' and that 
Ludendorff and Hitler were 'better fitted for a comic opera 
stage than a serious effort to overthrow the Berlin 
government'.44 Although less mocking, the Chicago Daily News 
denounced the Putsch with similar vigor. 'The success of the 
[Hitler/Ludendorff] movement would have plunged Germany into 
civil war', the paper pronounced, but the nation recognized that 
there was 'no salvation in royalist, militarist and junker 
reaction'.45 Both papers placed themselves unabashedly behind 
the fledgling Weimar Republic. Convinced that 'unity, order and 
freedom for Germany were impossible except under a sincere 
republican regime', both publications felt that the Weimar 
government's demonstration of 'remarkable vitality' in the face 
of the coup 'left the Republic more secure'.46 The Times even 
went further, iterating that had the coup spread to Berlin 'the
44NYT editorial 10 November 1923.
45CDN editorial 10 November 1923.
46CDN & NYT, Ibid.
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great mass of German workingmen would have resorted to a general 
strike to prove their devotion to republican forms of 
government', while the Daily News dubiously claimed that the 
failed Putsch clearly indicated the Reichswehr's loyalty to the 
Weimar regime.47
In retrospect, each paper overestimated the allegiance of the 
populace to Weimar. No mention was made of the disillusioning 
effect of the hyper-inflation or the debt crisis on the German 
people. In particular, the New York Times's unwavering faith in 
the sagacity of the German people would be a consistent theme in 
its editorial coverage of the rise of Nazism, even at the height 
of Hitler's electoral successes.
'Of course I know that Ludendorff is crazy', Chicago Daily
Tribune publisher, Colonel Robert McCormick confided to his
Berlin bureau correspondent, Sigrid Schultz.48 And yet, on his
paper's editorial page not only did McCormick refrain from
criticizing the German field marshal, he refrained from
discussing the Beer Hall Putsch altogether —  this, while his
counterparts at the New York Times and the Chicago Daily News
were conducting extensive post-mortems on the subject. The
Tribune's only editorial comment, entitled "Socialist Failure",
was a mere six sentences in length.
Visible among the causes of misery in Germany is the failure 
of a socialistic government to suppress or even repress for 
the benefit of the people the operations of profiteers and 
exploiters. The food riots reveal the fury of the people. 
Sometimes the police stand aside and allow the mobs to have 
their way. That seemingly is all the government could do —  
allow the people to use violence against certain classes. 
Protection of the masses from exploitation by privileged
4 7 Ibid.
48McCormick to Schultz, 11 March 1927, Schultz Papers, Box 4, 
Wisconsin State Historical Society.
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classes is one of the purposes of socialistic government, 
and the Berlin government is supposed to be that of a 
socialistic republic. It fails to keep great
industrialists, profiteers and plunderers from adding to the 
misery of the people in want of even meager subsistence.49
For a man like McCormick with a legendary reputation for 
long-winded dicta the "Socialist Failure" is conspicuously 
terse. The title of the piece itself is partisan, suggesting 
that the Weimar Republic was a disaster because of what he saw 
as its left-leaning nature. McCormick further assailed the 
inability of the Weimar government to protect its citizenry from 
the clutches of exploitative industrial capitalists —  the 
alleged raison d'etre of the regime itself. Moreover, whereas 
the New York Times and the Chicago Daily News equated Weimar 
Germany with 1780's America, McCormick's Chicago Daily Tribune 
likened it to Lenin's Russia. And, whereas the Times and Daily 
News presented the Beer Hall Putsch as a huge triumph for the 
Stresemann regime, the Tribune hinted that the coup attempt 
itself was an indication of Weimar's weakness, brought about by 
its socialist tendencies.
We can only speculate as to why McCormick refrained from 
discussing the Putsch directly and Hitler and Ludendorff in 
particular. His own Berlin bureau correspondent admitted that 
the coup left a regime for which McCormick held no fondness 
'incalculably stronger'.50 For McCormick to have highlighted the 
Hitler/Ludendorff fiasco would have also highlighted the 
Tribune's inaccurate prediction of Germany's demise. And while 
there is no evidence to suggest that McCormick admired Hitler at
49CDT editorial 10 November 1923.
50CDT 10 November 1923, P.l.
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the time, it is possible that the publisher’s fascination with 
the German military may explain the lack of criticism of 
Ludendorff in the Tribune's editorial pages.51 In fact, while 
McCormick privately questioned Ludendorff's sanity, he held the 
German field marshal in high enough regard to recommend him to 
the newly created Robert Rutherford McCormick Military History 
Chair at Northwestern University.52
Ascertaining the reasons why the Chicago Daily News and the 
New York Times staunchly supported the Weimar Republic in 1923 
while the Chicago Daily Tribune did not is quite difficult 
because of a general dearth of internal documents. For example, 
the New York Times Archive contains no editorial department 
memoranda from the interwar period. Moreover, the paper's 
editorial page editor, Rollo Ogden, kept little written 
correspondence. Although Ogden's deputy, Dr. John Finley, 
maintained an extensive collection of private papers, they bear 
little relevance to this study. Worse yet, the actual 
authorship of New York Times editorials remains a mystery. Thus 
we are left to speculate on the motives behind the paper's 
editorial stances, relying on loosely related evidence. 
Likewise, the current unavailability of most Chicago Daily 
Tribune internal documents places us in a similar position.
k k k
Only the New York Times attempted to trace the origins of the 
Bavarian Beer Hall Putsch. Cyril Brown, the paper's Berlin
51Edwards, Tribune, pp. 12-13.
52McCormick to Schultz, 11 March 1927, Schultz Papers, Wisconsin 
State Historical Society. As it turned out, Ludendorff was not 
eligible for the post because of Treaty of Versailles restrictions.
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bureau chief, claimed that the German Government's decision to 
end passive resistance to the Franco-Belgian occupation of the 
Ruhr, coupled with the spectre of communist revolution, prompted 
Hitler to plan a coup 'as early as September', but the Nazi 
leader had to wait for Ludendorff's approval. Relying upon
unspecified 'Hitler circulars', Brown postulated that Hitler 
believed that restoring the Wittelsbach monarchy in Bavaria 
would ignite revolution in other separatist-minded German states 
which in turn would 'repudiate Prussia and rally around Bavaria 
in a new empire'.53 The Times' s news department made the 
important point that Hitler —  not Ludendorff, von Kahr or 
anyone else —  was the motivating force behind the coup. The 
Chicago Daily Tribune and Chicago Daily News echoed this 
sentiment, although the latter presented a somewhat misleading 
headline to the contrary.54 Despite acknowledging Hitler's 
central role in the coup, none of the three newspapers under 
examination devoted much attention to his background, platform 
or personality. Instead, they profiled the "big name" in the 
affair, Erich Ludendorff.
Much of the outcome of the Beer Hall Putsch rested upon the 
actions of the Bavarian dictator, Gustav von Kahr. When von 
Kahr reversed his earlier position of 8 November and disavowed 
Hitler and Ludendorff on the morning of 9 November, the 
prospects for a successful coup dissipated. Von Kahr later 
claimed that he had been coerced into going along with the 
conspirators at the 'point of a gun', turning against them when
53NYT, 9 November 1923, P.2.
54'STORMING TROOPS TAKE HITLER ALONG WITH LUDENDORFF' CDN 
9 November 1923 P.l.
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he was no longer threatened.55 During the crisis Hiram K. 
Moderwell of the Chicago Daily News was more staunch in his 
advocacy of von Kahr than was von Kahr himself. On 10 November 
Moderwell praised the Bavarian dictator for 'his usual 
dexterity' in 'pretending to agree with the Hitler scheme for 
organizing a national government in Munich, thus avoiding arrest 
and the possible disorganization of his forces'.56 The Chicago 
Daily Tribune correspondent Larry Rue's eyewitness exclusive 
from the Biirgerbraukeller provides an interesting contrast. 
Although acknowledging Hitler's attempts initially to arrest von 
Kahr, Rue suggested (without explicitly stating it) that when 
von Kahr accepted the position of president of a provisional 
German government with a 'heavy heart in accordance with the 
interests of Bavaria and the Fatherland', he did so of his own 
free will. Without engaging in a lengthy discussion of the 
validity of the two accounts, later scholarship seems to support 
Rue's more balanced presentation.57
Rue's eyewitness account of the beginnings of the Putsch was 
the product of three factors: publisher McCormick's commitment 
to obtaining fresh exclusive news, Rue's amicable relations 
with the Nazi hierarchy, and luck. Because McCormick wished to 
avoid repeating the Tribune's failure to adequately cover 
Mussolini's march on Rome a year earlier, he and his staff made 
extensive preparations to place the paper in a prime position to 
cover any breaking story emanating from Germany's Right wing. 
To this end, he dispatched Larry Rue to Munich in early November
55Nicholls, Weimar P.90.
56CDN 10 November 1923.
57See Gordon, Beer Hall and Nicholls, Weimar.
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1 923.58 Rue, an experienced, well travelled reporter, 
specialized in covering crises. He was one of the first 
journalists to make extensive use of the airplane in order to 
help him acquire information about breaking news. Rue1s 
excursions, of course, depended on his publisher's financial 
backing. Not only did McCormick fund Rue's travels and 
expensive tastes, he also financed Rue's direct acquisition of 
news tips and stories. The evidence strongly suggests that 
monetary compensation was often a necessary prerequisite for 
effective reporting from Germany —  especially in acquiring 
information from the Nazis.59 Chronically strapped for cash and 
unconcerned with public opinion abroad, many party officials 
frequently demanded 'commercial compensation' for Nazi-related 
stories. William Nash, dispatched by the Chicago Daily News to 
south Germany in early November 1923, cabled a blistering 
indictment entitled "No Money, No News" excoriating the Nazi 
attempt to '"shakedown" [sic] American newspapermen'.60
While Nash (noted for his poor interpersonal skills61) 
condemned the Nazis from Coburg, Rue courted them in Munich. 
The evidence clearly suggests that Rue (along with H.R. 
Knickerbocker of the New York Herald Tribune and Dorothy 
Thompson of the Philadelphia Public Ledger) enjoyed good
58Wales to foreign service 11 April 1923, Box #4, Schultz Papers, 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin. In fact, McCormick ordered a 
complete investigation of the matter.
59There are a number of allusions to this practice. Most direct are 
Enderis to Birchall, 18 Jan. 1932 and Enderis to James 5 Jan 1933, 
James #6-0455,1164 NYT Archive. See also Moderwell to Dennis 27 
September 1923, CDN Papers, Newberry Library. This practice was 
also prevalent in Vatican reporting. See O 1Flaherty to Binder 13 
March 1929, Ibid.
60CDN 6 November 1923, P.2.
61Bell to Lawson, 26 June 1924, Bell Papers, Newberry Library.
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relations with Ernst Hanfstaengl, the Party's de facto foreign 
press secretary. On the afternoon of 8 November, after Hitler 
instructed Hanfstaengl to alert the international press of his 
intention to proclaim a new German government at the Munich 
Biirgerbraukeller that evening, the Harvard-educated Junker 
selectively sought Rue out but to no avail. With time running 
out, it appeared that Rue's absence from his hotel room would 
cost him and the Tribune an exclusive story. But luck 
intervened. Because both men shared similar tastes in food, 
Hanfstaengl found Rue at their favorite Hungarian restaurant 
less that two hours before Hitler's first appearance on the 
international scene.62 Thus, all of McCormick's preparations —
his establishment of a makeshift intelligence network, his
willingness to pay for stories and his decision to send a 
correspondent to Munich rather than to Coburg (where the Chicago 
Daily News and the New York Times thought the fascists would 
strike) —  would have been for nothing had it not been for a 
common culinary taste; proof that luck sometimes plays an 
important role in the reporting of fresh news.
* * *
Each newspaper's Beer Hall Putsch coverage reveals an 
important feature of international reporting: the attempt to
predict the course of events during a crisis. Here again, we
see a divergence of views. Although Cyril Brown of the New York 
Times and Hiram Moderwell of the Chicago Daily News recognized 
the seriousness of the crisis, both predicted the Putsch would 
fail. Brown believed the coup would be suppressed when Hitler
62Dornberg, J. Munich 1923 (New York 1982) P.21.
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and Ludendorff carried out their plan to march on Berlin [they 
never actually did], because of his great faith in the somewhat 
duplicitous head of the Reichswehr, General Hans von Seeckt.63 
Moderwell, with the advantage of the Daily News's later filing 
deadline than its morning counterparts, definitively stated that 
'the whole affair will be finished in twenty four hours'.64 In 
contrast Chicago Daily Tribune chief Berlin correspondent, John 
Clayton, argued that because 'the entire rank and file is 
permeated with nationalist members and the nationalist spirit, 
there is every chance that the entire German army will flock to 
the standard of General von Ludendorff and Herr Hitler, march on 
Berlin and place Herr Hitler's national government in power 
there' .65 That Clayton erred in his prediction is of minor 
importance. What is relevant, however, is the nature of the 
prediction and what it reveals about the Chicago Tribune.
Clayton's entire presentation provides us with an example of
"journalistic overplay" —  the practice of sensationalizing
facts in order to substantiate an extreme claim or prediction.
Despite the fact that downtown Berlin was tranquil on the night
of November 9th, Clayton seemed to convey the impression that
the city was on the brink of civil disorder:
We found the police fully prepared to deal with the 
situation. Their machine guns had not yet been unlimbered 
but they were ready to be placed at strategic corners to 
control the streets.66
Conversely, this is Moderwell's account of the same scene:
63NYT 9 November 1923, P.l.
64CDN 9 November 1923, P.l.
65CDT 9 November 1923, P.l.
66Ibid.
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It is remarkable how little impression yesterday's dramatic 
action in Munich has made upon the mass of Berlin's 
population... Berlin takes the news from Munich quite 
calmly, the people going quietly about their business. 
Nothing disturbed the peace of the night and early morning.67
Clayton's stark prediction was no aberration —  it was 
consistent with the Chicago Daily Tribune's "spin" on its German 
coverage throughout the week preceding the Putsch. One can see 
the "overplay" of the paper's headlines from 30 October through 
6 November 1923:
30 October, 'BERLIN CABINET TOTTERS AS IT OUSTS SAXONS'
31 October, 'ROYALISTS MOVE UP CANNON FOR BERLIN MARCH'
1 November, 'ARMY OF 30,000 MASS FOR DRIVE TOWARD BERLIN'
3 November, 'DICTATOR NEXT FOR GERMANY; SOCIALIST BOLT 
SPEEDS NATION TO A MONARCHY1
5 November, 'FULL DICTATOR POWER SEIZED BY STRESEMANN; ENDS
PARLIAMENTARY RULE IN GERMANY'
6 November, 'GERMANS CALLED TO ARMS TO BEAT ROYALIST COUP'
If Clayton had predicted the Putsch's failure, he would have 
repudiated the sensationalist approach taken by his own 
newspaper. Consequently, if there had been any prospect for a 
successful coup, Clayton might have been obligated to promote 
such a possibility so as not to undermine the momentum of the 
Tribune story. Only when greeted by overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary —  namely, the full-scale suppression of the coup, 
would he be able to abandon this course.
Clayton's practice of "journalistic overplay" is no surprise; 
it was a salient feature of publisher Colonel Robert Rutherford 
McCormick's newspaper philosophy.68 McCormick used this tactic
67CDN Ibid.
68Clayton also had a reputation for "dirty dealing" with the 
competition as well as his sources. See Binder to his wife 13 Sept. 
1929, Binder Papers, Newberry Library.
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in the paper's alarmist banner headlines. From his marketing 
viewpoint, presenting 'the news so that a kid could get it at a 
glance' increased circulation among the less educated, while 
heightening the importance of a story through a 
disproportionately strong headline. McCormick's headlines also 
reflected his political views. In foreign affairs, he presented 
world news through his prism of Anglo-phobic isolationism and 
obsessive anti-communism. Jerome Edwards compellingly argues 
that the Tribune's negative banner headlines 'served as a device 
to reinforce the idea of noninvolvement with the affairs of 
other nations'.69 Of the three newspapers scrutinized in this 
study, the Tribune most consistently raised the spectre of 
communist revolution at home and abroad.70 This theme was ever­
present in the paper's German coverage. Although optimistic 
about (and welcoming) an imminent Weimar collapse, the Tribune 
vacillated between its predictions of restored monarchy and a 
communist takeover.
It is obvious from analyzing the headlines of the Chicago 
Daily Tribune in the days leading up to Hitler's attempted coup 
that McCormick played the monarchical restoration card to the 
hilt. Clayton, however, deviated from the Tribune position the 
day before Hitler's move in an inconspicuously placed dispatch 
entitled, "Royalist Coup Fades".71 The Beer Hall Putsch afforded 
him the opportunity to "jump back on board", which he did with
69Edwards, J., Tribune, P.38
7 0Ibid., pp.38 & 59-64. McCormick expressed similar sentiments to 
members of his staff. Upon assigning William Shirer to the Vienna 
bureau, the Colonel remarked, 'don't fall for those Socialists and 
Communists there'. Shirer, W., My 20th Century Journey (New York 
1976).
71CDT 8 November 1923 P.8.
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the reckless abandon that characterized his boss, once again
predicting an imminent German collapse. Notwithstanding the
plausibility of this interpretation, however, there is as yet no
available direct evidence showing that Clayton tailored his Beer
Hall Putsch prediction to coincide with the general ominous
tenor of the paper's German coverage. It is safe to say,
however, that the Tribune's consistent use of alarmist headlines
damaged the paper's credibility, a sad irony given the calibre
of many of its overseas reporters.72
* * *
Whereas McCormick sought to ensnare his readership with up- 
close coverage of the Putsch, Adolph Ochs sought to impress his 
by employing a broader, comprehensive approach in reporting the 
event. True to form, the New York Times printed more articles 
and editorials on the Beer Hall Putsch than did its two 
competitors in this study. The paper's coverage emanated 
primarily from four sources: bureau chief Cyril Brown, reporting 
on events in Munich and the reaction in Berlin; European service 
head Edwin James, reporting from Paris on the French reaction to 
the Putsch; an unnamed correspondent (probably P.J. Phillip), 
reporting from Coburg (located approximately 150 miles north of 
Munich) on the possible spread of the revolt to neighboring 
German states; and an unknown writer in the Home Office, who 
provided a background history of the event.
Despite this collective effort, the major burden of the 
Putsch's coverage fell on Brown. He was responsible for the two
72A  1936 poll of 93 Washington correspondents revealed that the 
Chicago Daily Tribune was considered one of America's 'least 
reliable and least fair newspapers'. Edwards, Tribune, P.3.
(40)
most important aspects of the coup —  the particular 
developments in Munich and the Reich government's reaction. 
Unfortunately, it appears that the Home Office felt —  and 
justifiably —  that Brown's performance left much to be desired. 
In fairness to Brown, the absence of a Timesman in Munich forced 
him to rely on second- hand accounts from the Associated Press 
and probably from the Berliner Lokalanzeiqer on Hitler's 
storming of the Biirgerbraukeller on the evening of 8 November 
and the suppression of the coup on 9 November.73 That Brown 
refrained from analyzing the implications of the Putsch can be 
traced to the paper's emphasis on comprehensive news 
presentation rather than interpretation, a characteristic to be 
discussed in later chapters. However, Brown himself was 
culpable for failing to provide adequate information on the 
reaction of Stresemann's government in Berlin. Although he 
noted that Chancellor Stresemann and President Ebert held a 
cabinet meeting at midnight on the 9th, Brown failed to report 
the contents of the resulting government proclamation issued one 
hour later. This placed the Times in the embarrassing position 
of having to publish the Chicago Daily Tribune's account of the 
declaration on page one. In fact, Brown appears to have 
interviewed only one member of the Reich government during the 
crisis —  an unnamed army intelligence officer who provided the 
New York Times readership with a forgettable three word 
exclamation.
That Brown provided his superiors with little information, 
especially regarding the actions of the Reich government, is 
reflected by the number of words in his dispatches; his articles
73Van Anda to Brown, 22 October 1922, James #5-1089, NYT Archive.
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were the shortest and least satisfactory of those of the 
Timesmen assigned to the story. Brown's poor performance 
probably accounts for the conspicuous absence of his dispatches 
after 10 November. It appears that his responsibilities were 
shifted to the unnamed Coburg correspondent who arrived in 
Munich on 11 November. Brown's failure to provide extensive and 
up-to-date coverage may have represented the final straw after 
a spotty tenure of service to the Times. The evidence strongly 
suggests that Brown's 'insulting manner and persistent 
drunkenness' were a source of embarrassment to the paper and his 
inappropriate request for a vacation did not ingratiate him with 
management.74 Three months after the Putsch, Brown was 
unceremoniously dismissed and replaced by Thomas R. Ybarra.75
The Brown fiasco highlights the important role of the Chief 
bureau correspondent in effective overseas reporting. It also 
underscores a problem that would plague the New York Times 
throughout the 1920's and 30's —  the paper's failure to hire a 
top-flight correspondent for the Berlin bureau. Moreover, the 
German office was in a continual state of flux throughout the 
Weimar period. During a ten-year stint (1923-33), the Times's 
Berlin office employed six different chief correspondents (not 
to mention five "number two" and four "number three" men) 
compared to two for both the Chicago Daily Tribune and Chicago 
Daily News. The Berlin bureau's lack of staff stability 
resulted in a consistent lack of effective reporting, a fact 
noted by Times management. As I will discuss in later chapters,
74Swope to Van Anda 28 July 1922, Brown to Van Anda 12 December 1923,
Van Anda to Brown 13 December 1923, James #5-1144,71,78 Ibid.
75Van Anda memo 9 January 1924, Van Anda to Brown 8 Feb 1924, James 
#5-1177,84, Ibid.
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however, many problems associated with the Berlin bureau were 
created or exacerbated by the Home Office in New York.
* * *
Unlike the New York Times, the Chicago Daily News's Beer Hall 
Putsch coverage appeared to be in better hands. Although Hiram 
Moderwell had held the Berlin post only for little more than a 
year, the evidence suggests that the Scottish-born correspondent 
inaugurated an effective news gathering apparatus throughout 
Germany. Moderwell recognized that, unlike the rest of Europe 
where news emanated primarily from the capital city, Germany's 
decentralized political organization entailed a wide range of 
news sources throughout the Reich. Moderwell often travelled 
throughout Germany because he believed that 'the big story more 
often than not, lies outside Berlin' .76 He also secured the 
services of William Nash as the Daily News's roving "number-two" 
man although, as previously mentioned, Nash's inability to 
establish an amicable rapport with the Nazis probably cost the
paper an eyewitness account of the November 8th events in the
Munich Biirgerbraukeller.77
Despite Nash's failure, Moderwell provided Chicago Daily News 
readers with fresh, reasonably accurate and comprehensive 
coverage of the Putsch even though Western Union may have broken 
down on 9 November.78 Moderwell implemented two measures which
76Moderwell to Dennis 23 July 1923, CDN Papers, Newberry Library.
77Nash was probably hired more for his family's connection to Charles 
Dennis. In any event, Nash's tenure came to an abrupt end in the 
spring of 1924 not because of his journalistic deficiencies, but
because he took an unauthorized trip to Spain, courtesy of the 
paper's expense account! See Dennis to O'Flaherty 14 October 1924 
and O'Flaherty to Dennis 21 September 1924, Ibid.
78Maclean to Dennis 11 November 1923, Ibid.
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benefited him greatly during the crisis. First, because of his 
working relationship with a local editor affiliated with the 
powerful Mosse newspaper chain, Moderwell was able to gain 
access to pre-published information from such reputable papers 
as the Berliner Taaeblatt.79 Second, because of his paper's 
willingness 'to pay reasonably for good information that could 
not otherwise be got', Moderwell paid a well connected local 
journalist ten dollars a week for Reich government news tips and 
information.80 At times, it appeared that Moderwell's news 
gathering means worked too well. In fact, he apologized to the 
Home Office for sending Berlin news 'which was a little ahead of 
the facts'.81 In any event, the management of the Chicago Daily 
News was highly impressed with Moderwell's work. Dennis even 
requested editorials from the Berlin bureau chief, a privilege 
rarely granted to a news correspondent.82
For Moderwell, the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch probably 
was a cause for celebration; like many professionals stationed 
overseas, Moderwell had developed an empathy for the plight of 
his adopted home. He felt that the newly formed Weimar Republic 
had the difficult task of 'on the one hand, keeping the people 
always keyed up to the seriousness of the situation while on the 
other, preventing them from getting into a violent mood'.83 
Moderwell also praised Germany for her 'calmness and moral
79Moderwell to Dennis 27 September 1923, Ibid.
80Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82Moderwell to Dennis 23 July 1923, Ibid.
83Moderwell to Dennis 13 March 1923, Ibid.
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firmness1 in the face of French military pressure and German 
industrialist subterfuge throughout 1923.
Did Moderwell's personal political views interfere with his 
ability to present German news objectively? Though there is no 
clear answer, the evidence suggests that Moderwell struggled to 
suppress his internal bias. For example, during the Ruhr 
crisis, Moderwell stated to Dennis that he felt that he 'would 
be committing a crime if [his] articles helped to justify the 
[Franco-Belgian] invasion and the bullying, starving and 
shooting of unarmed [German] civilians in a time of peace1. 
However, in the same letter, Moderwell worried that his articles 
were 'colored by [his] emotions'.84 Unfortunately, we only have 
Moderwell's published dispatches of 9 and 10 November to provide 
us with his personal insights concerning the Beer Hall Putsch. 
Moderwell's optimistic reports from Germany, especially his 
statement that Ludendorff's and Hitler's failure strengthened 
the Berlin government, were rooted at least partially in the 
correspondent's hope that the nation would 'pick itself up out 
of what seemed a condition of inevitable chaos'.85
•k k  *
These episodes illustrate the latitude afforded to overseas 
correspondents to interpret a particular event, especially if 
the reporter enjoyed a good reputation. Richard Mowrer, who 
served with the Chicago Daily News foreign news service from 
1934 to 1945 and whose father, Paul Scott Mowrer, supervised the 
service throughout the 1920's and 1930's, staunchly believed
84Moderwell to Dennis 18 April 1923, Ibid.
Q 5
Dennis to Moderwell spring 1923, Ibid.
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that the foreign correspondent 'reported, interpreted and
explained the news as the subject warranted1 even if the piece 
failed to reflect the ideas of the publisher. Tribune Berlin 
bureau chief Sigrid Schultz (1924-41) claimed that her proactive 
boss, Robert McCormick, never interfered with her reporting from 
Germany, while Richard Mowrer put it more bluntly: 'Dispatches 
were not slanted to please anybody.'86 Thus, Schultz's and
Mowrer's assertion of the "man on the spot" approach seems to 
apply to the Beer Hall Putsch story, although this practice was 
seriously challenged by management as the 1920's wore on.87
* * *
The Beer Hall Putsch story was prominently displayed, (even 
appearing on page one of the provincially inclined Chicago Daily 
News), and also appeared extensively on each newspaper's back 
pages. Depth of coverage is another indication of a story's 
importance, since, unlike other types of reporting, publishing 
overseas news was expensive and time consuming. To illustrate: 
the New York Times spent five hundred thousand dollars solely on 
trans-Atlantic cable costs in 1926, equal to European Service 
director's Edwin James's 1922 estimate for running the paper's 
entire overseas operation.88 Later, the Times even sought
86Excerpts from S. Schultz interview, Sigrid Schultz Papers, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin, and R. Mowrer to the author 19 July
1995. Heald plausibly argues that the spirit of Schultz's claim is
undermined by her alleged practice of 'self-censorship' 'by
foreseeing what he [McCormick] wanted' . Heald to the author, 9 May
1996. William Shirer shared this assessment in his memoirs; Shirer, 
My Journey, P.362. Jon Bekken, a Chicago press historian, offers a 
similar view with regard to the CDN; Bekken to the author, 24 
September 1996.
87For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Heald, Vistas, 
Chapter 5 as well as Chapters 2,3, and 4 of this work.
88Desmond, Crisis and Conflict, pp.296-97.
(46)
reduced coverage of the Reichstag Fire trial because the event 
coincided with a steep fall of the dollar against the German 
Reichsmark.89 Newspapers were at the mercy of wire and wireless 
services such as Western Union, which by 1940 was charging 
approximately twenty cents a word for overseas transmissions.90 
Moreover, it is safe to assume that newspapers spent more than 
this (i.e. twenty cents) per word during the 1920's and 1930's 
since the entire period was characterized by falling but still 
high cable costs.
Hence, the New York Times. Chicago Daily Tribune and the 
Chicago Daily News implemented various measures to reduce 
transmission costs. Foreign correspondents were required to 
write their stories in a crude, skeletal short-hand before 
cabling them to a receiving office in New York (another cost- 
cutting measure in the case of the Chicago papers). There, 
telegrams would be deciphered and then relayed to the foreign 
editor and his staff in the Home Office where further editing 
and publication decisions would be made. In 1923, The Chicago 
Daily News established a 38,000 monthly word quota for its 
European service, a 10,000-word drop from the previous year.91 
However, the Berlin allotment of six thousand words per month 
equalled that of London and Paris, an indication of the general 
importance attached to German news.92 Tribune foreign editors 
consistently criticized even their best reporters for sending
89James to Birchall 15 Nov. 1933, James #6-1571, NYT Archive.
90Desmond, Crisis, P. 297.
91Heald, M., Vistas, P.Ill & Shirer, My Journey, P.284.
92P. Mowrer to Binder 11 Nov. 1930, Binder Papers, Newberry Library.
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too much news rather than too little.93 Managing Editor E.S. 
Beck suggested that correspondents should 'carefully edit out 
unimportant items... without wrecking the color in a really big 
outstanding story'.94 Even the editors of the voluminous New 
York Times prodded their correspondents to keep their word 
counts down.95
All three papers encouraged their correspondents to use the 
slower, but far cheaper mail system for more elaborate and less 
urgent feature stories. In fact, there is some evidence to 
suggest that Lawson relegated foreign news to page two because 
much of it consisted of dated mail articles.96 European service 
chiefs were also encouraged to evaluate and select news stories 
before transmitting them across the Atlantic. During 
blockbuster events all three Home Offices attempted to restrict 
the cable output of the unaffected bureaus. The Times issued 
such an order during the London Conference (1930), the Tribune 
during the Manchurian Crisis97 and the Daily News during the Ruhr 
Crisis.98
93See for instance, Wales to bureau chiefs 19 Feb. 1923, Pierson to 
Schultz 26 Aug. 1926, Beck to Schultz 1 April 1927, Beck to Schultz 
17 June 1930 and.Scharschug to Schultz 8 July 1931, Schultz Papers, 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
94Beck to Schultz 17 June 1930, Ibid.
95For instance, Birchall to Berlin 8 May 1930 James#5, James to 
Enderis ?June 1931 James #6-0212, Ibid. ?April 1932 0590, Phillip to
Birchall 4 Oct 1932 #0900, NYT Archive.
q / r
Lawson to Dennis 17 Feb. 1922 and Lawson to Smith 22 April 1922,
Box 75, CDN Papers, Newberry Library.
97Wales to bureau chiefs 19 Feb. 1931, Box 4, Schultz Papers,
State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
QO
For example, see 0 1Flaherty to Dennis 16 Jan 1923, CDN Papers, 
Newberry Library.
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Despite these budgetary efforts, transatlantic reporting 
remained costly. Foreign correspondents often ignored the 
pleadings of their superiors in the Home Office, perhaps more 
afraid of not cabling a story than sending it. And for good 
reason; although reporters had been dismissed for not sending a 
story, there is no record of any bureau correspondent being 
fired for sending one. This holds true for the quota-oriented 
Chicago Daily News. For instance, in the October 1930 cable
budget report, the Rome bureau exceeded its allotted quota by 
two-fold, the Berlin bureau by three-fold and the London bureau 
by four-fold, far exceeding the paper's cable and wireless 
budget for 1930."
The failure to control word volume also underscored the fact 
that the receiving editors in New York were far too few in 
number to process the flood of incoming cables for the next 
day's edition. Consequently, many European news articles were 
either printed after they had lost some of their freshness or 
were never published at all because time did not permit them to 
be deciphered and edited.100 Moreover, it appears that the 
threshold for these omissions was unusually low. According to 
Chicago Daily News editor Charles Dennis, just one cablegram of 
over five hundred words 'dislocates the whole service on the day 
it is received' .101 There is no evidence to suggest that
management tried to ease this situation by hiring additional 
receiving editors. Instead, home offices attempted to control
"p. Mowrer to Binder 11 Nov. 1930, Binder Papers, Ibid.
100Dennis to O'Flaherty, 8 December 1924, CDN Papers, Ibid.
101Dennis to E. Mowrer 11 December 1924, Ibid.
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costs by instructing their European correspondents to 'save 
[their] tolls for the big smashes1.102
Thus, logistics acted as a barrier against the depth of the 
Beer Hall Putsch story in two ways. First, managements' efforts 
to keep cable wordage to a minimum as a result of high costs 
limited the overall quantity of overseas news. Second, because 
these efforts in large part failed, foreign news was subjected 
to a more intense selection process than were other types of
news. In effect, foreign correspondents were forced to pit
their cablegrams against one another for an opportunity to 
compete against the more easily obtained and edited national, 
regional and local news.
* * *
The evidence strongly suggests that the Home Offices of the 
New York Times. Chicago Daily News and the Chicago Daily Tribune 
placed a high priority on the Beer Hall Putsch story. In the 
spring of 1923 McCormick had established a news network
throughout Germany for the purpose of monitoring fascist and 
monarchist machinations.103 Later that fall McCormick dispatched 
roving reporter Larry Rue to Munich to assist John Clayton and 
Sigrid Schultz in Berlin. Rue was trained by Floyd Gibbons and 
became noted for his ability to obtain exclusive stories in an 
unconventional fashion. As we have seen, Rue's "nose for news" 
was in fine form during the Putsch. In September 1923, the
102Scharschug to Schultz 20 December 1932, Box 4, Schultz Papers, 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
103Van Anda to Brown 27 September & 12 November 1923, James #5-1148 & 
1160, NYT Archive; McCormick to Clayton 16 June 1923, Box #4,
Schultz Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
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Times dispatched Paris correspondent P.J. Phillip to Bavaria in 
anticipation of a possible coup in Munich. Throughout November 
and early December, Daily News Berlin correspondent Hiram 
Moderwell enjoyed a 'favored position1 among the paper's 
correspondents ' in the matter of getting dispatches printed 
promptly'. Although acknowledging the 'astonishing nature of 
the German situation' the Home Office also advised Moderwell to 
'shorten the details of his dispatches without losing anything 
significant to the dispatch' —  thus illustrating that business 
constraints were placed upon foreign correspondents even in 
cases of "blockbuster" stories.104
Many U.S. newspapers, however, had committed additional 
resources and correspondents to the story. The Philadelphia 
Public Ledger dispatched Dorothy Thompson and the New York 
Herald Tribune sent H.R. Knickerbocker to Munich in November 
1923. Although the prospect of a fascist/monarchist coup 
attracted a major press gathering to Munich, it also facilitated 
extensive coverage of the breaking story because the mechanisms 
for large scale reporting were already in place. Thus, although 
not a cause of the prominence and depth of the Beer Hall Putsch 
reporting, the Home Offices' commitment of personnel and 
resources prior to the event was a necessary precondition for 
its "blockbuster" status.
Thus, the Beer Hall Putsch story overcame a myriad of 
obstacles rooted in differing editorial traditions and budgetary 
constraints to become the top news event of its day. But why? 
The following pages will address this question with the hope
104Dennis to Moderwell, 18 December 1923, CDN Papers, Newberry 
Library.
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that we can gain insight as to the qualifications of a "big 
story" in the context of the 1920's.
* * *
The Beer Hall Putsch stpry appealed to .thp American press 
because the event was viewed as internationally significant, 
sensational and negative. The story's international importance 
satisfied Adolph Ochs's criteria of publishing "all the news 
that's fit to print" as well as that of the more provincial 
Victor Lawson. The German situation, fraught with potential 
dangers, appealed to the American public's desire to read about 
the morbid, moribund and morose. Some press historians even 
believe that the fascination for the sensational reached its 
peak in the U.S. during the 1920's when "yellow sheets" such as 
the Daily Graphic thrived.
Another underlying reason behind the prominence of the Beer 
Hall Putsch story was the U.S. press's fascination with 
monarchism and, to a lesser extent, fascism. Prior to 1923, 
Adolf Hitler had already achieved some notoriety (albeit minor 
compared to his political contemporaries) among large segments 
of the American press corps. Both the New York Herald Tribune 
and the Chicago Daily News published extensive feature stories 
about the Nazis in 1922. However, an examination of George 
Witte's expose reflects the emphasis that the Daily News placed 
on publishing news which directly appealed to the American 
reader. This explains why the paper's Berlin bureau chief 
(until 1923) concentrated more on the growing threat of the 
Nazis to the Weimar Republic and the American role in the 
movement than the personality of its leader or the party's
(52)
ideology. Specifically, Witte argued that the 'Bavarian 
Fascisti' were planning a coup financed by the Krupps and
organized by a native Texan, Andrea Ellendt, whom he
characterized as a self-styled 'Joan of Arc' of Bavaria. 
Witte's interview with Hitler, a mere four sentences in length, 
appears to have been inserted as an afterthought.105 One month 
following Witte's series, the Home Office assigned the more 
capable and more sober106 Vienna correspondent, A.R. Decker, to 
write about the growth of fascism in central and eastern Europe. 
Although he characterized the Bavarian Fascists as a 'force 
which must be considered', Decker failed to provide information
about any members of the party leadership, including Hitler.107
Both Witte's and Decker's articles were probably inspired by 
Mussolini's takeover in Italy and may have been the brain-child 
of the Daily News's de facto European service chief, Edward 
Price Bell. The evidence suggests that during the early 1920's, 
Bell sought to educate the American public about the fascist 
phenomenon, of which they had only 'the shallowest conception', 
although he was less interested in informing the readership 
about fascist leaders, save Mussolini.108 Thus, although Hitler 
was not the main focus of fascist coverage prior to the Beer 
Hall Putsch, he benefited by it, if only in a limited way.
105See CDN November 2,9, 13 & 15 1922.
106The evidence strongly suggests that Witte's alcohol problem was an 
important factor in his dismissal from the Berlin post and the 
subsequent appointment of Hiram Moderwell. See Dennis to Bell 26 
Jan. 1922 & Bell to Lawson 26 June 1924, Bell Papers, Newberry 
Library.
107CDN 7 December 1922.
108Bell to Lawson 17 Jan. 1924, CDN Papers, Newberry Library.
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Far greater than its fascination with fascism was the 
American press's fascination with monarchism or, more 
specifically, the prosect of a Wittelsbach restoration in 
Bavaria and a Hohenzollern one in all of Germany. The New York 
Times, Chicago Daily News and the Chicago Daily Tribune all 
devoted special attention to this aspect of German politics, in 
part due to the American obsession with royal intrigues but 
mostly because a return of monarchy to Germany was seen as a 
distinct possibility. Two weeks prior to the Putsch, newly 
appointed Berlin bureau chief Hiram Moderwell predicted that 
there would be 1 a revolution and a seizure of the Reich 
government by the monarchists', a view shared by his Daily News 
superiors.109 And though the notion of a revived monarchy lost 
credence among the staff of the Chicago Daily News (with the 
notable exception of Moderwell's replacement, Edgar Ansel 
Mowrer) soon after the failed Putsch, the concept appears to 
have actually gained impetus within the ranks of the Chicago 
Daily Tribune —  especially with Robert McCormick and his newly 
appointed Berlin bureau chief, Sigrid Schultz. In fact, the 
most noteworthy feature of Schultz's reporting throughout the 
1920's and even the early 30's was her consistent monitoring of 
Germany's Crown-Prince-in- exile.
However, the most important reason for the prominence and 
extent of the Beer Hall Putsch coverage was the mainstream 
American press's belief that the coup was the culmination of a 
two-and-a-half week process that would destroy the fledgling 
Weimar Republic. Many American journalists were convinced that
109Dennis to Moderwell 4 Sept. 1923 and Dennis to P. Mowrer 23
October 1923, Ibid.
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the German government would not survive the fallout from the 
Ruhr crisis and the subsequent hyper-acceleration of an already 
runaway inflation rate. In this context, the Putsch story, as 
well as other events, were seen as symptomatic of German 
democracy's likely demise. The following headlines achieved 
front page status in the New York Times. Chicago Daily Tribune 
and Chicago Daily News during the fifteen days prior to the 
Putsch:
22 October, 'PROCLAMATION OF THE RHINELAND REPUBLIC;
BAVARIAN REICHSWEHR TAKE LOYALTY OATH TO VON KAHR1
23 October, 'COMMUNIST RISING IN HAMBURG'
24 October, 'FIGHTING IN THE RHINELAND'
25 October, 'COMMUNIST RISING IN BERLIN'
27 October, 'FOOD RIOTS IN THE RUHR1
29 October, 'LEFTIST GOVERNMENT IN SAXONY DEPOSED'
31 October & 2 November, 'CROWN PRINCE ATTEMPTS TO RE-ENTER
GERMANY'
3 November, 'BAVARIAN ULTIMATUM TO BERLIN'
6 November, 'REICHSWEHR TROOPS SENT TO THURINGIA'
An examination of the Chicago Daily News's internal memoranda 
throughout the summer and fall of 1923 clearly indicates that 
both management and Berlin bureau correspondents were convinced 
that Weimar Germany was on the verge of collapse.110 Upon his 
appointment as Berlin bureau chief, Hiram Moderwell noted that 
'the fundamental situation is extremely serious and all nerves 
are on edge'.111 Charles Dennis acknowledged that 'Germany was 
an important and complex situation' and astutely predicted in 
mid-October that 'great developments will follow with 
considerable rapidity'.112 Moreover, the evidence suggests that 
Dennis considered a Nazi move in Bavaria to be one of these
110Unfortunately, there is a lack of similar documentation for the
New York Times and the Chicago Daily Tribune.
m Moderwell to Dennis, spring (?) 1923, CDN Papers, Newberry Library.
112Dennis to Moderwell, 17 October 1923, Ibid.
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prospective 'developments'. He approved the publication of 
pictures of Hitler's forces because they were 'unusually 
timely'.113 Dennis also approved (and probably wrote) an 
editorial published on 24 October stating that 'monarchist and 
militaristic plotters need watching' and that there was a 'far 
reaching conspiracy afoot to overthrow the republican 
government'. Even after the failed coup, recently demoted 
George Witte observed that ' conditions in Germany had grown much 
worse since July' .114
By covering a possible German collapse the mainstream U.S. 
media implied that events in Germany mattered to the American 
public. Dennis echoed this sentiment, regarding Germany as 'one 
of the most interesting places on the face of the earth from a 
news point of view'115 while Moderwell called it 'the biggest news 
story in Europe'.116 Despite America's post-war psychological 
return to isolation, her internationally-minded journalists117 
recognized that Germany's stability was key to the United 
States's interests across the Atlantic.
Although having disengaged from Europe militarily, America 
renewed and strengthened economic ties with Germany. After 
1924, the Weimar Republic so benefited from the influx of 
speculative capital from U.S. banks and corporations that much 
of its economy became dependent upon fluctuations on Wall 
Street. In addition, despite the Teuton-phobia prevalent among
113Dennis to Moderwell, 20 October 1923, Ibid.
114Witte to Dennis, 13 November 1923, Ibid.
115Moderwell to Dennis, 27 September 1923, Ibid.
116Moderwell to Dennis, 23 November 1922, Ibid.
117See Heald, Vistas, Chapters 1 & 2.
(5 6)
Americans during the Great War, a substantial effort was made to 
renew cultural ties.118 Even segments of the American press 
community took part in this effort. Both the Chicago Daily 
Tribune and the Chicago Daily News sponsored U.S./German boxing 
competitions in the "windy city" throughout the twenties and 
early thirties, with both papers refraining from xenophobic 
reporting of the event. German boxers were welcomed and praised 
for their ability and sportsmanship, an example of international 
good will in the athletic sphere that lasted until the 1936 
Berlin Olympics boycott debate and the Joe Louis/Max Schmeling 
title fights.
Not only did the 1920's usher in a period of U.S. /German 
cultural accord; the period also witnessed a new harmony between 
both intellectual communities. Whereas American historians had 
helped to foment anti-German feeling during the Great War, many 
reversed their positions in the so-called war-guilt debate 
following the cessation of hostilities. Revisionist historians 
Harry Elmer Barnes and Sidney B. Fay bolstered the German case, 
which probably helped ameliorate America's attitude towards the 
new Republic.119 At the very least, the "war-guilt" debate kept 
Germany in the news. However, it is crucial to note that the 
"war-guilt" debate would not have reached this side of the 
Atlantic had it not been for America's financial stake in the 
post-war settlement —  specifically, the issues of reparations 
and inter-allied debts.
118 For a comprehensive analysis of German-American relations in the 
1920's, see Costigliola, F. Awkward Dominion: American Political, 
Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe (Cornell, Ithaca 
1985).
119For an excellent discussion of the impact of revisionism on 
American public opinion, see Schoenthal, "American Attitudes", 
Chapter Nine.
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Reparations and debts came to dominate U.S. press coverage of 
European affairs during the 1920's and early 30's, with Germany 
a continuous primary news source during the post-war years. 
Moreover, the U.S. press would take a comprehensive look at 
domestic developments in the Weimar Republic because of their 
possible impact on these larger issues and hence on U.S./German 
relations as a whole. We will later see how American 
journalists presented the Reichstag elections of May 1924 as a 
referendum on the Dawes Plan. Taken to its limits, therefore, 
the prominence and extensiveness of the Beer Hall Putsch story 
on the pages of the New York Times. Chicago Daily Tribune and 
the Chicago Daily News gives credence to the growing importance 
of Germany to the U.S. position in the interwar world.
* * *
The Beer Hall Putsch was the culmination of two and a half 
weeks of crisis for the Weimar Republic. And, except for the 
possible return of the Hohenzollern Crown Prince-in-exile, most 
segments of the American press concluded that Germany had 
successfully passed through a critical stage in its development. 
The New York Times and the Chicago Daily News agreed that 
Hitler's failed putsch strengthened the Weimar Republic, while 
the Chicago Daily Tribune remained ambivalent.120 With the 
possible exception of the Chicago Daily News, the depth and 
prominence of German news immediately after the Putsch was 
inversely proportional to the perceived level of the Republic's 
stability. Hence, in 1924, the Hitler-Ludendorff treason trial
120NYT editorial "Bavarian Opera Bouffe" 10 November 1923, CDN 10 
November 1923 P.l, CDT Ibid.
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and the Reichstag elections of May and December would not 
receive the same level of attention as events during the 
tumultuous year of 1923. Not until the Hindenburg-Marx 
presidential election in the spring of 1925 —  when many
American journalists believed the future of the Weimar Republic 
was again at stake —  would German news take precedence over 
other international stories.
Chapter 2 
1924: Germany’s Return To "Normalcy"
For the Hitler/Ludendorff followers, the Munich debacle was 
not without "silver linings". First, a German court composed of 
judges who were anti-Republican holdovers from the Wilhelmine 
period tried and acquitted Ludendorff and imposed on Hitler a 
prison term of five years, which was susequently reduced to 
seven months —  this, for committing high treason! Second, 
because the German press provided intense coverage of the 
proceedings, Hitler was able to evoke nationwide sympathy 
through his impassioned defence that his only crime was carrying 
out his patriotic duty against the "November criminals". Third, 
even with Hitler in jail, the Nazis (as part of a racialist 
coalition) made small, yet significant gains in the Reichstag 
elections of May 1924.121 And although most of these gains were 
erased in the subsequent December elections, May's encouraging 
results (particularly the levels of Nazi support outside 
Bavaria), together with the disappointment brought on by the 
failed Putsch, taught Hitler that he could achieve power through 
legitimate means; the Nazis would now place their hopes in the 
ballot box, instead of at the point of a gun.
1924 was also a mixed year for the Weimar Republic. 
Optimists could point to the onset of political stability in 
Germany; the failed November coup would mark the last attempt to 
overthrow the Republic by force. In addition, 1924 witnessed an 
economic recovery, due mostly to a series of emergency decrees
121For an analysis of the May and December 1924 elections see Childers, 
Nazi Voter pp.50-64. Maier, C. Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 
Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade After World 
War One, (Princeton 1975) pp.440-458 and Jones, L.E. "The Dissolution 
of the Bourgeois Party System in the Weimar Republic" in Bessel R. and 
Feuchtwanger E.J. Social Change.
(60)
which cut government expenditures, restricted credit and created 
a strong currency, thus ending the ravages of hyperinflation.122 
Germany also scored a diplomatic and psychological victory over 
France in the Ruhr crisis, thanks in large measure to American 
and British aloofness.123 Germany's reparations were scaled down 
with the implementation of the Dawes Plan, an initiative put 
forward by a committee of bankers chaired by Brigadier General 
Charles G. Dawes, a native of Chicago and the 1924 Republican 
candidate for Vice-President.124 Moreover, the Reichstag's narrow 
ratification of the plan in August facilitated an influx of 
American capital, thus fuelling further Germany's economic 
recovery.125
Notwithstanding these successes, the Weimar Republic still 
faced serious difficulties. The deflationary policies of 
Chancellors Stresemann and Marx also undermined public 
confidence in the republican system of government. For example, 
farmers, who had suffered relatively little from hyperinflation, 
were now hurt by the tight credit measures implemented during 
stabilization.126 Even those Germans left substantially
122See Childers, Nazi Voter, pp.52-53, Nicholls, Weimar pp.93-94 and 
Craig, Germany pp.452-456. See also Southern, D. "The Impact of the 
Inflation" in Bessel and Feuchtwanger, Social Change.
123For in-depth discussions of the impact of Ruhr crisis on the European 
balance of power, see Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics, Kent, 
Spoils and Marx, Illusion.
124See Nicholls, Weimar pp.94-96 and Childers, Nazi Voter pp.54-55. For 
a comprehensive discussion of the Dawes plan, see Kent, Marx op.cit. 
and Schuker, S. The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial 
Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Princeton 1978) .
125For a highly critical view of the DNVP's campaign against the Dawes 
Plan and subsequent split over the issue see Eyck, Weimar (Volume One) 
pp.314-15.
126Besides Childers and Jones, see "The Dilemma of German Agriculture 
during the Weimar Republic" in Bessel and Feuchtwanger, Social Change.
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unaffected by the policies of hyperinflation and stabilization 
came to hold the Weimar system in low regard because they viewed 
it as having brought economic and political chaos to the 
country. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the 
German National People's Party (DNVP, also referred to as the 
German Conservative Party), which advocated the abolition of the 
Republic and a return to Wilhelmine rule, would emerge as 
Germany's second largest political party. In fact, although the 
Nazis saw their electoral percentage cut in half, a closer 
examination of the December 1924 Reichstag election results 
reveals that only a little more than half the voters actually 
cast their ballots for parties which supported the Weimar 
system. Moreover, the unexpected election of Field Marshal Paul 
von Hindenburg to the Weimar presidency four months later 
signalled an ominous electoral shift to the Right —  this, 
during a period of relative prosperity. That the Republic 
failed to gain additional adherents, even in the aftermath of 
successes at home and abroad, illustrates how popular support 
for the German democratic experiment remained extremely tenuous. 
* * *
Many journalists had believed that Hitler's coup signalled 
the end of the Weimar Republic. Conversely, his failure seemed 
to provide Germany with a much needed political respite and an 
opportunity to strengthen its democratic institutions. The 
failure of the Putsch also meant that the Weimar government was 
going to be around for a while. The implications of a revived 
democratic Germany for the United States —  namely, a renewed 
debate over the issues of debts and reparations and over
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America' s general role in the post-war world —  were not lost on 
the managements of the New York Times, Chicago Daily Tribune and 
Chicago Daily News. All three newspapers seem to have 
formulated their 1924 editorials on Germany within the context 
of this debate. For publishers Adolph Ochs and Victor Lawson 
and their editorial chiefs, Rollo Ogden and Charles Dennis, the 
strengthening of Weimar democracy facilitated peaceful and 
equitable solutions (such as the Dawes Plan) to many of the 
problems which resulted from the Great War and the Treaty of 
Versailles. Moreover, the revitalization of Germany also 
provided America with a legitimate opportunity to return to the 
world stage. For Robert McCormick and his Chicago Daily 
Tribune, the prospect of a revived Weimar was troubling because 
he feared what Ochs and Lawson desired: an end to U.S. post-war 
isolation. Thus, it is only within this context that each 
paper's editorials and published news stories can be properly 
understood,
* * *
The coverage of the Hitler/Ludendorff treason trial 
illustrates how editorial factors can affect news presentation. 
The New York Times and, uncharacteristically, the Chicago Daily 
News, published the verdicts on the front page. Their 
correspondents seemed to enjoy greater latitude in their news 
commentary on the trial than over other stories, especially in 
the case of Times correspondent T.R. Ybarra, who characterized 
the acquittal of the 'arrogant' Ludendorff as 'ridiculous' and 
Hitler's lenient sentence as a 'mere sop for the [Weimar]
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Republicans1.127 These sentiments were echoed by the Chicago 
Daily News's Edgar Mowrer, who called both verdicts 
'preposterous'.128 The Times. particularly disillusioned by the 
affair, published two editorials on 1 and 3 April which strongly 
suggested that Weimar's days were numbered, and that right-wing 
momentum was growing while democratic support was only ' skin 
deep' .129 The Times even censured the German populace for 
equating 'treason against the Republic with honor and duty'.130
The Chicago Daily News, however, refrained from criticizing the
Weimar Republic. Although Mowrer admitted that 'Germany is 
honey-combed with anti-constitution, anti-republican, anti­
entente and militaristic plots', he also stated that 'the 
preposterous trial may have been the means of keeping the German 
government in the hands of modern moderate-minded men' ,131 As I 
will show later in this chapter, Mowrer's misplaced "positive 
spin" on the story illustrates the Home Office's desire to 
promote the Dawes Plan by presenting the Weimar Republic in a 
positive light. In other words, Mowrer's front page story was 
in full accord with his paper's editorial policy: condemn those 
who threaten German democracy and promote those who advocate it.
Unlike the readers of the New York Times and the Chicago 
Daily News, the trial of Hitler and Ludendorff probably made 
little impression on Chicago Daily Tribune readers. Not only 
did the Tribune fail to publish extensive coverage of the event
127NYT 1 April 1924, P.l.
128CDN 1 April 1924, P.l.
1 O Q
NYT editorial, "Stresemann Joins the Junkers", 1 April 1924.
130NYT editorial, "Ludendorff Acquitted", 3 April 1924.
131CDN Ibid.
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—  Sigrid Schultz's news story was a mere one third of a column 
in length —  the editors also "buried" the article in the 
paper's back pages.132 As a result, it is probable that the 
average Tribune reader overlooked the story altogether.
What makes the matter all the more puzzling was that although 
Colonel McCormick ordered Berlin bureau correspondent Sigrid 
Schultz to Munich five weeks prior to the verdicts, her 
dispatches of 29 February, 10 March and 21 March were not
published. McCormick printed only excerpts from Schultz's two 
cables of 1 April announcing the verdicts. We can only
speculate as to why the publisher went to the expense of 
directing his correspondent away from the capital to reap only 
a limited reward. Perhaps Schultz's uninspiring dispatch of 29 
February, which extensively quoted Ludendorff's testimony, left 
McCormick unimpressed. The same could be said of her brief 
account of General von Lossow's testimony of 10 March. However, 
Schultz's "hard-hitting" dispatch of 21 March, in which she 
accurately predicted virtual acquittals for Ludendorff and 
Hitler and which was more in accord with Tribune tradition, was 
not published either. Also unusual was that the Home Office 
condensed Schultz's 1 April dispatches by eliminating nearly all 
news analysis while retaining her aesthetic observations such as 
a description of Ludendorff's attire. The following sections of 
Schultz's dispatches of 1 April were never seen by Tribune 
readers:
Hitler's sentence was much more lenient than even the
State's attorney dared recommend, who intimated that five
years in fortress would not be too severe a sentence for 
trying to overthrow the government...
132CDT 1 April 1924, P.11.
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When the sentences were read out it was more or less 
understood that those sentenced would be paroled after 
serving six months of their sentence "if they behaved 
well"...
The decision of the Munich court has brought Ludendorff back 
into the political arena [and his party] will probably 
return to the Reichstag with much reinforcements since it is 
known that the German elections in May will greatly 
strengthen all the radical parties, be they conservative or 
communistic.133
With hindsight, McCormick's handling of the Hitler/Ludendorff 
treason trial did not conform with the paper's traditional 
editorial practices in presenting European news. Typically, 
McCormick played up the decadent aspects of European political 
life in order to justify American isolationism.134 Logically, 
therefore, Ludendorff's acquittal and Hitler's "slap on the 
wrist" could have been used as ammunition against the Dawes Plan 
and future U.S. interventions in Germany. That McCormick 
abandoned this course in this instance leads me to believe that 
he was already in the process of changing his views of the 
Weimar Republic. An editorial published on 1 May 1924 suggests 
that McCormick had reversed his stance because he felt that the 
German government had abandoned its left-wing agenda. 
Ironically, he seems to have based this decision on an interview 
conducted by Edward Price Bell of the Chicago Daily News with 
German Chancellor Wilhelm Marx a few weeks earlier.135 By 1925, 
the Chicago Daily Tribune stood firmly behind the Weimar 
Republic.
133Unedited Proofs, 1 April 1924, Schultz Papers, Box #5, Folder #1,
State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
134This is a major thesis of Jerome Edwards's, The Foreign Policy of 
McCormick's Tribune, 1929-41.
135CDT ed. "Germany's Retreat From Socialism", 1 May 1924.
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Much of the news and editorial analysis of the 1924 Reichstag 
elections from the New York Times. Chicago Daily News and the 
Chicago Daily Tribune focused on their relation to the prospects 
for the Dawes Plan. The results of the May balloting led all 
three newspapers cautiously to predict Reichstag consent to the 
initiative.136 The New York Times even suggested that some 
members of the KPD might vote for the plan,137 while the Chicago 
Daily News noted that German adherence to the Dawes Plan 'may 
prove both anxious and delicate'. The Chicago paper further 
contended that the success of the Dawes Plan depended on 
France's willingness 'to make substantial concessions, 
especially in connection with new sanctions to replace military 
and industrial control of the Ruhr' ,138
Far more important for this study, however, is the way each 
newspaper assessed the German political landscape and 
characterized the German populace; the different viewpoints 
reflect upper management's ideological inclinations. The New 
York Times's optimistic predictions with regard to the 
Republic's future reveal the paper's tendency to minimize the 
domestic and international significance of the divisiveness 
within German politics. For example, despite the strengthening 
of the anti-French DNVP in the May 1924 Reichstag elections, the 
paper asserted that there would be 'no new obstacles [to long­
term European stability] and that once the campaign atmosphere 
subsided, the business of working out the details of the
136,,Irreconcilables Beaten" CDN editorial, 6 May 1924, "France and the 
German Elections", NYT editorial, 7 May 1924, "France and Germany", CDT 




settlement would begin' .139 In another instance, the Times 
claimed that the debate between monarchists and republicans was 
largely 'academic' and a 'luxury' for the German voters to 
ponder.140 As mentioned earlier, the Times1s optimistic view of 
Germany's future appears rooted in its intense (though on 
occasion inconsistent) faith in the wisdom of the German people. 
In contrast to its characterizations during the Beer Hall Putsch 
treason trial, the paper reverted to its earlier view that the 
'German people have a stronger political sense than they are 
usually inclined to claim for themselves' because ' the German 
people want peace abroad' ,141
The Chicago Daily News editorial board described the Germans 
in a similar fashion, contending that 'as a people [they] are 
far too intelligent and practical to be greatly impressed by 
reactionary and vindicative slogans'.142 However, unlike the New 
York Times, the management of the Chicago Daily News regarded 
1924 Germany as a political mine-field whose stability was 
intertwined with that of Europe and, by extension, the United 
States. This view was reflected by the paper's editorial of 8 
December which claimed that in the previous day's Reichstag 
elections, 'the existence of the Republic, and hence of Europe, 
was at stake' .143
The influence of editorial bias is evident in the Chicago 
Daily Tribune's coverage of the Reichstag elections of May and
139n y t Ibid.
140NYT ed. "The New Reichstag", 9 Dec. 1924.
141NYT eds. "The New Reichstag" 6 May, 9 Dec. 1924.
142CDN ed. "Republicanism Wins in Germany" 8 December 1924.
143Ibid.
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December 1924. In contrast to the New York Times, the Tribune
printed crisis-like headlines such as 'NATIONALISTS SEEK TO
UPSET GERMAN RULE; CLAIM VICTORY AT THE POLLS; REDS GAIN' and
'GERMAN PARTY LEADERS MOVE FOR MONARCHY'.144 Not surprisingly,
the paper also emphasized the strength of the KPD's gains in the
May election. In his 6 May dispatch, Berlin bureau
correspondent George Seldes suggested that Germany stood on the
brink of communist revolution:
Already the threat of a Red revolution is heard. The 
Communists never dreamed they were so strong, and are now 
openly boasting that at the first misstep of the right-wing
monarchist parties to make any new repressions of Communism 
they will retaliate by starting a revolt.145
The Tribune's "red scare" approach reflected the political 
views of its publisher. Robert McCormick echoed the sentiments146 
of the German foreign office, characterizing the KPD's electoral 
success as 'terrifying'.147 The Colonel not only felt that 
Germany was vulnerable to communist intrigues but that America 
was as well. In fact, he once alleged that Marxist ideas had 
infiltrated the minds of Illinois elementary school children.148 
Such proclamations served to discredit McCormick but he rarely 
refrained from issuing bold statements and predictions. 
Occasionally, a McCormick prophesy came to fruition and his 
editorial of 8 May 1924 provides an ominous case in point:
144CDT 6&7 May 1924.
145CDT 6 May 1924, P.l.
146It is important to note that although McCormick did not pen most of 
his paper’s editorials, he carefully scrutinized each submission. See 
Edwards, Tribune, pp.23-24 as well as his interview with the author,
May 1995.
147CDT ed. "France and Germany", 8 May 1924.
148Edwards, J., Tribune, P.60.
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Nationalist students, addressing General von Ludendorff 
after his election, said they hoped to be alive on a day 
when he could lead them over the Rhine again. Not all 
Germans would say that now, but France knows that twenty 
years from now there would be few Germans who would not 
respond.149
McCormick also used the May Reichstag elections as a platform 
for his isolationist ideas. He described the League of Nations 
as 'an artificial structure as weak as its component human 
elements' and expressed his fear that U.S. participation in the 
international body would entail American military commitment 
abroad.
What human right has a senatorial graybeard to lay the 
future of a Kansas boy baby on the altar of chance? What 
will concern that boy, when mature enough to be a conscript, 
whether France has more or less territory? It might concern 
him greatly in a given instance and in another not at all. 
That is for the statesmanship of his time to decide.150
Despite McCormick's ideological biases, the Chicago Daily 
Tribune had strikingly similar perspectives on Germany's future 
to those of its ideological rivals, the New York Times and the 
Chicago Daily News, after the Reichstag election of December 
1924 because of the Colonel's new-found optimism about the
Weimar Republic. The Tribune expressed 'deep and sincere
gratification at the increased political and economic strength 
of the German state' .151 The German people appear to have gained 
credibility in McCormick's eyes because of the electoral defeats 
of the ultra-Right and especially of the Communists. As a
result, the paper agreed with its rival, the Chicago Daily News,
that it was incumbent on England and France to relieve 'the
149CDT ed. "France and Germany", 8 May 1924.
150Ibid.
151CDT ed. "Germany", 9 Dec. 1924.
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moral strain placed upon [Germany]' which would in turn weaken 
'the efforts of belligerent extremists of either the communist 
or nationalist brand' .152 Moreover, like Ochs and Lawson, 
McCormick now felt that ' the skies are brightening over the 
German people, and therefore over central Europe and the 
world1.153 However, this consensus would crumble a few months 
later following the unexpected death of Reich President 
Friedrich Ebert and the nomination of Field Marshal Paul von 
Hindenburg. Once again, it would seemed to American journalists 
that the days of the Weimar Republic were numbered.
* * *
Only the internal memoranda of the Chicago Daily News provide
a detailed look inside the paper's editorial decision-making and 
its impact on news presentation. Contrary to the recollections
of Paul, Edgar and Richard Mowrer, the "man on the spot" did not
enjoy complete autonomy in overseas reporting in 1924.154 The 
evidence suggests that after 1923 the Chicago Daily News Home 
Office tried to influence the tone and tenor of German reporting 
in order to coincide with its sympathetic editorial view towards 
the young republic. Management tended to exert pressure on the 
field correspondent prior to filing and also edited his copy in
152Ibid.
153Ibid. Most segments of the European press exhibited similar optimism. 
See the Literary Digest, 10 January 1925, pp.18-19.
154This upcoming episode provides a clear example of the unreliability of 
journalists' memoirs and recollections, especially those written and 
recalled many years later. For instance, Edgar Mowrer emphasized in 
his memoirs the 'freedom accorded him by CDN editors' (Heald, Vistas 
P.103). The documents from the 1920's and 1930's strongly suggest the 
opposite.
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order to alter the meaning of overseas dispatches after filing 
(known in the trade as "chopping").
These efforts were directed towards Edgar Ansel Mowrer, who 
after his transfer from Rome became the Berlin bureau chief in 
January 1924. Like many of his contemporaries, Mowrer received 
his start in journalism with the outbreak of the First World 
War. Mowrer was an author, philosopher and moral crusader all 
rolled up into one. His colleague John Gunther described him as 
a combination of Lincoln, Shelley and Mohammed.155 Unusually 
intelligent, Gunther also considered him the 'most educated 
American he had ever met' as well as ' the most engaging 
conversationalist' he had ever known. Early in his career, 
Mowrer used his position to promote his own political agenda. 
In 1915 he deliberately and consistently withheld information 
concerning Germany's Belgian relief efforts 'in order to 
heighten the appeal for American aid' .156 After the onset of the 
Great Depression, Mowrer believed that he was on a mission to 
stop Nazism.157 To what degree he let his strongly-held 
ideological beliefs undermine his objectivity in his reporting 
will be the subject of much discussion in this study. What is 
undeniable is that Mowrer's talents were clearly recognized by 
his colleagues and superiors.
Although new to the Berlin post, he quickly acclimated 
himself to his environs and actually improved upon the news
155Gunther, J., "London Diary," December 1935, 7, Gunther Papers, New 
York City as cited in Heald, P. 242.
156Mowrer, E., Triumph and Turmoil as cited in Heald, Vistas, P. 34.
157Diana Mowrer Beliard (daughter of Edgar Mowrer) to the author, 11 July 
1995.
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network established by his predecessor, Hiram Moderwell.158 
Unlike some other American journalists in Germany, Mowrer spoke 
fluent German and thus was able to establish a great number of 
news contacts.159 He would earn his reputation as a solid "beat 
reporter" with excellent writing skills. However, his 
'temperamental' ,160 'spirited and mercurial personality'161 as well 
as his rigidly held political and journalistic views conflicted 
with Daily News management, specifically, Charles Dennis, the 
overseer of the foreign news service.
Dennis was considered by some as 'the most meticulous editor 
of his era' and one 'who demanded a high degree of care on the 
part of all those who worked for him' ,162 Hal O'Flaherty (who 
later became the paper's European service head) recalled a 
legendary incident where Dennis's editing axed 297 words out of 
a 300-word piece written by one of his staff writers.163 Edward 
Price Bell was more critical of Dennis. Although he 'liked him 
as a man', Bell thought that Dennis was 'ignorant of foreign 
affairs, prejudiced, slow and vacillating' .164 Dennis, who 
ascribed intelligence, self-discipline and sagacity to the
158E. Mowrer to Dennis, 10 January 1924 and Bell to Dennis, 7 April 1924, 
CDN Papers, Bell to his wife 24 March 1924, Bell Papers, Newberry 
Library.
159Diana Mowrer Beliard to the author, 11 July 1995. Frederick T.
Birchall, who took over the New York Times Berlin bureau in 1932, spoke 
no German.
160Norman Weisbaum (foreign auditor of the CDN 1931-?) to the author,
July 1995. Weisbaum was struck by Mowrer's 'angry' demeanor.
161Heald, Vistas, P.34.
162O'Flaherty to Pryor, 19 August 1962, Paul Mowrer papers, Newberry 
Library.
163Ibid.
164Bell to Strong, 20 September 1926, Bell papers, Ibid.
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"German national character", tended to exaggerate greatly the 
strength of the Weimar Republic. Equally important, however, 
Dennis was schooled in traditional management with its formality 
and hierarchy. Unlike Edgar Mowrer, to Charles Dennis 
journalism was not a collaborative exercise; editorial decisions 
were handed down from the top and were not to be questioned.
Not surprisingly, it did not take long for Mowrer and Dennis
to clash. In the spring of 1924, Mowrer complained to Dennis
about the Home Office's attempt to tone down some of his
dispatches, including Chicago's 'interpolation' of modifying
expressions such as 'it seems' and 'it is alleged'. Mowrer
specifically cited a section from the paper's front page
coverage of the Ludendorff/Hitler treason trial which emanated
from his dispatch entitled "For National Honor".
(An excerpt from Edgar Mowrer's original dispatch): Hitler's 
jingo stock in trade was furnished him by the Entente.
(edited and published version): Hitler's jingo stock in
trade was drawn from his peculiar notions of the treatment 
of Germany by the Entente.165
Mowrer regarded Chicago's 'overcautious' handling of his copy 
as an unnecessary intrusion upon his rights as an on-the-scene 
observer. He firmly held that in instances such as this one 
(which he implied were frequent), the Home office should 'rely 
upon the judgement of the correspondent on-the-spot'. He 
reinforced his point by suggesting that if he sent a 
hypothetical dispatch stating that 'the French or Germans acted 
with great brutality, there [would be] no reason for changing it 
to read, "it is alleged they acted with great brutality"1166
165E. Mowrer to Dennis, 16 April 1924, CDN papers, Newberry Library.
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Mowrer*s dissatisfaction may be why he threatened to resign that 
June.167
Dennis's unusually forceful response seems designed to 
undermine the "man-on-the-spot" theory. He said 'the 
interpolations of "it is alleged" and "it seems"' were necessary 
on occasions where the Home Office believed that 'the 
correspondent was presenting his personal opinions as objective 
facts'.168 Dennis contended that Mowrer committed such a 
violation by suggesting in his original text that Britain and 
France were to blame for Hitler's views. He advised Mowrer to 
limit his commentary to 'what was done or said at any particular 
place or time1 without 'characterizing the deed or words' 
because 'the correspondent cannot afford to be both judge and 
executioner' .169 Dennis seemingly wanted Mowrer to refrain from 
news analysis —  the long-standing raison d'etre of the paper's 
foreign service: 'to explain to our readers not so much what has 
happened, as why it happened, what it means, and above all, what 
it mav lead to.170
But why? Although Dennis did not oppose the idea of news 
analysis per se, he asserted what he saw as management's right 
to present news in accord with the editorial interests of the 
paper. In a letter to Edgar's brother, European service head 
Paul Scott Mowrer, Dennis wrote:
167Bell to his wife, 21 June 1924, Bell Papers, Ibid. Later in the 
decade, Rome correspondent, Carroll Binder had similar problems with 
Dennis and the Home Office. See Binder to his wife, 9 Aug. 1927,
Binder to Dennis 24 Jan. 1928, Dennis to Binder 25 Nov. 1927, 1 April 
1928, Binder Papers Ibid. as cited in Heald, Vistas, P.104.
168Dennis to E. Mowrer, 6 May 1924 Ibid.
169Ibid.
170"Suggestions for Reorganizing the Foreign Service", Paul Mowrer memo,
6 May 1920, Paul Mowrer papers, Ibid.
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We are doing our utmost to be fair to our correspondents and 
yet to be right as we see the right. The question is 
whether we, in Chicago, are in a better position to judge 
these things than our correspondents in European capitals or 
whether we are not. With the utmost faith in those 
correspondents, we cannot help thinking that they do not 
realize certain modifying elements in the great questions 
with which they deal. We are all, wherever we are, doing 
our best to be right, to be just and to serve the Daily News 
in the best possible manner. The thing for us to do is to 
get together on these matters and not to complain about one 
another... We are trying to advance the interests of the 
Daily News every day and are trying to be fair and just to 
our hard-working European correspondents, in whose ability 
and honesty of purpose, we have absolute faith [my 
italics].171
This passage suggests that Dennis was actually more concerned 
about overseas dispatches undermining management's editorial 
views than with the limits of a correspondent's discretion. 
For example, although Mowrer's negative portrayals of Ludendorff 
and Hitler went unquestioned by Dennis, his "For National Honor" 
excerpt was unacceptable to management because it could have 
been inferred that Hitler was justified in his beliefs due to 
England and France's post-war policies. As previously shown, 
Dennis held Hitler in low regard and it can be assumed that he 
had no intention of legitimizing his fascist ideas. Even more 
critically, Dennis may have feared that any condoning of Hitler 
undermined the prestige of the Weimar Republic.
Implicit in his view was that through its news and editorial 
coverage, the Chicago Daily News (or any newspaper for that 
matter) could influence the course of a foreign nation's 
domestic policies. Nor was this view a transient one. Two 
years after the "For National Honor" dispute, Dennis instructed 
Edgar Mowrer 'not to display unnecessary pessimism regarding the
1 7 1
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German people's efforts to maintain a republican system of 
government and not tc prophesy unnecessarily the early 
destruction of that government'.172 One could speculate that 
Dennis's opposition to Mowrer's 1924 dispatch was rooted in the 
dubious notion that negative portrayals of England, France and 
Germany in the pages of the Chicago Daily News could create 
enough discord among those nations' peoples as well as in the 
United States to preclude a long lasting European peace.
Lawson and Dennis pinned their hopes for such a peace on the 
Dawes Plan. The Chicago Daily News mounted what can only be 
described as a small-scale public relations campaign promoting 
the Dawes Plan. The paper's editorial page spoke of the plan as 
'an admirable expression of enlightened men who sought equity 
broadly across national boundaries with scrupulous regard for 
all interests'.173 The Daily News also published a four-column 
front page cartoon which celebrated the results of the May 1924 
Reichstag elections and erroneously predicted that the returns 
clearly indicated a German acceptance of the Dawes Plan.174 In 
addition, management restricted the number of non-Dawes related 
overseas cables in order to focus its efforts on incoming news 
from Germany. Newly appointed Rome correspondent, Hiram 
Moderwell, lamented in the spring of 1924 that 'two cables a 
week on current Italian affairs would exhaust my quota' ,175
179Dennis to E. Mowrer, 8 September 1926, Ibid.
173CDN editorial, 2 May 1924.
174CDN 6 May 1924, P.l The Reichstag actually ratified the Dawes Plan by
a very slim margin.
175Moderwell to Dennis, 17 May 1924, CDN Papers, Newberry Library.
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The Home Office also exerted pressure on the Berlin bureau. 
In the autumn of 1924, Dennis praised Edgar Mowrer for his 
'particularly important1 pro-Dawes dispatches sent 'in 
compliance' with the Home Office's requests. Dennis then 
ordered Mowrer 'to send, between now and the [1924 U.S. 
presidential] election, any other significant developments 
demonstrating the enormous benefit which the Dawes Plan 
unquestionably would bestow upon Germany and the German 
people1 .176
That the Chicago Daily News supported the Dawes Plan is no 
surprise, as most of the mainstream press supported it as well, 
even McCormick's isolationist Tribune.177 The real question is 
why Dennis and Lawson fought for the initiative with such 
intensity. The answer seems to lie less in management's view of 
the plan's merits than in its possible international and 
domestic ramifications.178 Specifically, the evidence strongly 
suggests that the paper's management envisioned the Dawes Plan 
as a springboard for a more interventionist American foreign 
policy, such as future participation in the World Court. On a 
deeper level, the Dawes Plan became a political litmus test in 
the internationalist/isolationist debate. The Chicago Daily 
News took the position that 'excessive fear of broils and 
entanglements had never prevented broils and entanglements and
176Dennis to E. Mowrer, 10 October 1924, Ibid.
177Literary Digest, 8 March and 13 September 1924. Most segments of the 
European press also supported the Dawes Plan. See the Literary Digest, 
24 January 1925.
178In addition, the evidence loosely suggests that Dawes enjoyed the 
personal respect of both CDN management and staff. In fact, Dawes was 
asked to intervene in a labor dispute between the Home Office and the 
Foreign News Service by Edward Price Bell during the spring of 1924.
See Bell to Dawes, 20 May 1924, Bell Papers, Newberry Library.
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never will' .179 In this context, a Wilsonian-minded editorial 
stated:
The effective work and the clarifying principles contributed 
by the American experts for the good of Europe and the 
peace of the world well illustrate the possibilities that 
lie in sincere co-operation by the American government in 
wisely devised agencies for the peaceful settlement of 
international problems. The American people are proud as 
they have a right to be, of the work of General Dawes and 
his associates. They should ask themselves why, at the 
behest of a few self-willed obstructionists in the United 
States senate, civilization should be denied similar 
services henceforth through the world court. Surely these 
obstructionists cannot point to acts of wisdom at home or 
abroad justifying the people's acceptance of them as 
political and moral leaders in the face of the people's own 
longing to be helpful in the cause of world peace.180
The evidence also suggests that management's intense interest 
in the passage of the Dawes Plan could be traced to the paper's 
fear that negative coverage of the plan might undermine 
political stability at home. Lawson and Dennis's fear centered 
on the rise of Robert LaFollette, a senior senator from 
neighboring Wisconsin. The mainstream press of the 1920's 
characterized him as a radical socialist as did the Chicago 
Daily News. LaFollette's popularity had risen among large 
segments of the German-American population because of his 
opposition to U.S. participation in the Great War and to the 
Versailles settlement. The Wisconsin senator had become a 
growing thorn in the side of the Republican establishment, and 
posed a chronic threat to break away and form a viable third 
party (in fact, he ran as an independent candidate in the 1924 
presidential election). The critical moment for LaFollette came 
during the 1924 Republican national convention. Sympathetic to
179CDN editorial, "America and the German Peril", 25 Oct. 1923.
ieoCDN editorial, 2 May 1924.
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Germany's post-war ills as well as to his own constituency, 
LaFollette actively campaigned against the reparations 
adjustment plan of Charles Dawes, the 1924 Republican Vice- 
Presidential nominee.
Dennis regarded LaFollette's anti-Dawes campaign as a 'matter 
of determining importance in the 1924 presidential election' 
because the Wisconsin senator was attempting to trigger a ' far 
reaching revolt [against] the old parties' by bringing 'the 
Dawes Plan [and Dawes himself] "by hook or crook" into as much 
discredit as possible'. To counter 'the considerably effective 
effort to turn German-American voters to LaFollette', Dennis 
wrote his Berlin bureau chief that he knew 'no better way of 
overcoming the falsehoods now so widely circulated than to give 
in convincing detail the facts regarding the benefits, already 
received or in prospect, that Germany is getting from the Dawes 
Plan'.181 In sum, Dennis's actions reflected his belief that a 
failed Dawes Plan would undermine the nation's two-party system 
and benefit a man whom the editor regarded as an extremist.
This examination of the editorial policies and practices of 
the Chicago Daily News also raises questions concerning the 
formulation and objectivity of news stories. The paper's 
managing editor, Henry Justin Smith, had even argued that 'truth 
and interest do not present any contradiction in terms'182, the 
cynical yet prevailing view among many journalists of the 1920's 
and 1930's because of their manipulation by European and 
American government press agencies during the Great War. No
181Dennis to E. Mowrer, 10 October 1924, CDN papers, Newberry Library.
182As quoted in Lou Pryor's unpublished manuscript on the CDN, Paul 
Mowrer Papers, Ibid.
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longer did the "facts speak for themselves" because reporters 
now questioned the validity and objectivity of "the facts". 
Moreover, that most European governments, including Germany, 
maintained their own press agencies following the war in their 
efforts to "win the peace" only served to heighten the 
suspicions of U.S. foreign correspondents during the 1920's. 
Nevertheless, newspapermen relied heavily on government sources 
for information. In one study, Silas Bent demonstrated that 147 
out of 255 news items from a 1926 issue of the New York Times 
emanated from government spokespersons, while in another study, 
Peter Odegard estimated that fifty percent of national and 
international stories from the 1920's originated in public 
relations work.183
The Great War not only revolutionized the way many 
journalists obtained information; it changed the way they 
presented it. European-based correspondents in particular 
believed that a mere regurgitation of "official accounts" was no 
longer satisfactory to keep the American public informed about 
foreign events. Furthermore, they believed that dispassionate 
objective reporting should be jettisoned in favor of subjective 
news analysis. Walter Lippmann, one of America's first 
columnists and a stanch advocate of this view, bluntly stated, 
'show me a man who thinks he's objective and I'll show you a man 
who's deceiving himself'184 while Raymond Gram Swing, who served 
as the Berlin bureau chief for the New York Herald Tribune in 
the early 2 0 's believed that:
183As cited in Schudson, M., Discovering the News: A Social History of 
American Newspapers (New York 1978) P. 144.
184Ibid., P.149.
(81)
If European news is to be comprehensible at all, it has to 
be explained. If it is explained it has to be explained
subjectively. There is no getting around it, the man in 
Europe who is of the most value to his newspaper is the man 
who expresses opinions in his writings. That goes against 
the ethics of the profession, but it is absolutely essential 
to understand that.185
* * *
Despite their different perspectives regarding Germany, both 
Edgar Mowrer and Charles Dennis saw their roles as something far 
greater than mere recorders of events. Mowrer sought to alert 
the American public to the fact that the Weimar Republic was not 
devoid of de-stabilizing influences, even to the point of 
exaggerating the threat of the radical Right, while Dennis's 
pro-Dawes Plan campaign reflects how the management of the 
Chicago Daily News sought to use the press not only to 
disseminate information but also to facilitate political change. 
Dennis's authority was somewhat mitigated by his adversarial and 
self-righteous Berlin bureau chief who sought to "buck" his 
superiors by asserting his "man-on-the- spot" rights. Despite 
the Home Office's strong riposte, Dennis played management's 
trump card only if a dispatch entailed editorial significance —  
not for the sake of asserting a philosophical right nor even as 
a method of keeping his subordinate in line. This episode also 
illustrates the struggle between editor and reporter in the 
shaping of news. Dennis's attempt to reconcile his 'utmost 
faith' in his field reporters with management's responsibility 
to shape the destiny of the paper —  ' to be right as we see the 
right' —  underscores the sensitivity of this issue. What we 
can conclude is that the final news product, more often than 
not, represented the outcome of a clash of wills between
185Ibid. P.147.
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observer and overseer, the former convinced of his journalistic 
autonomy and the latter of his journalistic authority.
The acceptance of the Dawes Plan failed to reduce the 
friction between the Chicago Daily News Home Office and the 
Berlin bureau. In fact, the election of Hindenburg in 1925 
served only to exacerbate these tensions. The influence of this 
uneasy state of affairs on the paper's German coverage will be 
a prominent feature in the next chapter.
Chapter 3 
The Hindenburg Election and its Aftermath, 1925-28
Historians have often referred to the period of German 
history from the election of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg 
in April 1925 to the Wall Street crash in October 1929 as the 
Weimar Republic’s "golden era" and "years of illusion".186 Such 
labels illustrate the disparity between a rosy view of German 
life and its more sober, problematic reality. Following 
Hindenburg's victory, most segments of the mainstream American 
press including the New York Times, Chicago Daily Tribune and 
Chicago Daily News tended to highlight the former while 
de-emphasizing the latter.
Between 1925 and 1929, the Weimar Republic experienced its 
greatest stability since the Great War. Unlike the continual 
state of unrest which characterized its early years, the Germany 
of the latter half of the 1920's enjoyed an unprecedented period 
of political tranquillity. In the only Reichstag election held 
during this period (1928), the Nazis fared even worse than they 
did in 1924, garnering a mere 2.6% of the vote, while the 
staunchest supporter of Weimar democracy, the German Social 
Democratic party (SPD), increased its vote to 30%, nearly double 
that of its closest numerical rival, the Catholic Centre Party. 
Many sectors of the German economy also rebounded. In 1928 
industrial production exceeded pre-war levels for the first 
time.187 Moreover, whereas Germany began 1925 as a net importer
186See for instance, Marks, Illusion Chapter 4 and Childers, Nazi Voter, 
Chapter 3.
187Berghahn, Modern Germany, Table #7, P. 276.
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of goods, she ended 1929 with a favorable balance of trade.188 
Cultural life, too, flourished during these years as Berlin 
competed with Paris as Europe's leading tourist attraction. 
Germany's domestic tranquillity also facilitated a period of 
detente with her neighbors. Following the passage of the Dawes 
Plan, Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann signed the Locarno 
treaties, paving the way for German entry into the League of 
Nations in September 1926. In the spring of 1929, Germany's 
efforts to reduce her reparations burden resulted in the more 
lenient Young Plan.189 Collectively, these events contributed to 
a reversal in the mind-set of many American journalists. 
Whereas in the first half of the 1920's many correspondents 
believed that Germany was on the brink of disintegration, by 
1928 most felt that the Weimar Republic had outgrown its 
troubled beginnings and was well on its way to becoming the best 
that western democracy had to offer.190
However, these signs of stability coincided with indications 
to the contrary. Hindenburg's presidential election victory 
provided evidence that despite Germany's defeat in the Great 
War, the prestige of her anti-republican German military 
remained untarnished.191 Likewise, the narrow defeat of 
parliamentarian Wilhelm Marx not only reflected Hindenburg's 
personal popularity —  it also indicated a growing feeling of
188Ibid., Table #10, P.279.
18 9See Marks, Illusion, op. cit. For a less anti-German and more balanced 
view of the reparations issue, see Kent Spoils.
190For a detailed discussion of other segments of the U.S. press, see 
Schoenthal, "American Attitudes", Chapter 11.
1 91
See Carsten, F.L. The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918-1933 (Oxford 1966) 
pp.249-50.
(85)
disillusionment among the German electorate with the Weimar 
system in general.192 And although many observers believed that 
the rejection of the political extremes in the Reichstag 
elections that followed three years later legitimized social 
democracy, a closer examination of the balloting reveals trends 
which seem to contradict this view. In fact, the percentage of 
votes garnered by political parties loyal to the Weimar Republic 
fell to its lowest level since the hyperinflation/stabilization 
election of May 1924.193 Instead of recapturing votes lost in the 
1924 elections, the "system" parties lost out to an eclectic 
collection of special interest groups. And whereas their 
individual constituencies and agendas differed greatly, these 
anti-Marxist middle-class parties of discontent shared the 
belief that the Weimar Republic should be abolished. Not 
surprisingly, the Nazis were able to draw a great deal of 
support from these groups in their breakthrough election of 
September 1930.194
Economically, although German heavy industry rebounded during 
these "Golden Years", other economic sectors such as agriculture 
and small business never fully recovered from their immediate 
post-war ills. The 1928 per capita income of farmers fell 44%
192Jurgen Falter has even argued that Hitler's electoral constituency of 
1930-32 was virtually identical to that Hindenburg's 1925 coalition.
It is worth bearing in mind, however, that Childers has shown that the 
social composition of Nazi support varied between 1930 and 1932, thus 
somewhat undermining Falter's contention. See Falter, J. Hitler's 
Wahler (Munich 1991).
193Childers, Nazi Voter, Table 3.1, P. 125.
194Ibid., pp. 125-27, See also Jones, L. "The Dissolution of the
Bourgeois Party System in the Weimar Republic" in Bessel & Feuchtwanger 
Social Change, and Sturmer, M. "Parliamentary Government in Weimar 
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below the national average while the number of retail 
bankruptcies actually rose between 1924 and 1928.195 Even more 
important, Weimar's economic success was still predicated on a 
continuous influx of short-term U.S. loans —  a fact that became 
quickly apparent after "Black Tuesday" on Wall Street. Even 
Germany's cultural revival was a mixed blessing. Far from 
appreciating the opportunities afforded to them by the Weimar 
system, many artists and intellectuals used their new-found 
freedom to mock the fledgling republic.196
Most ominous, however, was the social penetration of the 
Nazis into mainstream aspects of German life. This was most 
evident among the intellectual and student populations. Despite 
receiving a paltry 2.6% of the 1928 electoral vote, the Nazis 
became one of the most popular extracurricular clubs on 
Germany's university campuses. In addition, a
disproportionately high percentage of secondary school teachers 
and college professors supported the rabid nationalism and anti­
modernism of Hitler's party. Finally, the pseudo-scientific 
rationale behind Nazi racial theories found a noticeable number 
of adherents in Germany's medical community.197 Thus, despite the 
various stabilizing trends between 1925 and 1929, the political,
195Childers, Ibid., pp.143-45. See also Gessner, D. "The Dilemma of 
German Agriculture During the Weimar Republic" in Bessel and 
Feuchtwanger, Social Change.
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social and economic foundations of the Weimar Republic were well 
on their way to being undermined prior to the Great Depression.
* * *
This chapter will seek to explain why the New York Times. 
Chicago Daily News and Chicago Daily Tribune tended to highlight 
the successes of the Weimar Republic during this period while 
ignoring many of its disturbing trends. As in the cases of the 
Beer Hall Putsch and the Hitler/Ludendorff treason trial, the 
archival documentation on the Hindenburg election and its 
aftermath varies from publication to publication. Most notable 
is the complete lack of relevant papers in the New York Times 
archive. The situation concerning the Tribune is slightly 
better, although many of the documents tend to raise more 
questions than provide answers. As noted in the first two 
chapters, the Chicago Daily News has the most internal 
correspondence pertaining to the mid-1920's. However, these 
documents address the coverage of the 1925 campaign only 
indirectly.
Nevertheless, one may conclude that the support for the 
Weimar Republic among all three newspapers after the December 
1924 Reichstag election was stronger than after the initial 
shock of Hindenburg's 1925 victory. Germany's image benefited 
from an increase in anti-French sentiment.198 More important, 
however, the lack of systemic change following Hindenburg's 
victory indicated the Republic's ability to withstand yet 
another seemingly irresistible assault on its parliamentary 
foundations.
198Schoenthal, "Attitudes", Chapter Eleven.
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Consequently, the New York Times. Chicago Daily News and the 
Chicago Daily Tribune were able to provide a credible rationale 
for their ever-growing faith in the fortitude and resiliency of 
the Weimar Republic. The poor showing of the ultra-Right and 
ultra-Left in the 1928 Reichstag elections confirmed their 
views. This optimistic evaluation of Germany's status may 
explain why each newspaper failed to acknowledge the growing 
popular discontent with the Weimar Republic and the penetration 
of the Nazi movement into Germany's social spheres after 
Hindenburg's victory. Although there were exceptions, the 
pattern of asymmetry that had developed in 1923 between the 
press's forebodings and what actually happened was reinforced by 
the frenetic nature of the Hindenburg/Marx campaign coverage.
* * *
At the end of 1924, most segments of the American and the 
European press regarded Germany as 'definitely out of danger' 
because the Weimar Republic had withstood challenges from both 
the ultra Right and Left in that year's December elections.199 
While the unexpected resignation of Chancellor Wilhelm Marx's 
cabinet one week later failed to alter this view, the new 
ministry of Dr. Hans Luther did create some anxiety among 
American newspapermen, not because the incoming leaders wanted 
to reorient policies, but rather because of the ministry's large 
conservative contingent. The Manchester Union (NH) contended 
that the new cabinet was 'designed to be merely a bridge over 
which the Monarchists could march to a restoration' while The 
Evening World (NY) characterized the Luther government as 'the
1 99 See Literary Digest 10 January 1925, pp.18-19.
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first monarchistic, reactionary regime Germany had had since the 
Republic's founding in 1918'. 200 Much of the American press's 
anxiety, however, centered upon the Luther cabinet's prospects 
for longevity or lack thereof. James Cox's Davton News (Ohio) 
doubted whether Dr. Luther's 'weak and tame' cabinet was 
'destined for a long term in public office'. In sharp contrast, 
the New York Times led the forces of optimism by claiming that 
Luther himself 'would tolerate no effort on the part of the 
reactionaries to undermine the German Republic' .201
Only the most pessimistic of journalists posited that the 
inauguration of the Luther ministry on 19 January signalled the 
immediate end of parliamentary democracy in Germany through a 
restoration of the Hohenzollern or Wittelsbach monarchies. The 
unexpected death of Reich President Friedrich Ebert one month 
later, however, touched off an editorial debate on the viability 
of the Weimar Republic. Now, 'autocracy has been given a great 
opportunity' wrote the Richmond Times-Dispatch. The Cleveland 
Plain Dealer contended that the monarchic and reactionary 
elements were stronger than they had ever been despite their 
poor showing in the Reichstag elections three months earlier.202 
The pessimism of these newspapers was rooted in their belief 
that Ebert had established himself as the linchpin upon which 
German democracy rested. The Evening World claimed that Ebert 
would go down in history as 'Germany's Lincoln' because of his 
'courage, genius for conciliation, consummate tact, superiority 
to purely party considerations, audacity and devotion to
200Ibid. 7 February 1925, pp. 12-13.
201Ibid. Cox was also the Democratic presidential nominee in 1920.
202Ibid. 14 March 1925, pp.14-15.
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democratic institutions, as well as his untimely death after 
'piloting his country through the raging seas of 
reconstruction1. 'As long as Ebert was president', the 
Cleveland Plain Dealer stated, 'there was a wholesome influence 
for honesty and sanity at the top of German affairs; now there 
is distressing uncertainty' .203
These ominous messages were countered by more reassuring ones 
from an eclectic collection of publications which included 
Ochs's internationalist New York Times and Hearst's isolationist 
New York American. The Schenectady Union-Star's (NY) view that 
Germany's worst days were behind her captured this optimistic 
spirit:
During the bloodless revolution in government, Germany 
endured unemployment. It saw its currency debased. Its 
people were impoverished. It was victimized by the few who 
profited at the expense of many; but the ideal of self- 
government prevailed. It will not be overthrown. There 
will be no return of monarchy. The Deutsches Reich will 
stand. It has seen sound currency restored. It has passed 
the critical point. Henceforth, it will rise. The storm 
and stress period has passed.204
The optimism of the Times and others was partially rooted in 
the erroneous belief that ' the monarchic Right lacked any 
outstanding figure'. While Joseph Shaplen of the New York 
Herald Tribune (who will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five) 
conceded that the upcoming presidential campaign would 'be a 
bitter one', T.R. Ybarra, his rival at the Times, suggested that 
the only scenario that would result in a right-wing victory 
would be a split within the Republican bloc between the 




advanced age of the pool of World War One military leaders from 
which the conservatives might launch a candidate precluded 
elderly men such as von Mackensen, von Tirpitz and most 
important, von Hindenburg, from running for office.205 This 
assumption probably led the London Sunday Times(UK) to predict 
that the conservatives would nominate the far less formidable 
Hans Luther. Finally, unlike those publications that expressed 
the belief that Ebert's death 'revived the ambitions of the 
monarchists', the New York Times claimed that a Republican 
success at the polls would be made 'more likely by the general 
sympathy in Germany for Ebert's memory'.206
* * *
The death of President Ebert on 28 February 1925 unofficially 
inaugurated a two-month period of campaigning and political 
manoeuvering. The presidential campaign received almost daily 
attention in the New York Times. Chicago Daily Tribune and 
Chicago Daily News. As in the case of the Beer Hall Putsch, the 
election's media appeal was multifarious in nature —  it seemed 
to offer something for everyone. Germany's first presidential 
election featured two ballotings (29 March and 25 April), a 
colorful slate of candidates (which included Erich Ludendorff 
and Clara Zetkin from the political extremes) and unexpected 
developments, most notably von Hindenburg's entry into the race 
on 8 April. Notwithstanding these elements, the campaign's 
overriding theme was the fate of the Republic. Much of the 
analysis of the New York Times. Chicago Daily Tribune and
205NYT, 3 March 1925, P.l.
206Ibid.
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Chicago Daily News centered on the possibility that Weimar 
Germany would give way to the forces of reaction and monarchy.
'Where is a man willing to be president of Germany and strong 
enough to save the country from the tidal wave of monarchism 
threatening the Republic?1 questioned John Clayton, the Chicago 
Daily Tribune's chief Berlin bureau correspondent, shortly 
following President Ebert's death. For all three newspapers, 
the answer lay in ex-Chancellor Wilhelm Marx, whom Edward Price 
Bell of the Chicago Daily News compared with Goethe and 
Schiller. 207 Marx's poor third place showing behind Dr. Karl 
Jarres (the nationalist candidate who later vacated his 
nomination to von Hindenburg) and Otto Braun (the socialist 
candidate) in the first balloting held on 29 March failed to 
undermine their confidence; in fact, each newspaper had 
predicted the correct outcome days before the election. 
Undeterred by Marx's performance, Thomas Ybarra, the New York 
Times's recently appointed chief Berlin bureau correspondent, 
along with Edgar Mowrer of the Chicago Daily News, maintained 
the results 'showed that the supporters of the German Republic 
will defeat the monarchists four weeks hence' as long as they 
back one candidate 'which will almost certainly be ex-Chancellor 
Marx' ,208
Prior to Hindenburg's entry, the predictions from the New 
York Times and the Chicago Daily Tribune for a Marx triumph 
appear to have been rooted in a quantitative analysis of the 
March 29 vote: the collective totals of the pro-Republican bloc 
narrowly exceeded that of the collective totals of the right-
207Bell to Dennis, 27 March 1924, Bell Papers, Newberry Library.
208CDN 30 March 1925, P.2, NYT Ibid.
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wing parties. However, their forecast of a Marx victory 
following the announcement of Hindenburg's candidacy seems based 
on dubious logic and wishful thinking. It may surprise the 
reader that both the New York Times and the Chicago Daily 
Tribune characterized the venerated war leader's nomination as 
'a confession of weakness' by Germany's right-wing coalition 
which would ultimately 'injure its chances of victory'.209 The 
Times's T.R. Ybarra added that 'Hindenburg's chances for victory 
will be greatly reduced by voters afraid of international 
complications' as well as 'by the skepticism of some voters to 
lend support to a seventy-seven year old man' .210 Times 
management concurred; on the eve of the final balloting, the 
paper predicted that Hindenburg's military experience would act 
against him, arguing that 'the field marshal though a hero, is 
after all, a hero of a lost war'.211
The stance taken by the New York Times and Chicago Daily 
Tribune towards the Hindenburg candidacy reflected the minority 
of press opinion. H.L. Mencken's Baltimore Sun reflected the 
general consensus that the nomination of the Field Marshal 1 is 
by no means as stupid as it appears at first glance' because the 
move would probably bolster the Bavarian vote and may detach the 
more radical elements from the republican bloc to the communist 
camp.212 The Minneapolis Tribune asserted that 'the German people 
regard Hindenburg much as American southerners regard Robert E. 
Lee', both of whose reputations emerged untarnished despite
209CDT, 7 April 1925. P.5.
210NYT Ibid.
211"The German Election", NYT editorial, 25 April 1925.
212Literary Digest, 25 April 1925.
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defeats in war.213 In a similar vein, the Columbus Ohio State 
Journal equated Hindenburg's popularity with the more broad- 
based appeal of Ulysses S. Grant prior to his 1868 presidential 
victory.214 'Simply put', in the opinion of the Brooklyn Eagle. 
'Paul von Hindenburg is the most popular figure in Germany and 
the strongest candidate the Nationalists could have put forth1 ,215
Hindsight confirms the majority view of the American press 
regarding Hindenburg's nomination and exposes the flawed 
arguments of the New York Times and Chicago Daily Tribune. 
Certainly von Hindenburg was a far stronger conservative 
candidate than Karl Jarres, the victor in the balloting of 29 
March. It is interesting to note that all three newspapers 
foresaw the dumping of Jarres despite his victory in the first 
election,216 although the Tribune was far more consumed with the 
prospective candidacy of the Crown Prince-in-exile and even that 
of his seventeen year old son.217
The New York Times and Chicago Daily Tribune1s 
underestimation of Hindenburg's appeal could probably be traced 
to their overestimation of the German voters' loyalty to the 
Weimar Republic. John Clayton described the aged field marshal 
as the 'plaything of [conservative] politicians who speaks like 




216See for instance, NYT 31 March 1925 and the CDN 6 April 1925.
217For a discussion of how other newspapers played this angle, see 
Schoenthal, "American Attitudes", P.218.
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would 'not be equal to the duties of the office which he 
seeks',218 Both newspapers viewed Hindenburg as nothing more than 
a symbol behind which lay the intrigues of his monarchistic 
handlers and assumed that German voters would think likewise; 
hence, 'the stronger must be the impulse of the masses who 
believe in a republic to work together to insure its 
maintenance' .219
The "chill of apprehension" that fell across Europe and 
America immediately following Hindenburg's victory on 26 April 
must have been icy for the New York Times and Chicago Daily 
Tribune since they had predicted a defeat for the field marshal 
with a stronger degree of certainty than other publications. 
The New York Times, having placed the most confidence in a Marx 
victory, expressed unmitigated dismay at the results. Its 
editorial, "Germany Takes the Plunge" indicted the so-called 
German character. Instead of following the 'sound arguments' 
against electing Hindenburg —  he was ' too old to discharge the 
duties of his office with vigor' and 'too much under suspicion 
of royalist leanings' —  the Times alleged that the German 
people acted with 'impulsive and unreasoning enthusiasm' in 
their choice.220 Whereas the Times had praised the character of 
the German people during republican triumphs such as the failed 
Beer Hall Putsch and the 1924 Reichstag elections, the paper now 
reverted to its stance taken in response to Ludendorff's
218CDT 18 April 1925, "The New Hindenburg Line", NYT editorial, 6 April 
1925.
219NYT Ibid.
220"Germany Takes the Plunge", NYT editorial, 27 April 1925.
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acquittal; namely, the German mentality was 'notoriously swayed 
easily by sentiment' .221
The motives behind the unusually strident "Germany Takes the
Plunge" may have been more self-serving than sincere, for if
Rollo Ogden and the rest of his editorial board were convinced
that a vote for Hindenburg reflected a collective "German
mentality", prone to impulsive and irrational tendencies, why
then did management believe that a Marx victory was virtually
assured? Lacking pertinent internal memoranda, the answer is
open to speculation. Nonetheless, blaming the German people
seems to have provided a convenient rationale for the paper's
faulty prediction. Moreover, the New York Times offered a
similar explanation for the German citizenry's electoral support
of the Nazis in the 1930's. Finally, the paper
uncharacteristically expressed pessimism concerning the future
of Germany and Europe.
The fact cannot be concealed that Germany has chosen to run 
an enormous risk, that she invites unsettlement at home and 
abroad and that the German people will have to begin over 
again their struggle to convince the world that they believe 
in the new order and that they can be trusted in their
promises and purposes.222
* * *
On election eve the Chicago Daily Tribune had also forecast 
a Marx victory, partly because it believed that 'the German 
voters do not want a military figure in the president's chair' ,223 
McCormick may have relied upon the optimistic analysis of John 
Clayton, his chief Berlin correspondent, instead of Sigrid
221ibid.
222ibid.
223"The World Watches Germany", CDT editorial, 25 April 1925.
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Schultz, Clayton's deputy. Schultz had argued that 'the 
nationalists would have a better chance of electing their man in 
the second election than either the Socialists or the Socialists 
and center parties combined' .224 To be noted is that McCormick 
reassigned Clayton to the Tribune's Rome bureau before the year 
ended. Although McCormick emphasized to Clayton the importance 
of Italy as a news center, his decision should be considered a 
demotion, especially in light of Clayton's attempts to transfer 
Schultz to the same post. 225 The evidence suggests that McCormick 
may have grown dissatisfied with Clayton's performance despite 
his good work in 1923.226 Clayton's mistaken forecast regarding 
the 1925 presidential election may have been the final straw.
What is clear is that other overseas journalists felt that 
Clayton had delegated many of his administrative 
responsibilities to Schultz. Charles S. Smith, a London-based 
Associated Press correspondent, described Schultz's promotion to 
Berlin bureau chief as a 'change in title alone' for she had 
been 'the man behind the guns for a long, long time'.227 
Schultz's ability to forecast events accurately may be part of 
the reason why she held her position in Berlin for sixteen 
years, longer than most of her contemporaries.228
224Schultz to McCormick, 13 March 1925, Schultz Papers, State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin.
225McCormick to Clayton, 25 November 1925, Ibid.
226McCormick to Clayton, 16 June 1923, Ibid.
227Smith to Schultz, 23 Feb. 1926, Ibid.
228As an important aside, the evidence indicates that McCormick's sexist 
views —  he once wrote Schultz, 'you are a woman doing a man's job' but 
'I will treat you as a woman' —  did not diminish his high regard for 
her and her views, particularly those on a possible restoration of the 
Hohenzollern monarchy. Except for the instance cited above, the 
available correspondence between the two does not show any explicit or 
implicit references to gender. See McCormick to Schultz, 31 January
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Unlike the New York Times, which throughout the campaign
consistently maintained that a Hindenburg government would have
deleterious effects upon Germany and the world, the Chicago
Daily Tribune clearly modified its view following the field
marshal's victory on 25 April 1925.
Editorial, 10 April: To thrust Hindenburg forward for the 
presidency of the German Republic is to wave a red flag in 
the face of every enemy of Germany in Europe, reinvigorate 
the parties and leaders most hostile to her in every 
country, give new life to the accusations of German 
belligerency and bad faith and rouse distrust in well 
disposed America.229
Editorial, 27 April: It remains to be seen what the
Nationalists will do when they are no longer making election 
speeches, but are faced with responsibility for their 
acts... It would be a mistake to presume that Hindenburg's 
election will prove catastrophic either for Europe or for 
us... Those who think that Hindenburg*s election will be 
followed inevitably by a general European conflict are 
unduly alarmed. . .230
What can be gleaned from these changes in McCormick's 
editorial positions? As in the case of the New York Times, the 
issue is open for speculation. However, a Tribune editorial 
published one day before Hindenburg's victory entitled "America 
and the German Election" may have provided an explanation when 
it stated that 'America and Americans have no legitimate 
interest in Germany's internal affairs... if the consequences of 
this election were confined to Germany we could view it with 
indifference'.231 Moreover, in McCormick's post-election 
analysis, he said that Germany might face wholesale domestic
1928, Ibid.
22 9"Hindenburg1s Nomination", CDT editorial, 10 April 1925.
230,1The German Election", Ibid. 27 April 1925.
"America and the German Election" CDT editorial, 24 April 1925.
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changes (i.e. a monarchic restoration) but without international 
complications. This outlook seems too conveniently predicated 
on his desire to keep America disengaged from events in Europe. 
By his initial effort to sensationalize the Hindenburg story, 
McCormick may have undercut his own isolationist aims regarding 
America's role in Europe. Thus, McCormick's unusually mild 
reaction to Hindenburg's victory may have had less to do with 
his political analysis of Germany and more with his foreign 
policy goals for the United States.
* * *
Compared to the Chicago Daily Tribune and the New York Times, 
the Chicago Daily News gave the most balanced appraisal of 
Hindenburg's electoral chances. As in the case of the Tribune, 
the Chicago Daily News Home Office appeared to rely upon the 
analysis of its chief Berlin bureau correspondent for its 
editorial views, a practice which would become rare by the end 
of the decade.232 However, unlike John Clayton, Edgar Mowrer 
acknowledged the breadth of Hindenburg's appeal. Said Mowrer,
'Hindenburg would attract a large number of Germans who were 
proud of his patriotism and war record' and therefore to 'look 
for a close election'. 233 Nor was the field marshal's appeal 
limited to veterans and militarists. 'Germany's greatest leader 
at her greatest time seems to attract the favor of womankind,
poo
"Tomorrow's Election in Germany", CDN editorial, 26 April 1925.
Dennis once wrote to Carroll Binder, an editorial writer, 'It is my 
infrequently [my italics] expressed desire that our editorial writers 
keep in close touch with our own special news dispatches, and whenever 
it is possible, refer specifically to them.' Dennis to Binder, 29 
September 1930, Binder Papers, Newberry Library. As I will show in 
Chapter 4, Dennis failed to "practice what he preached".
233CDN 9 April 1925, P.2.
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from little girls to old ladies' because 'German politics is 
largely emotional' ,234 Based on this reasoning, Mowrer could only 
'venture to guess that Marx [would] win by a small plurality'.235 
Charles Dennis and the Home Office concurred with Mowrer's 
assessment of the race through election eve, agreeing that the 
issue was whether the people of Germany 'wanted the monarchy 
restored or desired to continue living under a republic' ,236 
After Hindenburg's victory, however, the long-standing 
ideological rift between Dennis and Mowrer surfaced once again.
The Home Office and the Berlin bureau held opposing views 
regarding the impact of Hindenburg's victory. Lawson and Dennis 
were extremely optimistic about the future of the Weimar 
Republic, stating that international complications would not 
result from the field marshal's election. It would not even 
'defeat or unduly delay the proposed European security compact 
(Locarno) or the entry of Germany in the League of Nations'. 
Thus, the Chicago Daily News editorials went further than 
McCormick's Tribune. Moreover, a monarchical restoration was 
unlikely because ' the Reichstag and the people of Germany are 
aware of sinister [right-wing] intentions and will be able to 
prevent retrogressive steps'. 237 Privately, Dennis 'could not 
believe that serious minded Germans with their great industrial 
masses would permit themselves to return with any degree of
234Ibid. It is interesting to note that many journalists of the interwar 
era equated irrational thought processes with female voting patterns.
235Ibid. 25 April 1925.
236,,Tomorrow's Election in Germany", CDN editorial, 26 April 1925.
237Ibid.
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permanence to monarchy and militarism 1 . 238 The paper concluded 
that ’nothing is to be gained by making gloomy prophecies 
regarding the official actions of Field Marshal von 
Hindenburg' ,239
Edgar Mowrer's position,' however, reeked with ’gloomy 
prophecies'. His dispatches immediately following the election 
seemed to indicate that he initially met management half-way, 
stating that the future for Germany was 'uncertain',240 Privately 
though, Mowrer assessed Hindenburg's election as 'a terrible 
mistake such as only the Germans were capable of' .241 Moreover, 
the archival evidence is convincing of his belief that the 
Hindenburg presidency spelled impending doom for the Weimar 
Republic —  a view that he maintained through 1927 and perhaps 
longer.242
As was argued in the previous chapter, the Chicago Daily News 
mounted a small-scale public relations campaign in 1924 in order 
to promote the Weimar Republic. The campaign's immediate goals 
centered on securing public support for the Dawes Plan and 
discrediting Robert LaFollette, an effort that continued into 
the second half of the 1920's. As in 1924, the Home Office 
persistently attempted to bring its Berlin chief "into line". 
Mowrer, however, exhibited fierce individualism in his dealings
238Dennis to E. Mowrer, 25 November 1925, CDN Papers, Ibid.
239Ibid.
240CDN, 26 April 1925, P.l. Another possibility is that Mowrer's 
dispatch may have been "softened" by Home Office editors.
241E . Mowrer to Dennis, 27 April 1925, CDN Papers, Newberry Library.
242See for example, Dennis to O'Flaherty, 13 April 1925, Dennis to E.
Mowrer, 20 November 1925 and 8 Sept. 1926, Dennis to P. Mowrer, 31
August 1926, Ibid.
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with management, often making comments that most of his
contemporaries would consider disrespectful. Edgar Mowrer's
job, however, never appeared to be in jeopardy, perhaps due to
the influence of his brother, Paul Scott Mowrer, the paper's
European service head. Finally, Edgar Mowrer's journalistic
talents were recognized by other publications. He frequently
contributed free-lance pieces to magazines and later wrote his
first book, aptly entitled, Germany Turns the Clock Back (New
York 1932). Although these works lay outside the strict
editorial scrutiny of the Home Office, they met with more than
a passing glance from Dennis. His reaction to one article
typified his general attitude towards Edgar Mowrer:
I note a tendency on Edgar's part to deal cynically with 
German subjects. He recently wrote an article for The 
Nation, of New York, that has caused us to receive protests 
from friends of Germany and in his correspondence for us we 
find indications that he is not exactly constructive in what 
he writes. I feel that there is something wrong with his 
psychology in Berlin and his correspondence suffers in 
consequence.243
The Dennis/Edgar Mowrer clash intensified at the end of 1924 
when Chicago Daily News management renewed a long-standing 
effort to shift the emphasis of overseas reporting from 
political stories ("hard news") to exclusive feature stories 
("soft news"). 244 The Home Office's initial bid to reorient news 
policy was sidetracked by the Great War and its peculiar 
aftermath. Moreover, its efforts met with determined resistance 
from Edward Price Bell, the paper's senior foreign 
correspondent, and Paul Scott Mowrer, the paper's European
243Dennis to O'Flaherty, 13 April 1925, CDN Papers, Ibid.
244Ibid., 18 November 1924. For a comprehensive discussion of Home 
Office/Foreign Service relations, see Heald, Vistas, Chapter 5.
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service head, both of whom specialized in political and 
international affairs. Paul Mowrer considered 'erroneous', 
'management's idea that people who are not interested in foreign 
affairs can be so interested by our writing "entertainment" 
instead of serious information and opinion' ,245
Furthermore, Mowrer and Bell interpreted the Home Office's 
directive as part of a coordinated effort to undermine the de 
facto autonomy of the paper's foreign news service. Their fears 
were heightened by management's demand that overseas reporters 
keep a meticulous accounting of company expenses incurred in 
their news gathering.246 Bell took the matter quite personally 
and even threatened to resign. In a scathing letter to Lawson 
he stated that the paper's policy amounted to nothing more than 
'fruitless scrutineering [sic]' which 'depresses ambition, 
stifles initiative and puts a premium on indolence',247 Indeed, 
Paul Mowrer relinquished his post in disgust (though he stayed 
on with the paper) on 31 May 1924. His departure, along with 
Lawson's unexpected death fifteen months later, led to a renewed 
effort by Charles Dennis and the Home Office to exercise even 
tighter control over its foreign news service.248
Dennis filled the resulting power vacuum by appointing Hal 
O'Flaherty as the new director of the Chicago Daily News's
245P. Mowrer to Bell, 15 April 1920, Bell papers, Ibid.
246There are many references in the archives concerning this issue. See
for instance, Bell to his wife, 12 May 1924, Ibid. and Dennis to P. 
Mowrer, 12 March, 11 April, 19 May 1924, CDN papers, Ibid.
247Bell to Lawson, 11 May 1924, Bell Papers, Ibid. See also Bell to his 
wife, 12 May 1924, Ibid.
248P. Mowrer to Lawson, 31 May 1924, Ibid. The bitterness of Mowrer’s 
statement to Lawson leaves no ambiguity: 'Please do not believe that 
the humiliating and demoralizing incidents of the last few months are 
wholly responsible for this decision.' See also, P. Mowrer to all
correspondents, 21 August 1924, CDN papers, Ibid.
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European service. Although O'Flaherty was highly regarded by 
the staffs on both sides of the Atlantic, 249 he sided with 
management on the "hard news"/"soft news" issue. He believed 
that the implementation of the Dawes plan in the Autumn of 1924 
'closed the book' on the Great War and signalled the opening of 
a 'new epoch in news gathering' , 250 'Discursive political stories 
in which the public on both sides of the Atlantic have lost 
interest' should be avoided, while 'news stories that are 
exclusive and of real interest' should be emphasized.251 Although 
O'Flaherty acknowledged that 'we might find some of our men 
unwilling to change their style or adopt [sic] themselves to 
these new conditions', he was confident that 'our men in Europe 
will automatically cut out the political dispatches and turn to 
more readable news'.252
The Chicago Daily News's "soft news" initiative was fuelled 
by business considerations. Management had hoped to expand its 
readership in the face of stiff competition from the more 
"scoop" oriented Chicago Daily Tribune and Hearst's Chicago 
American.253 Lawson had felt that 'overseas political stories no 
longer appealed to the interest of Chicago readers as did news 
stories of a more striking nature' , 254 He had refused to publish
249Nicholas Shuman to the author, 10 June 1995. Shuman claimed that 'it 
was impossible to have a quarrel with O'Flaherty1.
250O'Flaherty to Dennis, 22 December 1924, CDN Papers, Ibid.
251Ibid.
2 52 Ibid.
25Management's "soft news" strategy extended into the domestic sphere as 
evidenced by Lawson's expansion of the paper's sports coverage. See
Lawson to Dennis, 21 May 1925, Lawson Papers Ibid.
254Dennis to O'Flaherty, 18 November 1924, Ibid.
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Clemenceau's memoirs in March 1925 because 'the American reading
public taken as a whole is not now interested in Clemenceau' ,255
Management's initiative made its strongest impact on foreign
correspondents' mail articles. Unlike a cable dispatch, which
contained breaking news and was usually politically-oriented, a
mail article afforded the reporter an opportunity to intensely
analyze his country's overall state of affairs. When Paul
Mowrer headed the European news service, management felt that a
number of mail articles were nothing more than political
elaborations heaped upon previously sent politically-oriented
cable dispatches. After Mowrer's resignation in June 1924, the
Home Office brought direct pressure upon each bureau chief to
de-emphasize the political aspect of mail articles and to focus
more on "human interest" features. Those correspondents who
resisted the new approach met with caustic ripostes from
Chicago. Dennis's scolding of Constantine Brown, who served in
the Constantinople and Paris bureaux, provides one such example:
You have undoubtedly paid too much attention to politics and 
too little attention to the human element in news... The 
earnest and persistent work of a correspondent who seeks 
always for important news and is satisfied with nothing less 
is bound to be more profitable to the newspaper than the 
work of a correspondent who is satisfied with surface 
material and his own philosophical reflections upon the 
political situation in his country [my italics].256
Management's policy indicated that the paper had expanded its 
definition of "newsworthy information" to include virtually any 
story that in their view would pique the reader's interest. 
This market-driven philosophy of journalism changed the way the
055
Lawson to Pickering, 12 March 1925, Lawson Papers, Ibid.
256Dennis to Brown, 6 October 1925, CDN Papers, Ibid.
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Chicago Daily News's foreign service reported events in Europe. 
Correspondents were directed to venture outside their country's 
respective capitals so as to provide the reader with a tourist's 
perspective. Although the subject matter of "soft news" varied 
from nation to nation, the Home Office encouraged its 
correspondents to cover the doings of royalty, a topic which 
fascinates Americans to this day. 257 Management's "soft news" 
policy had far-reaching repercussions for the paper's German 
coverage. 'Frightful and gruesome criminal trials' were now
placed on an equal footing with 'important political 
developments'.258 In fact, Dennis's instruction to Edgar Mowrer 
was to 'steer clear of politics, which is, after all, a surface 
matter and not very interesting except during times of crisis' .259 
This directive may be why even the pessimistic Mowrer provided 
extensive commentary on the disturbing trends that led to the 
increase in Nazi popularity in his free-lance pieces but not in 
the pages of the Chicago Daily News.260
The "soft news" strategy of the Home Office was considered 
less likely to alienate diverse segments of the paper's 
readership. Lawson and Dennis were acutely sensitive to the 
views of Chicago area residents. Dennis's notion that 'a good 
editorial should be a fairly reliable reflection of public 
opinion and public sentiment in the community where the 
newspaper is published [my italics]' illustrates management's
257ibid.
258Dennis to E. Mowrer, 11 December 1924, Ibid.
259Ibid.
260A s I will discuss in upcoming paragraphs, meticulous editing from the 
Home Office may also account for this discrepancy. See Dennis to P. 
Mowrer, 31 August 1926, Ibid.
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awareness of this issue.261 Understandably, the international 
views of many Chicago residents were shaped by their respective 
cultural heritages. The "Windy City" had large and growing 
Irish, Polish, Italian and German-American communities (a fact 
of particular importance for this study). The changing 
demographic composition of the Chicago market was not lost on 
Daily News management.
Lawson and Dennis feared possible reader backlash against 
overseas articles which might portray "the old country" in a 
negative light. With this mind-set the Home Office instructed 
its foreign correspondents 'to give every nation in Europe a 
fair show because every nation in Europe has among our readers 
thousands of representatives who are quick to demand for it a 
fair show 1 . 262 Moreover, the evidence suggests that management 
especially feared backlash from Chicago's German-American 
community. Spurred by the Revolution of 1848, Bismarck's 
Kulturkampf and the Depression of 1873, most of the German 
emigration to the United States occurred between 1850 and 1885. 
By the 1920's, many Germans (especially those who were second 
and third-generation Americans) had achieved middle class 
status. The demise of the German-language press following its 
suppression during the Great War removed the last remaining 
obstacle to the emergence of a large English-speaking literate 
German-American readership.263
The paper's fear of offending these new customers was 
evidenced by management's lukewarm response to an attempt by the
261Dennis to Stafford, 18 May 1925, Ibid.
262Dennis to E. Mowrer, 20 November 1925, CDN Papers, Newberry Library.
See Wittke, C., The German-Language Press in America (NY 1957).
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French to mount their own press campaign through a syndicated 
service complete with articles penned by Raymond Poincare. 
Dennis suggested editing the former French leader's pieces while 
Lawson took an even sterner view: 'We will use this service only 
insofar as it may be free from the criticism that it is racially 
hostile and bitter toward Germany. Please tell Mr. Chapell (the 
foreign editor) to kill the [Poincare] cables whenever he finds 
them objectionable. ' .264 After only two months of operation, the 
paper discontinued the service. 265 Lawson also took a special 
interest in his paper's presentation of prominent German 
figures. In a 1922 story, for instance, the publisher 
questioned whether the paper's characterization of Wilhelm II as 
'an imperial scapegoat' would be 'misunderstood by the average 
German-American reader to imply ridicule' towards the ex- 
Kaiser.266
Edgar Mowrer, however, remained unfazed by management's 
attempts to steer him towards presenting positive portrayals of 
Germany. Despite the stability after Hindenburg's election, 
Mowrer maintained that 'some steps toward the restitution of the 
monarchy have been made' and that there is a chance that the 
reactionary spirit in Germany will again retain the upper 
hand'. 267 Dennis countered by stating that 'the German republic 
has not fallen but, on the contrary, continues to grow 
stronger. . . If I am wrong in this matter, please give me
264See Lawson to Dennis, 20 January and 31 March 1925, Lawson Papers, 
Newberry Library as well as Dennis to Lawson 21 January 1925, Ibid.
265Lawson to Pickering, 12 March 1925, Ibid.
Lawson to Dennis, 22 September 1922, CDN papers, Ibid.
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specific proof of it'.268 Dennis felt that their antithetical 
viewpoints concerning Germany's future 'constituted the chief 
point of difference' between management and its Berlin bureau 
chief and he was 'anxious to arrive at a clear understanding1 
with Mowrer. Dennis's 'efforts to prevent [Mowrer's] prophesies 
from appearing' in the pages of the Chicago Daily News (e.g. 
editing) can be seen as one tactic employed to bring about this 
'understanding'; namely, Mowrer's capitulation to the Home 
Office's more optimistic view of Germany.269
Dennis's wish was never realized as Edgar Mowrer remained 
obstinate despite increasing Home Office pressure.270 Indeed, 
Mowrer fired some transatlantic shots of his own. On one 
occasion he directly accused Dennis of letting 'partisan 
feelings' undermine the paper's objectivity271: 'It seems that the 
German spirit against which we fought in the war has now become 
so sacred that it may be but criticized even to the benefit of 
the new and formally triumphant subsequent [sic] German 
spirit'. 272 On another, he sent a series of dispatches on 'the 
reawakening of German nationalism' and the 'recrudescence of 
German imperialism' while in Dennis's words, 'the world was
268Ibid.
269Ibid.
270It is important to note that Mowrer did not always maintain a
consistently pessimistic position regarding Weimar's prospects for 
survival, although he was generally skeptical. For example, in an 
article written for Harper's Weekly in December 1928, he stated that 
despite Germany's problems, it was 'a foregone conclusion that the 
German Republic will stand'. Mowrer, E. "Germany After Ten Years" 
(Harper's Weekly, 158, December 1928), as cited in Heald, Vistas, P.92.
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rejoicing over the success of the Locarno conference'.273 When 
the Home Office refused to publish Mowrer's pieces on the 
grounds that they were 'untimely', the Berlin correspondent 
retorted that 'suppressing the unpleasant does not seem to me to 
be in entire accord with our best tradition'. 274 Nor were 
Mowrer's reactions isolated outbursts. Three years of trans- 
Atlantic skirmishing led Dennis to conclude that the Berlin 
bureau chief had 'lost confidence in the editorial judgment of 
the editorial management of the Daily News' .275
The evidence also suggests that the Home Office pressed 
Mowrer to send more "soft" pieces as one way of reducing the 
number of negative presentations emanating from Berlin. But 
even here, Dennis desired pieces that reinforced positive images 
of Germany. He instructed Mowrer to send 'sympathetic 
descriptive material about the economic and social conditions in 
the Weimar Republic' in conjunction with 'sympathetic 
descriptions of those elements which stand for republicanism and 
against Kaiserism and militarism [my italics]'. In some 
instances, the Home Office edited or eliminated sections of 
Mowrer's pieces which in its view 'portrayed the German people 
as laboratory specimens rather than as human beings' or when the 
'[general] tone of his articles was unsympathetic to the 
difficulties faced by the German people'. Finally, management 
urged Paul Mowrer to exert influence on his younger brother to
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tone down the pessimistic spirit of his dispatches and mail 
articles.276
As the summer of 1926 drew to a close, it appeared that 
Chicago Daily News management and Edgar Mowrer had reached an 
uneasy modus vivendi. The Home Office edited those pieces that 
'failed to do justice to republican sentiment in Germany' ,277 In 
exchange, Mowrer retained his post and was grudgingly allowed to 
contribute dissenting free lance pieces to publications such The 
Nation and Harper's Weekly. The most significant aspect about 
this unusual state of affairs, however, is that management 
departed from its normal practice of basing editorial policy on 
the opinions of its bureau correspondents. The press's dubious 
but widely accepted pronouncement of Germany1s economic recovery 
after Hindenburg's victory served only to further discredit 
Mowrer and legitimize management's overseas strategy. 'I cannot 
see how we could be justified in prophecising [sic] blue ruin 
for German Democracy [sic] while German Democracy continues to 
rule Germany', wrote Dennis in 1 926.278 His view would not be 
seriously challenged until 14 September 1930, the day Hitler's 
Nazis became the second largest political party in Germany.
* * *
American press reaction to the German presidential election 
of 1925 illustrates how some major journalists dealt with 
incidents that they neither expected nor desired. The New York
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Times, Chicago Daily Tribune and Chicago Daily News were placed 
in a difficult defensive position as a result of Hindenburg's 
victory. Each newspaper's method of rationalizing the outcome 
seems rooted more in the dynamics of the publication's 
particular political, journalistic and corporate philosophy 
rather than in an objective analysis of Germany's state of 
affairs. The Times's condemnation of the German people appears 
to have been employed as a self-serving tactic to reestablish 
the paper's credibility. The Tribune's about-face seemed 
designed to further its publisher's isolationist viewpoint. And 
the documented clashes between the Chicago Daily News Home 
Office and its European service provides glaring evidence that, 
for some journalists, the newspaper business was first and 
foremost, a business.
After Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg's election in April 
1925, the Weimar Republic enjoyed its highest level of political 
and economic stability, yet paradoxically witnessed the 
continued erosion of German democracy. This theme of continuity 
and change could also be applied to the state of the 
organizational structures of.the New York Times. Chicago Daily 
Tribune and Chicago Daily News during the same period. Soon 
after the election, the Times and the Tribune appointed new 
Berlin bureau chiefs: Lincoln Eyre replaced T.R. Ybarra
(transferred to the paper's London bureau) while Sigrid Schultz 
replaced John Clayton (grudgingly transferred to the Tribune's 
Rome bureau). The Chicago Daily News saw the death of its 
publisher, Victor Lawson, and because he left no heirs, the 
paper he founded was put up for sale. Each of these 
developments, however, were "in-house" moves, providing a large
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measure of continuity. Eyre had served as a reporter for the 
Times during the Great War; Sigrid Schultz had been Clayton's 
deputy in Berlin; and Walter Strong, the new publisher of the 
Daily News, had served as the paper's business manager under the 
Lawson regime. The impact of these personnel changes upon each 
newspaper's coverage of the Nazi victory in the Reichstag 
elections of September 1930 will be examined in the next 
chapter.
Chapter 4 
The Roof Caves In: Germany, 1929-30
The prosperity and tranquillity which characterized Germany 
in the mid-twenties came to an abrupt end in 1929 with the Wall 
Street stock market crash and the onset of a world-wide 
depression. Indeed, 1929 would prove to be a watershed year in 
the history of the Weimar Republic —  thereafter, successive 
governments would be plagued by economic and political turmoil 
on a scale even greater than the crises of 1919 and 1923. 
Moreover, the inability of Germany's leaders to maintain public 
confidence, coupled with the opposition parties' efforts to 
capitalize upon the nation's predicament for self-serving and 
short-sighted political gains, would lay the groundwork for the 
Nazi party's electoral breakthrough in the September 1930 
Reichstag elections.
The roots of this parliamentary disaster can be traced to the 
political fallout from the previous Reichstag election held in 
May 1928. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the percentage of 
votes garnered by an eclectic collection of small special 
interest parties increased dramatically at the expense of the 
moderate German Democratic party (DDP) and the German People's 
party (DVP). More alarmingly, they grew at the expense of the 
traditional party of the conservative Right, the German 
Nationalist People's party (DNVP), whose electoral percentage 
dropped to 14% from a previous high of 20.5% achieved four years 
earlier. Usually intra-party strife, especially at the 
leadership levels, follows election day defeats and the DNVP 
proved to be no exception. Its chairman, Count Kuno von 
Westarp, who had steered the party in a moderate direction, was
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discredited by the 1928 results and replaced by the 
uncompromising Alfred Hugenberg, a newspaper mogul who had led 
the radical anti-Republican wing of the party.
Hugenberg sought to reverse the ill fortunes of his party by 
exploiting Germany's bitterness towards the Versailles 
settlement. Many Germans opposed the Young Plan (a reparations 
initiative introduced in 1929 which would have scaled down the 
payments originally designated by the Dawes Plan), feeling that 
they should not be held liable for the cost of the Great War 
since their nation was not responsible for its outbreak. In the 
spring of 1929, Hugenberg hoped to capitalize on this sentiment 
by introducing the "Freedom Law", a referendum which even 
contained a provision that would have allowed for the 
prosecution of government supporters of the Young Plan 
(including the Reich President) on the charge of high treason. 
This provision may explain why the "Freedom Law" was soundly 
defeated on 22 December 1929.
That Hugenberg's campaign failed would have been of little 
consequence had he not enlisted the support of Adolf Hitler's 
Nazis. Although the National Socialists surprised many 
observers by their vote totals in a series of regional elections 
in 1929, the chief obstacle they faced was their inability to 
establish national credibility —  a problem most fringe parties 
fail to overcome. By marching alongside the traditional party 
of the German Right, the Nazis acquired an air of respectability 
that neither a million election leaflets nor hundreds of 
impassioned Hitler speeches could engender. In stark contrast, 
Hugenberg's strategy of employing Hitler as a junior partner in 
the campaign against the Young Plan in the fall of 1929
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completely backfired. Not only did the Conservatives fare even 
worse in the 1930 Reichstag elections than they had in 1928; 
many of their former supporters actually voted Nazi. 
Hugenberg's attempt to manipulate the Nazis for his own 
political gain would later be emulated by other mainstream 
German political leaders with similar results for the Weimar 
Republic.
What made matters even worse for supporters of German 
democracy was that Hugenberg's deputizing of Hitler coincided 
with the nation's economic collapse following the Wall Street 
crash in late October 1929. As the influx of capital from the 
United States came to an abrupt halt, Germany's latent economic 
woes became acute. Between June 1928 and May 1930 industrial 
production dropped 31% while unemployment levels reached three 
million, a 200% increase, during roughly the same period. As a 
result, Germany's tax base shrank and her national debt 
mushroomed.279
These seemingly intractable problems forced the resignation 
of Chancellor Hermann Muller's cabinet in March 1930, the last 
Weimar ministry to be based on a parliamentary majority. Muller 
was replaced by Heinrich Briining, a leader of the Catholic 
Centre party (Zentrum), who possessed strong monarchist 
leanings. Because he lacked a Reichstag mandate for his 
policies, Bruning was forced to rely upon the good will of 
President Hindenburg by implementing policies via Article 48 of 
the Weimar constitution —  rule by emergency decree. In the 
summer of 1930, when the Reichstag attempted to undermine 
Briining's powers by amending Article 48, the Chancellor
279Childers, Nazi Voter, pp.130-31.
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dissolved the body and called for new elections to take place 
the following autumn.280
In retrospect, Briining would have been better off provoking 
a constitutional crisis rather than taking a gamble with only a 
faint hope of obtaining parliamentary support for his policies. 
Instead, the election of 14 September 1930 marked the first time 
in the short history of Weimar Germany that the anti- 
Republicans' tally clearly outnumbered that of their pro- 
Republican rivals. The Nazis were the chief beneficiary of this 
development, garnering 18.7% of the electoral vote, making them 
Germany's second largest political party. The future of 
Hitler's movement looked bright. The country's economic decline 
continued through 1931 with many Germans believing that there 
was no end in sight to the Great Depression. Moreover, the 
strong showing of the Communists (KPD) played into the Nazis' 
hands since Goebbels' propaganda efforts were designed to 
establish the party as the nation's bulwark against Marxism. By 
the end of 1930 many began to question whether the Weimar 
Republic could survive.
* * *
Most segments of the American press exhibited buoyant 
optimism regarding the political, economic and social conditions 
in Germany throughout 1928 and 1929. Neither the Wall Street 
crash nor the resignation of the Muller cabinet the following 
March seriously undermined the confidence of U.S. newspapermen 
in the stability of the Weimar Republic, although many of their
280Ibid.
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European counterparts were far more pessimistic.281 However, by 
the close of 1930 many American journalists questioned whether 
the Weimar Republic would give way to some form of 
dictatorship.282
To some degree the views of the New York Times. Chicago Daily 
News and Chicago Daily Tribune reflected this general consensus. 
A closer examination also reveals a clear difference of 
perception, especially in the cases of the Times and the News, 
between each newspaper's field correspondent and his respective 
home office, the latter being far more optimistic about 
Germany's future than the former, even after the Nazi electoral 
victory in September 1930. It appears that the fortitude the 
Weimar Republic exhibited in the face of the crises of 1923 and 
1924, along with the unexpected political and economic 
stabilization following Hindenburg's election in 1925, convinced 
the managements of each paper that Germany's position was 
invulnerable. It seems that the home offices of the New York 
Times, Chicago Daily News and Chicago Daily Tribune interpreted 
the developments of 1928-30 with this predisposition. More 
important, however, the internal memoranda of each newspaper 
illustrate how organizational factors such as centralized and 
decentralized decision-making structures shaped the presentation 
of news about Germany during this period.
* * *
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Germany had enjoyed favorable coverage among most American 
newspapers throughout the latter years of the 1920's. 283 A 
salient feature of this treatment was the new portrayal of the 
Republic's president, Paul von Hindenburg. Prior to 1926, two 
images of Hindenburg, both negative, prevailed. Some 
journalists described the victor of Tannenberg as an omnipotent 
political opportunist who wished to exploit his war-hero status 
in order to overthrow the Weimar Republic, while others saw him 
as a 'lifeless automaton' behind whom lay the anti-Republican 
machinations of his reactionary supporters.
Both assessments, however, dissipated largely because the 
expectation of "doom and gloom" for German democracy had not 
come to fruition. No longer a "political puppet", Hindenburg 
was now depicted as a 'block of granite': 'a man of ruggedness' 
who 'has turned his mind's eye to the oath to the Republic to 
which he swore and has stood firm' . 284 Hindenburg had also become 
a "kinder and gentler" leader —  a 'man of character, genuiness 
[sic] and solidity which made men instinctively trust him',285 
Some newspapers ordained him 'the Old Man of the Wilhelmstrasse' 
who 'walks with his dog at early morn, doubtless musing on past 
campaigns and on the peace for which he would willingly barter 
the cares of official life' . 286 The threat of monarchism was now 
derided as 'a fine spun theory'. 287 Instead, many journalists 
predicted that 'there will be no deviation from the narrow path
283For a comprehensive discussion of this topic, see Ibid., Chapter 9.
284Literary Digest 30 July 1927.
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which the old warrior has set himself to tread'. 288 This new 
image would help account for the optimistic belief of some 
segments of the American press that Hindenburg would be able to 
extricate the Weimar Republic from the depths of the Great 
Depression.
The mainstream U.S. press's confidence in the German republic 
extended to the economic and social spheres as well. 'Not in 
many decades have the German people been as happy as they are 
today' wrote the Literary Digest in September 1 927.289 'They are 
not only able to live and to dress better, but they dress more 
brightly and move about as if they were enjoying freedom' .290 
This air of contentment appeared to be partially rooted in the 
performance of the German economy. Most press dispatches 
proclaimed that the nation's economy 'is prepared for steady 
progress' and that 'there are no basic grounds for regarding a 
descent from the height now scaled as having begun or as being 
inevitable'.291 These factors led one correspondent to predict 
that 'time seems to be on the side of the Republican idea1 in 
Germany.292
The confidence of the American press continued through the 
May 1928 Reichstag elections. Although a few newspapers such as 
the German-language New York Staats-Zeituna and the New York 
Volkszeitunq expressed misgivings about the strong showing of 
the KPD and anti-republican small special interest parties, most
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editorial observers described the election as a 1 sweeping
victory for the moderate political parties of the Reich and
their program of peace1 and ’a "kick on the shins" for Germany's
sabre-rattling monarchists'.293 The Louisville Courier-Journal
reflected the views of many American journalists that 'brighter
days' lay ahead for Germany.
Rapprochement with France has gone forward, Germany as a 
member of the League of Nations has retrieved its national 
self-respect, a beginning has been made to evacuate the 
Rhineland, international cartels have furthered industry, 
the commercial treaty with France has spurred trade, and 
above all, the Dawes plan has opened the way to a definite 
solution of the reparations problem. Germany, in spite of 
its unemployment, is in a healthy economic state, and this 
situation, it is generally conceded, will keep the nation in 
the middle of the road.294
The optimism of the U.S. press reached its apex in the summer 
of 1929 with the introduction of the Young Plan. In the opinion 
of many editorial writers, the Young Plan effectively ended the 
Great War by resolving the reparations dilemma. Drew Pearson of 
the Baltimore Sun believed that the initiative would 'renew 
confidence in Europe and increase European prosperity', which 
would in turn stimulate 'American loans and exports' while Paul 
Mowrer of the Chicago Daily News predicted that the Young Plan 
would 'successfully remove reparations as an obstacle in 
international relations'.295 Most of the media's reservations 
centered on whether the plan would lead to a cancellation of 
Allied war debts. The New York Evening Post also noted that 'in 
both France and Germany there will be vigorous opposition to the 
accord on the part of the extreme nationalists'; however, the
293Ibid. 2 June 1928.
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paper also posited that 1 there is every reason to believe that 
both official and public opinion in the two countries strongly 
favor acceptance of the proposed terms of settlement' .296
After the Wall Street crash the following October, the U.S. 
press's coverage of the Young Plan diminished sharply. 
Hugenberg's anti-Young campaign received minimal attention among 
most American newspapers with the notable exceptions of the New 
York Times and the Chicago Daily News. However, even their 
coverage paled in comparison to that of the European press.297 
Most U.S. newspapers focused more upon domestic economic and 
political news than foreign news. A cursory examination of an 
array of publications shows that Hugenberg's campaign was 
largely ignored. Instead, the organization of the London 
Conference, along with the Chinese civil war, dominated news 
from overseas at the end of 1929 and in the opening months of 
1930.
The American press's peculiarly sanguine view of the 
ramifications of the Wall Street stock market crash also played 
an indirect role in bolstering the already high level of 
confidence it had in Germany's future. Mainstream and financial 
publications such as the New York World, New York Herald Tribune 
and the Chicago Journal of Commerce expressed the view that the 
Wall Street debacle would not trigger a long-term recession, let 
alone a worldwide depression. For instance, although the 
Guaranty Survey expected that 'industrial and commercial 
activity would be affected to some extent by the decline in 
stock prices, it also asserted that 'the experience of recent
296Ibid.
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years justifies the hope that any recession resulting from the 
action of the stock market would not be violent or of long 
duration. The New York World echoed this belief stating that 
‘there is nothing in the general situation to suggest more than 
a slight retardation of activity', thus, 'whatever adverse 
effects may follow the recent events on Wall Street should be 
short-lived' .298
Some publications such as the Newark News. Boston Post, 
Washington Star, Commercial and Financial Chronicle and New 
Republic even characterized the crash as a salutary experience, 
forever purging the trading floor of irresponsible speculators. 
The New York World shared this view, describing the crash as the 
'by-product of the country's return to the normal economic 
condition which is essential to healthy business and a firmly 
rooted prosperity. 299 Just as most segments of the American press 
were slow to acknowledge the severity of the Wall Street crash, 
they were equally slow to recognize its impact on Germany. In 
fact, it was not until the summer of 1930, when the Weimar 
Republic's unemployment figure topped three million, that the 
American press's confidence in Germany began to waver.
Although many American journalists were late in recognizing 
the deteriorating conditions in Germany, they were not surprised 
by the strong showing of the Nazi party in the 1930 Reichstag 
elections. In the weeks preceding the balloting, Hitler's 
fascists were seen as 'the driving force' behind a predicted 
series of 'drastic changes in Germany'. 300 The Literary Digest
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also predicted that the diversity of the Nazi movement’s 
constituency, coupled with the inherent contradictions within 
Hitler's economic platform, would become a serious problem once 
the Party came into power.301 However, many journalists 
acknowledged the uniqueness of the Nazi party —  'a 
comparatively young political organization whose methods and 
means of political struggle are entirely different from the 
traditional customs of the older German political parties'.302 
After the Nazi victory, the Digest conceded that 'Hitler may be 
the exception to the rule that the best way to tame extremists 
is to give them office' . 303 In fact, much of the press had 
designated Hitler as the latest menace on the world political 
scene who 'might bring about a catastrophic upheaval not only in 
his own country but in all Europe' .304
In the opinion of some American journalists, the impressive 
Nazi electoral victory seemed to be based on the irrational and 
impulsive judgments of Germany's women and young people. 
'Germany's inflamed youth' flocked to the Nazis because they 
desired 'vehemence and action, regardless of the practical',305 
whereas German women voted for 'handsome Adolf' because they 
'admired his good looks, his tall and handsome figure with his 
lock of dark hair that waves coquettishly over his brow and his
301Ibid. 6 September 1930.
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neatly carved mustache' . 306 It should be noted that the Nazis did 
enjoy early support from women and Germany's youth (middle-class 
students in particular). However, most studies show that 
although Hitler's party remained fluid, its electoral backbone 
was male and middle-aged.307
Despite their misgivings about the judgment of Germany's 
women and young people, most segments of the American press 
maintained that average Germans (i.e. males over the age of 
thirty) were intelligent, thoughtful and rational and therefore 
would refrain from voting Nazi. This assumption, that only 
irrational Germans would support the Party, reinforced the 
negative portrayals of Hitler found in most American newspapers, 
images further underscored by Hitler's poor relations with the 
international press. As mentioned in Chapter One, many 
journalists were displeased by the Nazi party's attempt to 
extract money in exchange for information. A Hitler interview, 
in particular, did not come cheap and when the fascist leader 
did grant a press conference, he disappointed reporters by 
'answering one question and then speeling [sic] on and on'.308 
Journalists told the American people that 'Germany's would-be 
Mussolini' was an 'ex-house painter, a woman- hater, a victim of 
an inferiority complex' and 'not even German' , 309 Such mocking 
depictions probably contributed to the underestimation of the 
potency of Hitler's movement by many American observers. Thus,
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despite the Nazi electoral victory, some journalists expressed 
fervent hope that the Weimar Republic would survive the fascist 
threat.
* * *
An examination of the Chicago Daily News's coverage of events 
in Germany reveals a contrast in perceptions between those on 
the editorial page and those emanating from the Berlin bureau. 
Such an observation supports the view that the conflict between 
Charles Dennis and Edgar Mowrer continued between 1928 and 1930 
even though their friction-filled correspondence came to an 
unexplained and abrupt end during the autumn of 1926. Moreover, 
a product analysis of the paper's coverage of the 1930 Reichstag 
elections suggests that Paul Scott Mowrer, who was dispatched to 
Berlin on 12 September to substitute for his ill brother, also 
may have been unable to convince Dennis and his editorial staff 
to reassess their rosy predictions for Germany's future. 
Finally, the disparity between the tone of the paper's editorial 
coverage and its news coverage seems to reflect the internal 
chaos within Chicago Daily News management as a consequence of 
Victor Lawson's death in 1925. However, the following analysis 
of the Chicago Daily News will be limited to a certain degree by 
a lack of archival documentation.
* * *
'Although Germany votes tomorrow for an entirely new 
Reichstag, a visitor from Mars would have a hard time in 
discovering just what it was all about... the explanation is 
that there are almost no real issues', commented Edgar Mowrer on
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the impending Reichstag elections of May 1928.310 The normally
pessimistic Mowrer was quite optimistic about the chances of the
pro-republican parties. 'My own guess is that the democrats and
socialists will win enough seats to allow a Great or Center
coalition to exist within the Reich as it now exists within
Prussia; hence, this might mean a real consolidation of the
democratic republic1, posited Mowrer on the eve of the
balloting.311 Not surprisingly, the Berlin correspondent took
credit when his forecast came true. Interesting is the even
more optimistic tenor of Mowrer's dispatch of 22 May as compared
to that of the previous day.
The whole election was characterized by the reaction towards 
unfulfilled promises and disgust with the entire 
parliamentary system as it exists under proportional 
representation.312 (21 May 1928)
The most democratic government Germany has known since 1920 
is the final result of the German elections and pacifists 
everywhere can rejoice.313 (22 May 1928)
It is plausible to conclude that the absence of negative 
commentary from Mowrer's dispatch of 22 May may have had its 
origins in Chicago rather than Berlin —  it seems too 
coincidental that his news story mirrored that of the paper's 
editorial, "Germany's General Election", on the same day. In 
it, Dennis stressed that the 'reassuring moral of the election 
was that the German nation has accepted the Republic and the 
policies of reconciliation and international amity'.314 And, in
310CDN 19 May 1928, P.2.
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direct contrast with Mowrer*s assessment of the German 
electorate on 21 May, "Germany's General Election" characterized 
the country's domestic problems as being of 'secondary 
importance' and instead reflected the citizenry's 'determination 
to remain republican, free, normal and pacific'.315
Despite the scant attention devoted to the story, a more 
pronounced divergence of views is evident in the Chicago Daily 
News's coverage of Hugenberg's anti-Young plan campaign. 
Whereas Edgar Mowrer called the referendum's rejection a 'moral 
victory'316 for the Nationalists and suggested that Hugenberg 
would remain a central figure in the reparations debate, the 
editorial page too called the result 'gratifying and 
reassuring', but one that 'should put an end to the mischievous 
and futile agitation which sensible and forward-looking Germans 
have deplored' .317 And although management acknowledged that 
'the Young Plan may have to be revised in the future', they were 
quick to note, in contrast to the Berlin bureau's view, that the 
plan would 'not be revised under pressure from hot-headed 
factional agitators'.318
The fall of the Muller cabinet and the appointment of 
Heinrich Briining as the new German Chancellor in late March 1930 
did not result in the publication of an editorial on the matter. 
However, a comparison of Edgar Mowrer's articles of 28 and 31 
March provide strong evidence of editorial influence on the 
paper's presentation of the story —  unless of course Mowrer
315ibid.
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himself had had a complete change of view within the span of 72 
hours —  a highly unlikely possibility.
Mowrer's story of 28 March took a balanced view of Briining's 
accession to power. He provided a short biographical sketch of 
Briining which praised his heroism as a soldier and his devotion 
to parliamentary democracy.319 However, Mowrer wondered if 
Briining would be able to achieve his goal of lightening ' the 
financial burdens on capital and business by reducing expenses 
for social purposes such as unemployment doles' because the new 
Chancellor's cabinet did not command the support of a Reichstag 
majority. 320 Hence, he concluded that the success of Briining's 
initiatives 'remains to be seen'.321 Three days later, however, 
Mowrer seemed to become far more optimistic. The published 
article of 31 March suggested that Mowrer now believed that 
because Briining could count on Socialist support in foreign 
affairs and Nationalist support for internal measures, his 
ministry would bring forth a 'sane budgetary policy without 
further deficits, a reestablishment of the confidence of capital 
and a general stock market increase' ,322
Although there is no direct evidence that Mowrer's copy was 
altered to promote the new German government, the contrast 
between his articles of 28 and 31 March is very suspicious. 
Moreover, that there is no evidence from the entire inter-war 
period suggesting that Mowrer had softened his bias against the
319
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Germans serves to support the theory that the tone and tenor of 
his original dispatch may have been changed by the Home Office. 
Edward Price Bell reinforced management's earlier assessments of 
Mowrer by accusing him of 1 indulging in certain flippancies 
which needlessly and deeply have hurt the feelings of our German 
readers' because of his 'egotistical, opinionated and sometimes 
extremely foolish nature'. 323 Thus, the Chicago Daily News's 
coverage of Briining's appointment is probably another example of 
how management can shape the presentation of news to conform to 
its editorial biases.
The ever-worsening economic crisis, coupled with an increase 
in political street violence between the Nazi brown shirts (SA) 
and SPD and KPD paramilitary groups, drew the focus of the 
international press on the upcoming Reichstag elections 
scheduled for 14 September 1930. The Chicago Daily News was no 
exception. The paper's campaign coverage began over a week 
before the balloting, a preview equalled only by that of the 
Hindenburg/Marx election in 1925. Unlike its coverage of other 
German campaigns, however, the Chicago Daily News (like many of 
its media counterparts) devoted particular attention to Hitler's 
Nazis. And after the NSDAP's huge victory, the Chicago Daily 
News regularly covered Hitler in its reporting of German news.
Edgar Mowrer, like most observers, recognized the increasing 
popularity of the Nazis in the weeks preceding the election. He 
too predicted success for Hitler's group at the polls but
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nowhere near the actual extent of the Party's victory. 324 Mowrer 
echoed the conventional wisdom of the time that the base of Nazi 
support came from Germany's impulsive youth, which was 
vulnerable to the Party's 'direct emotional appeals and 
excellent theatricals' . 325 The Chicago Daily News's Berlin bureau 
chief also shared the view of his rival at the Chicago Daily 
Tribune. Sigrid Schultz; namely, that the political fortunes of 
the NSDAP were on the rise because it had been endorsed by some 
prominent Germans including the ex-Crown Prince.326 Mowrer even 
characterized the Nazis as 'the most aristocratic party in 
Germany', supplanting Hugenberg's DNVP. Although he recognized 
the growing strength of the Nazis, Edgar Mowrer did not foresee 
the crushing blows dealt to the traditional center and right 
parties, the DDP, DVP and the DNVP (which he even predicted 
would gain a mild victory). As a result, he still held out the 
prospect that the non-socialist parties might 'achieve a common 
program' without the aid of the SPD.327
Paul Scott Mowrer, who may have been sent to relieve his ill 
brother, was more pessimistic about the chances of the pro­
republican forces. He criticized Briining's unpopular economic 
program of austerity for failing to curb Germany's spiraling 
unemployment rate, and as such shared the view of many 
commentators that 'government parties will not win a higher
324CDN, 12 September 1930.
325Ibid.
326Ibid. 6 September 1930.
327Ibid. 8 September 1930.
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proportion of seats than they have now' . And although Paul 
Mowrer thought that the prospect of an imminent dictatorship was 
'far from a possibility', he stressed the urgency for the pro­
republican forces to implement solutions to Germany's economic 
and political crises and to do so quickly. He believed, like 
most Americans, that the significance of this Reichstag election 
lay in the distinct possibility that:
'the results can fundamentally affect not only the internal 
economic situation, the future foreign policy and even the 
future form of government, whether a genuine republic or a 
more or less declared dictatorship in Germany itself, but 
through Germany it may influence the economic situation and 
the interior political situation and the international 
outlook of most other European countries'.328
Paul Mowrer made no attempt to "sugarcoat" the election 
results. 'Hitler was the real victor1 while 'Briining's 
government and all that it stands for has been crushingly [sic] 
defeated' wrote the paper's senior European correspondent. 329 He 
further argued that 'unless the representatives of the remaining 
60% of the German people agree to forget their multiple 
differences and stand together against the rising tides of 
extremism, parliamentary government may prove impossible and the 
fate of the Republic itself will be jeopardized' .33°
In contrast to his brother's pre-election analysis, Paul 
Mowrer traced the Hitlerian vote principally to Germany's 
'disgruntled middle class and over-indebted farmers who have 
lost confidence in the ability of the [Weimar] system to improve
328Ibid. 13 September 1930.
329Ibid. 15 September 1930.
330Ibid.
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their situation1.331 Whereas Paul Mowrer's theory has been 
generally borne out by over a half century of scholarship332 , it 
is important to detect Mowrer's implicit message that the Nazi 
appeal may have been more rational than previously thought. 
This is not to suggest that Paul Mowrer considered the Nazis a 
mainstream political organization —  in fact, on several 
occasions he referred to them as a band of 'fire-eating, Jew- 
baiting, reactionary extremists' 333—  but rather that he felt it 
was possible for the "average German" to support Hitler. Paul 
Mowrer's view, however, represented the minority of U.S. press 
opinion. The majority of journalists believed that Nazi voters 
were immature, impulsive, gullible, and incapable of rational 
thought.
None of Paul Mowrer's assessments of the Reichstag election 
were shared by Charles Dennis and his editorial staff. Instead, 
management downplayed the results to a perverse extreme in its 
attempt to maintain its long-held policy of presenting Germany 
in a positive light. Its editorial, "German Republicans Get A 
Warning", argued that the balloting 'may prove a blessing in 
disguise to German republicanism and German prosperity' because 
'sober second thought [on the part of German voters] will cause 
many of them to give their confidence to leaders who stand for 
constructive progress and to oppose emotional architects of
331Ibid.
332See Childers, Nazi Voter, and Hamilton, Who Voted? et al.
333CDN, 15 September 1930.
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disaster'. 334 Moreover, although the editorial noted how party 
divisions plagued Germany, it also asserted that there is no 
good reason why [the moderate parties] should not waive their 
disagreements, which actually are minor in nature, and unite to 
safeguard the Republic and the peace of Europe 1 . 335 In short, 
Dennis seemed convinced that the Nazi electoral breakthrough 
'most assuredly did not justify dismay on the part of sincere 
friends of governmental progress and popular rule1.336
* * *
The disparity between the views expressed in the editorials 
of the Chicago Daily News and Berlin bureau dispatches was
neither a coincidence nor an aberration. In fact, the 
incongruity reflected a general discordance between the
editorial board in Chicago and the paper's European news 
service. Although the first half of the 1920's witnessed a see­
saw struggle between the Home Office and the foreign news
service, the latter half of the decade saw a decisive shift in 
power from Europe to Chicago. Management itself had experienced 
a major restructuring, of which Charles Dennis was the primary 
beneficiary. As a result, the foreign news service of the 
Chicago Daily News ceased to. influence the editorial policies of 
the paper between 1926 and 1930.




This new state of affairs can be traced to Paul Scott 
Mowrer's resignation as the paper’s European service head and 
Edward Price Bell's recall to Chicago in 1924. Their departure 
left the foreign service staff without the prestigious 
leadership which had profoundly influenced the paper's editorial 
positions. Mowrer's replacement, the far weaker and more 
malleable Hal O'Flaherty, along with his foreign bureau chiefs, 
were often unable to resist the incursions of the Home Office on 
the content of their dispatches. The death of the paper's 
publisher, Victor Lawson, dealt another debilitating blow to the 
foreign service. 337 Although Lawson's interest in his overseas 
organization had diminished markedly in the years prior to his 
death, his position as the supreme authority of the paper had 
allowed for credible recourse for those dissatisfied by the 
actions of Charles Dennis. 338 Lawson's successor, Walter A. 
Strong, however, lacked the credibility, determination and self 
confidence to effectively challenge the de facto control 
exercised by Dennis and his editorial board.
Walter Strong was not a newcomer to the Chicago Daily News. 
As the former business manager under the Lawson regime, Strong 
was acutely sensitive to the financial status of the paper. His 
earliest memos to senior management stressed the importance of 
increasing gross revenue and net profits by reducing costs 
through the 'elimination of all the extravagances in the
337See Heald, Vistas, pp.100-102.
338The evidence shows that Paul Mowrer and Edward Price Bell dealt with 
Lawson directly when they were frustrated by Dennis and others. See 
Chapter 2 for the corresponding citations.
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editorial expense, advertising promotion expense and circulation 
program1.339 Strong criticized 'Lawson's failure to establish a 
definite policy' to manage costs. 340 In contrast to his
predecessor, Strong required that 'all contracts be submitted to 
the publisher's office'341—  an unusual instruction given the 
sheer size of the Chicago Daily News operation. Although he 
expressed a desire to launch a Sunday edition,342 the centerpiece 
of Strong's strategy was the construction of a modern production 
facility to replace the ill-equipped plant the paper had
maintained since the mid 19th century. 343 Strong accomplished 
this goal with the opening of the paper's new plant in 1930.
When he first became publisher of the Chicago Daily News in 
1926, Strong took little interest in news and editorial policy. 
He appeared to lack a desire to impose his political and
journalistic ideology on his staff, if, indeed, he possessed a
clear vision at all. Strong's revamped management structure 
clearly reflected his desire to transform the business aspects 
of the paper while steering clear of the news and editorial 
departments. The new publisher established two governing 
bodies, the "Executive Committee" and the "Executive Council"; 
together they contained only one member from the news
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department, Henry Justin Smith, the paper's managing editor.344 
Strong assigned Smith the role of day-to-day management of the 
foreign news service, a post previously held by Dennis in 
cooperation with Paul Mowrer. Strong's move was not designed to 
diminish Dennis's power. To the contrary, Strong placed Dennis 
'in entire (my emphasis) charge of editorial policies'; thus 
abdicating a right usually reserved for the publisher.345 In 
addition, Strong delegated to Dennis the authority to intervene 
in the affairs of the foreign news service 'where the text of 
overseas dispatches involves editorial policy' . 346 Moreover, 
Strong failed to entrust authority to Hal O'Flaherty and his 
foreign news service, thus depriving the overseas staff of a de 
jure check on the Home Office's power. As a result, Dennis 
exercised near-absolute control over editorial and overseas news 
policies without being burdened by the mundane responsibilities 
normally associated with such power. The evidence suggests that 
Dennis exploited his favorable position and that his 
forcefulness displeased members of the foreign service as well 
as the publisher himself.
As early as December 1928, Strong expressed dissatisfaction 
with the performance of Dennis and to a lesser extent, Smith. 
He stated that it was now 'necessary... to build up the 
editorial staff' and 'to bring about a closer cooperation and 
better understanding in the administration of the foreign




service1. 347 Strong may have been influenced by complaints from 
his overseas staff, particularly those of Carroll Binder, the 
paper's Rome bureau chief.
Binder, who began his career by covering local stories for 
the Chicago Daily News, was frustrated by management's habit of 
ignoring the content and analysis of its own foreign news 
dispatches in its editorials. He characterized the paper's 
editorial writers as a bunch of 'unqualified non-specialists' in 
the area of international affairs, who sat insulated in the 
Chicago office. Moreover, Binder was infuriated by the 
editorial board's practice of echoing the conclusions reached by 
the Chicago Daily News's rivals, the New York Times and Chicago 
Daily Tribune. For example, he cited a Daily News editorial on 
British tariff policy as yet 'another instance of a flat-footed 
contradiction of our own foreign service cable of the day 
before' and further claimed that 'the writer of this editorial 
evidently read a slovenly prepared account in the New York Times 
or the Chicago Daily Tribune' .348
Binder's allegation that his paper's editorials took their 
lead from the New York Times deserves closer examination with 
particular attention to its German coverage. The evidence 
suggests that Binder may have had a valid claim. Although there 
is no clear correlation between the foreign dispatches of the 
New York Times and the editorials of the Chicago Daily News,
347Strong to Binder, 20 December 1928, Binder Papers, Ibid. See also 
Ibid. 16 February 1931.
348Binder to O'Flaherty 15 September 1930, Ibid. See also Ibid. 4 June 
1929 and 18 October 1930. For an additional discussion of Binder's 
ideas, see Heald, Vistas, pp.103-4 & 140-45.
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there is a striking similarity in the editorial views of both 
papers. A comparison of excerpts from each paper's editorial 
coverage of the 1930 Reichstag elections illustrates this 
resemblance:
The outcome of the Reichstag elections more than bears out 
the predicted gains for the extremists of the Right and 
Left, but falls noticeably short of being a disaster for the 
moderate parties... Were it not indeed for the extraordinary 
showing of the Fascists, one might say that the 
constitutional bloc had done pretty well... Events would 
seem to compel a renewal of the partnership of the moderate 
elements under whose guidance Germany has gone back to 
strength and prestige. 349 —  (New York Times editorial, 16 
September 1930}
Disquieting as are some of the results of the German 
national election, they most assuredly do not justify dismay 
on the part of sincere friends of governmental progress and 
popular rule... The moderate and constitutional parties and 
groups will have to adjust their differences and work 
together in an open alliance for the welfare of the 
nation... The election may prove a blessing in disguise to 
German republicanism and German prosperity. 350 —  (Chicago
Daily News editorial, 1_7 September 1930}
Binder harbored aspirations beyond that of editorial 
watchdog. He wanted to completely overhaul the decision-making 
apparatus of the editorial department as it existed under Dennis 
in order to shift the control of foreign editorial formulation 
from the Home Office to the overseas staff. The salient feature 
of Binder's proposal was the creation of the "Foreign Editor" —  
an enlightened person with overseas experience (with himself in 
mind) who would 'be independent and answerable only to the 
publisher'.351 'Where editorials concern themselves exclusively
349"The German Elections", NYT editorial, 16 September 1930.
350 "German Republicans Get A Warning", CDN editorial, 17 September 1930.
351Binder to P. Mowrer, 23 July 1929, Ibid.
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with interpretations of particular situations and did not commit 
the paper to a pronounced editorial stand on a particular issue, 
the special competence of the Foreign Editor should be such as 
to obtain acceptance of his editorials without revision by non- 
specialists' [my italics]. 352 Binder stopped short of empowering 
the Foreign Editor with total authority, arguing that overall 
editorial positions involving such issues as the League of 
Nations and debts and reparations ‘should be formulated jointly 
by the editor, publisher, chief of the editorial page, foreign 
editor and the head of the foreign service 1 . 353 In essence, 
Binder's proposal was designed primarily to undermine Dennis's 
near-autocratic control of editorial policy.
Strong, greatly impressed by Binder's intellect and
provocative ideas and hoping he could deftly ease Binder onto
the editorial board without alarming Dennis, invited him to join
the editorial staff. 354 However, Strong was ambivalent regarding
Binder's reorganization plan because the publisher was clearly
intimidated by his editor-in-chief's imposing status. Here is
Strong's rationalization to Binder about his plan:
Mr. Dennis is a man of very fixed habits and convictions... 
I think that you with your logical and honest mind will come 
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name and that [as such] you will be willing to accept the 
situation as it is.355
Strong seemed to lack the resolve and stamina necessary to
impose his will on Dennis. The more Binder pressed the Chicago
Daily News publisher to reform the editorial department, the
more Strong resisted. In fact, Strong remained equivocal two
years after he himself expressed a desire to make managerial
changes. Although he informed Binder that it was still his
1 intention to build up the editorial department and that you
[Binder] are eventually to have the position of editor', the
publisher maintained that it would 'take many years to solve the
present equation'; 356 in essence admitting that he was not "up to
the challenge" of revising the status quo. Early in his reign,
he responded to Binder's pleas for editorial reform by arguing
that 'we cannot give up old things even if they are founded
merely on traditional acceptance by faith and expect to
substitute new ones without a struggle [my italics]'. 357 By
February 1931, Strong appeared to have "thrown in the towel".
I do not pretend to be infallible [especially] under the 
stress of this responsibility and work. I have no doubt 
overlooked the necessity to reassure you [Binder]... Your 
letter raised some disappointing irritation in my mind and 
some feeling of hopeless fatigue.358
Strong's allusion to his poor physical health turned out to 
be prophetic. On 9 May 1931, three months after he conveyed his
355Strong to Binder, 16 February 1931, Ibid.
356Ibid.
357Strong to Binder, 26 December 1929, Ibid.
358Strong to Binder, 16 February 1931, Ibid.
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sense of impotence to Binder, Strong died suddenly of a heart 
attack. He was only forty-eight years old.
Strong's failure to exercise the usual authority of a 
publisher clearly influenced the manner in which the Chicago 
Daily News presented events occurring in Germany. That he 
allowed Dennis to run the editorial page as if it were his own 
fiefdom, accountable to no one, may help explain the difference 
between the perceptions and opinions of the paper's overseas 
correspondents and those of the paper's editorial writers. 
Moreover, it is plausible that Edgar Mowrer's "flip-flops" in 
his coverage of the 1928 Reichstag elections and the 
Muller/Briining transition in 1930 can be traced to Strong's 
decision to allow Dennis editorial discretion over foreign news 
service dispatches. In a general sense, the upheaval following 
Lawson's death in 1925 illustrates the dilemma faced by any new 
publisher who believes he lacks the credibility to impose his 
will on the established bureaucracy even when he recognizes the 
necessity for hierarchical changes. This episode also 
demonstrates that in such circumstances the political and 
journalistic ideology of a newspaper need not always be traced 
to the publisher. Interestingly enough, the New York Times 
experienced a phenomenon similar to that of the Chicago Daily 
News, which will be the topic of the next section.
* * *
A greater degree of accord existed between the New York 
Times's news and editorial departments in their coverage of 
German developments from 1928 through 14 September 1930 than
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between those departments at the Chicago Daily News. 
Nevertheless, Times editorials tended to magnify the optimism 
expressed by the paper's Berlin bureau in their assessments of 
the 1928 Reichstag elections, the appointment of Bruning as 
German Chancellor and the defeat of Hugenberg's "Freedom Law". 
Moreover, despite the Nazi electoral breakthrough in September 
1930, Times management (through its editorial page) maintained 
its confidence in the Weimar Republic even though its own news 
department began to question the prospects for survival of 
German parliamentary democracy.
'The German general public continues to display scant 
interest and enthusiasm over the forthcoming Reichstag election1 
wrote Lincoln Eyre, the New York Times Berlin bureau chief in 
his 1928 campaign coverage. 359 'Even the flamboyant torchlight 
processions headed by blaring bands have failed to stimulate any 
real excitement among the voting populace', noted Eyre, who like 
most of his contemporaries forecast a strong showing for the 
Socialists. 360 Eyre's prediction did, in fact, come true although 
he cited the electoral gains made by the Communists and even the 
trivial ones of the extreme right. The editorial department, 
however, unabashedly celebrated the Socialist victory and the 
corresponding Conservative defeat, stating that an SPD-dominated 
government 'would be far from a loss for European peace and 
continued reconstruction' .361
359NYT, 19 May 1928, section one.
360Ibid.
361"The German Election", 22 May 1928, NYT editorial.
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The New York Times editorial page continued to magnify and 
even distort the positive assessments of the Berlin bureau 
staff. The defeat of Hugenberg's anti-Young plan referendum 
provides a good example. Whereas the Times1s unnamed Berlin 
reporter*362 called the "Freedom Law" 'a complete failure', 363 the 
Home Office asserted that the 'foolish Fascist referendum 
symbolized the last large scale attempt by mischief makers to 
deflect the German nation from the road along which it had 
traveled since the Dawes plan toward renewed well-being' .364 
Moreover, management took the opportunity to praise what it saw 
as the 'seasonal spirit of goodwill' demonstrated by the German 
people.365
The first clear differences between the editorial and news 
coverage of Germany within the New York Times can be observed in 
their interpretations of the collapse of the Muller government 
and the appointment of Briining to the Reich Chancellery in March 
1930. Published Berlin dispatches suggested that the 
ministerial change was an indirect consequence of the ever- 
widening Depression. Moreover, the Berlin bureau was quite 
pessimistic concerning Briining's ability to form a stable 
government. For example, a 29 March published dispatch stated 
that it was doubtful whether Briining 'could organize a cabinet
362Most likely the person in question was Guido Enderis, although the 
anonymity of the author is itself a story which I will address later.
363NYT 23 December 1929.
364"The German Political Discipline", 25 December 1929, Ibid.
365Ibid.
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which would have a fighting chance in the Reichstag 1 . 366 That 
Briining would be able to form only a minority government led the 
Berlin bureau to conclude that the Catholic Centre party 
leader’s accession to power would merely 'perpetuate a condition 
of latent crisis1.367
No negative sentiments, however, were to be found in "The 
Upset in Germany", the paper's editorial on the ministerial 
transition. Disregarding its own news department's reports, the 
editorial board maintained that 'despite the temporary 
depression, there was no cause for pessimism concerning the 
economic future of Germany1. It also doubted whether Germany's 
unemployed numbered as many as three million. 368 According to 
this editorial, Briining's task would be made easier 'once 
business improved and unemployment declined' , 369 It is 
interesting to note that the paper's underestimation of 
Germany's depression corresponded to its unrealistic perception 
of America's economic woes. In fact, the New York Times 
editorial board did not acknowledge the severity of Germany's 
financial problems until the following September.370
The New York Times's coverage of the 1930 Reichstag elections 
represented a microcosm of the paper's reporting of events in 
Germany throughout the previous three y e a r s —  an expanding gulf
366NYT, 29 March 1930.
367Ibid. 30 March 1930.
368"The Upset in Germany", 29 March 1930, Ibid.
369Ibid.
370,,The German Elections", 12 September 1930, Ibid.
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between the editorial board and the Berlin bureau. The tone of 
the paper's 1930 election reporting, conducted by newly 
appointed Berlin bureau chief, Guido Enderis, changed 
dramatically as election day came and passed. At first, Enderis 
seemed unconcerned about the prospect of electoral polarization, 
a possibility which many observers feared. In fact, the Berlin 
correspondent did not even mention the Nazis in his first 
preview of the election on 2 September. And although his 
published dispatch of 12 September did acknowledge the growing 
appeal of the Nazis, (claiming that they stood a good chance of 
gaining forty or fifty seats in the new Reichstag), he assured 
supporters of the Republic that 'while Herr Hitler is nightly 
drawing crowds of 15,000 on his stumping tour, the significance 
of each attendances [sic] shrinks to a trifle when it is 
computed that four such audiences represent the vote required 
for one seat in the Reichstag' .371 Enderis further downplayed the 
significance of a possible Nazi victory, claiming that even in 
the event of a Hitler win, his party would be 'automatically 
eliminated from consideration' in the formulation of any 
prospective coalition government.372
Enderis's tune quickly changed after the unexpected margin of 
the Nazi electoral gain. Like Paul Mowrer, Enderis admitted 
that 'republicanism suffered a heavy blow and Chancellor 
Briining's reform cabinet a decisive defeat when 13,000,000 out 




Republic and its champion'. 373 He also concluded that 'the 
sensational gains of Adolf Hitler's Nazi party constituted one 
of the most upsetting developments in German post-war 
politics'. 374 As far as the future of the Weimar Republic was 
concerned, Enderis now conceded that 'the situation is fraught 
with considerable gravity because of the impotency of the 
bourgeois parties' and that the prospects for the season of 
political tranquillity required to administer the Reich's 
domestic and foreign affairs appears none too bright',375 Enderis 
attributed the Nazi success to the party's 'adroit manner with 
which it exploited the post-war social and economic deprivation 
of the middle and non-Socialist working class' 376 as well as 
Hitler's 'sonorous, penetrating tenor, which combined with his 
histrionic ability, made him especially effective with audiences 
of young men and women' ,377
In contrast to its news coverage, the New York Times' s 
editorial coverage of the election maintained a remarkable 
consistency, even after the huge Nazi victory. Although 
management had agreed with the pre-election consensus that the 
fascists and the communists would make some gains, it had 
predicted a 'working majority for the Briining government made up 
of a coalition of middle parties' because 'the decisive majority
373Ibid. 14 September 1930.
374Ibid. 15 September 1930.
375Ibid., 16 September 1930.
376Ibid., 15 September 1930.
377Ibid.
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of German people stand for order at home and cooperation 
abroad 1 . 378 Moreover, though the paper's headline of 1 4 September 
decried that 'the fate of parliamentary rule is at stake', an 
editorial published the same day expressed little concern, 
characterizing the election as 'one of those consultations of 
the people forced by a parliamentary tangle and the necessity of 
clearing the air, rather than by any revolutionary change in the 
basic situation', and reiterated its earlier prediction that 
although extremist parties would gain, there will be a 'safe 
majority' for the moderate parties.379
The divergence of views between the Berlin bureau and the 
editorial department reached its widest point immediately after 
the election. 'The outcome of the Reichstag elections', 
according to the paper's editorial of 16 September 'falls 
noticeably short of being a disaster' , 380 Whereas the Berlin 
bureau expressed alarm at the 13,000,000 anti-Republican vote 
tally, the editorial board expressed relief because it 
considered the figure to be low.381 Furthermore, although "The 
German Elections" editorial correctly noted that the Nazis had 
secured a number of votes at the expense of the Conservative 
party, its assertion that the constitutional parties emerged 
unscathed was not borne out by electoral statistics which were
378"The Reichstag Campaign", 6 September 1930, Ibid.
379Ibid.
380"The German Elections", 16 September 1930, Ibid.
381Ibid.
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available at the time of publication. 382 So taken was the 
editorial board with its belief that its piece of 16 September 
actually claimed that 'were it not for the extraordinary showing 
of the Fascists, one might say that the constitutional bloc had 
done pretty well'!383
That a discrepancy existed between news and editorial 
coverage of Germany following the 1930 Reichstag elections is 
obvious. More problematic, however, is identifying the factors 
that shaped the Times's news and editorial presentations. 
Although the available evidence is far from incontrovertible, it 
does suggest that the New York Times1 s German reporting was 
influenced by both a series of organizational decisions based on 
circumstances similar to those of the Chicago Daily News and by 
the unique practices and traditions of the paper.
* * *
By the 1920's, the international community regarded the New 
York Times as a bulwark of journalistic integrity. In an era 
where the majority of the U.S. press was characterized as 
"yellow" and "sensationalistic", the New York Times was among a 
select group of newspapers noted for its emphasis on accuracy, 
breadth and objectivity. A comprehensive intelligence report 
prepared by the British Library of Information for Whitehall 
entitled "Memorandum on the Press of the United States, 1922- 
32", a relatively detached evaluation of the U.S. press during 




more reliable, yet colourless newspapers. Despite noting the 
paper's reputation for unbiased foreign news reporting, the 
memorandum criticized the New York Times 1s European coverage for 
its lackluster analysis, redundant news stories and uninspiring 
editorials. Moreover, the authors of the report implied that 
the tone of the Times1s news articles and editorials tended to 
be slanted in an optimistic direction. They concluded that,
'[The New York Times 1 rarely condemns either party in a dispute 
but welcomes any sign of peace'; (in some respects the paper's 
editorial stance towards Germany during the July Crisis gives 
credence to this appraisal). 384 Nonetheless, the report 
acknowledges the voluminous New York Times as the "newspaper of 
record" and perhaps America's most important.385
No understanding of the New York Times is possible without a 
discussion of the paper's most important publisher, Adolph S. 
Ochs, revered by his supporters and respected by his 
detractors. Many echoed Dr. Nicholas Butler's sentiment that 
the New York Times publisher was 'the mastermind of journalism 
in any land' , 386 When Ochs died in April of 1935, the Associated 
Press paid tribute to his memory by "going silent" for two 
minutes (compared to one minute for the slain President Kennedy 
28 years later). As the guiding force behind the news and 
editorial policy of the New York Times. Ochs did not design his
384Klein, "Reaping the Whirlwind" P.20.
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paper as a vehicle for political or even financial gain, 387* nor 
did he wish the Times to be an instrument of social change. 
When the paper was financially strapped at the turn of the 
century, Ochs rejected a lucrative advertising offer from 
Tammany Hall even though most New York newspapers had entered 
into similar arrangements with the state's Democratic machine. 
Rather, Ochs strove to create a newspaper that behaved like a 
national and world information service, akin to an early century 
version of CNN. 388 The success of the Times, therefore, hinged 
on the paper's unblemished reputation, because a loss of 
credibility would result in it being seen as a tabloid and 
therefore shunned by its serious-minded readership.
One method Ochs employed to enhance the Times's credibility 
was to separate clearly editorial and news coverage —  a feature 
which distinguished the New York Times from nearly every other 
publication.389 To reinforce this philosophy, he assigned each 
department to different floors. One of Ochs's last major staff 
appointments, the promotion of Rollo Ogden to editorial page 
editor in 1922, was one of his most crucial as far as German- 
related editorials were concerned. Ogden's messianic optimism 
(he was an ordained minister) impressed Ochs to the point where 
the publisher gave him 'unlimited freedom to advocate what
387*It is important to note, however, that Ochs brought the paper back 
from the brink of extinction to being a highly profitable enterprise 
though, as stated above, he did not view the NYT as primarily a 
business venture.
388Interview- Alex Jones and Susan Tifft, authors of an upcoming
biography on the Ochs and Sulzberger families 17 June 1994.
389John Oakes to the author, 23 June 1994.
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principles and policies he felt were right 1 .390 Although New York 
Times editorials went unsigned, it is almost certain that Ogden 
was a critical player in the formulation of the Times1 s rose- 
coloured view of the tumultuous events in Weimar Germany. Under 
the strong leadership of managing editors Carr Van Anda, 
Frederick Birchall and Edwin James, the news department also 
operated as a powerful autonomous unit. Not surprisingly, this 
state of affairs allowed for disparities between news and 
feature stories on the one hand and editorials on the other; 
hence, the differentiation between Berlin bureau dispatches and 
editorial views between 1928 and 1930.
However, these inconsistencies were not as frequent as one 
would expect, because of Ochs's hiring practices. Ochs wanted 
his correspondents to act as impartial observers, 
dispassionately recording events like 'an order of monks'.391 
Berlin correspondents made a practice of quoting extensively 
from politically diverse German newspapers such as the 
conservative Berliner Lokalanzeicer, the liberal Frankfurter 
Zeitunq, the socialist Berliner Vorwaerts and the Nazi 
Volkischer Beobachter. In fact, it was not uncommon to see 
entire news articles consisting primarily of long series of 
quotes, especially during Weimar election campaigns. 392 Moreover, 
Ochs was so committed to this journalistic ideal that he was
390McKerns, J.(ed.) Biographical Dictionary of American Journalism (NY 
1989) P.524.
391Interview- Jones and Tifft 17 June 1994.
392See for instance, NYT; 10-17 Sept 1930, 10-20 March 1932, 25 July-5
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more apt to hire a dispassionate, though pedestrian reporter 
than a creative one. In practice, this facet of his philosophy 
proved detrimental to the Times1s coverage of the rise of Hitler 
between 1928 and 1930. For example, when his senior editors 
recommended against promoting Guido Enderis to the post of Chief 
Berlin Correspondent because he lacked creative imagination, 
Ochs turned the criticism on its head by stating there was 'such 
a thing as having too much imagination' .393
Ochs demanded diligence, reliability and humility from his 
staff, with little tolerance for flamboyant individualism, 
either at the office or in public. Conduct which cast the Times 
in a negative light usually resulted in a harsh reprimand or 
dismissal. Management's attitude became further entrenched 
during the 1920's as a result of actions by the paper's Moscow 
correspondent, Walter Duranty. Duranty's pro-Soviet viewpoint 
(he failed to report the deaths of millions of Russian peasants 
caused by Stalin's collectivization plan) and his questionable 
personal conduct (he was known for both his fascination with 
women and opium) became constant sources of embarrassment to 
Times management. Ochs, however, resisted firing Duranty 
because the Moscow correspondent had become very popular among 
the left-wing segments of the paper's readership, especially 
after he was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 1 933.394 Undoubtedly, 
the Duranty experience caused management to exercise greater 
caution in its hiring decisions. 'Safe and sane' became the
393James to Birchall 28 May 1930, James#5-2250, NYT Archive.
394Salisbury, H. Without Fear or Favor, (New York 1963) pp.458-464.
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often repeated criteria for a vacant foreign correspondent's 
position.395 Consequently, the more energetic and usually more 
talented reporters were left out of consideration. Thus,
despite the fact that the New York Times maintained the largest 
European staff of any newspaper, it failed to distinguish itself 
as the nonpareil of foreign reporting. As a result of Ochs's 
influence, the Timesmen understood their role and place, —  
anonymous musicians in the world's most famous symphony
orchestra.
The hiring of Guido Enderis in 1930 as the New York Times's 
Berlin bureau chief reflected many facets of Ochs's news 
philosophy. The bureau had been in a continual state of flux 
since the firing of Cyril Brown at the end of 1923. Brown was 
succeeded by Thomas R. Ybarra in 1924, who was promptly
transferred to London in 1 925 .396 Ybarra was in turn succeeded
by Lincoln Eyre who had earned his reputation for fine reporting 
during the Great War. However, the evidence suggests that 
because of Eyre's drinking and other health problems, the bulk 
of German dispatches were penned by Paul Miller, the bureau's 
capable yet undistinguished "number two" man. 397 When Eyre died 
unexpectedly in 1928, the Times did not promote Miller. 
Instead, in 1929, it brought in Wythe Williams, one of the
395See for instance, James #5/2184-86,93,97,2205, NYT Archive.
It is important to note that some newspapers and news agencies 
frequently transferred their reporters in order to maintain their 
correspondents1 objectivity. Associated Press historian Richard 
Schwarzlose to the author June 1995. However, there is no evidence 
which suggests that the New York Times engaged in this practice.
397Miller to Birchall, 1 October 1928, Williams to Birchall, 17 January 
1929 and Birchall to James, 21 January 1929, James #5, NYT Archive.
(155)
paper's best field reporters, to provide stability to the 
bureau. However, Williams was fired after only a year of 
service.
Williams's dismissal reflected the criteria that management 
used to evaluate its foreign bureau chiefs. Williams was 
removed not because of his reporting, but rather for his lack of 
administrative skills.398 Duranty lamented that the paper's chief 
correspondents —  ostensibly the bureaux's best writers, 'spent 
half their time on office detail' .399 As a result, some 
dispatches signed by the bureau chief may actually have been 
written by a subordinate. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
paper's numerical superiority in correspondents failed to 
translate into a significant number of Pulitzer prizes in 
overseas reporting.
Ochs chose Enderis instead of the more journalistically 
qualified Joseph Shaplen, over the wishes of Frederick Birchall 
and Edwin James, the Times's acting managing editor and European 
service editor respectively. Ochs believed that Enderis's in- 
house experience, combined with his stint at the Associated 
Press, met the publisher's goal of objective, comprehensive, yet 
colourless reporting. 400 As it turned out, Enderis was
398James to Birchall, 1 July 1932, James #6-0708 and "Memorandum on Mr. 
Enderis", October 1940, Ibid. Times management may have also 
discovered that Williams had taken several unauthorized excursions. On 
one such occasion in 1929, William Shirer of the Chicago Daily Tribune 
agreed to pen Williams's dispatches while the latter was in Geneva.
See Shirer, W. 20th Century Journey, P.422.
O Q O
Hohenberg, J., Foreign Correspondence (NY 1964), P.279 and Duranty,
W., I Write As I Please (NY 1935), pp.101-102.
400The fact that Shaplen was Jewish was an additional factor which will 
be discussed in the next chapter.
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overmatched by the journalistic demands of the position —  he 
rarely "scooped11 the competition nor did he dazzle the paper's 
readership with insightful news analysis. As the international 
media focused more detailed attention on Germany after 1930, the 
New York Times management, in an act of desperation, dispatched 
Fred Birchall to Berlin to act as the bureau's chief writer. 
Nonetheless, the paper retained Enderis through 1940 because of 
his office managing skills even though his written contributions 
had become negligible.401
Notwithstanding his intervention in the Enderis affair, 
Ochs's role in the daily decision-making of the New York Times 
diminished sharply throughout the 1920's and early 1930's 
because of his advanced age and a series of bouts of clinical 
depression. As a result, Ochs handed the reins of power to his 
son-in-law, Arthur Hays Sulzberger.
Like Walter Strong at the Chicago Daily News. Sulzberger was 
reluctant to execute the powers of the publisher's office, 
especially during the 1920's. His passivity also can be 
attributed to his overall lack of credibility. Although 
employed by the Times prior to his promotion, Sulzberger was 
named publisher because the aging Ochs wished to ensure 
immediate family ownership upon his death. Moreover, he dared 
not disappoint his beloved daughter, Iphigene. This fortuitous 
circumstance was not lost on young Arthur, who quipped on many 
occasions that ' the key to success is to work hard and marry the
401See James #5/2010, 19, 21, 37, 53 & 62 and "Memorandum on Mr. Enderis" 
October 1940, NYT Archive.
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boss's daughter'. 402 Because he entered journalism soon after 
World War One, Sulzberger lacked the experience and the will to 
act decisively. His insecurity was not alleviated by the 
attitude of Edwin James who 'often regarded him rather 
scornfully and made no secret of it' . 403 Most important, 
Sulzberger refrained from exercising strong authority because he 
worked in the shadow of Adolph Ochs, both figuratively and 
literally. On one occasion where the heir apparent did assert 
himself, his father-in-law reminded him that he was 'not dead
yet'. 404 Thus, Sulzberger's early regime was characterized by a
lack of forcefulness and direction.
Sulzberger's impotence meant that the disparity between news 
and editorial analysis which had characterized the Times1s 
German coverage between 1928 and 1930 was left unresolved. In 
fact, Ogden's grip on the editorial page was so tight that 
Sulzberger commonly was known to remark that he read his paper 
'in order to find out what his opinions were'. 405 Hence, Ogden's 
unmitigated confidence in humanity's ability to overcome its 
many predicaments was left unchecked. Catastrophic events such 
as the Great Depression were depicted as minor problems. 
Moreover, the editorials of the New York Times concerning German 
developments even through Hitler's accession to . power were 
unrealistically optimistic and reassuring.
402John Oakes to the author 23 June 1994.
403Catledge, T., My Life and the Times, (New York 1971) P.159.
404Talese, G., The Kingdom and the Power (New York 1966) P.12.
405John B. Oakes to the author, 23 June 1994.
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Despite occasional interventions by Ochs, the New York Times 
operated without a fully empowered publisher during the Weimar 
era and consequently, the paper lacked clear direction from the 
top. Unfortunately, the emotionally distraught Ochs was 
incapable of providing daily leadership while the newly 
appointed Sulzberger felt constrained from doing so. The 
paper's news and editorial policies in regard to Hitler's rise 
during the early Depression era, therefore, lacked a general 
cohesiveness because daily decision-making became more 
decentralized. Power now rested with a new generation of 
Timesmen: Birchall, Ogden, James and the staff of an ever-
changing Berlin bureau. It would not be until 1932 that one 
would start to witness a general congruence between the 
editorial and news departments.
* * *
The significance of the Chicago Daily News's and the New York 
Times' s coverage of Germany lies in what was written, in 
contrast to the Chicago Daily Tribune's coverage, whose salient 
feature is how little was written. Between 1928 and 1930, 
Robert McCormick's newspaper devoted far less attention and 
prominence to major stories emanating from Germany than other 
newspapers that had maintained overseas bureaux. For example, 
the Tribune's coverage of the 1928 Reichstag elections was 
limited to two days, with its pre-election analysis appearing on 
the day of the balloting and buried on page 25. And although 
the election results made the front page, Berlin bureau chief 
Sigrid Schultz's published dispatch ran for less than three
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hundred words. 406 Moreover, in contrast to the New York Times and 
the Chicago Daily News, the Tribune had no editorial on the 
event. In fact, McCormick maintained a conspicuous editorial 
silence on German matters throughout this period. The paper 
even relied on the Associated Press for its back-page coverage 
of the defeat of Hugenberg's "Freedom Law". 407 The Tribune 
continued this pattern even during the highly publicized 1930 
Reichstag elections. Strangely, the paper's pre-election 
campaign coverage began and ended on 1 September, not to resume 
until election day (14 September).408
While the evidence is by no means conclusive, it does suggest 
several reasons which could have accounted for the de-emphasis 
of Germany by the Tribune's foreign news service —  a noticeable 
departure from the spotlight it had enjoyed during the first 
half of the decade.
One possible factor may have been financial. As the 
Depression worsened in America, newspaper owners reduced the 
number of pages in their dailies to lower paper costs. Overseas 
bureaux were particularly hard hit because despite the general 
economic deflation at home, cable transmission costs actually 
rose during the otherwise downward spiral. Sigrid Schultz and 
other European correspondents were ordered to keep their word 
counts low, especially in the reporting of mundane matters.409
406CDT, 20 & 21 May 1928.
407Ibid., 23.December 1929.
408Ibid., 1&14 September 1930.
409Beck to Schultz, 17 June 1930, Schultz Papers, State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin.
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Nevertheless, the validity of this factor in explaining the 
dearth of German news coverage between 1928 and 1930 is 
mitigated by the fact that other newspapers, such as the New 
York Times and the Chicago Daily News still published extensive 
stories from the Weimar Republic. Furthermore, the Tribune saw 
fit to print dispatches from other nations. In the week 
preceding the 1930 Reichstag elections, for example, the paper 
ran banner headlines on a military coup in Argentina (8 & 9 
September).410 The Tribune also concentrated on military 
developments in the Far East throughout 1930 and 1931, 
especially those regarding the Sino-Soviet-Japanese conflicts in 
Manchuria.
A more plausible reason seems to be the perception of 
McCormick and his staff that German affairs had lost their news 
appeal. The monarchic restoration angle, which the Tribune had 
consistently played up during the first half of the 1920's, lost 
much of its credibility in the second half of the decade, 
although the paper did attempt to resurrect the spectre of a 
Hohenzollern return in its 1930 coverage.411 Even the tremendous 
increase in political violence in the Weimar Republic was 
becoming stale news from the Tribune's point of view. By the 
end of 1930, George Scharschug, the paper's cable editor, was 
suggesting that Schultz play down her coverage of street clashes 
in Berlin because the 'riots were becoming almost a joke as they
410CDT, 8&9 September 1930.
411CDT, 1 September 1930. See also Schultz to Pierson, 17 May 1926, 
Schultz Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
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happened so frequently', although he rescinded this directive 
soon afterwards.412
Not only did German developments in the latter half of the 
1920's appear to have lost their newsworthiness, the Tribune 
also felt they had lost their significance to the Chicago 
reader. Whereas McCormick viewed the 1923 Ruhr crisis and Beer 
Hall Putsch, the Reichstag elections of 1924, and Hindenburg's 
election in 1925 as events which would directly impact on 
America's diplomatic and economic position in Europe, he did not 
regard the election of 1928, the death of Stresemann and the 
Young plan vote in 1929, and to a certain degree the Reichstag 
elections of 1930, in the same light. In specific terms, the 
Home Office's directive to Schultz in 1927 was that 'if a story 
does not report a decisive event of American or international 
importance, let it be kept to less than one hundred words1.413 
Furthermore, despite Hitler's unexpected triumph in the 1930 
balloting, the Home Office maintained that 'we do not think the 
internal politics which follow [the election] will be of much 
news interest over here'.414 Undoubtedly, the onset of the Great 
Depression and the corresponding emphasis by the American media 
on domestic matters is a plausible explanation for this 
phenomenon. However, once again, it is important to note that 
foreign news still occupied a prominent position in the Chicago 
Daily Tribune, only its venue had changed.
412Scharschug to Schultz, 10 December 1930, Ibid.
413Beck to Schultz, 1 April 1927, Ibid.
414Scharschug to Schultz, 18 September 1930, Ibid.
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The steady de-emphasis of German news between 1926 and 1930 
was facilitated by the tight editorial control that Colonel 
McCormick and Tribune management exercised over the Berlin 
bureau. Although the available evidence clearly shows that the 
Tribune was very pleased with Schultz's work, internal documents 
reveal her impotence in editing and publication decisions. In 
fact, while the Berlin bureaux of the New York Times and the 
Chicago Daily News maintained a tangible level of autonomy, it 
appears that despite Schultz's later claims to the contrary415, 
management dictated the scope and extent of her contributions.
The relationship between McCormick and his foreign service
staff was best summarized by correspondent William Shirer:
'The aura of Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick pervaded 
our office. Even the cynical, hard-boiled Henry Wales [the 
Tribune's London correspondent] spoke of him in awe —  and 
usually in whispers. The foreign service was the colonel's 
pet project. He ran it himself, rarely informing either 
his managing editor of the Napoleonic orders he sometimes 
peppered us with or his cryptic criticisms scrawled on the 
margin of our dispatches which came almost daily. Nor 
apparently did he bother to tell them of certain 
nonjournalistic assignments he would give us which often 
kept us away from our reporting for days or weeks. 1416
McCormick utilized his foreign news service to give credence 
to his ideological beliefs and selected his reporters 
accordingly. However, he did not follow this practice with 
Schultz for reasons that are not altogether clear. Though 
Donald Day cabled vivid, (though often fraudulent) analyses of 
Soviet communism, Schultz was ordered to avoid speculation and
415Schultz asserted in later interviews that she was never censored and 
was afforded a great deal of influence in editorial matters. However, 
the evidence does not appear to bear out her recollections.
416Shirer, My Journey, P.349.
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editorializing in her dispatches.417 In fact, a conspicuous 
feature of the Berlin bureau chief's published pieces was their 
brevity and usually there was a noticeable absence of thought- 
provoking analysis. Schultz's examination of the 1928 Reichstag 
elections was cursory and was also devoid of issues concerning 
Hindenburg's health, even though she had expressed to her 
publisher the intention of covering that aspect of the story.418 
Instead, the Tribune emphasized the gains of the Communists, 
reflecting McCormick's ideological and journalistic bent.419
Schultz continually pressed for publication of her cables and 
mail stories but was often rebuffed. A glaring example of this 
was her futile attempt to get her 2400-word preview of the 1930 
Reichstag elections published. Schultz acknowledged the 
article's prohibitive length and requested that it be run 
serially or on Sunday because she felt that 'quite a number of 
our readers would like to know just what the different parties 
stand for'. 420 Instead, her pre-election coverage (1 & 14
September) totalled less than nine hundred words. Moreover, 
whereas the thrust of Schultz's unpublished mail story was 
primarily on the Nazis and the Communists as well as on the 
global significance of the election, much of her published work 
was limited to issues tangential to the balloting, e.g., over
417Pierson to Schultz, 26 August 1926 and Scharschug to Schultz, 14 
October 1930, Ibid.
418Schultz to McCormick, 3 November 1927, Ibid.
419CDT, 21 May 1928.
420Schultz to Scharschug, 13 August 1930, Schultz Papers, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin.
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one half of Schultz1 s 1 September preview was devoted to the 
return of the ex-Kaiser's wife amidst speculation of a 
Hohenzollern restoration.421
Management consistently attempted, however, to include a
sensational dimension in its German articles. Throughout the
1920's, McCormick urged Schultz to find a "smoking gun" which
would link the Allies to the German Left at the close of the
Great War. 422 The evidence suggests that Schultz resisted at
least some of management' s attempts to get her to report
unsubstantiated news as fact, if it qualified as a "major
scoop". In 1926 the Home Office criticized Schultz for not
cabling an unconfirmed story of a possible coup. Schultz's
reply reveals that her professional standards may have been
higher than those of her employer.
I am fully aware that Putsch [sic] stories are good reading, 
but I am certain that you would not approve of my sending a 
Putsch [sic] story if I were absolutely convinced that it 
were ninety percent fake as this was the case... I shall be 
delighted to "cry wolf" whenever there is danger, but in 
this case I was certain there was none, and that you would 
not approve of my sending a sensational story that I knew 
was not entirely true [my italics].423
The evidence also suggests that management pressed Schultz to 
dramatize the evil nature of the Nazis, even to the point of 
distortion. Particular attention was paid to psychological 
quirks of Party members as well as to the idiosyncracies of the
421CDT, 1 September 1930.
422See for instance, McCormick to Schultz 14 February 1928, 18 September 
1929 and 16 July 1930, as well as Schultz's mail proofs, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin.
423Schultz to Pierson, 17 May 1926, Ibid. See also Ibid. 13 January 
1927.
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Party's doctrines. Although Schultz held the fascists in very
low regard, she still wanted to maintain her objectivity and
preserve her credibility as a journalist.
One can make glorious creepy stuff out of the Hitlerites but 
I believe we are acting more in the interests of the paper 
if we stick to the facts as closely as we can and not strain 
for the glory of a big flashy story that sounds grand one 
day and makes you feel foolish the day after.424
Thus, the de-emphasis of German news in the latter half of 
the 1920's appears rooted in a complex web of factors, all of 
which center around the journalistic philosophy and the 
management style of publisher Robert McCormick. With hindsight, 
the Nazi electoral breakthrough in September 1930 invited 
renewed media attention to the plight of the Weimar Republic. 
By 1932, Germany was again at the forefront of the Tribune's 
overseas news coverage. However, in the autumn of 1930, it 
appeared that neither McCormick, nor to a lesser extent Schultz, 
envisioned the reemergence of Germany as a primary news source.
Although nowhere close to the divergence of views within the 
Chicago Daily News and the New York Times, there did exist some 
disparity between Schultz's muted analysis of the prospective 
impact of the 1930 elections and Robert McCormick's optimistic 
views expressed through his editorial page. Schultz maintained 
that the Nazis had won 'a smashing victory' and that Hitler now 
'emerges as one of the most powerful men in Germany'. 425 She 
gloomily forecast that 'the next session of the Reichstag
424Schultz to Scharschug, ? 1930., Ibid.
425CDT, 15 September 1930.
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promises to be one of the stormiest in its stormy history' .426 
The Tribune1s editorial coverage, however, was far more 
reassuring. Although conceding that the Nazi victory could 
'hardly be a comfort to anyone who believes that what Europe and 
western civilization need is peace', the "German Election" also 
stated that because the fascist tally was really a 'protest 
vote' against the Treaty of Versailles, one should 'be inclined 
to discount radical inferences' from the results.427 McCormick's 
editorial view appears based on his faith in the German people. 
'The Germans are the most stable and orderly people of the 
continent, with a very high level of character and intelligence' 
and 'if any people in the world are fit for self-government and 
popular institutions, they are', he commented. McCormick's 
editorial page thus concluded that ' it is reasonable to believe 
that the [Weimar government] will unite moderate opinion' 
against the reactionaries.428
The irony of the "German Election" editorial is that it 
represented a reversal of McCormick's private views which he had 
held one year earlier. In a 1929 letter to Schultz he foresaw 
'a fascist, royalist or aristocratic revolution1 for Germany.429 
It is also not clear whether Schultz was able to influence the 
Colonel's views on the matter. One month prior to the 
publisher's dire prediction, Schultz had alerted him to the
426Ibid.
427,lThe German Election", 16 September 1930, Ibid.
428Ibid.
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growing threat of the Nazis as well as the Communists (although
she did not believe at that point that either party 'represented
an acute danger to the German republic'). 430 However,
approximately one month following her gloomy 15 September 1930
prediction about Weimar's future, Schultz softened her view.
Hitler could be a very acute danger to Germany and Europe if 
it were not for one fact: the last man who gets to Hitler 
before he makes a speech can direct his whole trend of 
thoughts. Once started, he gets drunk on his own words and 
they are fiery words which get the masses, only he seesaws 
back and forth. His speeches run the whole gamut, from 
bloodcurdling threats to almost pacifistic promises of 
friendship for everybody, including the French. The German 
voter is now beginning to wonder which is the real Hitler 
and if Hitler shifts around much more, the voter will break 
away [my italics].431
It is not clear whether Schultz had expressed these more 
optimistic sentiments in her weekly correspondence with 
McCormick prior to the publication of the Tribune's editorial of 
16 September 1930. If this were the case, one could plausibly 
argue that McCormick took his lead from Schultz. What is clear 
is that the Tribune's editorial reflects the publisher's views 
consistently held towards Germany throughout much of the 1920's; 
namely, that the nation had been mistreated by the Allies and 
her people possessed an admirable national character, much like 
that of the Americans.
* * ie
430Ibid., 18 August 1929.
431Ibid., 29 October 1930.
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Most newspapers were slow to react to the sudden reversal of 
the Weimar Republic's political and economic fortunes between
1928 and 1930. As iterated, the mainstream American press 
downplayed the impact of the Great Depression on Germany as well 
as at home. The defeat of Hugenberg's "Freedom Law" in December
1929 seemed to vindicate the Young Plan and the perceptiveness 
of the German people. And although the fall of the Muller
government in the following March caused consternation among
some segments of the U.S. press, it was not until Hitler's
victory in the 1930 Reichstag elections (the extent and impact 
of which was foreseen by none of the press) that the majority of 
mainstream publications began to worry about the future of the 
Weimar Republic.
Although the news coverage of the New York Times, Chicago 
Daily News and Chicago Daily Tribune resembled the pattern set 
by most U.S. publications, each paper's editorial coverage
deviated from the mainstream media consensus by downplaying the 
seriousness of the Nazi victory in September 1930. However, the 
three papers did express distaste for Hitler and his ideas, a 
view shared by most of their counterparts. In fact, one of the 
most consistent features of the American press's coverage of 
Germany between 1923 and 1933 was the negative portrayal of the 
Nazis. And although the American reader was not left with the 
impression that the Nazis would perpetrate a European-wide 
genocide, he would certainly conclude that they were thugs.
Although the reporting of German news by the New York Times. 
Chicago Daily News and Chicago Daily Tribune developed along 
different lines, the results were virtually identical: a
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disparity between news and editorial coverage, a lack of concern 
regarding events preceding the Nazi electoral breakthrough, and 
a belief that the Weimar Republic would survive the Hitler 
triumph. Second, the consensus of editorial opinion among the 
three papers demonstrates an instance where each management's 
general political ideology was only a minor factor shaping the 
presentation of German news, especially in light of their 
differing foreign agendas. The New York Times and the Chicago 
Daily News supported the tenets of Wilsonianism —  the League of 
Nations, disarmament, and U.S. intervention throughout the world 
—  whereas the Chicago Daily Tribune was at the forefront of 
isolationist sentiment. Nevertheless, each paper's German 
coverage was not completely devoid of management's political 
bias. Some of Sigrid Schultz's articles, supporting the fears 
of her publisher, raised the spectre of communism, while Rollo 
Ogden overemphasized the importance of the "Freedom Law" defeat 
on the Times's editorial page in order to lend additional 
support to the Young plan.
Notwithstanding the influence of each management's political 
ideology, the nature and extent of German news was shaped in 
large part by each paper's journalistic philosophy and corporate 
dynamics —  a theme established in previous chapters. The 
examples of the New York Times and the Chicago Daily News 
illustrate how the personality of the publisher, as well as his 
departure, could affect the strength and autonomy of the Berlin 
bureaux and editorial departments, while the case of the Chicago 
Daily Tribune illustrates how a powerful, interventionist 
publisher could control a story's presentation. Above all, the
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German coverage of the New York Times, Chicago Daily News and 
Chicago Daily Tribune between 1928 and 1930 reveals that news 
reporting does not occur in a vacuum; the shaping of a 
particular news story may depend less on the events reported 
than on the internal dynamics within the news organization.
Chapter 5
The Nazis at High Tide: Januaiy-August 1932
On the morning after the Nazi victory in the 1930 Reichstag 
elections, George E. Gordon, the American Charge d'Affaires in 
Berlin, cabled Washington that the result 'was another 
overpowering example of Germany's lack of political education 
and wisdom' .432 He criticized the inability of the republican 
parties to 'run the parliamentary machinery smoothly and relieve 
the impact of the Depression' but stopped short of labelling the 
Nazi success a "knock-out blow". 433 Gordon believed, however, 
that Hitler's triumph 'constituted a grave danger to the 
republican order'. His fears were not alleviated four days 
later after meeting with a diplomatic intermediary from the 
Party.434
Gordon's concerns were well founded: the election results
precluded a revival of a middle-party coalition. The 
unwillingness of Hitler or Hugenberg to join as junior partners 
in a Briining government also prevented the Chancellor from 
securing majority support from the Reichstag. Hence, Briining 
implemented most of his policies through the use of Article 48 
of the Weimar constitution, rule by emergency decree.435 Through 
the good graces of President von Hindenburg, the German 
Chancellor invoked Article 48 no less than forty times in 1931




435Childers, Nazi Voter, P.192 and Nicholls, Weimar, pp.125-6.
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and a record 57 times in 1 932 .436 Although it is doubtful if 
Briining could have governed without relying upon Article 48, his 
tactic blurred the lines between democracy and dictatorship, 
thereby facilitating a smooth transition to his successors, 
Franz von Papen, Kurt von Schleicher and most notably, Adolf 
Hitler.
From this position of weakness Briining was forced to face 
Germany's economic, political and psychological crises caused by 
the Great Depression. The Weimar Republic's poor economic state 
prior to the Nazi victory in September 1930 continued on a 
downward spiral. Between 1930 and 1932 industrial production 
fell more than 33%. Heavy industries were particularly hard 
hit, iron and steel suffering declines in production of 60% and 
50% respectively.437 In 1932, joint-stock companies registered 
their first negative return on capital investment since the 
close of the Great War, (-10%). 438 In addition, Germany was 
plagued by a series of banking and monetary crises throughout 
1931 and 1932. One such crisis prompted the closing of the 
Berlin stock market for seven months. The most serious 
consequence of the Great Depression, however, was the huge climb 
in Germany's unemployment rate. By the end of 1932, six million 
Germans, approximately 30% of the nation's labor force, were out 
of work. This figure, which was double that of 1930, is
436For a detailed analysis, see Boldt, H. "Article 48 of the Weimar 
Republic: Its Historical and Political Implications" in Nicholls, ed. 
German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler (London 1971) .
437Berghahn, Modern Germany, Table 8, P.277.
438Ibid., Table 20, P.286.
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considered by most historians to be a conservative estimate.439
Germany's unemployment problem had a three—fold effect. 
Economically, it reduced Weimar's tax base and hence its ability 
to provide relief to the nation's poor. Politically, it 
accelerated electoral polarization: most of those newly
unemployed joined the ranks of the communist party (KPD), 
driving those who feared a "red" takeover into the electoral 
columns of the Nazis. And psychologically, many Germans 
attributed unemployment, as well as other problems caused by the 
Great Depression, to the ineffectiveness of parliamentary 
government in general, thus further undermining the credibility 
of the Weimar Republic.
Notwithstanding all of these symptoms associated with 
Germany's economic woes, Briining (like many of his 
contemporaries) wished to avoid a repeat of the nation's 1923-4 
bout of hyper-inflation. With this in mind, the German 
Chancellor imposed a series of deflationary measures by 
emergency decree which included wage and price controls as well 
as tax increases and reductions in government benefits such as 
unemployment insurance.440
Briining also believed that his austerity program at home 
would bolster Germany's diplomatic position abroad. He 
advocated the formation of an Austro-German customs union and 
sought armaments equality with other European nations. However,
439Childers, Nazi Voter, P.193 and Berghahn, Modern Germany, Table 18,
P.284. For a comprehensive account of the Depression in Germany, see 
James, H. The German Slump, Politics and Economics 1924-1936 (Oxford 
1989) .
440Childers, Nazi Voter, P.193 and Nicholls, Weimar, P.128. James
contends that Briining was secretly reinflating the economy. Even if 
his theory is true, he neglects the fact that Briining's policy appeared 
deflationary and hence, was unpopular.
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the linchpin of Briining's "nationalist" foreign policy was the 
ending of reparations to the Allies. The Chancellor hoped that 
by demonstrating fiscal responsibility to the Americans through 
his domestic economic program, he would provide the Republic 
with diplomatic leverage against the stubborn French. Not only 
did Briining wish to lift a financial and psychological burden 
from the German taxpayer; more importantly, he assumed that a 
reparations triumph would bolster his own political position 
since he could then claim credit as the man who freed his nation 
from the "shackles of Versailles".
Despite achieving some of his goals, Briining's two-pronged 
policy failed miserably. His economic initiatives were widely 
denounced (even by members of his own party). Whatever the long 
term benefits, most Germans essentially were being ordered to 
pay more for less —  hardly a prescription for political 
popularity. Moreover, most Germans found Briining's cutbacks and 
tax hikes particularly hard to accept because some groups such 
as the Reichswehr and East Prussian estate owners actually 
benefited from the Chancellor's austerity budget. While German 
workers were coping with falling wages, Briining succumbed to 
pressure from Hindenburg's conservative clique and ordered a 
grain subsidy at 25% above the world market price.441
Briining's foreign policy was only a mixed success. On the 
one hand, his proposed customs union with Austria met with a 
rude rebuff from France, who along with her Eastern European 
allies proceeded to withhold short-term loans from Vienna's 
largest lending institutions, causing the collapse of the
441Nicholls, Weimar, P. 127 See also Gessner, "The Dilemma of German 
Agriculture", in Bessel and Feuchtwanger Social Change.
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Creditanstalt and triggering a European-wide banking crisis. On 
the other hand, Briining successfully continued Stresemann's 
policy of retooling the German army while presenting himself as 
a "poster-boy" for European disarmament. Most important, 
Briining made substantial strides towards the goal of eliminating 
Germany's debts to the Allies. In June 1931 President Hoover 
proposed a temporary moratorium on reparations and war debt 
repayments, which laid the groundwork for a permanent
cancellation of payments one year later. However, Briining
failed to accrue political capital from this achievement since 
the Hoover moratorium was viewed by most Germans as a symbol of 
American goodwill, not a consequence of the Chancellor's 
statesmanship. 442 Even if Briining had been given full credit for 
his foreign-policy successes, his domestic position would have 
remained fragile at best. Despite Germany's widespread 
resentment of the Versailles settlement, Briining's political 
fortunes, in fact, depended on his ability to steer Germany 
through the Great Depression by instilling confidence and hope 
among a disillusioned populace. As it turned out, Briining
behaved more like Hoover than Roosevelt in this regard. His
unceremonious dismissal by Hindenburg at the end of May 1932 met 
with little popular outcry.
* * *
The major beneficiary of Briining's failure was Adolf Hitler. 
Thanks to a highly effective propaganda apparatus, the Nazis 
built upon their 1930 electoral success with a series of strong
442Schoenthal, "American Attitudes", pp.246-7, Marx, Illusion, pp.114-5 
and Nicholls, Weimar, pp.128-130.
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showings in the various regional elections of 1931. And even 
though a Nazi-backed referendum to oust the Socialist-controlled 
Prussian Landtag failed in August of that year, the party 
clearly emerged as Germany's leading anti-republican 
alternative. In fact, between 1930 and 1932 Nazi party 
membership swelled from 293,000 to 1.5 million.
Hitler's own popularity was given an unintentional boost as 
a result of Hugenberg's attempt to revive the anti-Young plan 
coalition of 1929 and to push through a vote of "no confidence" 
against Briining in the Reichstag. Dubbed the "Harzburg Front", 
the coalition launched its campaign in October 1 931 .443 However, 
unlike the 1929 effort, Hitler, not Hugenberg, was the star 
attraction. And although the alliance would dissolve as a 
result of Hitler's decision to run against Hindenburg, the 
credibility of the Nazi leader in conservative circles was 
greatly enhanced.
A close examination of the voting patterns in the 
presidential elections of 13 March and 10 April reveals that 
much of the moderate German electorate had moved decisively to 
the right. Whereas Hindenburg ran as the anti-Republican 
candidate of reaction in 1925, most parliamentarians saw him as 
Weimar's strongest and last defender against Hitler. In fact, 
Hindenburg's hard-fought victories in 1932 were attributable 
largely to the votes of the Socialists and parliamentary 
moderates who had staunchly opposed his accession to power seven 
years earlier. Paradoxically, Hindenburg was abandoned by the 
very coalition of conservatives, nationalists and radical 
reactionaries that had brought him victory in 1925.
443Childers, Nazi Voter, P. 195.
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The Nazis remained unfazed by their leader's defeat. In 
fact, Hitler's failed presidential bid was not without a silver 
lining. It provided Goebbels' Nazi propaganda machine, the 
Reichpropagandaleitung (RPL) with an opportunity to refine many 
of its campaign tactics to be used in future elections. 
However, his direct confrontation with the venerated Hindenburg 
provided Hitler with an aura of legitimacy that he would not 
have enjoyed otherwise.
It did not take long for the Nazis to reap the benefits of 
the 1932 presidential campaigns. Later that spring the party 
made strong showings in Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Hamburg, while 
scoring outright victories in Oldenburg and Hessen. However, 
the most significant of these successes was achieved in April in 
Socialist-held Prussia in April, where the Nazis garnered an 
unprecedented 36% of the vote. It was this victory that set in 
motion a series of fateful decisions by newly appointed 
Chancellor Franz von Papen which would ultimately destroy Weimar 
democracy.444
The Prussian victory caught the attention of von Papen, who 
together with his defense minister, General Kurt von Schleicher, 
sought to dismantle the remaining vestiges of the Weimar 
Republic and replace them with an authoritarian regime in the 
Bismarckian and Wilhelmine mold. Towards this end, Papen 
crafted his policies to help the business and agrarian elites, 
and at the same time undermine the authority and popularity of 
the German Left. Although Papen refrained from including the 
Nazis in his "Government of National Concentration", the new 
Chancellor actively sought their blessing, in part because Papen
4440n the string of Nazi successes, see Childers, Nazi Voter, pp.196-201.
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lacked a popular base of support. As a gesture of political 
goodwill, Papen rescinded pruning' s, ban on, the S.A. and S.S. on 
June 14 and then, exploiting the ensuing political violence, 
dismissed the pro-Republican Prussian government of Socialist 
Otto Braun via Emergency Decree. 445 With the SPD reeling after 
the Prussian fiasco and the strength of the moderate center 
parties at their nadir, Papen dissolved the Reichstag and called 
for new elections to be held on 31 July. The new Chancellor 
assumed that he could bolster support for his regime by drawing 
votes from the disparate elements of the German Right since his 
policies over the previous two months had been designed to 
appeal to them.
The Reichstag election results only partially vindicated 
Papen's strategy. The elections were a political victory for 
the German Right, but not for those parties that backed the 
regime, the DNVP and the DVP. Instead, Hitler's Nazis garnered 
37.3% of the vote and emerged as Germany's largest political 
party by two-fold. Almost immediately, Hitler sought to 
undermine von Papen's position and pressed for the formation of 
a new cabinet with himself at the head. Although Hitler was 
initially rebuffed by Hindenburg, the prospect of a Nazi 
dictatorship appeared greater in the summer of 1932 than it had 
before, and ironically, it would do later.446
* * *
The 1930 Reichstag elections fundamentally altered the nature 
and extent of American press coverage of Germany. As mentioned
445Childers, Nazi Voter, pp.202-5 & Nicholls, Weimar, pp.133-4.
446Nicholls, Weimar, pp.136-7.
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in Chapter Four, some journalists quickly recognized that 
'Hitler, ("the nervous little man with the Charlie Chaplin 
mustache"447 ) might bring about a catastrophic upheaval, not only 
in his own country but in all of Europe 1 . 448 As a result of this 
widely-held sentiment, Germany again was the center-piece of 
European news among many segments of the U.S. media.
Herrmann aptly demonstrated this phenomenon on a quantitative 
level in his study of American journalistic perceptions of the 
demise of the Weimar Republic. The twelve newspapers he 
examined: the Boston Daily and Evening Globe. Chicago Daily
Tribune. Detroit Free Press. Los Angeles Times. New Orleans 
Times-Picavune, New York Times, Philadelphia Inguirer. 
Pittsburgh Press. Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph. San Francisco 
Chronicle, St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the Washington Post 
generated 890 items about Germany between January and April 
1932. Each newspaper published news from the Weimar Republic 
four days a week on average, a figure far exceeding that of the 
pre-Depression years. Moreover, collectively, nearly 20% of 
these news items made the front page. Thus, the reader of any 
of one of these prominent publications could expect to find 
Germany in the headlines more than once every ten days during 
this period.449
These figures, however, pale in comparison to those compiled 
by Herrmann for May to August 1932. In this period, the number 
of news items (1530) was nearly double that of the previous four
447Literary Digest, 28 November 1931.
448Literary Digest, 25 October 1930.
449This and subsequent calculations in this chapter are based on the 
appendices in Herrmann, "American Perceptions".
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months. Moreover, a remarkable 21.5% of these stories made the 
front page of Herrmann's broad sample. Thus, not only could 
each paper's readership expect to find news about Germany 
virtually every day but they would view it on the front page at 
least once or twice a week.
Hitler's presidential challenge to Hindenburg in February 
also shifted the focus of the American press within the context 
of its German press coverage. Whereas the bulk of German-based 
news stories centered on international issues such as 
reparations and disarmament throughout 1931, internal politics 
(of which the Nazis were a salient feature) accounted for 
approximately half of all news emanating from the Weimar 
Republic between February and August 1932, dwarfing all other 
subjects. Another important trend was the press's increasing 
emphasis on covering outbreaks of political violence in Germany. 
Although not unknown to the American reader, civil unrest 
remained a secondary focus of the press until the early spring 
of 1932. Herrmann's analysis indicates that from March through 
August 1932 (save May) the number of stories related to domestic 
unrest was exceeded only by those concerning internal politics, 
while international issues lost their prominence. For example, 
despite the meetings, of the Lausanne and Geneva conferences in 
June, the collective number of news items on reparations, debts 
and disarmament as well as the proceedings themselves was barely 
half the number of news items concerning Germany's domestic 
politics.
Herrmann's statistical analyses suggest that between January 
and August of 1932 most American newspaper readers were 
inundated with information about the plight of the Weimar
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Republic. It is important to note, however, that the issue of 
anti-semitism, whether in the context of Nazi ideology or S.A. 
violence against Jews, received negligible attention from the 
mainstream U.S. newspaper media. Fewer than one percent of the 
2420 German-related news items in Herrmann's sample addressed 
the topic. Between January and August 1932, the Boston Evening 
and Daily Globe published the most stories about Nazi anti­
semitism (5) while five of the twelve newspapers: the Detroit 
Free Press, New Orleans Times-Picavune, Philadelphia Inquirer. 
Pittsburgh Sun-Telecrraph and the Washington Post failed to 
publish a single story about the matter throughout the entire 
period. This is not to suggest that the American public was 
unaware that 'anti-semitism was an outstanding feature of 
Hitler's philosophy' (in fact, many journalists noted it during 
the Beer Hall Putsch), but rather that it was not the defining 
image of him or his party. Instead, the prevailing portrait of 
Hitler during this period was that of a radical nationalist and 
dangerous militarist similar to Mussolini. 450 One reason for the 
press's "downplay" of Nazi anti-semitism during this period may 
be attributed to Goebbels' post-1928 electoral strategy which 
stressed more popular issues such as anti-Marxism, nationalist 
resentment of the Treaty of Versailles and the Weimar system's 
inability to cure Germany's economic problems.451 Not until the 
inauguration of Nazi anti-Jewish policies in March of 1933 would 
the American press focus its attention on this issue.
450See Schoenthal, "American Attitudes”, P.262.
451This is not to suggest that the German electorate was not aware of 
Hitler's rabid anti-semitic views but rather that it did not see it as 
the Party's central feature. There are a number of excellent studies 
regarding this issue. For a "grassroots" evaluation, see Allen, W.S., 




Between January and August 1932 the extent, nature and tone 
of German news during this period was shaped by developments 
within the Weimar Republic itself. Even though there were 
important differences in the way some newspapers interpreted 
Weimar politics, a remarkable degree of consensus existed among 
a plethora of regionally and ideologically diverse publications 
(including those in Herrmann's sample). Throughout the spring 
and summer of 1932 most American journalists recognized the 
general political unrest which had gripped Germany since the 
onset of the Great Depression. Headlines such as 'GERMAN 
POLITICAL RIOTS TAKE BIG TOLL1, 'NAZIS AND COMMUNISTS CLASH IN 
POLITICAL FIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE REICH' and 'RIOTS CONTINUE IN 
GERMANY' became commonplace, especially at election time.452 
Though most newspapers thought that the so-called moderate 
elements were not exercising effective control of the Weimar 
government, they stopped short of expressing the view that 
Germany was on the verge of civil war. The Review of Reviews 
voiced this sentiment: 'it is perfectly unmistakable that a
German revolution, or a shift in German control to a Fascist 
dictatorship without violence, may and even will most likely 
occur' , 453 It should be noted that the number of stories from 
Herrmann's sample on internal stability in the month of August 
(152) was nearly double that of the average of the previous 
seven months. This sudden increase likely reflects the concern
A R O
Washington Post, 2 July 1932, Philadelphia Inquirer 4 July 1932, in 
Herrmann, "American Perceptions", P.33.
453Review of Reviews, January 1932, P. 36, Ibid.
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of American journalists following the Nazi victory in the 
Reichstag elections of 31 July.
The American press's general unease about Germany's lack of 
internal stability coincided with its acknowledgment that the 
Nazis were a growing political force. With the exception of 
March and early April (when journalists euphorically celebrated 
Hindenburg's victories over Hitler), American newspapers 
expressed the prophetic fear that 'the German government would 
not attempt to resist Hitler's seizure of power' and might even 
bring him into power constitutionally' . 454 Their anxiety was 
further heightened by the strong Nazi showing in the Prussian 
elections in April which the Literary Digest took as 'proof that 
the star of Adolf Hitler, son of an obscure Austrian 
functionary, is still in the ascendant of its rise towards 
fascism in Germany'.455
Few journalists took the position that a Nazi takeover was 
inevitable. In fact, of Herrmann's sample, the number of news 
items which expressed the view that Nazi power had peaked 
following the July 1932 Reichstag elections far exceeded those 
which predicted that a Hitler dictatorship was in the offing. 
Frederick Kuh of the United Press wire service stated that the 
results of the elections had 'effectively frustrated the 
supremacy of the Right-Wing forces in Parliament so that 
Hitler's ambition to achieve lone mastery of Germany was 
balked' , 456 The Philadelphia Inquirer was even more decisive —  
'the Reichstag election... ruined forever Adolf Hitler's
454New York Sun (undated), as cited in Literary Digest 9 January 1932.
455Literary Digest 7 May 1932.
456Literary Digest, 13 August 1932.
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ambition of ruling the Reich with an independent majority' .457 
However, the reader should note that the percentage of those 
news items which took a similar view to that of the Inquirer 
fell from 40% to 25% to 10% during the three occasions which 
sparked a certain measure of optimism: Hindenburg's first
victory over Hitler on 13 March, Hindenburg's second victory 
over Hitler on 10 April and the July Reichstag elections. 
Because the Nazis had emerged as Germany's largest political 
party as a result of the July elections, it should come as no 
surprise that of the 133 news items generated about the Nazis in 
its aftermath, 102 expressed the view that Hitler was gaining 
strength.
Given the consensus among the mainstream American press that 
the Weimar Republic was in a general state of disorder, a 
condition perpetuated in large part by the Nazis, one might 
expect to find a similar pattern with regard to the prospects 
for the survival of Weimar democracy. However, no such 
consensus was reached until the end of April. Thereafter, 
American journalists became overwhelmingly pessimistic about the 
Republic's prospects of weathering the political and economic 
storm which had befallen it. Whereas a slim majority of 
Herrmann's newspaper sample opined that the Republic was in a 
strong position for future survival during the first four months 
of 1932, only three news items (all published in May) out of 
fifty-six were reasonably confident of the Republic's longevity 
in the succeeding four months.
457Philadelphia Inquirer, editorial, 3 August 1932. For similar
sentiments, see Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph, 2 August 1932 and Washington 
Post, editorial, 14 August 1932 as cited Herrmann, "American 
Perceptions", Chapter Five.
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Several factors may account for this relatively sudden change
in attitude. Much of the American press was alarmed by the
impressive electoral gains by the Nazis in the 24 April Diet
elections, particularly in Prussia. Frank Simonds, a noted
reporter and columnist, reflected this apprehension:
Stripped of all euphemistic disguises, the decision of the 
Prussian election places Europe and the rest of the world on 
notice that a majority of the German people have rejected 
the republican conceptions embodied in the Weimar 
constitution and the political policies expressed in theaccord 
of Locarno.458
The Party's victory on 31 July only seemed to reinforce the 
pessimism of late April. However, it appears that developments 
in the intervening period also contributed to the American 
press's new state of mind. Hindenburg's removal of Briining, who 
many journalists such as Walter Lippmann regarded as 'the best 
liked and most trusted man in Europe', seemed to signal the 
beginning of the end for Weimar democracy. 459 The appointment of 
Franz von Papen as Briining's successor did little to restore the 
American press's confidence in the Republic. The Nation 
described Papen as 'everything that a German Chancellor should 
not be [my emphasis]' while the New Orleans Times-Picavune 
criticized Papen's cabinet for being 'crammed with ennobled 
aristocrats and devoid of parliamentarians'.460 Moreover, the 
fact that Papen had been accused of spying against the United 
States in 1915 during his stint at the German embassy in
458Petroit Free Press, 8 May 1932, as cited in Herrmann, "American 
Perceptions", Chapter Four.
459Los Angeles Times, 1 June 1932, Ibid.
460,1 The German Peril", Nation, 15 June 1932, Ibid. and New Orleans Times- 
Picayune, 2 June 1932.
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Washington only served to taint further his image on the western 
shores of the Atlantic.
However, it was Papen's policies, especially his appeasement 
of the Nazis, which proved to be his greatest public relations 
detriment. Most journalists condemned his lifting of Briining's 
ban on the S.A. and S.S. while his ousting of the democratically 
elected government of Prussia in July was viewed by many 
publications such as the Detroit Free Press and the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch as indicative of ' Germany1s rapid descent from bad 
to worse' and as 'a nullification of all the results of the 
post-war revolution that established Germany as a Republic1.461 
In sum, Papen's appointment signalled to the American press 
corps that militarism in the Junker mold had returned to 
Germany. In fact, Herrmann's newspaper sample generated 260 
items on this subject from June through August —  all but five 
expressing the view that Wilhelmine-style militarism was either 
on the rise or that it had already supplanted Weimar democracy.
Nazi electoral successes, the fall of Briining, the 
appointment of von Papen and his use of blunt dictatorial 
measures to suppress democratically elected bodies served to 
undermine the American press's faith in von Hindenburg, upon 
whom optimistic journalists had pinned their hopes of preserving 
the Weimar Republic. Hindenburg enjoyed his greatest popularity 
among American newspapermen during the presidential campaigns 
against Hitler. In the first four months of 1932, journalists 
often referred to him as 'a man of steel, 'the rock to which the
461Frederick Kuh, Detroit Free Press, 21 & 22 July 1932, St. Louis Post- 
Dispatch, Ibid.
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Reich is tied' and an 'inveterate soldier and statesman'.462 His 
victories of 13 March and 10 April were almost universally 
greeted with unabashed enthusiasm as well as a sigh of relief. 
Banner front-page headlines such as 'HINDENBURG SWAMPS HITLER1, 
HITLER IS POOR SECOND IN GERMAN CONTEST' and 'CRUSHING DEFEAT 
ADMINISTERED HITLER' rang from the Atlantic to the Pacific.463 
The Literary Digest proclaimed that the 'triumph for the 
staunch, gray-haired President is proof positive of Germany's 
determination to follow a path of moderation in internal and 
international affairs' and one that 'offers the securest 
guaranty for American investments in the Fatherland' .464
However, the press's confidence in Hindenburg was shaken soon 
after. The media split on his dismissal of Briining. 
Publications such as the Literary Digest believed that the Reich 
President's 'brusk' move only served to 'frighten the French, 
make some English editors distrustful and generally alarm Europe 
on the eve of the Lausanne Reparations Conference'. 465 The 
Associated Press wire service also denounced Hindenburg's 
decision as 'without parallel in the history of the German 
Republic'.466 In contrast, Walter Lippmann justified the move, 
noting that 'it had been evident that Dr. Briining was rapidly
462Editorial/ New Orleans Times-Picayune 16 February 1932. editorial San 
Francisco Chronicle, 12 March 1932, See also Washington Post, 16 
February 1932, as cited in Herrmann, "American Perceptions", Chapter 
Three.
463Petroit Free Press & Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 March 1932, Ibid. See 
also New Orleans Times-Picayune 14 March 1932.
464"Hindenburg Making Germany Safe For Everybody", Literary Digest, 26 
March 1932.
465Literary Digest 11 June 1932.
466Philadelphia Inquirer & Daily Globe, 31 May 1932, as cited in 
Herrmann, "American Perceptions", Chapter Four.
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losing the civilian support which he had used so skillfully to 
hold the army in line' .467 Furthermore, many American journalists 
blamed Hindenburg for von Papen1s decision to dissolve the 
Reichstag on 5 June, a move regarded by many at the time as a 
first step towards dictatorship. And although the aged 
Hindenburg was praised for refusing Hitler's request for the 
German chancellory in the aftermath of the July Reichstag 
elections, 468 American journalists failed to rekindle their 
previous faith in the Reich President. In fact, unlike the 
prior seven years, Hindenburg ceased to be considered by 
mainstream U.S. newspapers as the linchpin on which the Weimar 
Republic rested. After August, the press shifted this burden 
onto another military man, General Kurt von Schleicher, not 
exactly the symbol of parliamentary democracy.469
The developments during the first eight months of 1932 
disturbed most mainstream American journalists. Although the 
majority of them did not view a Nazi dictatorship as inevitable, 
they were clearly concerned about its prospect. At the very 
least, many of them had concluded that Weimar democracy was 
coming to an inglorious end. After the summer of 1932, the 
point of contention among most journalists was not whether the 
Republic would survive but what form of government would replace 
it.
* * *
467Los Angeles Times, 1 June 1932, P.l, Ibid.
468Herrmann, "American Perceptions", P. 100. See also Appendix H, P.236.
469Ibid.
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With the exception of the New York Times and the Boston Daily 
and Evening Globe, the Chicago Daily Tribune published more news 
items on Germany between January and August 1932 (206) than the 
nine other major dailies that comprised Herrmann's sample. 
Excluding the New York Times (whose abundance of news items 
corrupted Herrmann's mean), McCormick's paper equalled or 
exceeded the average per month output of news stories of 
Herrmann's sample except for July. Even including the New York 
Times, the Tribune fares well, achieving numerical parity or 
superiority in five months out of the eight-month period.
The Chicago Daily Tribune's German coverage became the focal 
point of its European news coverage in 1931 and 1932, coinciding 
with Weimar's steady political and economic destabilization. 
The Home Office not only pushed its Berlin bureau chief, Sigrid 
Schultz, to send both cable and mail articles, but with respect 
to her cables, informed her that 'at times we have had to take 
liberties and blow your stories up to the space that they seemed 
to merit' .47° The Home Office, now more secure with Schultz at 
the helm in Berlin (she was in her eighth year of service in 
Germany, a veteran by foreign journalist standards) 'tried to be 
very careful to be guided by the ideas outlined in [her] 
dispatches' .471
To a large extent, the Chicago Daily Tribune's coverage of 
Germany in the first eight months of 1932 mirrored that of its 
mainstream counterparts. Consistent with Herrmann's sample, 
McCormick's daily published its greatest number of stories about
470Scharschug to Schultz, 16 August 1932, Schultz Papers, State
Historical Society of Wisconsin.
471Ibid.
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Germany in June, July and August. This was due to Germany being 
central to international developments, such as the Lausanne and 
Geneva conferences, and internal events —  Briining's dismissal, 
von Papen*s appointment, the stormy prelude to the July 
Reichstag elections (especially the overthrow of the Prussian 
government) and Hitler's bid to become Chancellor in August. 
The only significant deviation from the overall reporting 
pattern occurred between January and February, when the number 
of items published by the Tribune increased by five, while 
Herrmann's sample fell by two stories on average during the same 
interval.
After January 1932, the Tribune, like other large mainstream 
American newspapers, focused more on German domestic politics 
and less on international issues such as reparations and 
disarmament. In fact, the percentage of news items that the 
Tribune devoted to these areas practically matched those of 
Herrmann's sample; forty-four percent were centered on internal 
politics and twenty-five percent on international issues.
Like most of the American press, the Tribune paid scant
attention to Nazi anti-semitism. The paper published only three
stories on this topic between January and August (which was
actually three times the average of Herrmann's sample). All
three stories described violence by Storm Troopers against Jews;
stories about Nazi racial ideology were not published —  even
though Schultz sent mail articles about the Nazi anti-Jewish
department store campaign in June 1932. She also sent an
unpublished story about Nazi racial attitudes on courtship and
marriage. In it Schultz wrote:
Hitler's orators, editors and followers, aside from their 
anti-semitism and hostility toward black, brown, and yellow
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peoples, have laid violent stress on the doctrine of the 
inherent superiority of the nordic strain over all the 
others of Europe. They inveigh against assimilation or even 
association with non-nordics.472
The Tribune understood that many facets of Nazi anti-semitic 
ideology were perceived by most Americans as excessive, but not 
shockingly deplorable. It is worth remembering that the 1920's 
and 1930's was a time when the Ku Klux Klan was at the height of 
its political power and when Jews were excluded from many 
aspects of American mainstream life, including professional and 
social clubs, businesses such as advertising as well as several 
Ivy League universities. McCormick himself did not hold any 
special sympathy for the plight of European (let alone, 
American) Jewry. George Seldes, who had preceded John Clayton 
as the paper's Berlin bureau chief in the early 1920's, recalled 
in his memoirs that the Tribune could never secure an interview 
with Albert Einstein because McCormick refused to accede to the 
physicist's request for a twenty-five dollar donation to a 
Zionist fund. McCormick's parsimony is surprising in light of 
the fact that the Tribune publisher had paid five thousand 
dollars for Isadora Duncan's letters and paid twenty-five 
thousand dollars to induce Sigmund Freud to visit him in 
Chicago. 473 One piece of evidence, however, indicates that 
McCormick wanted his news articles to be devoid of obvious 
racial bias. In December 1925 he criticized John Clayton for 
'his excessive superior nordic attitude' reflected in his 
articles on Poland and ordered him to act as 'dispassionate
472"Nazi Marriage", 14 January 1932, Unedited Proofs, Sigrid Schultz 
Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
473Seldes, G., Witness to a Century: Encounters with the Noted, the 
Notorious, and Three SOB's, (New York 1987) pp.151-152.
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investigator', suggesting yet again the great degree to which 
the tone of a correspondent's reporting can be influenced by an 
imposing superior.474
It was the Chicago Daily Tribune's coverage of street clashes 
(usually between Nazis and Communists) and royal intrigues which 
distinguished it from other newspapers. With the exception of 
May, the Tribune published a higher proportion of stories 
devoted to internal unrest during the first eight months of 1932 
than those publications in Herrmann's sample. The paper also 
ran stories on this subject even when its mainstream media 
counterparts did not. In February 1932, for instance, the 
Tribune accounted for one-third of all stories about civil 
unrest in Herrmann's sample of twelve newspapers. So pervasive 
was this aspect of the paper's German coverage that it was a 
mainstay of Sigrid Schultz's political dispatches.475 
Correspondents from other European countries also contributed to 
the paper's "riot" coverage. In July 1932, the Tribune 
published a dispatch from William Shirer humorously entitled: 
'VIENNA NAZIS SLUG DIPLOMATS AT SWANKY CLUB; MOB WRECKS 
FURNITURE, SWINGS TABLE LEGS'.476
That the Tribune provided more extensive (and at times more 
exaggerated) coverage of Germany's civil unrest than its 
mainstream competitors should come as no surprise. Wars and 
revolutions had always received special attention in McCormick's
474McCormick to Clayton, 17 December 1925, Schultz Papers, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin.
475See for example, CDT 10 March, 1 June, 18 July, 31 July, 2 August and 
3 August 1932.
476CDT, 1 July 1932. For Shirer's other "riot" stories, see 11 May and 3 
June 1932.
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paper (hence, its saturation coverage of the Sino-Japanese 
conflict in Manchuria). Moreover, in McCormick's eyes, a 
heightened state of tension always preceded major disruptions to 
the status quo; there was never "a calm before a storm". As 
mentioned in Chapter One, McCormick took a calculated risk in 
shaping the paper's German coverage in 1923 as if revolution 
were imminent. In 1932, the Tribune once again emphasized 
internal unrest, laying the groundwork for its coverage of a 
possible civil war.
What is unusual is that the Tribune Home Office had actually 
taken a respite from this strategy at the close of 1930 when 
Sigrid Schultz was instructed to reduce her quota of "riot" 
stories because their frequency was diminishing their news 
appeal. 477 Schultz and her superiors had 'hoped for bigger and 
better riots' but were swayed by the personal assurances of the 
German finance minister and Press Department chief in late 
January 1931 that the German domestic situation was improving.478 
However, by the summer of 1931 reality had set in and the 
Tribune renewed its emphasis on "riot" stories.
Both Schultz and the Home Office now saw that 'riot messages 
received the best play' .479 However, management was disturbed by 
the fact that the Associated Press and the United Press wire 
services were not only providing more extensive coverage of 
civil unrest, they were 'jazzing stories up' (a euphemism for
477See Scharschug to Schultz, 10 December 1930 & Schultz to Scharschug, 
22 December 1930, Schultz Papers, State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin.
478Schultz to Scharschug, 26 January 1931, Ibid.
479Ibid., 24 August 1931.
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distortion) to further enhance their appeal. 480 The Home Office 
concluded that the Tribune was 'underplaying riots' and risked 
losing readers.481
Schultz had prepared the Berlin bureau for the challenge from 
the powerful wire services by establishing an elaborate "riot 
organization".
We get general news through the Ullstein service (at no 
cost) and the Telegraph Union service. We have our 
informants in police headquarters. Among the Nazis and the 
Communists, we have the secret phone numbers of their 
leaders. The dinners we give them to encourage their 
willingness to talk don't appear on the expense account, but 
they give us the necessary contact. Should a policeman, 
Nazi or Communist get killed, I can assure you we hear about 
it! 482
The prospect of the Home Office overplaying the internal
unrest angle to the point of distortion, however, worried
Schultz. In the same letter in which she outlined her "battle
plan" against the wire services, she warned her superiors:
I know there are lots of stories from Berlin that could be 
"jazzed up". I know quite a number of our colleagues, 
especially in the [news] agencies, are doing it, but I 
always understood that the Tribune wants accurate and 
reliable news and every member of this office tries to be 
reliable and send only news that we sincerely believe or 
know to be true, after investigating it. I believe our 
readers prefer this "safe and sane", if unspectacular 
reporting —  or am I wrong?483
Schultz's concern stemmed from an unfortunate episode 
involving a Tribune story published under her byline on 10 






'MOBS ROCK BERLIN1, Communist militants fired upon a formation 
of Berlin police during the late hours of 9 August after the 
latter attempted to storm the offices of a KPD newspaper. A 
shootout then ensued leaving four policemen and twelve 
Communists dead, along with many wounded. 484 The next day the 
Tribune published a follow-up story which stated that 1 at least 
sixteen people were killed' and fifty were wounded in the melee, 
many of them critically.485
Two weeks later, when the published copy of her story arrived 
in the Berlin office, Schultz was overcome by panic —  her 
dispatch had been altered. She alerted cable editor George 
Scharschug that although 'there had been serious clashes' on the 
evening of 9 August', 'the slaughter story of 10 August was not 
true —  there was no "mob firing on the police in mass formation 
in Berlin". There was no single dead [sic], not to speak of
sixteen'. 486 After Schultz received the Tribune's follow-up
story, she feared that 'more corpses might sneak into our 
stories and create more havoc'. 487 She suggested that someone in 
the New York Cable Office, perhaps the rewrite man, was 'tempted 
by the figure sixteen' . 488 Although Schultz did not directly 
accuse any of her superiors of altering her copy, she sternly
484CDT, 10 August 1931.
485Ibid. 11 August 1931.
486Schultz to Scharschug, 24 August 1931, Schultz Papers, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin.
487Ibid., 26 August 1931.
488Ibid.
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informed the Home Office that 'if you want more "riots", we'll 
send more, but authentic news —  not New York fabrications1.489
And for good reason. Weimar officials did not take kindly to 
the Tribune1s error. An image of stability was important for 
the government in its foreign policy, especially for attracting 
overseas investment. Not surprisingly, the German Press 
Department unleashed its wrath on Schultz. She reflected, 'the 
tragedy [of this episode] is that these insertions [my italics] 
into our cables ruined a good Briining interview for u s . . . The 
thirty-two dead were rubbed under my nose and the interview was 
lost' .49° Fortunately for Schultz, the fake story incident 
appeared to be an aberration; there is no evidence of the Home 
Office taking liberties with her "riot" dispatches following the 
episode. Schultz continued to send an overabundance of cables 
on civil unrest over the course of the next year. The available 
evidence seems to indicate that she managed to maintain her 
credibility as well by exercising restraint when the costs of 
reporting a "riot" story outweighed its benefits. In August 
1932, for instance, Schultz refrained from cabling "hot" 
information about an impending S.A. march on Berlin because 
doing so would have revealed the name of a long-time Nazi 
informant.491 She also refrained from cabling the news that the 
poorly planned march never took place because reporting 'a 
revolution that doesn't "revolute" makes a correspondent look as 
if he or she were nervous, jumpy and scared' .492
489Ibid.
490Ibid.
491Schultz to Scharschug, 16 August 1932, Ibid.
492Ibid.
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The Tribune1s emphasis on Germany's internal unrest was one 
of its distinctive features; its coverage portending a 
Hohenzollern return to power was another. As mentioned in 
previous chapters, the Tribune consistently highlighted the 
monarchic angle in its coverage of Germany, especially during 
times of instability. It did so during the tumultuous year of 
1923 as well as during the hotly contested Hindenburg/Marx 
campaign in 1925.
1932 would prove to be no exception. The paper published 
more articles exclusively devoted to royal intrigues than did 
any of its major competitors. More significantly, substantial 
chunks of the Tribune's general political stories were devoted 
to Hohenzollern activities. In a front-page preview of the 
first Hindenburg vs. Hitler presidential race, one-fourth of 
Sigrid Schultz's analysis was about the machinations of German 
princes. 493 Even the most trivial of royal news was reported by 
the paper. Not only did the Tribune publish a story entitled 
'EX-KAISER ILL; CATCHES COLD SAWING WOOD', it ran on page one!494 
On many occasions Schultz wove the monarchic angle into the 
event. The appointment of Franz von Papen made her task easy. 
When the newly-appointed Chancellor announced the names of his 
Junker-filled ministry, the Tribune published the front page 
banner headline: 'LINK EX-KAISER TO CABINET'.495
493CDT, 10 March 1932. P.l.
494CDT, 4 January 1932, P.l.
495CDT, 2 June 1932, P.l.
(198)
The Home Office was very pleased with Schultz's approach to 
the von Papen story as well as others. 496 Management and 
the Berlin bureau shared similar reasons for inflating the role 
of the Hohenzollerns in German politics. Both sincerely 
envisioned a monarchic restoration in Germany's future. 'I know 
the New York Times is most emphatic in saying, no more Kaiser in 
Germany [sic] —  most others are too', Schultz wrote the Home 
Office, '—  but monarchism is not dead in Germany' , 497 The 
Tribune's cable editor, George Scharschug agreed, replying, 'you 
are the only correspondent with a decided Kaiser movement 
complex, but I have a sneaking idea that you are on the right 
track'...'you have a most interesting story on your hands and a 
story, I think, that will continue to grow'. 498 At least of equal 
importance was that Schultz and management agreed that royalty 
stories were very popular among American readers. 'I send most 
of the stuff I can find on the Kaiserists, believing the public 
likes it', wrote Schultz in August 19 3 2 . 499 The Home Office 
concurred, noting that her 'stories on German political affairs 
have continued to get good play' .50°
ie * *
With the exceptions of its emphasis on violence and monarchic 
intrigues, the extent and composition of the Chicago Daily
4 96Scharschug to Schultz, 12 June 1932, Schultz Papers, State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin.
497Schultz to Scharschug, 20 August 1932, Schultz Papers, Ibid.
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499Schultz to Scharschug, 20 August 1932, Ibid.
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Tribune1s coverage of Germany in the first eight months of 1932 
mirrored that of the mainstream American press, as did the the 
tone and tenor of its reporting.501 Like its counterparts, the 
Tribune was optimistic about the future of the Weimar Republic 
after Hindenburg's 13 March victory, stating that Nazism would 
not grow 'unless events are critically unfortunate1.502
However, its confidence in Weimar stability was steadily 
eroded during the ensuing months. The Nazi victory in the 
Prussian elections in late April alarmed Schultz. 503 The Tribune 
characterized Bruning's fall the following May as one which 
would 'have grave consequences in the international situation'. 
McCormick praised 'his statesmanly moderation' and regretted 
that his removal occurred 'at so critical a time' . 504 McCormick 
held Briining in such high regard that he refused to publish a 
Schultz mail story which criticized the regime for its 
suppression of radical press organs. 505 In addition, the 
jingoistic publisher expressed clear reservations about 
Bruning's successor, von Papen, especially with respect to his 
spying activities against the United States during the 
neutrality period. In a July editorial, McCormick stated, 'If 
a bold and unscrupulous man were wanted to overthrow the 
republic of Germany, von Papen's record would point him out as
501See Herrmann, "American Perceptions", Appendices D & H.
502"The German Election", CDT editorial, 15 March 1932.
503See CDT, 24 & 25 April 1932, P.l.
504"Reversal In Germany", CDT editorial, 3 June 1932.
505"Liberty of the Press", Unedited Mail Proof, 11 February 1932, Schultz 
Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
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suited to the task' .506 And although the Tribune initially held 
out hope that the moderates might temper the radical Right 
following the Nazi electoral victory in July507 , it took a more 
profoundly pessimistic view the following day: 'Not only is
Germany politically fragmented, but its greatest masses are out 
on the two extremes... A democracy can exist with its masses 
gravitating toward the center. . . but not when this is 
reversed. '508
As with most segments of the mainstream American press, the 
linchpin of the Tribune's assessment of Germany was its 
perception of Hindenburg. And not surprisingly, the Weimar 
President's image underwent a radical change between January and 
August 1932.
Early on, Schultz had equated Hindenburg with George 
Washington: 'first in war, first in peace and first in the
hearts of his countrymen'. 509 Schultz praised his 'eagerness "to 
do something", to help, to balance the pros and cons of each 
situation carefully and then to take a quick decision tempered 
with kindliness and respect for the other fellow's case'.510 She 
also stressed his youthful vitality.511 Most important, however, 
Schultz tried to counter the notion that the aged Field Marshal 
lacked awareness and perspicacity; arguing, 'his aides and
506"Captain von Papen in the U.S.", CDT editorial, 31 July 1932.
507"The German Political Crisis", CDT editorial, 2 August 1932.
cnp
"Failures in Democracy", CDT editorial, 3 August 1932.





friends cannot lull Hindenburg into a blind feeling of 
confidence so dear to the hearts of advisors of statesmen' and 
'he waxes very indignant when he gets the impression that 
something is being kept from him' .512
The Home Office's agreement with Schultz's assessment of\ •
Hindenburg was evidenced by the fact that many of her dispatches 
received minimal editing. In fact, Schultz's published 
Presidential and Prussian election previews virtually matched 
those of her mail proofs sent two weeks earlier.513 Management's 
positive sentiments towards Hindenburg were also reflected on 
the editorial page. McCormick was confident that 'with 
Hindenburg as head of state, reckless experimentation in 
international affairs is a danger avoided' .514
By August 1932, however, Schultz's faith in Hindenburg had 
dissipated. Privately, she conceded that his 'age is telling on 
him. . .his son and aides can make him do what they wish', 
although he still has the 'vitality to stop some of the more 
wild plans of the Papen crowd'.515 Schultz's newly-found 
misgivings concerning Hindenburg's ability to preserve Weimar 
democracy, however, remained unpublished. In fact, the Tribune 
refrained from evaluating, or in many cases, even mentioning 
Hindenburg by name in its news articles or editorials throughout
512Ibid.
513Unedited Proof (untitled), 18 February 1932 & "Hitler Continues 
Struggle for Power: Why April 24th Elections Decisive for Germany", 
Unedited Proof, 11 April 1932, Ibid.
514"The German Election", CDT editorial, 15 March 1932.
515Schultz to Scharschug, 6 September 1932, Schultz Papers, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin.
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July and August 1932. Without the benefit of archival evidence, 
one can only speculate as to the reasons behind this silence.
Schultz's private papers, however, shed light on the matter. 
Her letters to the Home Office indicate that the Tribune's pro- 
Hindenburg stance was based in part on McCormick's desire to 
obtain interviews with and access to the Reich President: a 
difficult goal because Hindenburg 'often shied away from the 
limelight'. In a letter to McCormick dated 30 January 1931, 
Schultz wrote, 'Tribune editorials should have smoothed the way 
considerably [towards obtaining an interview with Hindenburg]1. 
And she was quite pleased when 'the Foreign Office told [her] 
that the President was delighted with them' ,516
Thus, the Chicago Daily Tribune's German coverage, with its 
heavy emphasis on civil unrest and monarchic intrigues, as well 
as its pro-Hindenburg position, demonstrates how the editorial 
and proprietary interests of the newspaper can affect the nature 
and tone of its reporting.
* * *
Whereas the tone and tenor of the rest of the mainstream 
American press's German coverage generally fluctuated with the 
ebb and flow of events, the reporting of the New York Times 
appeared to be on a pre-set mission to vindicate and validate 
the strength of Weimar democracy and the character of the German 
people. The editorial department's near-messianic faith in the 
longevity of the Weimar Republic did not waver between January 
and August 1932, even on those occasions when that of its own 
news department did. As previously mentioned, the optimism of
516Schultz to McCormick, 30 January 1931, Ibid.
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the New York Times would come to represent the most extreme case 
of rose-coloured views among the large mainstream American 
press.
After it had spent a year and a half minimizing and 
dedramatizing Germany's economic and political problems, the 
hopes of the New York Times were raised in February 1932 when 
Hindenburg announced that he would seek a second term as 
President of the Weimar Republic. Echoing the sentiments of 
many publications, the Times called his decision 'a victory for 
the cause of peace and moderation' .517 However, the Times went 
beyond the views of the consensus in stating that Hindenburg's 
election would 'assure a victory for Bruning's coalition' in any 
future Reichstag campaign.518 In contrast, the paper's Berlin 
bureau appeared far more cautious. On the eve of the election, 
the Times published an article by Frederick Birchall, who had 
recently become the de facto bureau chief, in which he stated 
that 'it would be reckless to predict tomorrow's vote' because 
there are ' so many imponderables' .519 He conceded that both 
Hitler and Thaelmann (the Communist candidate) would 'get a 
considerably larger vote than they had ever received before' 
because of 'the enormous discontent affecting every class' in 
Germany. Hence, the outcome of the election would depend on the 
'extent of the drift' towards radicalization.520
Despite Hitler's strong showing (which was enough to force a 
run-off election), both the news and editorial departments
517,,Hindenburg Against Fascism", NYT editorial, 16 February 1932.
518Ibid.
519NYT, 12 March 1932, P.l.
520Ibid.
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expressed unrestrained jubilation following Hindenburg's 
victory. This 'true "Feste Burg"... signals hope in democracy 
and in friendly international relations' stated one editorial,521 
while its Berlin dispatches called the election a 'victory for 
Briining' and boldly stated that it indicated 'the first step 
toward the elimination of the Nazis as a powerful political 
factor in Germany'. 522 Hindenburg's run-off victory on 10 April 
reinforced the Times' s view that the future of the Republic was 
bright. 'There can be little doubt that Germany's internal 
questions will be dealt with successfully' opined an 11 April 
editorial, 523 while the front page proclaimed that 'by converting 
hope into certainty', Hindenburg's 'decisive victory' has 
'greatly stiffened the forces of liberalism'.524
Only the Prussian Diet elections seemed to cause 
consternation for Rollo Ogden, Dr. John Finley and the rest of 
the New York Times editorial board. However, even in this case, 
the paper rationalized the 'unpleasant result', taking solace in 
the fact that the Nazis garnered only thirty-six percent of the 
vote, far less than a majority. However, it did acknowledge the 
severity of the defeat for Prussia's pro-Republican parties, 
stating that the Nazi victory may place the Socialists and 
others 'in a hopeless minority'.525
One of the more peculiar features of the New York Times' s 
German coverage was its reaction to Bruning's ouster and von
521 "A True Feste Burg", NYT editorial, 14 March 1932.
522NYT, 14 March 1932.
523"Germany Stands Fast", NYT editorial, 11 April 1932.
524NYT, 11 April 1932.
525»After the Prussian Test", NYT editorial, 26 April 1932.
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Papen's appointment. The Berlin bureau's reaction was similar 
to that of much of the mainstream press; namely, that 
' Hindenburg' s forced retirement of Briining may have grave 
internal repercussions' .526 Moreover, Guido Enderis characterized 
the newly-installed von Papen regime as 'ultra-conservative, if 
not reactionary' and one that 'cannot be said in any sense to 
represent the German people' . 527 In stark contrast, the editorial 
board minimized the importance of Bruning's removal. Although 
the editorial praised Bruning's 'intelligence, energy, courage 
and amazing resourcefulness', it also posited that the danger 
associated with his removal 'may not prove to be so great as 
many have hastily predicted' , 528 Moreover, in contrast to 
virtually every large mainstream American newspaper, the New 
York Times welcomed the von Papen regime, because 'a 
conservative Government heavily tinged with militarism and 
nationalism may be able to stave off a Hitler regime longer than 
Briining could have done' .529 Not only did the board refrain from 
criticizing the new leadership for the unconstitutional 
deposition of the Prussian government in July, it actually 
praised von Papen for 'putting down with an iron hand the 
inveterate disturbances of peace' and downplayed the whole 
affair as 'merely a reassertion of the old German instinct for 
public order' ,530
526NYT, 31 May 1932, P.l.
527NYT, 2 & 3 June 1932, P.l.
528"The Fall of Briining", NYT editorial, 31 May 1932.
529"Briining's Successor", 2 June 1932, Ibid.
530"Martial Law in Prussia", 21 July 1932, Ibid.
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The Times ended the first eight months of 1932 where it had
began —  with unmitigated confidence in the fortitude and
resilience of the Weimar Republic. In an editorial published on
the day of the Reichstag elections (31 July), the paper
predicted that:
there is reason to hope and believe that control of the 
next Reichstag will be in the hands of parties and men [who 
are] neither noisy agitators or idle dreamers, but [in 
those] confident of being able to lead Germany back to much 
of her old prestige and prosperity by sane methods and a 
strong stable government.531
Despite the fact that Hitler's organization emerged from the 
election as Germany's largest party, both the news and editorial 
departments interpreted the balloting as a Nazi defeat. One 
editorial proclaimed that Hitler has been 'stopped with thirty- 
seven percent of the vote' and that 'the role of Mussolini or 
Lenin' was not in his future. 532 Indeed, 'Hitler's much 
advertised triumph was only a dream'. 533 The Times' s news 
coverage was only slightly more balanced. Although Birchall 
noted a 'strong shift to the Right', he designated 'Briining the 
real victor' because the ex-Chancellor could use his leverage in 
future cabinet formations. 534 But even without Briining, Birchall 
predicted that von Papen's Junker cabinet could 'carry on 
without party backing, but sure of Reichstag support' . 535 He 
characterized the constituent-lacking regime and the
531|,Germany Voting", 31 July 1932, Ibid.
532,,The German Election", 2 August 1932, Ibid.
533Ibid.
534NYT, 1 August 1932, P.l.
535Ibid., 2 August 1932.
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politically-polarized legislature as an 'interesting innovation' 
and actually compared the relationship to the American division 
of power between the President and the Congress. 536 Birchall 
foolishly dismissed the Nazis as a factor in Weimar's political 
future, stating that the history of Hitler's party was one of 
heartbreaking defeats when victory lay just one step beyond its 
reach.537
* * *
The reasons for the unrealistic optimism of the New York 
Times's German reporting, particularly in its editorial 
coverage, from January through August 1932, are ripe for 
speculation because of the dearth of pertinent archival 
material. Nevertheless, certain observations can be made 
regarding the paper's unjustified complacency with which it 
treated disturbing news from Germany.
Like other American newspapers, the New York Times maintained 
an unusually high degree of faith in Hindenburg's ability to 
preserve democracy in Germany. However, what distinguished the 
Times from the others was that it held him in high regard even 
after the Nazi victory in the Prussian Landtag elections when 
many other observers recognized that Hindenburg alone could not 
stem the Hitler electoral tide. Moreover, when many newspapers 
questioned the sagacity of Hindenburg's dismissal of Briining at 
the close of May, the Times still referred to the Field Marshal 
as a 'tower of strength'. 538 Even the Berlin bureau, which had
536Ibid.
537Ibid.
538"The Fall of Briining", NYT editorial, 31 May 1932.
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initially been hostile to Hindenburg's move, defended his action 
less than two weeks later on the grounds that 'Briining took 
Hitler too lightly' . 539 And of course, the paper did not pass up 
the opportunity to praise Hindenburg for refusing Hitler's 
demands for the Chancellery in August.540
The New York Times's unabated faith in Hindenburg was 
reinforced by its continual assertions that the Nazis were on 
the verge of political decline. Sentiments such as 'the 
reservoir of Nazi support is about exhausted' and the 'Nazis 
have reached their peak' were reiterated throughout the first 
eight months of 1932.541 The Times also appeared to have had a 
fall-back position in the event of a Nazi accession to power: 
Hitler's radicalism would be tempered by the influence of 
moderate politicians and by the demands of governmental 
responsibility. The paper even questioned whether in fact 
'Hitler practiced 100% Hitlerism', contending that 'Hitler's 
intentions are not so extreme as his proclamations'.542
Implicit in these editorial positions was the dubious 
assumption that the German people possessed an affinity for 
parliamentary democracy and a penchant towards moderation. The 
paper asserted that 'many international observers have tended to 
exaggerate the numerical strength of Hitlerism and to 
underestimate the strength of German republicanism and
539NYT, 12 June 1932, P.l.
540Ibid., 8 August 1932.
541|,Hitler Votes", 12 January 1932, "The Reichstag Elections", 2 August 
1932, NYT editorials. See also "German Republicanism", 15 March 1932, 
"The German Duel", 10 April 1932, "The Prussian Test", 20 April 1932, 
Ibid. and NYT 14 March, 31 July, 1 August & 2 August 1932.
542,,Briining Talks to Hitler", NYT editorial, 9 January 1932. See also 
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democracy'. 543 During the presidential campaign, the Times 
praised the Germans for their 'sober facing of the facts and 
firm sense of responsibility'. 544 Editorially, the paper boldly 
predicted that 'if it ever [came] to an actual trial of force, 
the German republicans [would] give a better account of 
themselves than the Hitler warriors'.545
The views of the editorial board may also have been 
influenced by the private views of Berlin-based Fred Birchall, 
who, as the paper's former managing editor, maintained strong 
links with management. Although Birchall's published analyses 
during the presidential campaigns were balanced and cautious, he 
privately informed Edwin James, the new managing editor, that 
Hindenburg's decision to run for office 'should take the wind 
out of Hitler's sails'. 546 And while Birchall publicly stated 
that the election was too close to call, privately he gave 
Hitler 'less than a one percent chance' of defeating 
Hindenburg.547
The impact of Birchall's opinions on the editorial board, 
however, is questionable. Even though James was present at 
editorial board meetings, and may have relayed Birchall's views, 
James's suggestions were accepted only occasionally. 548 In Ochs's 
tradition, the editorial department functioned as an autonomous
543"German Republicanism", NYT editorial, 15 March 1932.
544"The German Duel", 10 April 1932, Ibid.
545"Hitler’s Army", 16 April 1932, Ibid. See also "Hitler in Prussia", 
20 March 1932, Ibid.
546Birchall to James, 15 February 1932, James Papers, NYT Archive.
547Ibid., 9 March 1932.
548James to Birchall, 1 September 1932, Ibid.
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unit. Publisher-in-waiting Arthur Hays Sulzberger was powerless 
at this early time to influence editorial stances. The evidence 
suggests that although Sulzberger had "the last word" on many 
matters, he still needed his father-in-law's approval for any 
modification of editorial policies. And cases of approval 
seemed rare. For example, Ochs chided his heir apparent when 
Sulzberger took exception to a series of 1932 editorials which 
harshly criticized Franklin Roosevelt.549 Sulzberger was also 
intimidated by the paper's veteran editorial page editor, Rollo 
Ogden. 'I could no more talk to him than fly on my own', 
recalled Sulzberger in later life. 550 Ogden's own messianic 
optimism may have been reinforced by the Weltanschauung of his 
assistant editor, Dr. John Finley, whom Sulzberger regarded as 
a 'lovely man, but one who 'didn't know very much about the 
world, especially the nasty part of it' .551 Thus, it is doubtful 
whether the news department or the young publisher were able to 
exert influence over the rigidly optimistic editorial 
department. This state of affairs would continue up through and 
after Hitler's appointment as German Chancellor.
* * *
The New York Times provided the most comprehensive account of 
any newspaper regarding developments in Germany between January 
and August 1932. The Times published on average three times as 
many items per month (68) as did Herrmann's sample of eleven
549Sulzberger to Ochs & Ochs to Sulzberger, ? December 1932, as cited in 
Shepard, R. The Paper's Papers: A Reporter's Journey Through the 
Archives of the New York Times (New York 1996), P.105.
550Shepard, Paper's Papers, P.107.
551Ibid.
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metropolitan newspapers (21). In July alone, the New York daily 
printed more articles than any single American publication for 
the entire first four months of 1932. Moreover, individual New 
York Times stories on Germany tended to be two to three times as 
long as those featured in its counterparts. The Times also 
published at least twice as many editorials on German affairs 
than was typical in Herrmann's sample. Finally, although a 
smaller percentage of stories about Germany reached the front 
page of the paper, the sheer volume of news items published 
resulted in a greater number of German stories making the 
headlines in the New York Times than any other newspaper.
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is not surprising 
that the Times clearly outdistanced its competitors regarding 
the amount of news published about Germany. What is 
interesting, however, is that the breakdown within the paper's 
German coverage was in equal proportion to that of Herrmann's 
representative sample: roughly fifty percent devoted to domestic 
politics, twenty-five percent to reparations and disarmament, 
twenty percent to civil unrest, etc.
The composition of the New York Times's German coverage 
between January and August 1932 also reflected that of the 
mainstream American press on anti-semitism, despite the fact 
that the paper was owned and published by Jews. Even though the 
Times generated a whopping five hundred and forty news items 
about the Weimar Republic during this period, only four 
concerned Nazi racial ideology or Nazi-inspired anti-Jewish 
violence.
It is surprising that so few items were published despite the 
pressure from religious organizations, such as the American
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Jewish Committee, to focus more attention on the plight of 
German Jewry. Nor did these urgings fall on deaf ears. In 
March, and again in July, the Home Office relayed its concerns 
that the Nazis had stepped up their anti-Jewish campaign,
especially in schools and provincial cities, to the Berlin
bureau. 552 The Home Office instructed the bureau to send such
stories if the reports were confirmed. Birchall, however, did
not believe that such cables were warranted because after 
'having especially watched for real anti-semitic 
manifestations', he concluded that they were 'non-existent'.553 
He slightly modified his view in July, saying that 'Nazi anti- 
Jewish sentiment was neither stronger nor weaker' than it had 
been before, thus not requiring the paper's attention.554
It appears that Birchall was implying that Nazi anti-semitism 
in-and-of-itself was not newsworthy. His view, shared by many 
American journalists, was articulated by Berlin bureau chief 
Guido Enderis in 1931. In a letter to Sulzberger justifying his 
not reporting an anti-Jewish riot in Berlin on 12 September, 
Enderis explained that 'everybody knows that the Nazis are anti- 
semitic; it's no. longer news'. 555 Sulzberger accepted Enderis's 
logic, only lightly criticizing him for disregarding a 15 
September Home Office directive requiring more information about 
the violence. 556 More importantly, the young publisher instructed
552James to Berlin bureau & James to Birchall, 8 March 1932 and James to 
Birchall 22 July 1932, James Papers, NYT Archive.
553Birchall to James, 9 March 1932, Ibid.
554Birchall to James, 23 July 1932, Ibid.
555Enderis to Sulzberger, 5 October 1931, Sulzberger Papers, Ibid.
556Sulzberger to Enderis, 22 October 1931, Ibid.
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Enderis not to compensate for this isolated dereliction by 
sending a 'disproportionate amount of Jewish news' but to 'carry 
on as [he had] before the incident occurred' .557
Sulzberger himself was in a difficult position. The matter 
of the 12 September riot had been brought to his attention by 
Morris Waldman, an official with the American Jewish Committee. 
Waldman pointed out that no.n-Jewish newspapers such as the Times 
of London and the Manchester Guardian had given the story its 
full due, whereas the New York Times provided a belated and 
mundane account.558 In response, Sulzberger attempted to appease 
Waldman almost to the point of conceding that the paper was in 
error.
You are well aware that we try to publish the news with 
accuracy and that we sincerely appreciate it when our 
friends take the pains to point out instances where, in 
their opinion, we have failed to meet our standards. May I 
add that our knowledge of the difficulties inherent in the 
task of a newspaperman is such that no single incident such 
as the one in question would cause us to doubt either the 
judgment or ability of our Berlin representative. 
Personally, should you be interested and care to stop in 
here some day, I should be glad to show you the report that 
was made to me.559
Sulzberger's conciliatory reply not only revealed the 
seriousness with which concerns from Jewish organizations were 
treated, it also masked the lack of sympathy he held with regard 
to the plight of his own people. Even though his uncle sat on 
the American Jewish Committee's board of directors, Sulzberger 
characterized the organization 'as one he could never belong to' 
because he 'did not feel the ties which caused the group of
557ibid.
ECO
Waldman to Sulzberger, 1 October 1931, Ibid.
559Sulzberger to Waldman, 22 October 1931, Ibid.
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high-minded men who compose its executive committee to watch the 
interests of the Jew as they do1 .560
Sulzberger's ambivalent religious views were consistent with 
his ethnic history. Both he and Ochs were Jews of German 
descent. Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a 
deep-rooted schism developed between German and non-German Jews. 
As a group, German-American Jews tended to advocate assimilation 
by sacrificing religious customs and weakening the bonds of 
Jewish brotherhood. German-American Jews also tended to look 
down upon their less affluent and less assimilated Eastern 
European brethren.
Ochs and Sulzberger shared these feelings. Both were strong 
anti-Zionists and both were uncomfortable participating in 
activities where Jews were the sole beneficiaries. For example, 
in late 1932, Ochs refused to attend a dinner honoring the 
prominent reformer, Samuel Untermeyer, for his efforts to help 
persecuted Jews in Germany, on the grounds that 'a strictly 
Jewish crusade may do more harm than good' .561 Sulzberger too, 
expressed insecurity about his religion, especially concerning 
issues of emotionalism and faith. 562 He even admitted privately 
that his relative lack of sympathy for the Jewish plight was due 
to the fact that he was 'too fortunately born'.563
All of this discussion about Ochs's and Sulzberger's 
religious beliefs would be irrelevant were it not for their 
attempts to impose their brand of assimilationism on the
560Sulzberger to Enderis, 22 October 1931, Ibid.
561Shepard, Paper's Papers, P.303.
562Sulzberger to his father, circa 1920, Sulzberger Papers, NYT Archive.
563Sulzberger to Enderis, 22 October 1931, Ibid.
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operations of their New York Times. Given the prominence of 
anti-semitism in early 20th century America, both wished to 
ensure that the Times would not be perceived as the nation's 
"Jewish Newspaper". To this end, Ochs and Sulzberger 
implemented measures to "de-Jewify" the paper. Some Jewish 
staff members abbreviated their Hebrew-sounding forenames on 
their bylines; Abraham Rosenthal became A.M. Rosenthal, Abraham 
Raskin became A.H. Raskin, etc. Gay Talese and Harrison 
Salisbury contend that it was no accident that nearly all of the 
paper's editors were non-Jewish, leading the former to quip, 
'the New York Times is owned by Jews, edited by Catholics and 
written for Protestants'.564
Management's attitudes towards employing Jews had a direct 
bearing on the operation of its Berlin bureau and, in 
particular, the appointment of a new bureau chief to replace 
Wythe Williams in 1930. Evidence from the New York Times 
Archive shows that then-managing editor, Fred Birchall, and 
then-European service chief, Edwin James, frequently alluded to 
an anti-semitic 'racial bar' in their discussions about the 
possible hiring of Joseph Shaplen, a Jew, to fill the post.565
Birchall and James actually sought to waive this unwritten 
rule and hire Shaplen but Ochs ignored their recommendation and 
awarded the spot to Williams's "number two" man, Guido Enderis, 
because he wanted to promote from within the bureau itself. The 
folly of Ochs's decision was evident soon after. Sulzberger 
recognized the need to strengthen the Berlin bureau following
564Talese, Kingdom, P.58, Salisbury, Without Fear, P.29.
565Birchall to James, 29 January 1930 £ James to Birchall 28 February
1930, James Papers, NYT Archive. See also Birchall to James, 15 August
1932 £ James to Birchall 29 August 1932, Ibid.
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lacked since Lincoln Eyre's death'.571 Birchall was also 
instructed to make an on-site assessment of the beleaguered 
bureau. His report revealed that the situation was even worse 
than management had previously thought. 'Something must be 
done', he privately cabled in August 1932, 'the fact is that 
with Berlin temporarily a better news center than Paris and 
almost as good as London, we are worse equipped to deal with 
things here than we are in Vienna [a minor outpost]'.572
Birchall thought that Enderis was being poorly served by his 
staff. He described Hugh Jedell, the bureau's "number two" man 
as 'a good translator but of little other practical use' , 573 And 
although Birchall believed that Karl von Pueckler showed 
'promise as a future correspondent', he also believed that von 
Pueckler 'was handicapped by all sorts of German patriotism' ,574 
Birchall's assessment of von Pueckler is worth noting because 
the German national would later become a Nazi informant.575
Birchall's evaluation of Enderis was more balanced. On the 
one hand, Enderis possessed such an 'amazing knowledge of 
Germany and German personalities' that even 'the Foreign Office 
consulted him about things it did not understand' . 576 Enderis’was 
also cited for 'his accuracy in reading popular tendencies' even 
though his published dispatches do little to support such a
571James to Birchall, ?July 1932, #6-0721, Ibid.
572Birchall to James, 4 August 1932, Ibid.
573Ibid.
574Ibid.
575Birchall to James, 18 April 1933, Roll #59, Ibid.
576Birchall to Sulzberger, 30 April 1932, Sulzberger Papers, Ibid.
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Enderis's poor coverage of the Hoover Moratorium. 566 Edwin James 
observed that Enderis was capable of handling 'the little 
routine matters' but not the big stories. 567 Enderis himself 
realized that he was not qualified for the head post and 
implored the Home Office for additional manpower. 568 His pleas 
were answered with a drastic and unorthodox directive 
implemented immediately prior to the biggest European news story 
of 1932, the Hindenburg-Hitler presidential campaign. In what 
was designed as a stop-gap move, the Times temporarily relieved 
Birchall of his managing editor duties and dispatched him to 
Berlin to become the bureau's main writer. The paper also 
recalled Edwin James from Paris to assume Birchall's previous 
duties in New York.
Birchall's arrival paid immediate dividends in the eyes of 
management. The Home Office praised the former managing 
editor's articles for being 'just what we have been wanting but 
not what we have been getting 1 , 569 Even Ochs, who by 1932 had 
detached himself from the day-to-day operations of the Times, 
complimented Birchall's work.570
Nevertheless, many of the Berlin bureau's problems remained. 
Birchall's deployment was meant as a temporary measure to give 
its dispatches from Germany the 'distinction which they had
566Sulzberger to Enderis, 9 July 1931, James Papers, NYT Archive.
567James to Birchall, ?July 1932, #6-0721, Ibid.
568 See Enderis to Birchall, 23 July 1931, Birchall to James, 4 August 
1932, Ibid. See also Birchall to Sulzberger, 30 April 1932, Sulzberger 
Papers, Ibid.
569James to Birchall, 7 March & ?July 1932, #6-0721, James Papers, Ibid.
570Ochs to Birchall, 13 March 1932, Ibid.
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claim.577 Finally, Birchall described him as an 'excellent office 
manager' and cited his ability to reduce administrative 
expenses. 578 On the other hand, Birchall noted Enderis's poor 
physical health and low morale which was due in part to the fact 
that Enderis was a tireless worker who had not enjoyed a 
vacation in three years. 579 However, in Birchall's opinion, 'the 
remedy needed to go much deeper' than just giving Enderis a 
holiday. 580 'The major problem with the Berlin outfit is that we 
have Guido plus nothing' and 'Guido himself is no writer' —  his 
pieces are 'excessively modest and conservative'.581 Moreover, 
Birchall revealed that many of the bureau's dispatches published 
under Enderis's byline were only edited by him, but were 
actually penned by Jedell and Pueckler.582
Birchall recommended firing Jedell and appointing 'a strong 
man to play second fiddle' to Enderis. 583 Birchall lamented the 
fact that the Times could not risk filling the position with 
Shaplen, alluding to the strong possibility that the Nazis could 
exert political authority in the near future. 584 He mentioned 
Harold Callender, an experienced Times European correspondent, 
as a possible replacement, although he cited logistical
577ibid.
578ibid.
57 9Birchall to James, 4 August 1932, James Papers, Ibid.
580Ibid.
581Ibid.
582Birchall to James, ?July 1932, #6-0719, Ibid.
583Birchall to Sulzberger, 30 April 1932, Sulzberger Papers, Ibid.
584Birchall to James, 29 August 1932. James concurred, see James to 
Birchall, 15 August 1932, Ibid.
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difficulties in executing such a move. In retrospect, the best 
move (in addition to terminating Jedell) would have been to 
demote or even fire Enderis. However, Birchall immediately 
rejected these two options, stating that if the Times removed 
Enderis, 'the most popular and respected' of Berlin 
correspondents', it would hurt the paper's prestige. 585 And if 
the Times relegated him to the "number two" slot, it would not 
only damage the paper's prestige, but a humiliated Enderis 
'would lie down on us'.586
Hence, Enderis remained in Berlin (through 1941 no less) but 
Jedell was formally dismissed at the end of 1932, although he 
did contribute free-lance pieces as late as March 1933. The 
Times delayed its hiring of the far more capable Otto Tolischus 
(who would go on to have a distinguished career in journalism) 
until the late spring of 1933, forcing Birchall to remain as the 
chief writer in Berlin on a semi-permanent basis. As a result, 
bylines featuring the name, "Guido Enderis" (with the notable 
exception of March 1933) would steadily become a thing of the 
past. The literary quality of the New York Times's coverage of 
Germany would continue to improve with Birchall's prominence, 
although its misplaced optimism, especially on the editorial 
page, would remain as a salient feature of the paper's 
reporting.
* * *
In retrospect, the Chicago Daily News provided a more 
realistic assessment of the political situation in Germany
585Birchall to Sulzberger, 30 April 1932, Sulzberger Papers, Ibid.
586Birchall to James, 4 August 1932, James Papers, Ibid.
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during the first eight months of 1932 than the New York Times or 
the Chicago Daily Tribune, perhaps due to the fact that unlike 
in prior years, the tone and tenor of Edgar Mowrer's dispatches 
were not significantly altered. We know this because Mowrer's 
outside work, Germany Turns the Clock Back, published in early
December 1932, echoes the opinions ascribed to him in the pages
of the Chicago Daily News. In addition, a general degree of 
accord now existed between the views of the editorial department 
and those of the Berlin bureau. These radical developments can 
be traced more to changes within the power structure of the 
paper itself than to changes in the fortunes of the Weimar 
Republic.
* * *
Like most of its mainstream press counterparts, the Chicago 
Daily News exaggerated the importance of Hindenburg's first 
victory over Hitler in March 1932. Hitler's 'serious drubbing' 
has ' enormously strengthened the position of Briining both within 
and without Germany', wrote Edgar Mowrer following the 
election. 587 The editorial page echoed his sentiments, stating 
that '[Hindenburg's victory] is a cause for satisfaction and 
relief to friends of peace and social order throughout the 
world. It is a fresh demonstration of the stability of German
political and economic institutions'.588
Unlike other newspapers, however, the Chicago Daily News did 
not characterize the result of the following month's run-off 
election as a victory for Hindenburg. The paper's headline,
587CDN, 14 March 1932, P.l.
588"Responsibility Wins In Germany", CDN ed., 15 March 1932.
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'HITLER GIRDS TO TAKE REICH STATE BY STATE; RE-ELECTION OF 
HINDENBURG FAILS TO DAMPEN NAZI HOPES' clearly reflected this 
view.589 Mowrer called the result 'undecisive' [sic], stating 
that 'the election did not settle anything'. 590 The paper's 
editorial, "Hitlerism Shows Its Strength" appears to have been 
only a further elaboration of Mowrer's dispatch: 'The outlook in 
Germany and the rest of Europe for a recession of stormy fascism 
is far from reassuring despite the victory of the aged field 
marshal'.591 The paper's pessimism may have resulted from false 
expectations in light of the fact that the editorial page had 
predicted 'a decisive victory' for Hindenburg, and Mowrer argued 
that Hitler need not outpoll Hindenburg in the run-off tally, 
'only hold his own or slightly increase his vote'. 592 Far from 
celebrating, the Chicago Daily News ominously noted Hitler's 
gain of two million votes from the first election. 593 More 
significantly, the paper described the Field Marshal's victory 
as a hollow one for the Weimar Republic because 'voters cast 
their ballots for Hindenburg personally, rather than for the 
forces of moderation symbolized by his candidacy' .594
The Chicago Daily News was profoundly pessimistic about the 
chances of the democratic parliamentarians in the Prussian 
Landtag elections two weeks later. The paper's staff considered
589CDN, 11 April 1932, P.l.
590Ibid.
591"Hitlerism Shows Its Strength", CDN ed., 12 April 1932.
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the result troubling. Mowrer stated that 'the defenders of the
republic' had 'received a serious jolt'.595 He further contended
that 'Hitler not only did not lose in comparison with the
presidential elections, but, with the allowance made for
circumstances, he gained remarkably'.596 The paper's editorial, 
"Consequences of Hitler's New Gains" mirrored Mowrer's views. 
It stated that 'the momentary reassurances arising from the re- 
election of Hindenburg vanish in the presence of increased 
fascist strength' and as a consequence 'continued uncertainty in 
Germany and throughout Europe seems inevitable' .597
The image of the Weimar Republic reached its nadir in the 
eyes of the Chicago Daily News upon the dismissal of Briining and 
the appointment of von Papen at the close of May 1932. 'Germany 
is in for a fresh period of severe political disturbance and the 
prospects for the success of the Lausanne reparations 
conference, faint in any case, today seem hopeless', predicted 
Mowrer after Briining's ouster. 598 In addition, von Papen's 
appointment had opened 'the floodgates, and the ancient stream 
of pre-war German militarism and junkerdom have come pouring 
into what is left of the Republic' . 599 The editorial page 
continued: 'there is no concealing the gravity of the
situation... reactionary elements... that dominated pre-war 
Germany are again in control'.600
595CDN, 26 April 1932, P.l.
596Ibid.
597"Consequences of Hitler's New Gains", CDN ed., 26 April 1932.
598CDN, 31 May 1932, P.2.
599Ibid., 1 June 1932.
600"An Upset For Republican Germany", CDN ed., Ibid.
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The assumption of power by Germany's traditional elites 
probably caused Mowrer to reassess the political situation. He 
concluded that the accession of Papen and Schleicher signalled 
the end not only of Weimar democracy, but of the Nazi movement 
as well. Thus, despite the fact that the Party had emerged as 
the biggest vote-getter in the July Reichstag elections, Mowrer 
boldly stated that 'Germany is not going fascist [because of 
the] shrewd calculations of von Papen and von Schleicher' ,601 The 
editorial board agreed, concluding that 'conservatism [would] 
continue to rule in Germany with a powerful and daring arm which 
threatens the existence of the Republic'.602
Why did Mowrer write off the possibility of a Nazi accession 
to power following the July Reichstag elections (even though 
Hitler's group doubled its vote from the 1930 balloting to 
become Germany's largest political party)? Why did he not use 
the same rationalizations which characterized the New York Times 
and other newspapers with rose-coloured views? This is not easy 
to explain. However, Mowrer did not hold Briining in high 
regard. In fact, he criticized the ex-Chancellor's 'long drawn- 
out government by emergency decree' . 603 Moreover, Mowrer did not 
view Hindenburg as a "tower of republican strength". Instead, 
he described the President of the Reich as an aged man who has 
always been remote from anything resembling democratic 
thought' .604
601Ibid., 1 August 1932.
602 "Germany Asks Strong Government", CDN ed., 1 August 1932.
603Ibid., 31 May 1932.
604Ibid.
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Two different factors may account for Mowrer's about-face. 
First, although he was no admirer of the Junker Right, Mowrer 
credited von Papen and, particularly Schleicher, for their 
adroitness in consolidating power in the summer of 1932. In 
Germany Puts the Clock Back Mowrer summarized in detail the 
ruthless speed with which the new regime suppressed Socialist 
influence in Prussia. 605 Furthermore, he contended that Papen had 
outmanoeuvred Hitler in the past and would continue to do so in 
the future.606 Second, based on his qualitative analysis of the 
political vulnerabilities of fascist movements as opposed to the 
far more tenuous statistical analysis used by the New York 
Times, Mowrer concluded in August 1932 that the Nazi tide was 
receding. He suggested that because Hitler (like Mussolini) had 
prophesized the success of the Nazi movement, rooted in what 
Mowrer called 'its impression of being something inevitable, 
fateful and irresistible', the Party would not recover from even 
the slightest loss in electoral momentum. 607 Because the Nazis 
failed to substantially raise their vote totals from the 
presidential and Prussian elections, Mowrer reasoned, 'the 
movement had lost the inevitable quality which unquestionably 
attracted millions of voters'.608
* * *
A prominent feature of the Chicago Daily News's coverage of 
Germany during the first eight months of 1932 was the striking
605Mowrer, E. Germany Puts the Clock Back, (New York 1932), Chapter One.
606Ibid., Chapter 22.
607CDN, 9 April 1932, P.l.
608Ibid.
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congruity of views between the normally oppositional editorial 
department and the Berlin bureau. This was no accident; 
following the death of publisher Walter Strong in the spring of 
1931 the paper's management structure underwent a major 
overhaul, profoundly affecting its German coverage.
These changes were implemented by the Chicago Daily News's 
new publisher, Frank Knox. Politically, Knox could best be 
described as a Hoover Republican in domestic matters and a 
moderate internationalist in foreign policy. Although he 
advocated multi-lateral disarmament, 609 Knox opposed U.S. 
participation in the League of Nations and the World Court.610 
The new publisher's views, however, were at odds with the 
Wilsonian tradition of the paper. It is for this reason that 
early in his reign Knox refrained from reversing the Chicago 
Daily News's editorial stances on the League and the World 
Court.611 In retrospect, this decision was a smart move. Among 
the liberally-minded staff of the paper's foreign news service, 
only Edward Price Bell took serious enough exception to his 
boss's political beliefs to cause an irreparable breach.612
However, it was Knox's organizational philosophy which would 
foster the greatest change in the news and editorial reporting 
of the Chicago Daily News. Knox's background as an army officer 
and an editor under William Randolph Hearst underpinned his 
advocacy of a highly centralized administration dominated by the
609Knox to Bell, 26 December 1931, Bell Papers, Newberry Library.
610Binder to P. Mowrer, 1 September 1931, Binder Papers, Ibid.
611Ibid.
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publisher. Knox adhered to these traditions, exercising control 
in every aspect of the operation.
The Chicago Daily News’s foreign service proved no exception. 
In September 1931 Knox placed the service under 'the immediate 
charge of Hal O'Flaherty, who would be in hourly consultation 
with Charles Dennis'.613 Moreover, in contrast to the Strong 
regime, Dennis was to be 'available at any moment to consult 
with the publisher' ,614 Knox also consolidated power over the 
foreign service by abolishing the position of European Director, 
a post of great prestige but little influence, held by Paul 
Mowrer. In response to the deleterious effects of the Great 
Depression, Knox personally ordered his foreign service staff to 
'reduce ruthlessly every kind of expense which [could] be 
eliminated without definite impairment of the service'.615 In 
later recollections Mowrer and other European correspondents 
would blame Knox for destroying the foreign service.616 However, 
Paul Mowrer and others expressed little initial opposition to 
Knox's moves. Quite to the contrary, with the exception of not 
being permitted to place overseas stories on page one except in 
rare circumstances (a frequent complaint even during the Lawson 
regime), Mowrer stated that he had 'absolutely no criticism to 
make... Colonel Knox's management suits me'.617
613P. Mowrer to Bell, 21 September 1931, Ibid.
614Ibid.
615Ibid.
616See for instance, P. Mowrer to Pryor, 18 September 1962, CDN Papers,
Ibid.
617P. Mowrer to Binder, 2 May 1932, Binder Papers, Ibid.
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Knox also revamped the editorial page. Unlike Strong, the 
new publisher not only 'took the liveliest of interest in all 
editorial problems' but also 'had a great deal to contribute' .618 
And although Knox penned few editorials, it is clear that by the 
autumn of 1932 he exercised full control of the editorial 
department.619
The chief loser from Knox's consolidation of power was 
Dennis. No longer would the editor enjoy the unofficial title 
of '"absolute czar" in editorial matters' as he had had under 
Strong.620 Instead, he would be relegated to writing editorials 
about national politics under the watchful eye of Knox and his 
role in the operation of the foreign service was greatly 
diminished.621 Nor was Dennis part of Knox's long term plans. 
In fact, the Colonel thought Dennis 'should retire because he 
was getting old' . 622 And although it appears that Dennis may have 
resisted Knox's decisions, the editor-in-chief's determination 
may have been undermined by a nonlife- threatening but 'sudden 
and serious decline in his health' in early November 1 931 .623
That the onset of Dennis's medical problems occurred four 
months prior to the Hindenburg/Hitler presidential election was 
critical as far as the Chicago Daily News's coverage of Germany 
was concerned. Upon the recommendation of Strong's widow, 'on
618Binder to P. Mowrer, 1 September 1931, Ibid.
619Binder to Knox, 29 October 1932, Ibid.
620Binder to P. Mowrer, 10 July 1931, Ibid. See also Ibid., 17 July 
1931.
621Binder to Knox, 29 October 1932, Ibid.
622Paul Mowrer as quoted in Lou Pryor's Manuscript, CDN Papers, Ibid.
623Bell to Knox, 7 November 1931, Bell Papers, Ibid.
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the first day of his tenure' Knox tapped Carroll Binder, who 
Dennis had relegated to covering local stories, to become the 
paper's chief editorial writer on international affairs.624 
Binder shared Knox's desire for an editorial page marked by 
'originality, variety and forthrightness'.625 He also gained 
Knox's confidence and as a result, became an intermediary 
between the publisher and the foreign service.626
Unlike Dennis, Binder was a great admirer of Edgar Mowrer's 
'superlative' work, contending in 1931 that 'nothing comparable 
has come from Germany', 627 which suggests that Binder took his 
lead from Mowrer in the formulation of his editorials on the 
Weimar Republic. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the removal of Dennis and the appointment of Binder as the chief 
foreign editorial writer accounts for the harmony of views 
between the Berlin bureau and the editorial department after 
1931. Moreover, it is plausible that Binder convinced Knox that 
the paper should espouse Edgar Mowrer's views, as evidenced by 
the fact that the Berlin bureau chief's dispatches were not 
significantly edited. Immediately following the Prussian 
elections when Edgar Mowrer expressed great pessimism regarding
the future of the Weimar Republic, Paul Mowrer voiced the
opinion that 'under the previous regime, Edgar's remarkable 
articles on Germany would not have been printed' . 628 It seemed
624Binder to P. Mowrer, 24 September 1933 (a recollection), 6 June & 17 
July 1931, Binder Papers, Ibid.
625Binder to P. Mowrer, 24 September 1933 (a recollection), Ibid.
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clear that an era of cordial relations between the Berlin bureau 
and the Home Office had opened in Chicago.
* * *
The preceding examination of the reporting of events in 
Germany by the Chicago Daily Tribune. New York Times and Chicago 
Daily News during the first eight months of 1932 serves to 
reinforce a major thesis of this study: factors outside the
parameters of the story, particularly ones within the news 
organizations themselves, helped shape the tone, tenor and 
extent of their German coverage as a whole. This is not to say 
that the tumultuous changes which occurred in the Weimar 
Republic during this period were of little influence on American 
journalists. After all, German news was a fixture on the front 
page of many mainstream American publications at a time when it 
could have been easily overwhelmed by the reporting of domestic 
affairs. It should be remembered that there was no shortage of 
news in the first eight months of 1932: the worst depression in 
American history, the most important presidential campaign since 
1860, unparalled incidents of civil unrest (leading many 
historians to conclude that it was in this period when America 
came closest to revolution) and what many journalists called 
"the story of the century" —  the Lindbergh baby kidnapping and 
murder —  filled the pages of American publications.
Nonetheless, the events of 1930 caused American foreign 
correspondents to shift their focus back to Germany. The 
developments of the first eight months of 1932 ensured Germany's 
place in America's newspapers. Only through the Nazi regime's
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destruction in the Second World War would this position be 
relinquished.
Chapter 6 
Hitler Emerges Triumphant: 
Germany, September 1932 - January 1933
Von Papen had hoped that the results of the July Reichstag 
elections would engender support for his "Government of National 
Concentration". Now comprising a Nazi/Communist majority, 
however, the new assembly greeted him with a preliminary vote of 
"no confidence" on 12 September. This prompted Papen (through 
the graces of Hindenburg) to dissolve the Reichstag for the 
second time in four months.
Elections were called for 6 November. During the intervening 
period Papen attempted to bolster his support by appealing to 
the disparate elements of Germany's Right wing and working 
class. He raised the tariff on British goods by three hundred 
percent and cut corporate taxes to appease big business. Papen 
also tried to attract working-class support by introducing 
public works initiatives for firms hiring from Germany's pool of 
six million unemployed.629
Like his predecessor, Briining, Papen hoped for a political 
mandate through a diplomatic offensive. He pressed for the 
abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles and called for the Allies 
to return the Saar and former German colonies. The centerpiece 
of Papen's foreign policy was his decision to accelerate and, 
more significantly, to make a public display of German
62 9Zalampas, Adolf Hitler, P.23. For an in-depth discussion of the 
German economy during the Papen, Schleicher and Hitler eras, see James, 
H. "Innovation and Conservatism in Germany's Economic Recovery: The 
Alleged Nazi Recovery of the 1930's" in Childers and Caplan (eds.) 
Reevaluating the Third Reich (New York 1993). For a general discussion 
of the last five months of the Republic, see Dorpalen, A. Hindenburg 
and the Weimar Republic (Princeton 1964) pp.371-483 and Eyck, History 
of the Weimar (Volume Two) .
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rearmament. This move was directed mainly towards the 
disillusioned junior officer corps of the Reichswehr —  segments 
of which had become sympathetic to the Nazis.630
Papen's aim, however, went beyond achieving a mandate for his 
regime. The aristocratic Chancellor sought Reichstag support to 
alter or even scrap the Weimar constitution in favor of one 
resembling the quasi-autocratic outline of 1871, in essence 
having the Reichstag relinquish its post-war powers and 
restoring authoritarian rule.631 From the beginning, there was 
virtually no chance that the body would vote for its own 
diminution, unless there were to be a Conservative landslide 
victory in the November elections.
Such a victory did not come to pass. Although the DNVP 
scored some minor gains, the Reichstag elections of 6 November 
failed to provide anything near a parliamentary mandate for the 
Papen regime. Particularly striking was the success of the KPD, 
which garnered over 17% of the vote (mostly at the expense of 
the Socialists) to become Germany's third largest party.
Nor did the Communists remain quiet. Throughout November, 
the KPD collaborated with the Nazis in conducting a general 
strike which shut down the Berlin transit system. Labor unrest, 
combined with the unsatisfactory results of the elections, 
compelled Hindenburg to ask reluctantly for Papen's 
resignation. 632 The Nazi/Communist alliance in the transit strike
630Ibid. See also Craig, Germany, pp.553-64 and Nicholls, Weimar, P.138. 
For an in-depth analysis of Papen's military policy see Carsten, 
Reichswehr pp. 364-384 and Geyer, M., "Professionals and Junkers:
German Rearmament and Politics in the Weimar Republic" in Bessel & 
Feuchtwanger Social Change.
631Craig, Ibid.
632Craig and Nicholls, Ibid.
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also alarmed Defence Minister von Schleicher, who questioned the 
loyalty of both the Reichswehr and the Weimar police forces in 
the event of a joint extremist uprising. Schleicher eventually 
convinced Hindenburg of the somewhat questionable proposition 
that Germany was on the verge of civil war and von Papen had 
lost the confidence of the army. After two weeks of 
vacillation, Hindenburg concluded that he was 'too old to assume 
responsibility for a civil war' and decided to 'let Herr von 
Schleicher try his luck' ,633
Von Schleicher appeared to be in a far stronger position upon 
assuming the Chancellorship on 2 December than von Papen had 
been the previous summer. Central to this development were the 
changing fortunes of the Nazi party. Although the Nazis 
remained Germany's largest party, they had lost two million 
votes in the November elections and suffered a second setback 
one month later in a regional election in Thuringia. The Party 
grew short of funds and had difficulty inspiring sufficient 
enthusiasm among a German electorate that had gone to the polls 
four times in the previous nine months. Hitler's consistent 
refusal to take a subordinate position in a coalition government 
also dampened the spirits of his staunchest supporters. A 
general feeling of a "missed opportunity" pervaded the ranks of 
the NSDAP. To paraphrase Goebbels, it appeared that the Nazi 
party had campaigned itself into oblivion.634
Hitler's misfortune afforded Chancellor von Schleicher an 
opportunity to disable the Party permanently by luring away a 
disenchanted Nazi contingent led by Gregor Strasser. By
633Craig, Germany, P.563.
634Childers, Nazi Voter, P.212 & 269, Nicholls, Weimar, P.137.
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dividing the Nazi constituency von Schleicher aimed to transcend 
the socio-economic divisions which had characterized German 
politics since the nation's unification. The new Chancellor not 
only expanded Papen's public works projects but also solicited 
the support of independent labor unions. By making a sincere 
effort to inaugurate a period of detente with the Socialists, 
Schleicher even held out the long-range possibility of SPD 
participation in a reorganized ministry.
Despite Schleicher's appeal to a broad-based constituency, 
his attempt to bring stability to Germany failed. First, he 
fell victim to his anti-Republican past. Most Socialists 
harbored deep reservations about Schleicher's sincerity because 
it was he who had helped orchestrate the demise of the SPD 
government in Prussia the previous July. Second, his "divide 
and conquer" approach towards the Nazis also crumbled. In a 
move of inexplicable incompetence, Strasser, after announcing 
his break with Hitler, went away on vacation to Italy —  
affording Hitler the time and opportunity to tighten party 
discipline by entrusting his closest ally, Rudolf Hess, with 
enforcing the Fiihrer's order for absolute loyalty. 635 Finally, 
von Schleicher's attempt to court groups outside the traditional 
German right alienated his conservative constituency, especially 
the army. Other elements of the traditional right also worked 
against the Chancellor. Hjalmar Schacht led a group of
industrialists opposing Schleicher in favor of Hitler.636
The key figure, however, was Papen himself. The ex- 




Schleicher's policies, including organizing a successful effort 
to bankroll the near-bankrupt Nazi party in their important 
regional campaign in Lippe in January 1933. Papen also cajoled 
and pressured Hindenburg's son, Oskar, into dumping Schleicher 
only a month into the General's Chancellorship.637
Von Schleicher thus was left politically isolated, 
compelling him to request rule by emergency decree. Under 
Papen's spell, however, Hindenburg refused to grant the general 
such powers, in effect, dismissing him. Von Schleicher resigned 
shortly thereafter, on 27 January 1933.
Out of the web of Papen's behind-the-scenes machinations, 
Adolf Hitler emerged as Germany's new Chancellor three days 
later. Papen and his conservative allies, Hugenberg among them, 
convinced a reluctant Hindenburg that Hitler would rule Germany 
in name only. Because the Nazi leader's cabinet would be 
stacked with conservative ministers, Papen boldly predicted that 
'within two months we will have pushed Hitler so far into the 
corner that he'll squeak'. 638 He also argued that a 
Nazi/Conservative "Government of National Concentration" would 
enjoy the support of close to half the Reichstag, a great 
improvement over previous regimes. Finally, Papen calculated 
that if the new regime failed, Hitler (in his position as 
Chancellor) would be saddled with much of the blame.
In hindsight it is easy to ridicule Papen's logic —  
especially in light of the fact that although the Nazis were 
given only two ministerial posts, they provided Hitler with 
control of most of Germany's police forces. But it is worth
637Herrmann, "American Perceptions", P.139.
638Craig, Germany, P.570.
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remembering that, at the time, most German politicians praised 
Papen and his conservative allies for their shrewdness in 
"boxing Hitler in". They were not alone in their views; such 
naivete was shared by most elements of the mainstream American 
press.
* * *
Despite the prominence of the American presidential campaign 
and the Lindbergh baby case, Germany remained a fixture in the 
pages of American newspapers between September 1932 and January 
1933. In fact, the number of news stories generated by the 
mainstream American press during that period did not fall below 
the levels established in the first five months of 1932.639
Not surprisingly, Hitler's appointment as German Chancellor 
was the dominant story from the Republic but other events, 
especially Papen's call for rearmament in September, also 
received prominent attention in the American press. In fact, 
Papen's diplomatic offensive, and his much publicized conflict 
with the Nazis and the Reichstag, explains why the newspapers in 
Herrmann's sample generated more stories about Germany (527) in 
September than in any month of 1932.
Two related trends characterized the tone and tenor of the 
American press's coverage of Germany throughout this period. 
The first was that 'the [Weimar] Republic as a republic [was] 
finished' and the second was that the Nazis were in terminal 
decline. 640 Most major newspapers agreed with the Pittsburgh 
Press's view that 'Germany would continue under reactionary
639This and subsequent calculations and analyses are based on Herrmann, 
"American Perceptions", Appendices I, S and M.
640The Nation, 26 October 1932 as cited in Zalampas, Adolf Hitler,
Chapter One.
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dictatorship' and that the 'Republic exists in name only, and 
merely because its opponents are too busy fighting among 
themselves to junk it' .641
The American press continued to express mixed views about the 
Papen Chancellorship. On the one hand, many journalists 
condemned Papen's policy of rearmament and cited it as proof 
that 'Germany was seeking to return to militarism'. 642 On the 
other hand, many journalists went along with Papen's anti­
democratic constitutional changes in the belief that they would 
enfeeble the Nazis and the KPD by weakening the Reichstag. The 
San Francisco Chronicle, a staunch supporter of this policy, 
argued that '[Germany] can no longer 'leave the government to 
the mercy of a legislative debating society1.643 However, some 
newspapers such as the Philadelphia Inquirer characterized 
Papen's move as an act of 'political suicide'.644
Despite their previous reservations, von Schleicher's 
appointment as Chancellor was favorably received by the American 
press. Time described the General as 'witty and companionable' 
while Business Week characterized him as a 'remarkably able 
man'. 645 Politically he was called 'a modern realist' who was 
' sensible enough to know that what the German people want is
641Editorial, Pittsburgh Press, 11 November 1932 as cited in Herrmann, 
"American Perceptions", Chapter Six.
642New Republic, 28 September 1932, Ibid.
643Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle, 14 October 1932.
644Philadelphia Inquirer, 17 October 1932, P.l as cited in Herrmann, 
"American Perceptions ”, Chapter Six.
645Time 12 December 1932, Business Week 14 December 1932 as cited in 
Zalampas, Adolf Hitler, Chapter One.
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bread'. 646 The Associated Press praised his handling of the 
Geneva conference as well as his attempt to broaden his 
constituency by 'building a bridge over the chasm separating the 
Nazis from participation in the government and, on the other 
hand, establishing friendly contact with organized labor1 ,647 
Schleicher's sudden popularity among many mainstream journalists 
seemed rooted in their hope that the General would 'crush any 
attempt at a Nazi uprising' . 648 Only publications on the liberal 
left such as the New Republic criticized the new Chancellor.649
The second theme was that of Nazi decline. From the 
reporting of Papen's dissolution of the Reichstag on 12 
September to the Nazi victory in the Lippe Diet elections four 
months later, the American press consistently sounded the 
deathknell of Hitler's fascists. Most publications predicted 
that Hitler would soon meet his 'Waterloo' while, on the eve of 
the November Reichstag elections, many such as the San Francisco 
Chronicle expected that 'Hitler's fall would be much more rapid 
than his rise' , 650 The results, combined with those in Thuringia, 
seemed to vindicate these predictions. Many publications 
expressed the view that the Nazis had 'received a fatal check' 
or at the very least, 'Nazi strength was definitely waning'.651
646San Francisco Chronicle, 18 December 1932, Sec. IV P.6. See also 
Pittsburgh Press 5 December 1932, P.6 as cited in Herrmann, "American 
Perceptions", Chapter Seven.
647Associated Press in New Orleans Times-Picayune, 3 December 1932.
648The Nation, 19 October 1932 as cited in Zalampas, Adolf Hitler,
Chapter One.
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New Republic 14 December 1932, Ibid.
650Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle 6 November 1932.
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Nation 16 November 1932, New York Herald Tribune in Literary Digest 19 
November 1932, P.13.
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Strasser's widely publicized defection also confirmed
impressions of the Party's downfall, leading Frank Simonds to
conclude that 'the Nazis [were] visibly breaking up'. 652 Only a
few publications, such as the Los Angeles Times, expressed the
idea that predictions of Hitler's demise might have been
premature. Moreover, the New Orleans Times-Picavune contended
that the American press allowed itself to be influenced by the
views of '[Hitler's opponents] and outsiders' without 'making
due allowance and discount for its source' . 653 S. Miles Bouton
echoed similar sentiments in the American Mercury.
Every month for years American readers have been told that 
the Nazi movement had reached its highest point and begun to 
ebb. Every gain by the Hitlerites was followed by 
comforting assurances that now the last reservoir of their 
votes had been exhausted.654
The revival of the Party's fortunes in the Lippe elections on 
15 January, however, would mark the end of much of the press's 
celebration over the "decline" of the Nazis. Most publications 
asserted the view that the victory strengthened 'Hitler's 
strategic position', refuting 'assertions that Hitlerism was on 
the downgrade' ,655
Schleicher's fall on 28 January came as no surprise to the 
American press. Journalists had become concerned about the 
General's position, particularly after the Nazi victory in
652 Philadelphia Inquirer, 10 January 1933 as cited in Herrmann, "American 
Perceptions", Chapter Seven.
653Editorial, New Orleans Times-Picayune, 8 November 1932.
654American Mercury September, 1932 as cited in Herrmann, "American
Perceptions", Chapter Six.
655Business Week 25 January 1933, Associated Press in the Washington Post 
16 January 1933, P.l, Ibid.
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Lippe. With the exception of the New York Times, the press 
recognized that Schleicher was nothing more than 'a tottering 
Chancellor' after Hindenburg and Hugenberg withdrew their 
support for him. 656 Newspapers such as the Philadelphia Inquirer 
even criticized their counterparts for assuming that Schleicher 
had enjoyed Hindenburg's unreserved support in the first place.657
Most of the mainstream American press initially reacted to 
Hitler's appointment as Chancellor with cautious optimism. 
Although the majority of journalists agreed that Hindenburg had 
'virtually launched his fatherland on an entirely new course in 
what may prove to be one of the most decisive decisions in the 
nation's history', they also shared Papen's confidence that 
Hitler 'seized only the semblance of power'. 658 Moreover, many 
journalists naively believed that ' it was inconceivable that 
Hitler as Chancellor [would] seek to put into practice the 
platform he has been dinning into German ears' because he was 
'sworn to obey the Constitution and [would] likely do s o 1 in the 
future. 659 The San Francisco Chronicle even praised Papen for 
utilizing Hitler as a bulwark against communism.660
However, a small number of publications took a pessimistic 
view. The New Orleans Times-Picavune and the New Republic 
ridiculed the notion that Hitler could be "tamed" by his
656Associated Press in the New York Times, 28 January 1933, P.l.
657Editorial, Philadelphia Inquirer 30 January 1933 as cited in Herrmann, 
"American Perceptions", Chapter Seven.
658Pittsburgh Sun Telegraph 30 January 1933, Pittsburgh Free Press 
editorial 31 January 1933, Ibid.
659Editorial St. Louis Post Dispatch, 31 January 1933 and H.V. Kaltenborn
in Commonweal, 15 February 1933, Ibid.
660Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle 31 January 1933.
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conservative ministers. The Louisiana newspapers wrote that 
’unless Hitler changed his tactics, his encirclement by 
"conservative" cabinet colleagues may prove disappointing if it 
is designed to hold him in check' while the New Republic 
predicted that Hugenberg and his allies would 'go the way of 
Mussolini's early collaborators1.661 It would take the rest of 
the American press many months to arrive at these sobering and
accurate conclusions.
ie * *
The news and editorial reporting of the Chicago Daily News 
mirrored much of the mainstream press consensus. Although Edgar 
Mowrer's dispatches continued to ridicule Papen and the Junker 
elites, they lacked the sense of foreboding which normally 
characterized his reporting. He refrained from sounding the 
deathknell of the Republic —  even Hitler's appointment as 
Chancellor failed to jolt him. Instead, Mowrer seemed to have 
grown accustomed to Weimar's semi-permanent dictatorship. 
Chicago Daily News editorials exhibited a similar pattern. By 
January 1933 Carroll Binder had strengthened his hold on foreign 
affairs editorials by 'pushing out' Nicholas Yarros, a long-time 
Dennis ally. 662 Knox also bolstered Binder's power by prohibiting 
Dennis from making alterations or modifications on all drafts of 
editorials.663 Binder continued to laud Mowrer, even though the 
Berlin correspondent's personal advice to sell off a German bond
661Editorial New Orleans Times-Picayune, 31 January 1933. The New
Republic, 15 February 1933 as cited in Zalampas, Adolf Hitler, Chapter 
One.
662Binder to P. Mowrer, 11 January 1933, Binder Papers, Newberry Library.
663Binder to P. Mowrer, 24 September 1933, (a recollection), Ibid.
(242)
cost him $350 (a large sum by 1932 standards). 664 Thus, the 
accord between the editorial department and the Berlin bureau, 
which took shape during the first eight months of 1932, 
continued through 1933.
The general dearth of archival evidence from this period
makes it difficult to account for Mowrer's "mellowing". Two
seemingly contradictory trends may have influenced his change in
tone. The first was the notion of Nazi decline. The November
Reichstag elections reassured Mowrer that Hitler's 'chances of
ever dominating Germany [had] become insignificant'.665 He
highlighted the dissension within the ranks of the Nazis,
especially between the hotheaded Brownshirts and the rank and
file. 666 According to Mowrer, 'the only issue is whether after
the election Hitler will submit to von Papen and enter the
cabinet in a subordinate position' , 667 The editorial page echoed
these sentiments in a piece which read much like a post-mortem:
[Hitler's] campaign was ill-fated from the beginning... He 
never deserved to be called the German Mussolini. He 
appropriated the trappings and the manners of II Duce, but 
he lacked the inflexibility of will and purpose, the power 
to eliminate opposition[!], the insight into the popular 
mind and the genius for statesmanship of the Italian 
dictator.668
Second, however, Mowrer expressed concern about the prospect 
of an unbridled Nazi dictatorship because the number of 
satisfactory cabinet combinations available to Hindenburg were
664Binder to P. Mowrer, 11 January 1933, Ibid.
665CDN, 7 November 1932, P.2.
666Ibid.
667CDN, 5 November 1932, Ibid.
668CDN editorial, 8 November 1932.
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woefully few. He called the appointment of von Schleicher 'the 
only thing that could be done to keep the frame of the German 
constitution intact, yet avoid handing over power to Adolf 
Hitler1.669 Mowrer also showed confidence in the new Chancellor, 
stating that although 'von Schleicher is the president's last 
card, he is an ace'. 670 Mowrer's change of heart (especially in 
light of his criticism of von Schleicher following the Prussian 
coup) met with a similar turn-around on the editorial page. 
Because of his 'training, temperament, skill and particularly 
his iron will, von Schleicher should be able to vanquish 
Hitler',671 Moreover, 'von Schleicher has a livelier sense of the 
plight and the aspirations of the German masses than the not 
very astute von Papen' . 672 Worth noting, however, is that neither 
Mowrer's nor Binder's positive assessments went so far as to 
state that Schleicher would uphold Weimar democracy, although 
both now seemed more comfortable with the General's 'plans for 
consolidating the Reich along autocratic lines'.673
Perhaps because he predicted the downfall of Nazism three 
months earlier, Mowrer failed to express alarm at Hitler's 
appointment as Chancellor, even questioning 'whether Hitler 
wants to be Chancellor' .674 Mowrer also argued that because 
Hitler 'will be fenced about with controls', he would not assume
669Ibid. 2 December 1932, Ibid.
670Ibid.
671CDN editorial, 5 December 1932, Ibid.
672Ibid.
673Ibid.
674CDN, 30 January 1933, P.l.
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the role of dictator. 675 Yet, in the same breath Mowrer stressed 
the importance of the appointments of Frick and Goring, which 
gave the Nazis control of Germany's police forces. 676 He also 
predicted that should Hitler dissolve the Reichstag, he would 
wage an electoral campaign 'under very favorable 
circumstances' .677
A similar type of vacillation appeared on the editorial page. 
Binder held out the likelihood that 'Hitler would make himself 
dictator of Germany', especially if Hindenburg 'passed from the 
scene' , 678 'But for the moment, he is more or less a figure-head 
who enjoys his office only by the grace of former political 
foes'.679 Binder also placed great faith in 'the republican and 
socialistic elements' who 'are not likely to relinquish their 
hard-won gains without a struggle'. 680 The paper concluded by 
predicting that Hitler's 'fascist followers are likely to be 
disappointed at the discrepancy between what Chancellor Hitler 
practices and what Nazi leader Hitler preached' .681
* * *
The pattern of the New York Times's German coverage between 
September 1932 and January 1933 remained consistent with its 
reporting from previous periods. Quantitatively, the Times
675ibid.
676Ibid. 31 January 1933, P.l.
677Ibid., 30 January 1933.





surpassed by three to five fold the average number of German 
news stories generated by other large mainstream American 
newspapers. The margin was greatest in October when the rest of 
the press was preoccupied with the FDR/Hoover campaign. With 
few exceptions, the composition of the Times1s German coverage 
corresponded to that of other major American newspapers. The 
New York daily reflected the national trend in devoting the bulk 
of its attention to Weimar internal politics, as opposed to 
international issues. The Times also followed suit in its 
diminishing coverage of civil unrest.
Difficult to explain, however, are the monthly fluctuations 
between the number of stories about Germany which made the front 
page of the Times compared with those of other newspapers. For 
example, consistent with the paper's general quantitative 
advantage, the number of Times stories about Germany selected 
for page one in November was three times that of the national 
average. However, in January the number of stories making the 
front page of the New York Times fell below the national 
average, this despite the fact that the paper published three 
times more news items about Germany than its nearest competitor. 
Due to the paucity of archival documentation from this period, 
the roots of this as well as of other aspects of the Times' s 
German coverage cannot be established to a certainty.
The New York Times was more confident about a Nazi collapse 
than even the Chicago Daily News. In October, Guido Enderis 
alluded to the poor financial state and low morale of the Party 
when he commented that 'Hitler's Nazis... look less jolly 
rattling their tin containers than the Salvation Army1682 while
682NYT, 23 October 1932, P.6.
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the editorial board asserted that 'the Nazi movement has seen 
its best days'.683 The November Reichstag elections served to 
reinforce these views. The Party's loss of two million votes 
led Frederick Birchall to conclude that ' the movement is at last 
in the retrogressive stage 1 684 while the editorial page reiterated 
that 'the Nazi tide was ebbing, the threat of sole control of 
the country by Hitler is definitely removed' .685
It seemed as if the New York Times utilized every event to 
further this notion. Upon Schleicher's appointment, Rollo Ogden 
and his editorial staff proclaimed that 'Hitler has been kept 
out of power and his chances wane with every month that 
passes'. 686 Enderis boldly asserted in his 1933 preview that 
'whatever the future may hold for Hitler, he will not be the 
dictator of Germany' . 687 Moreover, Nazi achievements were often 
minimized or ignored. No mention was made of Hitler's 
successful effort to reinvigorate the Party following Strasser's 
defection. In addition, the Party's strong showing in Lippe, 
where it received over 40% of the vote, was minimized, as 
evidenced even by the Times' s headline: 'NAZIS GAIN IN LIPPE
POLL AFTER BIG DRIVE, BUT FAIL TO WIN BACK NOVEMBER LOSSES'.688
The paper's prophecies of an imminent Nazi collapse coincided 
with its radically optimistic view of the Weimar Republic's 
prospects. Whereas the rest of the mainstream American press
683"The German Campaign", NYT editorial, Ibid.
684NYT, 7 November 1932.
685|,German Prospects", NYT editorial, 8 November 1932.
686"Germany1 s New Chancellor", 3 December 1932, Ibid.
£0 7
"Republican Germany", 18 December 1932, Ibid.
688NYT, 16 January 1933, P.4.
(247)
was suggesting that German democracy had been supplanted by 
authoritarian dictatorship, the Times alone held the view that 
'based on the events of last six months', 'the outlook for 
German democracy was by no means so gloomy as would appear on 
the surface of things'. 689 It was as if the paper slanted its 
analysis of important events to promote Weimar stability. 
Immediately following the November Reichstag elections, the 
Berlin bureau concluded that ' the Papen-Schleicher regime may 
continue indefinitely or at least well into the next year1690 
because ' Papen was the real victor' in the election.691 Even when 
Papen was dismissed two weeks later, the editorial board hailed 
it as a first step towards a republican return to power. 692 Both 
the Berlin bureau and the editorial department welcomed von 
Schleicher because of his 'much milder program' 693 and his 
'breadth of view, intellectual elasticity and tactful political 
skill'. 694 Hindenburg's implementation of dictatorial rule was 
actually praised as an 'extra-parliamentary innovation1.695 
Enderis concluded that because Germany had made headway in 
solving international issues such as armaments and Hitler had 
been 'sidetracked', 1932 'had not been such a disastrous year 
after all' ,696
689,IThe German Test", NYT editorial, 20 November 1932.
690NYT, 23 October 1932.
691Ibid. 7 November 1932, P.l.
692"The German Test”, NYT editorial, 20 November 1932.
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Von Schleicher's resignation and Hitler's appointment as 
Chancellor took the New York Times by surprise. Two months 
earlier the paper had claimed that 'cooperation between the 
Hitlerites and the Papenites [was] inconceivable' 697 and two weeks 
prior to the appointment the editorial board argued that ' the 
German picture is very much more encouraging than it was a year 
ago'. 698 The day before Schleicher's ouster the Times reported 
that 'the Chancellor seems safe'. 699 The limited archival 
evidence from this period, particularly of Enderis's frustration 
that the Berlin bureau 'couldn't get anything out of the Junkers 
[sic] crowd', suggests that he was unaware of Papen's 
negotiations with Hindenburg. 700 Moreover, a 5 January letter 
from Enderis to the Home Office underscored the bureau's 
difficulty in cultivating news information sources in general. 
This problem led the Berlin correspondent to suggest that the 
Times 'pay for exclusive news tips and stories which [did] not 
come [the paper's] way free or through regular channels'.701 
Although James held out the possibility of putting Enderis's 
idea into practice, he resisted the plan because he feared that 
such a costly practice would undermine the bureau's objectivity 
in its reporting.702
Immediately following Schleicher's resignation, the paper did 
not 'envisage'... 'a government headed by Hitler' and instead
697"The German Test", NYT editorial, 20 November 1932.
698"Gains in Germany", 10 January 1933, Ibid.
699NYT, 27 January 1933, P.l.
700Enderis to James, 5 January 1933, James Papers, NYT Archive.
701Ibid.
702 James to Enderis, ? 1933 (probably January), Ibid.
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predicted that Papen would be 'the likely successor'. 703 The 
editorial page too was caught off-guard: 'It is hard to discover 
the rationale—  if there be any —  of the latest political upset 
in Germany' , 704 The paper praised Hindenburg in its editorial on 
Schleicher's ouster but had great difficulty in minimizing the 
blow of Hitler's appointment:
It would be useless to try to disguise the qualms which the
news from Berlin must cause to all friends of Germany...
Germany has entered upon a perilous political adventure.705
Nevertheless, the New York Times placed great faith in the 
German people's 'healthy sense of self preservation1706 as well 
as Hindenburgls ability to 'unmake Hitler as quickly as he had 
made him' if the new Chancellor sought to 'translate the wild 
and whirling words of his campaign speeches into political 
action' , 707 Though stunned, the paper concluded that there was 
'no warrant for immediate alarm' .708
The New York Times generally adhered to its pattern of 
unmitigated optimism in its assessments of Germany during this 
period. As in the past, the paper's editorials consistently 
announced the death of the Nazis as a viable political force 
while proclaiming the fortitude of Weimar democracy. The views 
of the Berlin bureau appeared more in harmony with those of the 
editorial board than they had been in the past. Unfortunately,
703NYT, 28 January 1933.
704"Von Schleicher Resigns", NYT editorial, 30 January 1933.
705"Germany Ventures", 31 January 1933, Ibid.
706"Germany1s New Chancellor", 3 December 1932, Ibid.
707"Germany Ventures", 31 January 1933, Ibid.
708Ibid.
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the lack of archival documentation from this period does not 
allow for a well supported explanation for these 
characteristics. Fortunately, there is a greater abundance of 
primary evidence dating after Hitler's appointment to the Reich 
Chancellorship.
* * *
Some of the same patterns which had differentiated the 
Chicago Daily Tribune's German reporting from that of its 
competitors remained during the September 1932-January 1933 
period. Although the Tribune reduced its coverage of civil 
unrest and monarchic intrigues, it still published more stories 
on these subjects than any of its competitors. 709 Riots and 
royalty, however, were treated with the same prominence as major 
German political news. The story of Schleicher's ouster, for 
example, ran alongside an article about ex-Kaiser Wilhelm's 
seventy-fourth birthday celebration, while another story about 
the Hohenzollerns shared space with the Nazi victory in Lippe.710 
A sample of the Tribune's foreign stories during the week 
preceding the November Reichstag elections illustrates that the 
paper's propensity to "hype" the news was not limited to events 
in Germany:
'BRITISH "HUNGER ARMY" THREATENS TO INVADE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
TONIGHT; NEW RIOTING FEARED'
'FIVE SLAIN IN CUBA ON EVE OF ELECTION'
'PREMIER HERRIOT REACHES MADRID; SPANISH STUDENTS RIOT1711 
'LONDON POLICE FIGHT "HUNGER ARMY" IN NEW RIOT1
709Herrmann, "American Perceptions", Appendices I & M.
710CDT, 16 & 28 January 1933, P.6.
711CDT, 1 November 1932.
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'PREMIER HERRIOT INSISTS "ON WORD OF HONOR" HE HAS NO SECRET 
MISSION IN SPAIN'712
'FRENCH PROPOSE GENERAL STAFF FOR ALL EUROPEAN ARMIES'
'WAR BETWEEN THREE SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS THREATENED'
'BANDITS PLUNDER HARBIN REGION IN NORTH MANCHURIA'713
'THREE ARE KILLED AS BERLIN POLICE FIRE ON STRIKERS'
'CANADIAN CONVICTS SET FIRE TO PENITENTIARY; ATTACK GUARDS 
WITH KNIVES AND CLUBS'
'REVEAL LETTER FROM MOSCOW URGING LABOR DISORDERS IN
BRITAIN'714
Publishing news from Germany apparently was important to 
McCormick since the Tribune printed more stories between
September 1932 and January 1933 than any other American
newspaper except for the New York Times. However, the 
significance of this fact is offset by several factors. First, 
German events which probably would have received the paper's 
banner headline in 1923-24 now failed to make page one
altogether. Schleicher's resignation, which was on the front 
page of every major American newspaper, ran on page six of the 
Tribune. Moreover, management deemed Hitler's appointment as 
Chancellor secondary to Congress's passage of a bankruptcy
protection law. Second, the Tribune relied more on the 
Associated Press for its stories about Germany than it had in 
the past. This glaringly manifested itself during the November 
Reichstag campaign when the paper ran wire service accounts 
summarizing the election results for two consecutive days.715 
Finally, while the Chicago Daily Tribune printed the most news 
stories about Germany between October 1932 and January 1933, it
712Ibid., 2 November 1932.
713Ibid., 3 November 1932.
714Ibid., 5 November 1932.
715CDT, 7 & 8 November 1932.
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published the fewest number of editorials. Although McCormick 
commented on German rearmament, he remained silent on von 
Papen's resignation and Schleicher's appointment and dismissal, 
as well as on the general state of the Weimar Republic.
Nor were those editorials that were published written in the 
provocative tradition of its publisher. Quite to the contrary, 
after his piece of 14 September in which he condemned Hitlerism 
and stated that 'republicanism was in dire peril', subsequent 
Tribune editorials were terse, equivocal and failed to address 
the specifics of the designated topic.716 McCormick's commentary 
on the November Reichstag elections was limited to ' the Reds 
gained and the Nazis have lost' while the rest of the piece was 
devoted to the American Presidential campaign.717 The Tribune's 
editorial on Hitler's appointment was non-descript; no member of 
the "Government of National Concentration" including Hitler 
himself was identified by name. Instead, McCormick stated that 
Germany's paramilitary forces were 'natural expressions of the 
nation's gymnastic habits'.718
Lacking pertinent memoranda from this period, we are left to 
speculate about McCormick's unusual pattern of behavior which 
was somewhat reminiscent of his actions during the 
Hindenburg/Marx campaign of 1925. An examination of Sigrid 
Schultz's published and unedited views may shed some light on 
his seeming indifference.
As mentioned in previous chapters, Tribune management often 
softened Schultz's private views about Germany, if they were
716"The German Crisis", CDT editorial, 14 September 1932.
717 "German and American Elections", CDT editorial, 8 November 1932.
718"The Marching German Republic", 31 January 1933, Ibid.
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published at all. What remained was often a flavorless "just 
the facts" accounting of events. The last four months of 1932 
would prove to be no exception.
A comprehensive analysis of conditions in the Weimar Republic
cannot be found anywhere in Schultz1s published pieces though
she had sent at least three detailed mail articles on the
subject during the two-week period preceding the November
Reichstag elections. In an October piece she commented that:
Germany's electorate is tired, hungry and cold. Many of 
them have reached the stage where they simply don't care 
what happens, as long as they have the feeling that somebody 
is at the helm of the government energetic enough to lead 
the country back to prosperity.719
Other than riots and royalty, Schultz's published articles 
concentrated primarily on the personalities and policies of 
Weimar leaders. Her views indicated a mixed opinion of Papen. 
Schultz wrote that 'his self confidence, optimism and eagerness 
to work [had] won him the sympathy of millions, but that his 
inconsistencies [had] harmed him'. 720 Now, 'Von Papen's position 
[had become] a stormy one'.721
Schultz's published views were a softened version of her 
unedited ones. The archival evidence shows that her opinion of 
Papen soured during the late Autumn of 1932 after an initial 
period of unreserved praise. In September, Schultz predicted 
that the 'Papen government [was] here to stay for quite a while' 
'because he will introduce an era of energetic action1.
7 1  q
Unedited Proofs, 24 October 1932, Sigrid Schultz Papers, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin. See also 20 August, ? November (3),
14 November, ?December, Ibid. Some of these articles were over ten 
pages in length.
720CDT, 6 November 1932, P.l.
721Ibid.
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Moreover, she contended that he was not actuated 'by a thirst 
for power' but because 'he sincerely believed that he would be 
able to help his countrymen'. 722 However, Schultz's opinions 
initially made little impression on McCormick, whose editorial 
of 14 September called Papen's 'aristocratic' government 
'understandable but deplorable'.723
By November, Schultz herself had become more skeptical. She 
suggested that there were two sides to him: Papen, the
enlightened aristocrat, 'a man of charming courtesy, great 
culture, vivacious wit and good humor' and Papen, the dictator, 
whose 'voice cracks like a whip while his mouth curls in 
contempt1,724 Commenting on his disingenuous nature, Schultz 
wrote:
Many of the things dictator Franz von Papen has said with an 
absolute ring of sincerity in the last six months he held 
reign in Germany were not always accurate —  to put it 
mildly —  and Herr von Papen cannot but have known it.725
In assessing Papen's failure in the November 1932 Reichstag
elections, Schultz cited the fallout from his dismissal of the
Socialist-led Prussian government, his pro-Junker policies and
his Machiavellian-like ploys to deny Hitler power. Papen's
'clever but tricky manoeuvering in the past has alienated all of
the main political leaders of Germany' and as a result:
Germany no longer believes in him... "Judge me by my 
actions", Papen told Germany. Germany studied his actions 
and the conclusions the vast majority drew about his
7 22Schultz to Scharschug, 16 September 1932, Schultz Papers, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin. See also 6 September 1932, Ibid.
"The German Crisis, CDT editorial, 14 September 1932.




character and politics made them vote for everybody else 
except Papen.726
Schultz's reassessment of von Papen appears based on his 
failure in policy and leadership in the autumn of 1932. 
However, her views may have been also influenced by her personal 
meeting with Papen. Schultz's impressions of Papen conveyed 
subsequently in her personal correspondence strongly resemble 
those of her unpublished articles. Again, Papen's duality comes 
to the fore:
His party manners would win the heart of any outsider but 
compare them with his business manners and you will find the 
man is a ruthless creature, his ruthlessness tamed by his 
good looks and made less repulsive by his firm conviction 
that he is doing his sacred duty.727
Schultz was so convinced of Papen's Machiavellian-like 
motives that she believed that he orchestrated his own ouster as 
part of an elaborate scheme to discredit Hitler by bringing the 
Nazi leader into power in December, traditionally the month of 
greatest unemployment. 728 Even after his resignation, Schultz 
contended that 'the Papen crowd will continue to pull the main 
wires' .729
Schultz held Papen's successor, von Schleicher, in much 
higher regard, as indicated by her correspondence and unedited 
proofs. She was impressed by Schleicher's 'perfect manners, 
gaiety, wit and laughing eyes'; he exhibited 'none of the 
outward earmarks of grimness or harshness one usually associated
726Ibid.
171
Schultz to Scharschug, ? November (pre 17th) 1932, Ibid.
•700
Schultz to Scharschug, 23 November 1932, Ibid.
729Ibid.
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with the word "dictator"'. 730 Schultz also praised his political 
skills, particularly 'his versatility, clear thinking, 
adroitness and his ability to inspire friendship and reach 
compromises' .731
Despite these sentiments, Schultz was pessimistic about the 
new regime's prospects for success. In a 19 December letter to 
Scharschug she questioned whether Schleicher would stay in power 
long enough for her biographical sketch to reach Chicago.732 She 
was troubled by Industry's opposition to Schleicher's 
negotiations with the Socialists and the labor unions as well as 
by the restlessness of Germany's unemployed.733 'If Schleicher 
fails to restore quiet and create work for the workless', she 
wrote in late December, 'then the Hitlerites and the Communists 
will sweep the country into a whirlpool of utopian experiments 
as dangerous as the Russian Revolution' ,734
Except for the view that Schleicher was 'one of the ablest 
men of modern Germany', the Chicago Daily Tribune reader was 
given a sterile and far less detailed analysis of the new 
Chancellor and his policies.735 Schultz's positive assessment of 
Schleicher and her pessimistic views of the prospects for his 
regime were absent from the Tribune's published dispatches from 
Berlin. Instead, with the exceptions of pieces about civil
730Unedited Proofs, ? December 1932, Ibid.
731Ibid.
7 32Schultz to Scharschug, 19 December 1932, Ibid.
733Ibid.
734Unedited Proofs, ? December 1932, Ibid.
735CDT, 5 December 1932.
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unrest and monarchic intrigue, her articles read like toned-down 
versions of wire service reports.
A similar dichotomy is seen in the Tribune's portrayal of 
Hindenburg, as well as of the Nazis. Privately, Schultz wrote 
that 'Hindenburg was a shadow of his former self' in that he had 
lost his iron will and yet, except for an article noting his 
declining physical health, no story commenting on Hindenburg's 
failing judgement can be found. In addition, although Schultz 
began to dismiss Hitler as a threat in September, she modified 
her view by November. Schultz wrote Scharschug in December that 
even though 'Hitler was weakening, he still remained a danger' .736 
In an unedited proof she wrote, 'it remains to be seen in 1933 
whether Schleicher will be strong enough to hold the reins with 
the Hitlerite steeds pulling in one direction and the communists 
roaring in the other' , 737 The Tribune, however, published these 
appraisals on only a few occasions and only during the November 
1932 Reichstag campaign. 738 In fairness to management, they did 
not go so far as to convey the opposite of Schultz's views. 
Nevertheless, the full weight of Schultz's general pessimism was 
not conveyed to Tribune readers and hence they, may have been 
surprised by the collapse of the Weimar Republic in January 
1933.
From the preceding discussion, several larger conclusions 
about the way news was shaped can be drawn. First, Schultz's 
change of attitude regarding von Papen is an example of how 
journalists' interactions with news figures tend to influence
Schultz to Scharschug, 19 December 1932, Ibid.
737Unedited Proofs, ? December 1932, Ibid.
738CDN, 6 November 1932, Ibid.
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their assessments. It also suggests that journalists may turn 
against a regime if it fails to keep the support of its people, 
even if they admire certain personal qualities of the leader. 
Second, Schultz's assessment of the von Schleicher ministry 
demonstrates that reporters can refrain from letting their 
personal feelings about a leader color their appraisal of his 
regime's prospects. Finally, that the Tribune readers were not 
made aware of Schultz's views demonstrates once again the extent 
to which a newspaper's management can influence the scope, tone 
and style of news.
The discovery that most of Schultz's thoughts were not 
printed in Chicago also raises a host of new questions. First 
and foremost, why did McCormick extract much of the flavor from 
Schultz's analysis? Second, did McCormick's confidence in 
Schultz diminish during this period? Finally, was there a link 
between the ambivalent views of the editorial page and those of 
the news pages?
The answers probably lie in the archives of the Chicago Daily 
Tribune which to date remain inaccessible to virtually all 
scholars. As cited, the only available correspondence from this 
period is between Schultz and George Scharschug, the paper's 
cable editor. Unfortunately, within those documents little 
mention is made of McCormick's opinions. The other source of 
McCormick's views on Germany during this period, his editorials, 
though reliable, were infrequently presented. Worse yet, the 
pertinent documentation from the Sigrid Schultz papers comes to 
an abrupt end after 1932. Thus, it is difficult to gain an 
insider's view of one of America's most prominent newspapers 
during one of history's most important periods.
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*
Although the American press's delusion about a "contained" 
Hitler Chancellorship proved short-lived, one could ask why the 
media was not more skeptical about it in the first place. It is 
plausible to argue that American journalists reflected an 
international consensus of opinion which included political 
leaders and intellectuals, as well as European newspapermen. 
Many underestimated Hitler's political skills and ideological 
resolve. Equally important, however, was that American 
journalists overestimated the acumen of Papen. Nevertheless, 
the reaction of most of the mainstream American press to 
Hitler's appointment indicates that many journalists had 
retreated from their dire predictions of 1930 and 1932, 
mirroring their initial reaction to Hindenburg's accession to 
the Presidency in 1925: an initial forecast of doom followed by 
comforting reassurances that things were not as bad as they 
appeared. Unfortunately, 1933 would confirm the American 
press's worst fears.
Chapter 7 
From Republic to Dictatorship: 
Germany, February-March 1933
'I want to appeal to the press of the world not to form premature judgments on 
the events that are taking place. Please judge Germany's deeds as a whole, not 
as isolated incidents'.-- Adolf Hitler, 2 February 1933
In only seven weeks Germany went from a republic to a 
dictatorship. By the end of March, the remaining vestiges of 
parliamentary democracy, constitutional federalism and 
individual freedoms had been eliminated. With these safeguards 
against absolute dictatorship gone, Hitler and the Nazis 
proceeded to mold Germany and later most of Europe into a 
'barbarous utopia1, the likes of which history had never before 
witnessed.739
This quick transformation into a "racial state" was 
facilitated by the deterioration and eventual dissolution of the 
Weimar Republic. The Weimar "system" itself had undergone an 
ignominious metamorphosis. As a result of its three-year 
succession of authoritarian minority governments, Germany was no 
longer a model of representative democracy; instead, the 
Republic bore an increasing resemblance to the Germany of 
Bismarck. Moreover, in nearly every national and regional 
election since 1930, the collective tallies of those parties 
hostile to the Weimar system were greater than those which 
supported it. By the end of 1932, most observers agreed that
739Term used in Burleigh and Wippermann, The Racial State.
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the spirit and much of the substance of Weimar was gone and that 
any remaining vestiges would soon vanish.
Before 1933, Nazi political fortunes were only indirectly 
linked to those of the Weimar Republic. True, the Nazis had 
profited greatly at the polls from Weimar's demise but other 
anti-Republican groups, such as the Communists, had benefited as 
well. With his appointment as Chancellor in January 1933, 
however, Hitler became the sole beneficiary of Weimar's end; the 
final measures which would destroy the Republic would also 
establish the basis for his absolute rule. Unfortunately, this 
fact was realized too late by Hitler's anti-Republican allies as 
well as by his opponents. The communists fell victim to their 
rigid ideology; their leaders actually welcomed Hitler's 
accession to power, interpreting it as the final stage of 
capitalism, delaying concerted action until such time that 
Moscow considered Germany ripe for a proletarian revolution. 
Moreover, the KPD continued its tradition of undermining 
Socialist resistance to the Nazis by refusing SPD overtures to 
challenge Hitler with a unified Leftist front.740
Hitler's conservative cabinet members, who were supposed to 
"tame" the radical Chancellor, actually encouraged him to 
abolish parliamentarism and wage war against the Left as quickly 
as possible. Hugenberg pressed for an immediate ban on the KPD 
and a Reich takeover of Prussia; Finance Minister von Krosigk 
suggested to Hitler that he dissolve the Reichstag immediately 
so as to preclude an organized legislative opposition; and Vice-
740Moinmsen/ H. "The Reichstag Fire Decree and Its Consequences" in Koch, 
H.W.(ed.) Aspects of the Third Reich (New York 1985). The SPD was 
also hurt when a number of trade unions broke with the Party in early 
March, see Craig, Germany pp.576-7.
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Chancellor von Papen advised that regardless of the outcome, the 
regime should make sure that the Reichstag elections scheduled 
for 5 March be Germany's last. In fact, Hitler's conservative 
ministers wasted little time in presenting their program for 
Weimar's destruction: all of these suggestions were made on
Hitler's first full day in office.741
Other potential sources of conservative resistance to Hitler 
either remained aloof or actively supported his policies. 
Hindenburg, for example, signed without hesitation the 1 
February decree dissolving the Reichstag and called for 
elections on 5 March. Far from trying to contain Hitler's 
power, Hindenburg shared his Chancellor's hopes that the 
elections would result in a parliamentary majority for the new 
government. Moreover, Hindenburg also hoped that the election 
results would allow for the passage of an enabling act (a 
measure widely advocated by nearly all anti-Republicans) which 
would emasculate the Reichstag by concentrating all legislative 
and legal authority within the Hitler government.
At the root of Hindenburg's thinking was his genuine concern 
that yet another minority regime in a three-year succession of 
minority regimes would leave Germany vulnerable to left-wing 
insurrection. In his eyes maintenance of the status quo was 
fraught with short and long-term dangers. Success for the new 
government in the 5 March elections, therefore, was crucial to 
alleviating the aged Field Marshal's greatest fear, nationwide 
civil war. To this end Hindenburg quickly agreed to sign a
741Kershaw, Hitler (London 1991) P.66, and Pridham and Noakes, Documents 
on Nazism, 1919-45 (New York 1975) pp.158-60.
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series of emergency decrees (based on Article 48 of the Weimar 
constitution) which allowed the Nazis to wage their electoral 
campaign under the most favorable circumstances. On 4 February 
he issued a decree which allowed the cabinet to suppress any 
publication or disrupt any assembly that it believed expressed 
anti-government sentiments. On 6 February Hindenburg signed an 
emergency decree which provided the legal basis for a Reich 
takeover of SPD government offices in Prussia.742
It was his signing of the "Decree for the Protection of the
State and People" on 28 February, however, which was to be the
decisive blow. Issued in reaction to the burning of the
Reichstag the previous evening by a deranged Dutch communist,743 
the so-called Reichstag Fire Decree permitted the Reich 
government to deprive a citizen of his personal liberties 
without providing for due process, a critical deviation from 
previous decrees. Henceforth, Germans could be arrested under 
false pretenses and detained indefinitely without charge. In 
addition, the Reichstag Fire Decree allowed the Reich government 
to take control of state governments under the guise of
"restoring order".
742See Koch, H.W. "1933: The Legality of Hitler's Assumption of Power" 
in Koch, Aspects and Dorpalen, A. Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic 
(Princeton 1964) pp.449-51.
743The question of who perpetrated of the arson itself has been a source 
of intense historical debate. Craig, Bracher and others claim that 
the Nazis were behind the fire in order to justify their suppression 
of the Left. However, evidence from the papers of Nazi government 
officials indicates in fact that M.^  van der Lubbe committed the arson 
alone. See Mommsen, H. "Reichstag Fire", Weinberg, G. The Foreign 
Policy of Hitler's Germany: A Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933- 
36, (Chicago 1970) P.28 and Childers, T. "A History of Hitler's 
Empire", (Teaching Company Lecture Series 1991), which confirms the 
earlier assessment of Tobias, F. Der Reichstagsbrand, Legende und 
Wirklichkeit (Rastatt 1962).
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Notwithstanding these aspects, the most significant feature 
of the measure was its provisions for enforcement. Again 
departing from precedent, Hindenburg allowed the Cabinet, rather 
than himself, to be the final executor of the measure, leaving 
the power to depose state governments to Interior Minister 
Wilhelm Frick, a Nazi. Frick wasted little time: between 6 and 
19 March most state governments, even particularist Bavaria, 
came under Nazi control. The Reichstag Fire Decree would later 
prove to be an integral component of the National Socialist 
legal system. In fact, the measure provided the legal basis for 
the execution of the "July Conspirators" in 1944.744
Hindenburg detached himself from other policy decisions as 
well. He did not question Goring's 17 February directive to 
police chiefs ordering them to treat left-wing supporters 'with 
all severity' but not to 'even give the appearance of 
persecution of patriotic associations (S.A., S. S. and 
Stahlhelm)' , 745 Nor did he resist Goring's 22 February induction 
of S. A. and S. S. members into the Prussian police forces. 
Goring's actions are critical in understanding the wholesale and 
brutal suppression of the Left (they facilitated the arrests of 
mid-level Socialist and Communist officials, thus removing the 
conduit between Party leaders and their rank and file) as well 
the atrocities committed against the nation's Jews following the
744For contrasting views concerning the Decree itself, see Koch, "The 
Legality", which argues unconvincingly that the Reichstag Fire Decree 
as well as the Enabling Law did not represent a departure from 
previous emergency measures. More accurate are Mommsen, "Reichstag 
Fire", Craig Germany pp.574-5, Kershaw Hitler pp.67-68, Bracher, K.D. 
The German Dictatorship (London 1975) pp.200-208 and Pridham and 
Noakes Documents, pp.173-4.
745Pridham and Noakes, Documents, P.169.
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imposition of the Reichstag Fire Decree. Furthermore, 
Hindenburg ignored pleas from SPD and Catholic Centre Party 
leaders to curtail Nazi violence, and exhibited no concern about 
the construction of Dachau, Germany's first concentration camp, 
on 20 March. Even more ominous, when Jewish groups protested 
the widespread instances of S.A. violence against them, 
Hindenburg simply referred them to the Nazi-controlled interior 
ministry.
Apologists for Hindenburg point to his declining physical and 
mental health as the primary reason for his timid performance. 
It was no secret that Hindenburg lacked the stamina at age 85 to 
involve himself in the daily decision-making of the Hitler 
government. Most observers felt that he only had a year or two 
left to live, a prediction that did come true. Besides, 
Hindenburg had relied upon the conservatives in the cabinet, 
especially von Papen, to keep Hitler in line. That these 
cabinet ministers failed to handle the power delegated to them 
accordingly may perhaps be viewed as absolving the field marshal 
of much of the blame for Hitler's rise.
Nevertheless, Hindenburg's interventions accelerated the pace 
of Weimar's destruction. In addition to signing emergency 
decrees which undermined his own authority, Hindenburg paralyzed 
the Reichswehr by instructing his generals at the outset to 
remain aloof from the domestic unrest promulgated by the S.A. 
and S.S. True, Reich Defence Minister General Werhner von 
Blomberg sympathized with Hitler and the Nazis made substantial 
inroads in the junior officer corps. Nonetheless, the venerated 
Field Marshal enjoyed the loyalty of the bulk of the army; had 
he wanted to thwart Hitler, he would have had the power to do
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so. That he chose not to sealed the fate of the Republic and 
ultimately, the army.746
To cite Conservative complicity in the dismantling of the 
Weimar Republic is not to suggest (as do some "Functionalist 
School" historians) that Hitler himself lacked a plan for his 
aggrandizement. Yes, Hitler had a propensity for indecisiveness 
and vacillation; his early reign was marked by personal 
passivity and even impotence. For example, the S.A. virtually 
ignored his orders of 10 and 13 March to curb their violent 
activities, particularly towards foreigners and to a lesser 
extent, Jews. Hitler remained silent when Goring publicly 
contradicted him by inciting the S.A. to 'settle old scores' and 
to take vengeance against the Jews. Moreover, the Volkischer 
Beobachter, the Party's primary press organ, published only 
Goring's statements on the matter. 747 Nevertheless, it is 
important not to view Hitler's apparent passivity as a sign of 
complete weakness. Rather, it could also be argued that during 
his first weeks in power the new Chancellor recognized the 
vulnerabilities of his position. Outnumbered by Conservatives 
in his cabinet, the manipulative Hitler let von Papen, Hugenberg 
and others propose measures for Weimar's abolition which he 
himself advocated. Moreover, to reinforce the illusion that he 
was their tool, Hitler treated his Conservative ministers, as 
well as Hindenburg, with deference, and at times, with
746See Carsten, Reichswehr, Chapter Eight and Geyer, M. "Etudes in 
Political History: Reichswehr, NSDAP and the Seizure of Power" in 
Stachura, P.(ed.) The Nazi Machtergreifung (London 1983).
747Pridham & Noakes, Documents, pp.183-84. See also Bessel, R.
Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism, the S.A. in Eastern 
Germanyr 1925-34 (Yale University Press 1984) .
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servility. As a result, Hitler's government remained unified in 
purpose during those first critical weeks in power. 
Conservative opposition did not manifest itself until the end of 
March, by which time the Nazi leader enjoyed an impregnable 
political position.748
Indeed, it was in March when Germany "crossed the Rubicon". 
In what would be the Republic's last elections, Hitler's 
coalition government emerged with a slim majority, despite the 
fact that the Nazis used the powers of the State to rig the 
elections, even to the extent of intimidating and coercing 
voters as they stood in line at polling stations. However, to 
pass the "Law to Eliminate the Peril to Nation and Reich", 
better known as the Enabling Law, which would formally end 
Weimar democracy and inaugurate his dictatorship, Hitler 
required a two—thirds vote from the body. With SPD opposition 
certain, passage of the act hinged on the actions of one of the 
Republic's founders, the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum).
Hitler had reason to be confident; he required only a handful 
of Zentrum votes since the Nazis had taken steps to make sure 
that KPD members would not be in attendance. The Catholic 
Centre Party had remained split from the time of Hitler's 
appointment, even after some well publicized episodes of Nazi 
violence towards high level party members. The Zentrum's right 
wing, led by Ludwig Kaas, supported the Hitler government, 
largely because of its suppression of the Left. The Kaas
748There is a myriad of sources which comment on the
"Intentionalist/Functionalist" debate. The intentionalist cause is 
best promoted in Jackel, E. Hitler's Weltanschuung: A Blueprint for 
Power (Middletown CT 1972) while the functionalists are best served by 
Broszat, M. The Hitler State (New York 1981).
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faction welcomed the Enabling Law as a continuation of this 
effort, thus ensuring its passage. That the moderates, 
including Briining, also voted for the draconian measure reflects 
the disturbing state of affairs in Germany during that time.
From outward appearances it would seem that the Nazis and the 
Catholic Centre Party had struck a freely arrived at political 
bargain; in exchange for their votes, Hitler would respect the 
autonomy of Catholic institutions. In reality, however, this 
was more a case of "political arm-twisting" than of "one hand 
washing the other". The moderate wing was demoralized by the 
Nazi takeover of Catholic Bavaria and intimidated by the 
unspoken, yet clearly conveyed threat that Hitler would unleash 
his wrath on its constituents as well as themselves if he did 
not receive their votes. That this fear was present is 
reflected in one Zentrum deputy's comment, 'he who lives, 
sees' .749
Now armed with a firm legal basis for his rule, Hitler moved 
quickly to eliminate remaining opposition. Fearing persecution, 
all German political parties had disbanded themselves by the end 
of June. In July the Nazis legalized a one-party state with the 
promulgation of the Law Against the Establishment of Parties. 
In early April the Nazis purged Germany's civil service of 
potential resistance, a feat that to its detriment, the Republic 
had been unable to achieve.
749Pridham and Noakes, Documents, pp.188-92. See also Bracher, K.D. 
"Stages of Totalitarian Integration: the Consolidation of National 
Socialist Rule in 1933 and 1934" in Holborn, H. (ed.) Republic to 
Reich: the Making of the Nazi Revolution (New York 1972) Berghahn, 
Germany P.127, Craig Germany 576-78 and Koch, "Legality" op. cit.
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The Nazis also intruded into German social and cultural life. 
Independent professional organizations were declared illegal and 
were replaced by National Socialist ones. Anti-semitic policy 
which in late February and March had consisted of Einzelaktionen 
(random acts of terror usually carried out by the S.A. and S.S. 
and condoned by Nazi authorities) took on a more systematic form 
at month's end. 750 On 28 March the Party called for a boycott of 
Jewish owned businesses, quickly followed by laws which denied 
participation in German political, professional and cultural 
life to Jews. Critically important, however, is that the 
relatively smooth transition to totalitarianism was underpinned 
by a subtle yet ever-present threat of Nazi terror. Through the 
development of the "Block Warden System", a grass-roots network 
of neighborhood informants, the Gestapo created the impression 
that the walls did indeed "have ears". So pervasive was this 
fear that historians have presented strong evidence that the 
level of intimacy within friendships and families declined 
markedly during the Nazi period.751
Despite these infringements on individual rights, many 
Germans welcomed and continued to support Nazi rule 
enthusiastically. Hitler had quickly brought stability and 
order to a nation which had been plagued by civil unrest and
7501933 would not mark the end of random anti-semitic outbreaks. Pogrom 
like outbursts erupted in 1935 and again in 1937. However, it is 
important to note that a number of Nazi officials viewed these 
episodes negatively because of the image of chaos that they promoted.
The Nazis implemented anti-semitic legislation such as the Nuremberg
Laws in part as a legislative reaction to the Einzelaktionen.
For comprehensive analyses of the workings of the police state see 
Peukert, D. Inside Nazi Germany, Conformity and Opposition in Everyday 
Life (London 1987) and Gellately, R. "Enforcing Racial Policy in Nazi 
Germany", in Childers and Caplan, Reevaluating the Third Reich (New 
York 1993).
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disillusioned by impotent leadership, instilling a spirit of 
national pride and renewal which many had felt was missing in 
Weimar politics. In short, Hitler's accession to power
symbolized that "Germany was back". However, one should be 
careful not to paint Germans with a broad brush (as do AJP 
Taylor and to an even greater extent Daniel Goldhagen) .752 
Despite its best efforts to influence the elections, the Nazi 
Party had failed to receive an electoral majority in March 1933. 
Moreover, the German populace expressed a wide range of 
reactions to Hitler's early policies. There was no clear 
consensus regarding the anti-Jewish boycott: opinion ranged from 
enthusiastic support in areas such as Franconia, to 'markedly 
cool' in Munich, to blatant disobedience in Berlin. In fact, 
some historians seem to suggest that Hitler did not enjoy 
majority support until after his diplomatic successes of the mid 
1930's. 753 It would more accurate to say that the primary 
contribution of "average" Germans to the Nazi consolidation of 
power lay less in their feelings towards Hitler and more in 
their myopic desire to scrap the Weimar system and their callous 
indifference to the persecution of the Left, not to mention the 
Jews. 754 The divided attitudes toward Hitler prevented a broad-
752Taylor, AJP The Origins of the Second World War (London 1961) and 
Goldhagen, D. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust (New York 1996) .
753Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reichr 
Bavaria 1933-45 (Oxford 1983) pp.231-2, 235-8. See also Weinberg,
Foreign Policy, pp.24, 198, 246, and 360.
754
This insensitivity was noted by some American visitors returning from Germany in 
March 1933, as reported in the NYT 20 March 1933.
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based, grass-roots opposition from being formed, and thus were 
a source of his strength.755
And therein lies the tragedy of this period —  Hitler did not 
have to resort to unpopular means to secure dictatorship. Who 
knows if Hitler would have succeeded had he been forced to act 
outside Weimar's legal and legislative framework. Had his 
opponents put up a modicum of resistance or had his allies "left 
him in the lurch", he was prepared to unleash the forces of the 
State upon the nation's citizenry. Sensitized by the chaotic 
experience of the previous fourteen years, most Germans deplored 
even the appearance of domestic unrest and usually condemned 
those who instigated it. This attitude prevailed into the 
Hitler dictatorship as evidenced by the popular backlash against 
the regime during Kristallnacht in 1938. Would Hindenburg and 
the Reichswehr have remained aloof had Hitler incited a civil 
war? The point to be made here is that the systematic ease with 
which Hitler gained power made the possibility of subsequent 
resistance far more difficult, if not impossible. The speed of 
Nazi consolidation took even Goebbels by surprise, the latter 
admitting in April that absolute dictatorship had 'been achieved 
much more quickly than we had dared to hope' .756
* * *
755In addition to Peukert, Kershaw and Gellately op. cit., see Bessel, 
R.(ed.) Life in the Third Reich (Oxford 1987) and Kershaw, I. The 
Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford 1987). For 
a comparison of opinion on the local level, see Allen, Nazi Seizure of
Power, op. cit. and Rinderle, W. & Nor ling, B. The Nazi Impact on a 
German Village (University of Kentucky Press 1993).
756Pridham and Noakes, Documents, P. 192.
(272)
The first two months of Hitler's rule were more extensively 
reported by the mainstream American press than any other two- 
month period in the history of the Weimar Republic; in fact, the 
number of stories (1382) in Herrmann's sample in February and 
March almost equalled the combined total of the previous five 
months. The number of news items about internal politics in 
February was double that of January. More significantly, the 
print media kept American readers informed of widespread 
violence orchestrated by the Nazis; stories regarding civil 
unrest appeared on an average of once every three days. 757 The 
February figure, like that for any other month from the entire 
Weimar era, pales in comparison with the number of stories 
published in March. Even excluding the New York Times. 
America's largest and most influential newspapers printed an 
average of two stories per day on events in Germany; there were 
sharp increases in the coverage of German domestic politics and 
internal disorder, even while the attention of the American 
public was consumed by the debut of the Roosevelt 
administration.
The immense volume of news from Germany served to intensify 
the revulsion of American journalists against the Hitler regime 
and underscored the gravity of the situation. Although the 
media felt initially that 'Hitler had become Chancellor with his 
wings clipped', its confidence began to erode, particularly
757These and subsequent calculations are based on Herrmann, "American 
Perceptions", Appendices Q,R and S.
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during the last two weeks of February. 758 On the 15th the Nation 
considered Germany under 'mob law, supported by all the powers 
of the reactionary centralized authority 1 .759 On the 18th the New 
York American conceded that 'all the power is now in Hitler's 
hands and nothing in the world could tear it from him', while 
the Literary Digest stated that 'Germany's Mussolini is in the 
saddle for the time being' .76° Even cultural publications such 
as Modern Music (NY) contended that Germany was retreating 
rapidly into the Middle Ages.761 Some publications such as the 
American Hebrew (NY) still clung to the hope that Hindenburg and 
von Papen would control the Nazis by 'bending them into the twig 
that would make the newer German tree' .762
In one fell swoop the Reichstag Fire Decree eradicated any 
hope that Hitler could be stopped. Most journalists believed 
that either the Nazis engineered the arson themselves or, as 
Time posited, were using the event as 'an excuse to launch a 
juggernaut of super-suppressive measures'.763 The Associated 
Press objected to the measure's 'far reaching interferences with
758Editorial, Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 February 1933, as cited in 
Herrmann, "American Perceptions", Chapter Eight.
759The Nation, 15 February 1933, as cited in Zalampas, Hitler, Chapter 
Two.
760Literary Digest, 18 February 1933.
761Ibid.
762Ibid.
763Time, 13 March 1933 as cited in Zalampas, Hitler, Chapter Two.
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personal liberties', while the St. Louis Post-Dispatch noted 
that it legitimized the use of 'savage tactics' by the Nazis.764 
American journalists clearly recognized the implications of the 
Reichstag Fire Decree for Germany's Reichstag election. 
Although many had predicted a victory for Hitler's government 
prior to the decree, reporters and editors alike were convinced 
that Hitler would win ' the most unfair election campaign that 
Germany [had] ever seen' because he would use 'the weapon of 
violence to control the results'. 765 Most publications made no 
attempt to sugarcoat the outcome of the Reichstag election. The 
Nation exclaimed that the 'gods would weep' because Germany's 
'battle for democracy' had been lost. 766 The Detroit Free Press, 
troubled by the long-term consequences for the United States, 
stated that ' the results may keep the Roosevelt administration 
on needles and pins during its lifetime' .767
Even though Hitler needed a two-thirds Reichstag vote to pass 
the Enabling Law, the Associated Press claimed that 'Germany was 
well on the way to Fascist dictatorship [because] by the vote of 
the people he has been given the legal tools to annihilate the
764Associated Press 1 March 1933, editorial St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
Ibid., as cited in Herrmann, "American Perceptions", Chapter Eight.
765Ibid. See also editorial, Philadelphia Inquirer 5 March 1933, Ibid.
766The Nation 15 March 1933 as cited in Zalampas, Hitler, Chapter Two.
767Detroit Free Press, 23 February 1933 as cited in Herrmann, "American 
Perceptions", Chapter Eight.
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last vestiges of the democracy which he considers a failure' .768 
The passage of the measure, though dramatic in its presentation 
(it made the front page of virtually every major American 
newspaper) was anti-climactic in its tone —  in the eyes of 
American correspondents, Nazi dictatorship was a foregone 
conclusion. Editorials expressed dismay, yet little shock about 
the eradication of the Republic. Journalists evinced a sense of 
foreboding as 1 Germany turned a completely new page in her 
history' .769
The rapid demise of the Republic was only one facet of 
American press coverage of Germany during the first two months 
of Hitler's rule. Its outstanding feature was the reporting of 
the wave of anti-semitic terror which engulfed the nation in 
March. Herrmann's sample of publications printed a whopping 418 
news stories about Nazi persecution of Jews, which accounted for 
nearly half of their stories about Germany. No other single 
issue had received that much attention in Weimar's fourteen year 
history.
The overwhelming majority of news stories and editorials 
vehemently condemned the Nazis for their 'acts of revolting 
cruelty' .77° Time and Newsweek informed America that Jews were
768Associated Press, 6 March 1933, Ibid.
769Editorial Washington Post, 23 March 1933, Ibid.
770Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph 24 March 1933, as cited in Lipstadt, Beyond 
Belief, Chapter One.
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being 'jailed, beaten and tortured'.771 The Literary Digest 
p r o v i d e d  g r a p h i c  d e t a i l  o f  N a z i  
atrocities by reporting that some Jews had their 'eyes poked 
out, castor-oil poured down their throats and were burned with 
red-hot irons'. 772 In stating that 'all of Germany's six hundred 
thousand Jews are in terror', H.R. Knickerbocker recalled that 
'not even in Czarist Russia have the Jews been subject to a more 
violent campaign of murderous agitation',773 Even publications 
in non-Jewish areas such as Toledo (Ohio), Tulsa (Oklahoma), 
Nashville (Tennessee) and Grand Rapids (Michigan) condemned the 
persecution, 774 while the Catholic Commonweal expressed dismay at 
the indifference of many German Christians to the Jewish 
plight. 775 Nor was Nazi persecution of the Jews thought to be 
short-lived; the overwhelming majority of Herrmann's sample of
771Time & Newsweek, 27 March 1933, as cited in Herrmann "American 
Perceptions", Chapter Eight.
772 Literary Digest, "American Outcry at German Jew-Baiting", 1 April 
1933.
773New York Evening Post 15 April 1933 as cited in Lipstadt, Beyond 
Belief, Chapter One.
774Literary Digest 1 and 8 April 1933.
775Commonweal 5 & 12 April 1933 as cited in Herrmann, "American 
Perceptions", Chapter Eight. The Commonweal was one of the few 
publications to comment on German public reaction to the outbreak of 
anti-semitic violence, which is difficult to explain given the 
attention generated by the story.
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mainstream American newspapers maintained that Nazi anti­
semitism would be a lasting problem in Germany.776
Other aspects of the Nazi terror pushed the American press 
beyond indignation. Ten people out of the many thousands of 
victims were Jews of American descent. Readers across the 
nation learned of the frightening experiences of ordinary people 
such as Mr. and Mrs. Max Schussler, originally from New York, 
who found themselves awakened at two A.M. by pistol waving S.A. 
men, and Julian Fuchs, a Berlin nightclub owner, who was 
accosted by Nazi storm troopers and imprisoned in his own 
washroom. 777 The importance of these accounts cannot be 
underestimated because they gave faces to the victims of Nazi 
thuggery, evoking sympathy from the American public. As 
important, and perhaps an indication of the level of Jewish 
assimilation, the headlines for these stories did not include 
the religion of the victims, only their nationality. The final 
straw, however, was Hitler's decision of 22 March, granting 
amnesty to the perpetrators of the attacks, a move which 
outraged much of the American press.
The American press's censure of the Hitler regime in February 
and early March destroyed any remaining good will between Nazi 
authorities and American correspondents. As previously 
mentioned, the Nazis had never enjoyed good relations with the 
foreign press, in large measure because the Party demanded money
776Herrmann, "American Perceptions", Appendix R. Eighty-one percent of 
his sample predicted that anti-semitism would continue in Germany.
777CDT 10 & 14 March 1933.
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in exchange for stories and tips. 778 In addition, Hitler's 
propensity to engage in monologues and his refusal to answer 
questions did not endear him to reporters during interviews. 
Once Hitler came to power, the mainstream press harbored serious 
doubts about the veracity of government news releases regarding 
the terror. On some occasions the Nazi officials denied 
outright that "excesses" had taken place. In a 25 March press 
conference, Goring claimed that 'not one Jew's fingernail has 
been touched' and 'not one synagogue has been desecrated or 
destroyed'.779 To reinforce this myth, the Nazis pressured German 
Jewish groups, such as the Central Union of German Citizens of 
the Jewish faith and the Patriotic Society of National German 
Jews as well as "alleged" victims, to issue public denials that 
any atrocities against their brethren were taking place.780 At 
other times, the Hitler authorities admitted that crimes had 
occurred, but said that they were committed by communists 
disguised as Storm Troopers.781 The most common Nazi tactic was 
to deny at first that any indiscretions had occurred, then 
promise an investigation, and then end with an assurance that 
such incidents would not happen again. By the end of February 
the credibility gap proved unbridgeable.782
778See Chapter One of this study for a more detailed discussion of this 
practice.
779As printed in the CDN 25 March 1933.
780See Lipstadt, Beyond Belief, pp. 16-17. See also NYT 25 March 1933, P.l.
781A s reported by the CDN 8 March 1933.
782 For a detailed discussion of Hitler's relations with the international 
press corps during his first months in office, see Lipstadt, Beyond
(continued...)
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The biggest reason for the hostility of American 
correspondents towards the Hitler regime was the Government's 
institution of press censorship. Although the laws of 4 and 28 
February 1933 were directed against domestic publications, the 
foreign press suffered as well because its reporters relied upon 
German newspapers for its own stories, particularly those 
emanating from outside Berlin. When the Nazi authorities 
recognized the role played by the international press in 
facilitating a worldwide backlash against Germany, they further 
undermined correspondents' access to data by making it illegal 
for 'any German to impart information to foreigners'. 783 This 
measure followed on the heels of the censorship decree of 7 
March, which allowed postal and cable authorities to delete 
anti-government statements from outgoing dispatches and mail 
stories, although this was not carried out on a wide scale until 
the end of the month. More effective was the Hitler 
government's threat to expel correspondents if they 
'misrepresented the internal situation': one which was carried 
out against Edgar Mowrer. 784 The threat of expulsion was also 
meant to coerce the managements of newspapers, magazines and 
wire services to instruct their correspondents to soften their 
views towards the regime. Louis Lochner of the Associated Press 
recalled how his superiors ordered him and his colleagues to
782 (. . .continued)
Belief, pp.18-22.
783As reported by the NYT, 19 March 1933.
784A s quoted by the NYT 7 March 1933.
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'tell no untruth, but to report only as much of the truth 
without distorting the picture, as would enable us to remain at 
our posts 1 .785
The tactic which proved most effective during the early 
months of the Nazi regime was the threat of government reprisals 
against a correspondent's news source, often a victim of Nazi 
thuggery. Even Edgar Mowrer, whose reports of the terror were 
among the most graphic, admitted on 22 March that he had 'not 
used one-tenth of the duly verified information concerning the 
horrors practiced against scores of persons, notably Jews'.786 
The regime also coerced, disrupted and intimidated those 
reporters who had consistently portrayed the Nazis in a very 
negative light so that they would leave Germany. The Hitler 
government prevented those they deemed Greuelhetzer ("atrocity 
mongers") from using the mail system, forcing reporters to rely 
exclusively on the more expensive telephone and telegraph 
services. In some instances, reporters were arrested for 
violating a law retroactively, subjected to police interrogation 
and even given stints in a concentration camp. More often 
though, the Nazis exerted subtle pressure on correspondents. 
Edgar Mowrer usually had two S.S. men stationed outside his home 
while the Nazis turned Sigrid Schultz's housemaid into a Gestapo
785Lipstadt, Beyond Belief, P.23.
786CDN 22 March 1933, P.2.
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informant. 787 Thus the era of the free press in Germany had come 
to a rude and abrupt end.
Despite the efforts of the Regime, American journalists, 
through their courage and skill, were able to get through enough 
detailed accounts of the Nazi reign of terror to influence 
profoundly public opinion at home. On 27 March 1933 there was 
a "National Day of Prayer" on behalf of Germany's Jews. The 
following day, a mass anti-Nazi rally took place in Madison 
Square Garden where sixty thousand protesters were joined by an 
eclectic group of prominent religious and political figures 
including Al Smith and Robert Wagner. In addition, anti-Nazi 
protests occurred in over eighty U.S. cities, most of which had 
negligible Jewish populations. German-made goods were boycotted 
in New York and Philadelphia and many German and German-American 
businessmen publicly distanced themselves from the Hitler 
regime.788 Even Washington was drawn into the fray. The House 
of Representatives debated whether there should be any official 
action against Germany in response to its persecution of the 
Jews (although nothing substantive came of it because of the 
intervention of Secretary of State Hull).
Although the overwhelming majority of the American press 
condemned the Nazi persecution of Jews, Deborah Lipstadt argues 
that a significant minority professed "less sympathetic" views. 
Some publications remained unconvinced that the situation in 
Germany was all that bad. 'Terrible things may be happening but
no n
Lipstadt, Beyond Belief, pp.22-24, Heald Vistas, pp.118-119.
788For a brief summary of international reaction to Nazi excesses see
Weinberg, Foreign Policy, pp.38-40.
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they are not as terrible as the reports from Germany would have 
you believe1 commented one Los Angeles Times editorial.789 Some 
journalists accepted the denials of German-Jewish organizations 
at face value, as did John Elliot of the New York Herald 
Tribune, while others such as the editors of the Columbus 
Journal (Ohio) discounted the atrocity reports as repeats of the 
anti-German propaganda during the Great War.790
Another segment of the minority view acknowledged that 
"terrible things were happening" but claimed that the Jews, not 
the Nazis, were to blame. The bulk of the espousers of this 
position, a view often laced with anti-semitic stereotypes, 
belonged to the Protestant press. For example, the Christian 
Science Monitor asserted that it was the 'Jewish inclination' 
towards 'commercial clannishness' 'which got them into trouble' 
while the Christian Century excused Hitler's actions on the 
grounds that ' too many Jews in Germany are radicals and 
communists'. And in a case of reverse sequential logic, the 
Christian Science Monitor blamed the hostile response of 
American Jews to the Nazi violence for the violence that 
occurred in the first place, condemning their 'eye for an eye' 
attitude and instead suggested that Jews should 'heed Jesus's
78 9Los Angeles Times 16 March 1933 as cited in Lipstadt, Beyond Belief, 
Chapter Two. Interesting is Hearst Foreign Editor Claude Bowers 
response to this view, 'there is no reason to doubt the proof from all 
the reputable news-gathering agencies of the world1 . (28 March 1933 as 
cited in Herrmann, "American Perceptions"). Lipstadt's contention that 
the 'picture drawn by the American press [of the plight of German 
Jewry] was a confused one' during the early months of Hitler's rule is 
difficult to defend given the overwhelming consensus of press opinion 
sympathetic towards the Jews.
790New York Herald Tribune, 25 March 1933 and the Columbus Journal, 24 
March 1933 Ibid.
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commandment to "love one another"'.791 Although demagogues such 
as Father Coughlin would later espouse similar views, the 
fiercely anti—Nazi position of the Catholic Commonweal 
demonstrated that not all religious commentators discounted the 
plight of the Jews.
Notwithstanding the consensus of press opinion which opposed 
Nazi policies and supported the Jews, the lines of public debate 
over Hitler were drawn by the end of April 1933. And despite 
the nationwide condemnation of the anti-semitic pogroms in 1935, 
1937 and 1938 (Kristallnacht), many Americans, (particularly 
those from the isolationist ranks), soon gravitated to a pro- 
Germany position, thus making for a more balanced war of words. 
By 1939 American attitudes toward the Hitler regime seemed 
intrinsically contradictory, as shown by two polls taken after 
Kristallnacht. In one poll, 94% of those questioned disapproved 
of Germany's persecution of the Jews, yet in the other, 60% of 
those questioned believed that the Jews were either entirely or 
partially responsible for their plight. The paradoxical nature 
of American public opinion also extended to the nation's 
attitude after the outbreak of war in 1939 —  both anti-German 
and isolationist sentiment grew stronger.792
But in 1933 the spectre of war, though raised by some, was a 
secondary issue for the reporters stationed in Germany. Many
7 91Christian Science Monitor, 4 & 8 April 1933, the Christian Century, 26 
April 1933, Ibid.
7 92Levering, R. The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978 (NY 
1978), Chapters Two and Three. See also Cantril, H. Public Opinion, 
(Princeton 1951) P.381 as cited in Lipstadt, Beyond Belief, Chapter 
Five. Worth noting is that the Nazi propaganda campaign in the United 
States actually backfired on the Regime. See Frye, A. Nazi Germany 
and the American Hemisphere, 1933-41 (New Haven 1967) .
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correspondents conveyed the idea that a malevolent force had 
invaded Germany, in part because they were not quite sure who, 
if anyone, was behind the reign of violent chaos. Most major 
American newspapers felt that Goring encouraged, (but did not 
direct) the terror, while a few thought that Hitler was a force 
for moderation. In fact, some contended that Hitler's 
inclination towards restraint had increased as he acquired more 
power, a function of the somewhat dubious theory that "the 
office tempers the man". This argument was put forth by the New 
York Times and the Christian Science Monitor, which compared 
Hitler to the old saying about the month of March: 'he came in 
like a lion but will go out like a lamb' .793 Less optimistic, 
journalists such as Dorothy Thompson referred their readers to 
the barbarism of the Middle Ages as a parallel to Germany's 
current condition. 794 To still other reporters, events in Germany 
differed fundamentally from previous Western historical 
experience —  it was as if Hitler and the Nazis were mythic 
beings endowed with the power to captivate and mesmerize. The 
Literary Digest evoked this image with its assertion that ' the 
statement two plus two are four uttered in Hitler's vibrant 
baritone might be clothed in the passionate conviction and noble 
splendor of some message from the stars'. 795 Perhaps Birchall 
captured the surreal and uncertain turn of events in Germany 
best through his description, 'the Reich is changing rapidly and
793Christian Science Monitor, 7 March 1933 as cited in Lipstadt, Beyond 
Belief, Chapter Two.
794Heald, Vistas, P.169.
795Literary Digest, 18 February 1933
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basically into something different, the precise character of 
which no man at present can confidently predict1 .796 
Unfortunately, journalists would eventually witness Germany's 
descent to the depths of evil.
* * *
The rapid changes that characterized Germany during the first 
two months of Hitler's rule held particular appeal for the 
Chicago Daily Tribune which prided itself on reporting 
groundbreaking news. The Tribune published one and one half 
times more items on Germany during February and March 1933 than 
did the average of Herrmann's sample. This was all the more 
remarkable considering the fact that between 16 February and 7 
March the Chicago press reserved large blocs of space for the 
biggest story in the City's recent history: the assassination of 
Mayor Anton Cermak in Miami as he accompanied then President­
elect Franklin Roosevelt.
Not surprisingly, the Tribune extensively covered the general 
disorder and violence that followed Hitler's appointment. In 
fact, the paper devoted a higher percentage of its German 
reporting to Nazi terror than did any other major American 
newspaper. Nearly every reported attack on Americans received 
front page billing. Given Chicago's large Catholic population, 
it was not surprising to see that the Tribune emphasized the 
reporting of violence directed towards Germany's Catholics. The 
paper's inclination towards reporting domestic unrest also 
contributed greatly to its heavy play on Nazi anti-semitism. In
796NYT/ 20 February 1933, P.l.
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fact, fifty percent of the Tribune's published news stories from
Germany concerned the plight of the Jews, a greater portion than
that in any other major American newspaper.797
However, what distinguished the German coverage of the
Chicago Daily Tribune from other publications was the paper's
emphasis on monarchic intrigues. As it had in the past, the
paper not only reported on the machinations of the
Hohenzollerns, it also injected them into its daily coverage of
government activities. One need look no further than some of
the Tribune's headlines between 6 February and 24 March 1933 to
recognize this pattern:
'EX-KAISER'S SON JOINS HITLER AT NAZI FUNERAL' (6 February) 
'KAISER SENDS HIS BAGGAGE INTO GERMANY; RESTORED MONARCHY IS 
SUSPECTED' (7 February)
'GERMAN VOTERS AT SEA; HITLER OR MONARCHY?' (18 February) 
'WIFE OF KAISER IN BERLIN AS HIS POLITICAL ENVOY' (26 
February)
'HITLER CABINET REVIVES SPIRIT OF KAISER'S DAYS' (3 March) 
'HITLER'S AIM TO RESTORE GERMAN MONARCHY REVEALED' (7 March) 
'HITLER REGIME KILLS GERMAN RULE BY PEOPLE; EX-KAISER'S 
FAMILY GIVEN HONORS' (22 March)
'HITLER IS MADE DICTATOR; SAYS "NO KAISER NOW"' (24 March) 
Although there is a dearth of archival evidence for the 
Tribune from this period, the documents cited in previous 
chapters clearly demonstrate that McCormick had always 
maintained that a return of the Hohenzollerns was likely, if not 
inevitable. What is noteworthy (and puzzling), however, is that 
McCormick became more convinced of the likelihood of a 
restoration as Hitler consolidated his power at the expense of 
the monarchists, Papen and Hugenberg. His editorial of 8 
February stated that it would be 'rash to predict' a rebirth of 
Kaiserdom, while his less equivocal one of 16 March stated that
7 97See Herrmann, "American Perceptions", Appendix Q.
(287)
'although a matter for conjecture, monarchy is the natural 
supposition 1 . 798 And on 24 March, though he acknowledged in his 
paper's own headline that Hitler would not restore monarchism to 
Germany, McCormick concluded that there 'cannot be much doubt 
that the return of the Hohenzollerns impends'.799
McCormick's position that a Nazi dictatorship represented no 
more than a transitional phase between republic and monarchy 
interfered with his recognition of the unprecedented state of 
affairs in Germany. This is not to suggest that he looked 
favourably upon the Nazis. McCormick believed that 'Hitler's 
personality and utterances encouraged little hope that the 
Fascist movement [would] produce lasting good for Germany' .80° 
He was also 'distressed' by the 'brutal terror' inspired by 
Hitler and exercised by Nazi gangs, as well as by the 
government's suppression of the international press.801 Nor was 
he optimistic about the future, which after the passage of the
798Editorial, Ibid. 16 March 1933.
799Ibid. 24 March 1933. In fairness to McCormick, it should be noted 
that Augustus Wilhelm, the former Crown Prince, was a staunch 
supporter of the Nazis. However, this fact alone does not fully 
account for the logic behind his views.
800Ibid. 2 February 1933.
801Ibid. 21 March & 23 February 1933. McCormick's acute sensitivity to 
the Nazi practice of .press censorship was echoed by his cable editor,
George Scharschug in a 27 March 1933 letter to Schultz in which he
hoped 'for the sake of Germany that the government lets you tell the 
full story' because it was 'the best way to avoid unfriendly
propaganda'. One may infer from his statement that Scharschug failed 
to understand the motives behind the censorship in the first place. 
Scharschug to Schultz, 27 March 1933, Schultz Papers, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin.
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fall of the Republic, although this is a matter for speculation. 
Conversely, McCormick generally refrained from criticizing the 
German people. His strongest comment was that he was 
'disappointed to find the German sense of reasoned order, 
patience and discipline overborne by bitter factionalism and 
reckless political violence1 .806
However, it would be McCormick's isolationist views which
would exert the most profound influence on the Tribune's
editorial attitudes towards Germany from the Enabling Law down
through the attack on Pearl Harbor. As was the case in
Hindenburg's 1925 campaign (when McCormick initially raised the
prospect of war only to downplay it after the Field Marshal's
victory because he did not want to encourage U.S. intervention),
once Hitler became absolute ruler, McCormick departed from his
earlier view that a Nazi dictatorship would lead to war.
[In contrast to] 'the Reds in Russia, '[the Nazis] are not 
seeking to create in Germany a people with spear heads 
pointed to the rest of the world but a nation reorganized 
for better association with other countries... It is, 
theoretically at least, their objective to unite Germany, to 
free it from the limitations imposed by an unjust treaty and 
to give it the place to which its natural power and 
accomplishment would entitle it.807
Many of McCormick's critics have cited these statements, 
coupled with his staunch advocacy of appeasement, as evidence 
that the Tribune publisher was pro-Nazi. This contention, 
however, is questionable in light of the fact that McCormick had 
consistently opposed Hitler's domestic policies (save his 
suppression of the Left) throughout the 1920's and early 1930's.
806Ibid. 23 February 1933.
807Ibid. 21 March 1933.
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Schultz asserted in a 1971 interview that McCormick later 
sympathized with Germany after the 1934 Hitler-ordered execution 
of S. A. chief Ernst Rohm. She contended that McCormick's 
hostility towards the regime had been based on his disapproval 
of Rohm's homosexuality. To support her view, Schultz noted 
that McCormick's fiercest anti-Nazi pieces were written in the 
fall of 1933 soon after she had informed him of Rohm's sexual 
proclivities.808 Schultz's theory, however, falls short because 
she too failed to account for McCormick's anti-Nazi positions 
before he learned about Rohm. What seems more likely is that as 
Hitlerism became an international issue and the prospects of 
another disastrous war loomed large, McCormick correspondingly 
softened his views towards Germany. Thus, it appears that it 
was primarily his isolationism, not his right-wing sympathies 
which underpinned his attitudes towards Germany after March 
1933.
McCormick's somewhat contradictory views of Hitler's first 
months in office seem to have had a limited effect on Schultz's 
reporting. True, the emphasis on monarchic aspirations was a 
prominent feature of her reporting during this period, as it had 
been for years past. And given Schultz's confidence in a 
Hohenzollern return in 1930 and again in 1932, it is reasonable 
to assume that she shared, at least to some degree, her 
publisher's opinion on the issue. Finally, that the Home Office
ong
Schultz interview 1971 (Part One), Schultz Papers, State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin.
(291)
praised her ’excellent reporting on the German situation1 also 
indicates that she stood in accord with her publisher.809
As was the case with McCormick, the monarchic angle also may 
have delayed Schultz's recognition of Hitler's consolidation of 
power.810 If her dispatches can be taken at face value,811 
Schultz felt that Hitler was a tool manipulated by his 
conservative cabinet ministers for most of his first eight weeks 
in office. On 5 February, 12 February and 18 February, Schultz 
declared Papen or Hugenberg the victors in their intra-cabinet 
battles with Hitler, consistently conveying the impression that 
'the Nationalists [had] "put one over" on their new allies'.812 
As late as 7 March Schultz claimed that Papen and other cabinet 
members were exerting effective pressure to restore the 
Hohenzollern monarchy. In any event, she was convinced that a
809Scharschug to Schultz, 27 March 1933, Schultz Papers, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin.
810As yet another example of the unreliability of journalists' 
retrospective accounts, in a 1971 interview, Schultz stated that as 
early as 1930 she considered Hitler's accession to power inevitable. 
This study has shown, through an examination of her correspondence, 
that this was not the case. See Schultz interview (1971 Part One), 
Schultz Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
811The Nazi censorship decrees of March do make it difficult to 
ascertain her reporting throughout most of the month, although her 
February dispatches through 6 March were not subjected to censorship. 
Moreover, we do not know of the extent to which Schultz's views were 
modified by the Home Office. However, her reporting during this 
period indicates a continuation not a deviation from the previous 
years.
812CDT 12 February 1933, P.2.
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prospective Nazi dictatorship would 'pure and simple, meet with 
strong opposition' .813
Schultz's idea of an 'outmanoeuvred' or 'tamed' Hitler814 may 
be traced in part to her mixed assessment of him. Though
Schultz described Hitler as a 'master propagandist and master 
showman' who 'played on German emotions like a great artist',815 
she was careful to point out that he was 'often shaken by doubt, 
swayed by sentiment and a bit helpless'.816 Hitler's futile 
attempt to restrain the S. A. in the wake of Goring's
intervention of 10 March may have reinforced her view. More
importantly, Schultz's evaluation of Hitler must be seen in
comparison to her assessment of von Papen, whom she considered 
a first-rate Machiavellian political operator. Thus, it would 
not be too much of an overstatement to say that Schultz 
considered Hitler an amateur among professionals.
Schultz made it clear from the outset that the end of the 
Weimar Republic was at hand. She saw little significance in the 
Reichstag campaign of 5 March, accurately noting that even if 
Hitler's government failed to obtain a majority, the Chancellor 
would dissolve the legislative body by decree. After Hitler's 
victory, Schultz predicted that through an enabling act the
813Ibid. 27 February 1933.
814Ibid. 18 February 1933.
815Ibid. 27 February 1933.
816Ibid.
(293)
Reichstag would 'close shop for at least two years'.817 She 
considered ratification of the Enabling Law a foregone 
conclusion and predicted its 'prompt passage1.818
However, although Schultz sounded the death knell of the 
Republic, she refrained from pronouncing Hitler Germany's 
absolute dictator until 22 March. In examining her dispatches 
up to that date, it is not clear when, in her view, the Papen- 
Hugenberg regime ended and Hitler's began. The Tribune's March 
headlines such as 'HITLER SEIZES CONTROL OF ALL GERMAN STATES', 
PRUSSIAN MAYORS FIRED BY HITLER' , HITLER TIGHTENS GRIP ON GERMAN 
RULE AT POLLS' which in their singular identification of Hitler 
as the representative of the German government marked a 
departure from the paper's February headlines, are unreliable as 
a clue to Schultz's change of mind because headlines were 
formulated in Chicago, not Berlin. Moreover, nowhere in the 
text of her articles did she indicate that Hitler had gained the 
upper hand within the cabinet. Hence, although the actions of 
Nazi leaders and gangs were reported in detail, the impetus and 
implications of their actions were not analyzed. In fairness to 
Schultz, Scharschug suggested on 27 March 1933 the possibility 
that some of her dispatches may have encountered 'censor 
troubles', a source of chronic concern for the Tribune Home 
Office.819
817Ibid. 7 March 1933, P.3.
818Ibid. 21 March 1933.
Scharschug to Schultz, 27 March 1933, Schultz Papers, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin.
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Schultz, as well as McCormick, omitted any tangible 
discussion of Hindenburg's role. In fact, McCormick did not 
mention Hindenburg by name in a single editorial from this 
period. The absence of commentary on the Field Marshal, which 
began in the summer of 1932 and would continue until his death 
in 1934, reflected both McCormick's and Schultz's belief that 
Hindenburg had ceased to be an important factor in German 
politics.
Although Schultz was later occasionally subjected to 
harassment by the authorities (including an interrogation by the 
Gestapo), probably because the tone of her dispatches tended to 
portray the regime in a negative light, she managed to remain at 
her post until finally being expelled in 1941 .82° While we cannot 
know for sure, Schultz's long tenure in Berlin was probably due 
in part to her cordial social relations with the Nazis, 
particularly Goring (who was a frequent guest at her dinner 
parties).821 It is also plausible that during the second half of 
the decade Schultz's position may have been more secure because 
Hitler did not wish to alienate McCormick, a staunch advocate of 
appeasement. Perhaps the plethora of documents in the Chicago 
Tribune Archive will further substantiate these hypotheses once 
they are made available.
* * *
The Chicago Daily News featured articles about Germany 
virtually every day in February and March 1933, even placing
820Lipstadt, Beyond Belief, P.22.
821Sigrid Schultz interview, 1971, Schultz Papers, State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin.
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them on page one on several occasions in a paper where such 
displays were usually reserved for matters of local or national 
interest. As in the case of the Tribune, the Daily News covered 
Hitler’s consolidation of power extensively despite the 
distraction of the Cermak assassination, publishing five 
editorials on the Nazis in March alone. Its news about Germany 
emanated primarily from three sources: Edgar Mowrer, John
Gunther, Carroll Binder and the editorial board. The salient 
feature of the Chicago Daily News's coverage of Hitler during 
this period was the paper's keenness and depth of foresight in 
its analysis, on a level far superior to that of most other 
major American newspapers.
At the outset, however, the paper did not merit such praise. 
In the early days of the Hitler Chancellorship, Mowrer shared 
the delusion of many observers that 'the real authority lies 
with von Papen' , 822 He also suggested that Hitler's fascist 
platform was merely a vote-getting veneer which he would shed 
upon the assumption of office. On 2 February Mowrer asserted 
that 'Hitler has thrown aside the veil of social radicalism and 
appears as a naked reactionary', resembling his conservative 
ministers.823
On 6 February Mowrer was relieved for nearly three weeks by 
John Gunther, the paper's thirty-two year old rising star.824
822CDN 1 February 1933, P.l.
823Ibid. 2 February 1933.
824Mowrer's absence was probably unplanned. His daughter believed that 
he may have been injured in a skiing accident. Diana Mowrer Beliard 
to the author, 7 June 1997.
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Gunther had been the Vienna bureau chief since 1930 and would 
report from there with distinction and later have a successful 
literary career. The future author of the "Inside" series 
immediately discounted the press’s (and Mowrer's) contention of 
a "controlled" Hitler. In his first dispatch, Gunther asserted 
that ' it was easy to make Hitler Chancellor of the Reich but it 
will be exceedingly difficult to get rid of him' .825 Influenced 
by the promulgation of the 4 and 6 February emergency decrees 
which suppressed the Left and legalized the Reich takeover of 
Prussia, Gunther opined that the 'government monopoly [of 
power]' had become a 'Hitler monopoly'. 826 On the 17th he cabled 
that 'day by day the relentless march towards permanent power 
continues under Adolf Hitler', reinforcing a theme of 
inevitability which came to characterize the paper's dispatches 
from Germany. 827 Moreover, Gunther believed that Hitler would 
remain in power regardless of the 5 March election results.828
The only aberration in Gunther's reporting appeared in his 
published article of 9 February, which appeared under the title, 
'HITLER'S FIRST TEN DAYS IN POWER BRINGS LITTLE CHANGE IN 
GERMANY':
No heads have rolled in the sand. No corpses of Jews are 
swinging from the lampposts of Unter den Linden. Department 
stores are still doing business —  very good business, too.
825CDN 6 February 1933, P.2.
826Ibid.
827Ibid. 17 February 1933.
828Ibid. 23 February 1933.
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Nazi storm troops have not yet, surprisingly enough, crossed 
the Rhine. International bankers with offices in Berlin 
still survive —  in fact, they are negotiating with the 
government, whose followers had threatened to throw them 
out. The Treaty of Versailles, strange to say, has not yet 
been scrapped and the corridor and Upper Silesia are still 
Polish. Universal compulsory military conscription, fond 
dream of the Hitlerites, is still a dream. The Communist 
party has not been outlawed, although it very well may be 
shortly.829
The factual accuracy of the above text is not in question 
(although even at this early stage some Communist heads "had 
rolled in the sand"). It appears to imply, however, that since 
nothing terrible has occurred in the first ten days of Hitler's 
rule, nothing terrible will occur in the future (except that the 
Communists may be disbanded) —  a clear contradiction of 
Gunther's sense of foreboding exhibited in his articles of the 
previous three days. Moreover, that Gunther's subsequent 
dispatches offer no cause for optimism suggest the possibility 
that he may have been instructed (probably by Dennis) to write 
a dispatch which took a more encouraging view. Unfortunately, 
the lack of archival evidence about this episode precludes any 
definitive conclusion, though on the face of it, the 9 February 
dispatch appears glaringly misplaced.
On 24 February Mowrer returned to work and almost immediately 
reversed the positions he took in the beginning of the month.. 
On the 27th he acknowledged that Hitler now exercised 
'predominant influence' in the cabinet in large part because of 
the 'violent measures taken by the National Socialist 
government' .83° Nearly three weeks before the passage of the
829Ibid. 9 February 1933, P.l.
830CDN 27 February 1933, P.2.
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Enabling Law, Mowrer predicted that 'a centralized dictatorship 
extending over the German states [would] be established, cloaked 
in the forms of moribund parliamentarism which [would] deceive 
no one1; a dictatorship represented in what Hitler and Goring 
decide'.831 On 10 March he proclaimed that 'all Germany is now 
in the hands of the National Socialists' and mused that the 
Enabling Law was 'not really necessary since Hitler and his 
friends [had] acted as though such a law already existed'.832 In 
fact, the Chicago Daily News considered its passage such a non- 
event that it carried only the Associated Press's account of the 
story.
His foresight aside, what made Mowrer1s reporting so 
refreshing was his confrontational tone towards the Nazis. When 
anti-semitic violence intensified in the aftermath of the 5 
March elections, Mowrer mounted 'a one man crusade': not only 
reporting it in graphic detail but also vigorously defending the 
veracity of his dispatches against the wave of Nazi attacks on 
the credibility of the foreign press.833 Ultimately, Mowrer's 
campaign would result in his expulsion from Germany. But for a 
brief period he was the international press's modern-day Paul 
Revere, even risking his life to alert America to the evil 
brewing in Germany. It was his performance in March 1933 which
831Ibid. 6 March 1933.
832Ibid. 21 March 1933.
833
Diana Mowrer Beliard to the author, 15 July 1995.
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earned Mowrer Gunther's statement that Mowrer was a combination 
of Shelley, Lincoln and Mohammed.834
At the beginning of March, Mowrer seemed an unlikely 
candidate for such distinction. He had been one of those who 
believed that Hitler would 'sincerely deplore... anything like 
a Saint Bartholomew's night' although admitting that random S.A. 
violence against the Jews 'might get out of hand' , 835 Within two 
weeks, Mowrer reversed this position, asserting unequivocally 
that 'what has happened sporadically to Americans has been the 
lot of many Germans' and that it was foolish to believe that 
'the excesses [had] been merely the results of storm battalion 
men getting out of hand against the desire of the government' .836
Despite withholding many episodes, Mowrer nonetheless
provided graphic descriptions of the Nazi terror, including his 
reports of 'bloodstained floors' in makeshift torture chambers. 
In a 22 March article he described how Brown Shirts, after 
inflicting a physical beating on their victims, 'mostly Jews', 
would 'compel them to lick up their own blood or that of fellow 
sufferers'.837 Mowrer also noted (albeit incorrectly) that the 
construction of Dachau was 'the first time that concentration
834Heald, Vistas op. cit., Chapter Two.
835CDN 3 March 1933.
836Ibid. 9 & 18 March 1933.
837Ibid. 22 March 1933.
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camps [had] ever been prepared for one's own people'. 838 At the 
end of March, he reached the 'unquestionable' conclusion that 
'the terror [had] been successful and German Jews and
republicans were thoroughly cowed' .839
Mowrer's dislike of the Nazis was exceeded only by his
distrust of them. The disbelief expressed in Mowrer's mocking
recapitulation of Hitler and Goring's assertions that Van der
Lubbe had set the Reichstag on fire is similar to that of New
Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrity in his commentary on
President Kennedy's assassination thirty years later.
The fire was alleged to have been the work of Maginus [sic]
Van der Lubbe, a member of the communist party. Van der
Lubbe is supposed to have smuggled himself into the
Reichstag building which is very carefully watched. With 
kerosene, with special materials for starting fires and with 
explosive caps, he is presumed to have set fire to the heavy 
woodwork in at least thirty places. Then he is supposed to 
have lost his way or was unable to exit the building. . . 
Hitler, von Papen and Goring personally reached the scene of 
the building in record time [my italics].840
Mowrer's dismissal of the Government's version of the origins 
of the Reichstag fire inaugurated a distinct pattern in his 
reporting: he would begin by citing Nazi assertions that the 
"reign of terror" was fabricated by foreign journalists or the 
work of communists and then proceeded to defend vigorously the 
veracity of his reports as well as those of his colleagues. On 
11 March Mowrer wrote,
838Ibid. 21 March 1933. Lenin first established concentration camps for 
Russians in 1922.
839Ibid. 29 March 1933.
840Ibid. 28 February 1933, P.l.
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Hostility against the foreign press seems to be steadily 
increasing, since the Nazis make foreign correspondents 
responsible for the growing hostility in other countries 
toward Germany, which, if it exists, is due exclusively to 
Nazi deeds.841
And he reiterated on the 23rd,
If the German government wishes to convince the world that 
nothing has occurred outside the normal run of events, it 
has an impossible task.842
Mowrer also resented the imposition of censorship on the 
international press. He made sure to clue in Chicago Daily News 
readers that his dispatch of 6 March 'may be the last uncensored 
description of German events for some time' . 843 The extent to 
which Mowrer1s own reports were affected is unknown because of 
the lack of archival evidence, though given their fiercely anti- 
Nazi tone it would be logical to conclude that most of them made 
it through cleanly. The fact that his own dispatches were not 
censored did not stop Mowrer from stating that the practice 
should be abolished and from citing examples of censorship 
against other correspondents —  possible evidence of Mowrer's 
larger sense of mission.844
With one notable exception (the editorial of 7 March), the 
editorial board of the Chicago Daily News followed the lead of 
its Berlin bureau. In fact, the editorials of 22 and 29 March
841Ibid. 11 March 1933, P.2.
842Ibid. 23 March 1933.
843Ibid. 6 March 1933.
844Ibid. 29 March 1933.
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featured the introduction, 'as the Berlin correspondent of the 
Daily News reports'. 845 An 18 February piece echoed Gunther's 
view that Hitler was moving inexorably towards dictatorship: 
[what] took Mussolini years Hitler has done in a day' and hence 
would 'remain in office' regardless of the upcoming election 
results, while a 2 March editorial acknowledged that 'both
Hindenburg and von Papen [had] been pushed into the background 
by Hitler'.846 Nevertheless, management was 'astonished' that 
'Hitler [had] acquired dictatorial power in only one month' .847 
Its 22 March postmortem on the Republic echoed Mowrer's long 
held view that 'the German republicans [had] only themselves to 
blame' because they lacked political wisdom. 'Hence,
[republicans] only offered [the German electorate] bread crusts, 
while the Nazis promised them pie' , 848 The editorial board was 
extremely pessimistic about the future of Germany's Jews. As 
early as 29 March, the paper foretold that 'there [was] a 
systematic effort to deprive most German Jews of their means of 
livelihood and to herd them into medieval ghettos'.849
The tone and tenor of the Chicago Daily News's coverage of
Hitler during this pivotal period was determined as much by the
845CDN editorials 22 & 29 March 1933.
846Ibid. 18 February & 2 March 1933.
847Ibid. 2 March 1933.
848Ibid. 22 March 1933.
849Ibid. 29 March 1933.
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changes in the paper's management as by events in Germany 
itself. Publisher Frank Knox further consolidated his power in 
1933 largely at the expense of Charles Dennis, the paper's long­
time editor-in-chief. Moreover, as Knox strengthened his grip 
the corporate balance of power swung even further in favour of 
his right-hand man, Carroll Binder.
It is in the Chicago Daily News editorials about Germany 
where this change is most evident. Five of the six editorials 
published in February and March 1933 echoed the alarm and 
pessimism of the Berlin bureau, indicating that they were almost 
certainly authored by Binder with little interference from his 
ostensible superior, Dennis. That there is no evidence that 
Binder's respect and admiration of Mowrer had lessened during 
this period suggests that he stood in full agreement with the 
Berlin bureau chief on the German situation. In fact, Binder's 
comment, 'Edgar and I speak the same language [about 
international issues]' made in September 1933 confirms the 
point.850
Whereas Binder was influenced by Mowrer, Knox came to follow 
the opinions of Binder. The paper's editorial of 22 March which 
absolved the French of blame for the dissolution of the Weimar 
Republic provides a good case in point. From reading the piece, 
no one would have known that since the Great War, Knox had 
maintained 'a bias against everything French', because the 
publisher had chosen to 'pay more deference to [Binder's]
850Binder to P. Mowrer, 24 September 1933, Binder Papers, Newberry
Library.
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suggestions about foreign affairs'.851 That Knox suppressed his 
own views in favour of Binder's (and hence Mowrer's) is also 
important with reference to the gloomy editorial of 29 March 
which accurately predicted the "ghettoization" of Germany's 
Jews. Again, one would not have known that Knox actually 
believed that correspondents from Germany —  including his own - 
- were exaggerating reports of Nazi anti-semitic terror, a 
stance he reversed only after his visit to Berlin in the summer 
of 1 933.852
No such about-face occurred with Edward Price Bell. Bell was 
an early critic of the American press's negative portrayals of 
the Nazi regime. 853 He considered the 'uproar outside Germany 
against Hitler's policies affecting the Jews, wrong and 
foolish'. 854 Bell admired Hitler's 'desire for peace' and stated 
that only 'Hitlerism could avert another European war'.855 He 
shared Dennis's optimism that the 'international situation [was] 
tending toward equilibrium than toward a fresh disaster1 ,856 
Bell's views are worth mentioning because his departure in 1931 
was a direct function of Knox's takeover of the paper, hence
851Ibid.
852Mowrer, E. Triumph and Turmoil pp.216-218.
853Bell to Kiep, 20 February 1933, Bell Papers, Ibid.
854Bell to Leitner, 10 April 1933, Ibid.
855Bell to Mills, 1 June 1933, Ibid.
856Bell to Mills, 2 March 1933, Ibid.
(305)
another example that links (albeit loosely) the Daily News’s 
German coverage to changes in Chicago rather than Germany. The 
absence of an influential pro-German viewpoint, one which 
evolved into a pro-Hitler position after 1933, demonstrates that 
this paper's news presentation may have been influenced as much 
by those who shaped the news as by those who did not.
Despite his predominant influence, Binder's control of 
foreign affairs editorials was not absolute. Ultimately, he 
depended on Knox to 'squelch Dennis's fuddy-duddy notions [of 
international matters]'. 857 As mentioned in Chapters Five and 
Six, Knox had gone a long way to achieving this end by 
designating Binder as the unofficial foreign affairs writer and 
by restricting Dennis's ability to alter editorial submissions. 
However, according to Binder, 'when Knox was away', 'Dennis 
[would] occasionally rewrite an entire editorial [and] almost 
invariably garbled it because he lack[ed] the familiarity with 
the deeper aspects of the question' ,858
Binder could have been easily referring to the Chicago Daily 
News's 7 March editorial on the Reichstag elections results, one 
which inductive reasoning dictates must have been written or 
edited by Dennis. Flying in the face of the paper's previous 
and subsequent analyses, "Hitler's Victory and Its Meaning" 
characterized the election campaign as 'reasonably free' and the 
results a cause 'for moderate satisfaction among Germany's
857Binder to P. Mowrer, 24 September 1933, Binder Papers, Ibid.
858Ibid.
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liberal and constitutional elements'.859 Moreover, the prospect 
of an unbridled Hitler dictatorship was discounted because the 
Nazi leader would have to rule ' in accordance with the letter of 
the Weimar constitution' .86° Finally, the editorial asserted that 
Hitler would be restrained by his party's rank and file, 'among 
whom, there are temperate men and women who cherish the 
principles of representative and constitutional government' —  
an assessment which Binder probably viewed as one example of 
Dennis's 'fuddy-duddy notions'.861
Dennis's optimism, (if it was he who wrote this editorial), 
was a throwback to his editorial and private views of Germany 
during the 1920's —  positions which had in part caused great 
friction between himself and Edgar Mowrer. Although it would be 
sheer speculation to say that Dennis wrote the 7 March editorial 
as a personal rebuttal to Mowrer, it is "food for thought" given 
that its claims had little if any basis in the facts available 
at the time. Worth noting is that Binder's intense personal 
dislike and jealousy of Gunther did not interfere with his 
evaluation of Gunther's dispatches which formed the basis of the 
18 February editorial.862
859CDN editorial, 7 March 1933.
860Ibid.
861Ibid.
862The source of the friction concerned who would take over the coveted 
London bureau in 1929-30. Binder thought of Gunther as conniving and 
disingenuous and resented the fact that Gunther was pampered by Strong 
and later Knox. See Binder to his wife, 18 July 1929, 8 January & 21 
May 1930. See also Heald, Vistas, P.142 & 256.
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The editorial of 7 March 1933 marked the last time that 
Dennis intervened in the paper's German editorials. That summer 
and fall, Knox stepped up his campaign against Dennis by 
exercising tighter control of editorial policy on national 
matters. In 1934 Dennis resigned and was replaced by Binder's 
close friend Paul Mowrer. Binder himself became the paper's 
foreign editor, assuming the responsibilities which he had first 
proposed to Walter Strong. 863 Neither Paul Mowrer nor Binder could 
stem the inexorable decline which befell the Chicago Daily News 
soon after. The cumulative effects of the Great Depression 
forced Knox (over the protests of Mowrer) to make deep cuts in 
the foreign news service while other news organizations expanded 
their news gathering services. In addition, Knox's entry into 
the political arena as the Republican nominee for Vice-President 
in 1936 ended a brief period of editorial harmony when he
succumbed to the pressure of the isolationist wing of his party,
creating an irreparable breach between himself and the
internationalist Mowrer. Knox soon sold his interest in the 
Chicago Daily News after becoming Secretary of the Navy under 
Roosevelt in 1940 and was replaced by a succession of mediocre 
publishers and editors. Although the paper would stay in 
existence until 1977, the paper never regained the reputation it 
had enjoyed as one of America's best sources of news analysis on 
foreign affairs.864
* * *




The New York Times published 444 news items on Hitler's first 
two months in power, about five times as many stories as 
contained in the average of Herrmann's sample of major American 
newspapers. The paper produced a mind-boggling average of seven 
stories on Germany per day. The Times' s coverage of the Nazi 
consolidation of power was comprehensive, in the purest sense of 
the term. Besides providing reports from Berlin and editorial 
analysis from New York, the paper published reactions from 
Washington and from nearly every European capital, including 
Stockholm and Copenhagen.
Parodoxically, the comprehensive nature of the New York 
Times's coverage of Hitler's first two months in office did not 
leave its readers any more aware of the tumultuous turn of 
events in Germany than did other newspapers. To the contrary, 
more often than not, the paper tended to misinform and confuse 
its readers by discounting, ignoring and even withholding 
disturbing facts and ominous signs which most other major 
publications included in their analyses. That the New York 
Times failed, bv the standards of the time, to provide a 
reasonably accurate picture of what was happening in Germany was 
as much a function of the paper's own internal proclivities and 
deficiencies as of the behavior of Nazi censors.
One could argue that if American readers had only the 
editorials of the New York Times to rely on for information in 
February and March 1933, they would probably conclude that the 
German situation was a temporary disappointment, but hardly a 
long-term disaster.
As they had in the past, Rollo Ogden, John Finley and the 
other members of the New York Times editorial board consistently
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lulled their readers into thinking that there was no cause for 
alarm regarding the accession of Adolf Hitler. The editorial 
board simply ignored or minimized the disturbing reports 
emanating from Germany, even those from the paper's own Berlin 
bureau.
Though it was expressed in different forms at different 
times, the salient feature of New York Times editorials on 
Germany was their unbridled optimism. In the first couple of 
weeks of Nazi rule the paper's editorials depicted Hitler as a 
dangerous man, but one who had been rendered innocuous by his 
conservative cabinet: 'Hindenburg's ingenious device [enabling
him] to keep an eye —  and hand on the Nazi chieftain' ,865 
Moreover, the editorial board opined that 'Hitler would be 'even 
more dominated' as the March Reichstag elections approached.866
When it became apparent in late February that Hindenburg, 
Papen and Hugenberg had not "tamed" Hitler, the editorial board 
still maintained its buoyant optimism, promoting the idea that 
Hitler himself had been transformed into a political moderate by 
the pressures of the office and the protocols of statesmanship. 
Although the Times acknowledged in a 19 February editorial that 
'it is always dangerous to give dangerous men supreme power in 
the expectation that they will suddenly become conservative and 
safe', it placed greater weight on the notion that 'the very 
lions of agitation and demagoguery once in office have a way of 
roaring thereafter as gently as sucking doves'. 867 Pursuant to
865NYT editorial, 5 February 1933.
866Ibid.
867Ibid. 19 February 1933.
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this theme, a 26 February piece suggested that Hitler, far from 
emerging as the next Attila the Hun, would model himself after 
Napoleon III. 868 In fact, well after the 5 March elections the 
editorial board still insisted that Hitler had become a moderate 
—  ignoring the widely circulated and generally accepted reports 
of wide-scale arrests and brutality against the German Left and 
German Jews. Its editorial of 7 March argued that 'it is still 
to be shown that Hitler is ready to run the risks attendant upon 
applying the Mussolini method in Germany1 on the grounds that 
'there [was] no reason why he should invite trouble at least for 
the immediate future'. 869 And, while the New York Times' s news 
department noted the opening of the Dachau concentration camp, 
its editorial board praised Hitler for his appointment of 
Reichsbank chief Hans Luther as the new German ambassador to the 
United States claiming that the move was evidence 'that the new 
regime [was] not contemplating anything startling or wild in 
foreign policy' .87° By contrast, no other major American 
newspaper drew such a baseless conclusion. In fact, Hitler's 
move was simply a ploy to remove the stubborn Luther from the 
Reichsbank and replace him with the more politically sympathetic 
Hjalmar Schacht.
Whether they depicted Hitler as a 'lion of agitation' or a 
'sucking dove', New York Times editorial writers consistently 
reiterated certain general claims to reassure readers that 
Hitler would succeed and that Weimar democracy would last. The
868Ibid. 26 February 1933.
869Ibid. 7 March 1933.
870Ibid. 20 March 1933.
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fact that the paper had used these theories to support its 
optimistic predictions during earlier periods in Weimar's 
history to no avail seemed not to have dissuaded the editorial 
board from resorting to them in February and March 1933.
The first of these could be called the quantitative argument.
The editorial board would misevaluate and even misrepresent 
election statistics to give credence to the view that support 
for the Republic was strong and the Nazis were on the wane. 
Nearly all of the editorials written during the 1930 and 1932 
campaigns employed this tactic. The editorials on the March 
1933 Reichstag campaign proved to be no different. The 
editorial of 2 February predicted that the Nazi/Nationalist 
coalition would not obtain an electoral majority on the grounds 
that it had not done so in the past, and the newspaper 
reiterated this position on the 26th —  after over three weeks 
of Government persecution of the Socialists, Communists and even 
the Catholic Centre Party. The editorial board even cited and 
dismissed Birchall's 15 February dispatch which asserted that it 
would take 'something akin to an act of Providence' for the 
Hitler government to lose in the elections.871 And despite the 
Regime's victory, the editorial board expressed little concern 
since it defined the near fifty percent of those who did not 
vote for the Nazis or the Nationalists the 'irreducible core [of 
Germans] still faithful to the democratic ideal' —  a tenable 
conclusion only if one terms those who voted for the Communists
871Ibid. 2 & 26 February 1933. See also NYT 15 February 1933, P.l.
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or those who supported the Right Wing of the Catholic Centre 
party as good loyal republicans!872
While some editorials misled their readers into thinking that 
a Nazi dictatorship was inconceivable based on this logic, other 
pieces minimized and underestimated the Nazi threat by depicting 
Hitler and his party as immature, bungling, yet harmless 
political amateurs. A 26 February editorial compared the 
behavior of Hitler's Storm Troops to 'a gang of sophomores 
trying to break up the freshman dinner'. 873 And in the aftermath 
of the Reichstag fire and its ensuing decree, when the 
overwhelming majority of journalists were sounding the death 
knell of the Weimar Republic, New York Times editorial writer, 
Simon Strunsky, was calling the episode simply a momentary 
outgrowth of 'Nazi hysteria and fumble which [would only] work 
mischief for Germany's immediate future, but [would have] no 
lasting qualities' , 874 In fact, whereas virtually every major 
American journalist acknowledged that Germany was in for a long­
term dictatorship with the passage of the Enabling Law, the 
editorial board held that the nation was engaged merely in 'a 
condition of momentary madness'.875
But by far the most recurrent theme in New York Times 
editorials was the paper's unmitigated confidence that the 
German people, through their strength of knowledge and 
character, would uphold the values of democracy and resist
872NYT editorial 7 March 1933.
873Ibid. 26 February 1933.
874S. Strunsky, NYT, "Topics in the Times", 2 March 1933.
875NYT editorial 27 March 1933.
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dictatorship. This is evident in the board's 26 February 
assertion that 'twenty million Germans are not going to submit 
to Hitler as the Italian people did to Mussolini' , 876 Unflustered 
by Hitler's victory in the 5 March elections, the editorial 
board argued that ' the healthy instinct for self-preservation 
which the German people have exhibited since the Great War would 
thus be a safeguard against wild adventure by the new Rightist 
regime' . 877 And on 21 March when the official colors of Weimar 
were permanently retired, the editorial board still clung to the 
hope that Germany would not 'permit itself to play traitor to 
its own past and to the cause of civilization' .878
In defence of Rollo Ogden and his staff, it must be noted 
that the editorial page also expressed some criticisms of the 
Hitler regime —  albeit belatedly. Though the paper had 
maintained a conspicuous silence during much of the Nazi terror, 
a 21 March editorial accused the Nazis of 'deliberately invoking 
the spirit of religious and race hatred' 'to the level of the 
Czars'. 879 In another piece published the same day, the paper 
condemned the censorship of the international press, although it 
suggested that the measure would be short-lived because the 
'highly educated German people' [would not] put up with it'.88° 
Finally, the editorial board called the Government's pattern of
876Ibid. 26 February 1933. Actually, this statement is true if taken 
out of context. The German people did not submit to Hitler in the way 
that the Italian people did to Mussolini —  the Germans submitted much 
more quickly.
877Ibid. 7 March 1933.
878Ibid. 21 March 1933.
879Ibid. See also 27 March 1933.
880Ibid.
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denials and counter-accusations regarding the Nazi terror 
'clumsy and unsatisfying1.881
It stands to reason that the impact of these criticisms and 
the alarm they sounded were muted to a large degree by the 
editorial board's repeated assertions that Hitler would not 
establish a dictatorship, or that if he did, it would be a 
benign one. Even in late March, when Ogden and his staff began 
to note certain disturbing aspects of the regime, they still 
reverted to earlier form, contending —  without any foundation 
offered —  that the 'obtuseness' exhibited by the German 
government would not 'go so far, so disasterously [sic] far as 
it did in 1914'. 882 That this 'obtuseness' (a revealing 
characterization in itself) would go bevond that of the Kaiser 
and his advisors is strong retrospective evidence that the 
analysis of Germany by the New York Times editorial board was 
based on a vision which had little basis in reality.
A series of Sunday analyses written by managing editor, Edwin 
James echoed the optimism of the paper's editorials, perhaps 
even to a greater extreme. In the days following Hitler's 
appointment James asserted that the new Chancellor could 'not 
put in effect any of the basic changes in things he advocated so 
strongly in his campaign speeches' because he was 'hamstrung' by 
his Conservative ministers and by Hindenburg, who would resort 
to force if necessary. 883 Unlike other observers, however, James 
continued to reassure readers that Hitler was still the tool of
881Ibid. 27 March 1933.
882Ibid. 27 March 1933.
883NYT editorial section, 5 February 1933.
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Papen, Hugenberg and Hindenburg as late as 27 March, despite the 
almost universal opinion to the contrary.884
James was one of the few journalists who erroneously 
predicted that the Nazi/Nationalist coalition would meet defeat 
in the March Reichstag elelctions. And in the event of a Hitler 
victory, James assured readers that all would not be lost, 
claiming that Hitler would still have to govern under the laws 
of the Weimar Constitution. James even pooh-poohed the 
significance of the Enabling Law on the grounds that the 
Reichstag had not invested dictatorial power in Hitler but 
rather 'in the existing government1. Nor was this a case of 
semantics —  James was still under the illusion that Hitler did 
not dominate the cabinet. He even reinforced this view by 
arguing that 'there were no immediate prospects that the Nazis 
would have any more ministers' under the measure. Moreover, 
although none of his colleagues, including the editorial board, 
shared this view, James, in his capacity as managing editor, 
accountable only to the publisher, made sure that his logic was 
the one conveyed by the Times' s headline on the Enabling Law's 
passage.
'HITLER CABINET GETS POWER TO RULE AS A DICTATORSHIP;
HINDENBURG LESS ACTIVE; HITLER TO ISSUE DECREES WITH MORE
AUTHORITY THAN PREDECESSORS '885 [my italics]
Note how this headline, though legally accurate, 886 fails to 
transmit the chilling implications of the law; namely, that
884Ibid. 27 March 1933.
885NYT 24 March 1933. P.l.
886James's argument can be carried to an even greater level of
absurdity. Because Hitler ruled under the provisions of the Enabling 
Law for the four years of its duration, it can be argued that the 
Weimar Republic lasted until 1937!
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power was actually being invested in Hitler alone, Hindenburg 
was rendered inactive and Hitler could issue decrees with 
absolute authority. In short, this marked the dawn of the Third 
Reich —  a fact recognized by virtually every mainstream 
newspaper's managing editor, except for Edwin James.
If the internal safeguards of Hindenburg, Hugenberg and Papen 
failed, argued James on 26 March, Hitler would be deterred from 
pursuing extreme policies at home and abroad by the forces of 
geopolitics and world opinion. James went on to predict that 
much like 1914, Britain, France and the U.S.S.R, now with 'the 
new virile Poland' would combine forces to stop Hitler from 
foreign aggression. 887 In the same piece James contended that 'it 
may prove true that the Government has no intention of ruining 
Germany's international position by espousing an official anti- 
semitic program in the Reich' . 888 Six days later the Regime 
announced the imposition of a nationwide boycott of Jewish 
businesses.
James made no mention of the alarming reports from the Paris 
and Vienna offices, courtesy of German refugees, about the Nazi 
anti-semitic terror following Hitler's electoral victory, 
including a 19 March dispatch which told of an episode in a 
Berlin police station where seven Jews were taken at gunpoint 
and 'compelled under threats of death to flog one another until 
several of them lost consciousness'.889
887NYT editorial section, 26 March 1933.
888Ibid.
889NYT 20 March 1933 (Paris bureau).
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The fact that James focused little attention himself on the
anti-semitic aspect of the Hitler story in February and
especially March was probably based on his feeling that ' for
some time1 the New York Times' s local and national news
departments had devoted too much attention to the plight of
Germany's Jews and not enough to the persecution of the Left.
To this end he instructed the Berlin bureau in April and again
in August to send 'a little less Jews and a little more
Socialists and Communists' on the justification that
' if there are six hundred thousand Jews getting a raw 
deal, there are some millions of Socialists and Communists 
who are also getting a raw deal. Maybe not as raw [as the 
Jews] but the numbers make up the difference. The 
persecution of the Jews is a damnable thing but it is after 
all only part of the general and larger situation1 [my 
italics]' ,890
Despite his protests, James's own articles also talked little 
about the persecution of the Left. He made no reference to, for 
instance, a 17 March dispatch from Vienna which spoke of Nazi 
brutality and torture of prominent Socialist officials in 
Cologne as well as of Karl Boechel, a deputy in the Saxony 
Parliament who was beaten close to death in front of the
Parliament building by a group of Brown Shirts and then
prevented from receiving medical help.891
* * *
Because of a dearth of evidence, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the Berlin bureau may have at times fuelled management's 
optimism or whether the latter's was independently generated.
890James to Birchall, 24 August 1933 and 12 April 1933, NYT Archive.
891NYT 18 March 1933.
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Nevertheless, some of the similarities between the paper’s 
editorials and published dispatches are striking.892
For all of February and most of March Enderis and Birchall 
were proponents of the "caged Hitler" theory. The day after 
Hitler’s appointment, Enderis characterized the new government 
as 'Colonel von Papen's show'. 893 He reinforced this stance on 
5 February, arguing that the Nazis held only the 'limelight 
positions' in the cabinet —  an interesting designation of those 
who controlled the nation's police forces —  while the 
Conservatives held the 'substantial' ones. 894 Although 
acknowledging that fact that Hitler, through the imposition of 
the repressive decrees of 4 and 6 February, would be able to 
wage an electoral campaign under the best of circumstances, 
Enderis thought that the outmanouevred Nazis would suffer defeat 
at the hands of the Conservatives in the 5 March balloting.895 
In fact, Enderis's only concern centered on Hindenburg, whose 
'fidelity to democratic practices' he questioned after the Reich 
takeover of Prussia a week after Hitler's appointment.896
Management was aware of Enderis's journalistic limitations 
(see chapters four and five) and probably realized that his 
writing and analytical skills were not equal to the biggest 
European story since Lindbergh's landing in Paris. Thus, it was
p go
Without possession of a correspondent's proofs, one cannot be sure of 
the extent to which his original work was edited by the Home Office 
nor after 7 March 1933, the extent to which material was censored by 
Nazi authorities. Fortunately there is archival evidence that will 
shed a good deal of light on this issue.
893NYT (GE) 2 February 1933.
894Ibid. 5 February 1933.
895Ibid. 11 February 1933.
896Ibid.
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not surprising to see Frederick Birchall again assuming the role 
of the New York Times1 s chief correspondent in Berlin. In fact, 
between 13 February and 13 March only one published dispatch 
featured Enderis's name.
Birchall agreed with Enderis that Hitler was a puppet of von 
Papen and Hindenburg. His 12 February dispatch read, 'the 
safeguards against extremist Nazi policies still hold and there 
is every manifestation of a desire to subordinate extremism' and 
in the same vein he argued on the 23rd that Hitler would be 
'checked by the Nationalists and [Catholic] Centrists and 
[would] be subjected to "Hindenburgian control" in the last 
eventuality1 .897
Ironically, as Hitler's power in the cabinet grew and the 
activities of his Storm Troopers became more unrestrained, 
Birchall began to suggest that the Chancellor had moderated his 
views, thus obviating the need to contain him. Perhaps 
Birchall's late February statement that 'Hitler himself has been 
sobered somewhat by his responsibilities in office and on the 
whole is fairly responsive to the counsels of his new 
associates' could be traced to the Chancellor's ostensibly 
accomodating attitude towards his Conservative colleagues.898
Birchall maintained this view through 21 March despite the 
intensification of Nazi violence against the Left and the Jews 
in the aftermath of the 5 March elections. 899 The Reichstag Fire
897NYT (FTB) 13 & 24 February 1933.
898Ibid.
899Besides his published dispatches, see Birchall to Sulzberger, 21 
March 1933, Publisher’s papers, NYT Archive. This letter in 
particular will be the subject oF intense examination in the upcoming 
pages.
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Decree and the election results convinced Birchall only that 
Papen's influence in the cabinet had ceased and hence Hitler had 
'no formidable opponents left'. 900 On 21 March, Birchall 
privately charcterized Hindenburg as 'a rubber stamp to validate 
decrees' and 'doubt[ed] whether or not he [was] even permitted 
to know half of what's going on'.901 Thus, although he 
acknowledged the 'absolute and complete control [of Germany]' 
was in the hands of the Nazis as early as 9 March, Birchall was 
unsure of 'what the results of [a Hitler dictatorship] may 
entail' .902
At the very least, Birchall was prepared to give Hitler every 
benefit of the doubt. He disagreed with the ominous predictions 
of other journalists, claiming that there would be 'no extreme 
persecution of Nazi opponents* because 'there would be no 
advantage to the Government in unsettling Germany's social 
structure'. In a play on an infamous Hitlerian phrase, Birchall 
predicted that 'no heads will roll except in the figurative 
sense' ,903
The outbreak of widespread Nazi terror, though acknowledged 
by Birchall, did not seem to compel a reconsideration. Even in 
his report of 7 March describing the early cases of Nazi 
"excesses" against Jews, Leftists and Americans, Birchall noted 
a 'new moderation in the political atmosphere', a sentiment he
9Q0NYT 2 March 1933.
901Birchall to Sulzberger, 21 March 1933, Sulzberger Papers, NYT 
Archive.
902NYT 6 & 10 March 1933.
903Ibid. 7 March 1933.
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reiterated two days later. 904 Moreover, between 9 and 12 March 
Birchall absolved Hitler for the 'spreading hooliganism' on the 
grounds that it was 'obviously not easy to control 17 million 
[Nazi] voters in their hour of triumph', and susequently praised 
him for his efforts to restrain the storm troopers. 905 In what 
could have passed as a report from the Reich Propaganda 
Ministry, Birchall procaimed on 12 March that 'the series of 
small outrages during the last week should now end 1 , 906 In none 
of his reports during this period did Birchall comment on the 
notion that at least some of the violence might have been 
inspired by years of belligerent Hitler oratory or ideas from 
Mein Kampf.
The fear of censorship and reprisals against bureau staff may 
have been one reason why this notion was absent from, or 
minimized in, Birchall's dispatches between 7 and 13 March and 
especially in Enderis's thereafter. On 14 March Sulzberger, in 
a letter to Birchall acknowledged the existence of censorship 
pressures though he did not discuss them. 907 Birchall, in his 21 
March reply, 'confidently expect[ed] to see the circulation of 
the New York Times prohibited in Germany', remarking ominously,
' I am afraid everybody is in for bad time in which we shall not 
escape' . 908 Two days later, Birchall introduced a system of coded
Ibid. 8 & 10 March 1933. On the 10th Birchall implied that he agreed 
with police reports that most of Germany remained 'quiescent and 
peaceful1.
905Ibid. 9 March 1933.
906Ibid. 13 March 1933.
907Sulzberger to Birchall 14 March 1933, Publisher's Papers, NYT
Archive.
908Birchall to Sulzberger, 21 March 1933, Ibid.
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phrases such as 'Thunderstorm in Boston equals massacre of Jews 
in Berlin' as a way of circumventing suspected Nazi wiretaps of 
the Bureau's international telephone line.909
Nazi intimidation affected Enderis's March reporting, as well 
as his psyche. In violation t>f Times policy, Enderis left many 
of his dispatches unsigned so as to avoid being traced by the 
authorities, especially in the case of those stories which 
called for a recitation of Nazi violence or an evaluation of the 
Regime. Enderis's front-page article on the passage of the 
Enabling Law, for instance, featured only a Berlin dateline.910 
In response the Home Office instructed Enderis to shed his 
anonymity and refrain from this practice on the grounds that a 
signed dispatch was the best way for a New York Times reporter 
to be held accountable for his ideas —  ironically, the reason 
why he withheld his name in the first place.911 A cursory 
examination of Enderis's articles reveals that the Home Office's 
efforts met with only limited success, perhaps due to Birchall's 
sympathy for the thirty-year Berlin resident: 'please
understand, Guido is scared stiff'!912 Nor were Enderis's fears 
unfounded; in early May, Karl von Pueckler, the bureau's "number
909Birchall to Seldon, 23 March 1933, James Papers, Ibid.
910NYT 24 March 1933. See also Ibid. 17, 18, and 23 March 1933. The
story of the 17th was about a meeting of German Jewish veterans which 
was interrupted by Nazi Brown Shirts. The one on the 18th was about 
the Nazi raid on the home of novelist and staunch Hitler opponent, 
Lion Feuchtwanger. And the one on the 23rd discussed the
Nazi/Nationalist split over control of Prussia. Enderis's name did
appear on less innocuous pieces such as another 18 March dispatch 
which discussed arrangements for the upcoming Potsdam ceremony.
911James to Birchall 18 & 19 April 1933, Ibid.
912Birchall to James, 18 April 1933, Ibid.
(323)
three man" was uncovered as a Nazi informant.913 Thus, the Berlin 
bureau featured two reporters who were not about to criticize 
the Regime, one because he was afraid to and the other who saw 
no reason to.
This left Birchall. Though no friend of the Nazis, he had 
given Hitler a great deal of latitude during the first week of 
the March terror. However, after his 12 March dispatch
predicting the end of the violence, not a single dispatch under 
his name was featured in the New York Times for another two 
weeks —  a seemingly incomprehensible turn of events. Unlike 
the case of Edgar Mowrer, there is no evidence which suggests 
that Birchall was sick or injured and it is doubtful that he 
would be allowed to take a holiday during the biggest overseas 
story in years. Nor was management upset with his articles —  
Sulzberger in a 14 March letter praised Birchall for his
'splendid pieces'.914 Why then would the paper allow the less 
well thought of Enderis to assume Birchall's role in covering 
the dawn of the Third Reich?
The reason is that on the evening of 12 March Birchall
undermined the journalistic integrity of the New York Times and
nearly destroyed his own. Ironically, what got him into trouble 
was not what he wrote, but what he said. Birchall agreed to 
speak to a nationwide American audience on CBS radio from Berlin 
about the situation in Germany and the Times chose to publish 
excerpts from the program.
913Birchall to James, 5 May 1933, Ibid.
914Sulzberger to Birchall, 14 March 1933, Ibid.
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Birchall's broadcast seemed to amount to a tacit endorsement 
of the Hitler regime, a step further from his written articles. 
It was virtually devoid of criticism and made no reference to 
the outbreak of the anti-semitic brutality of which anyone 
living in Berlin at the time would have been acutely aware. 
Instead, Birchall told millions in America that there was 'no 
cause for general alarm in the ascendancy to power of Adolf 
Hitler' and 'urged his listeners to dismiss from their minds any 
thought that there would be in Germany any slaughter of the 
National Socialist Government's enemies or racial oppression in 
any vital degree1. He also 'urged Americans to dismiss any 
thought that the present rulers of Germany desire to go to war 
with anybody'. Birchall's personal impression of Hitler read 
like a Goebbels propaganda speech: 'He is a bachelor and a
vegetarian and neither drinks nor smokes. His whole life, his 
whole thought are given to this National Socialist movement, and 
he has taken upon himself the hardest job ever a man could 
take' .915
The backlash was immediate. Many Jewish publications and 
organizations which heretofore limited their criticisms of the 
New York Times to not sympathizing enough with the plight of 
their brethren, now accused the paper of 'whitewashing Hitler' 
completely and of condoning the brutality taking place in 
Germany.916
That the paper offered no response reflected the peculiar 
state of affairs within management itself which had existed for
915NYT 13 March 1933.
916See Shepard, Paper's P.304.
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much of the past decade. Arthur Hays Sulzberger, who occupied
the publisher's chair while his father-in-law lived out his last
two years in semi-retirement, still lacked the clout that
usually came with the office. As mentioned in Chapter Five,
Sulzberger exerted little, if any influence on Rollo Ogden and
the editorial department. This fact is clearly evidenced on a
more subtle level such as Sulzberger's choice of words to
Birchall, which sounded more like those addressed to a peer in
the midst of an intellectual disagreement than to an editor in
the midst of a public relations crisis. Sulzberger tempered his
fury over the fact that Birchall had left him in the dark about
agreeing to the broadcast, obtaining only James's approval (and
James had not bothered to inform his publisher either).917
Sulzberger gently suggested to Birchall that ' it was unwise to
broadcast, particularly without the knowledge of the
publisher'.918 As for the broadcast's content, Sulzberger again
exhibited a remarkable degree of deference to Birchall,
especially given the circumstance in which the Berlin
correspondent had placed the paper:
By reason of the censorship, the talk had to be more
temperate than the splendid articles you have been sending 
us. Your remarks, therefore, were susceptible to the 
interpretation that you were speaking in defense of what has 
been taking place in Germany.919
Had Sulzberger possessed the actual powers of the publisher, 
he might have fired Birchall immediately, if for no other reason 
than to show the American public that the paper would not
917ibid.
Q1 ft
Sulzberger to Birchall/ 14 March 1933, Publishers' papers, NYT
Archive.
919Ibid. See also Shepard, op. cit.
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associate itself with someone who appeared to be a Nazi 
sympathizer. Instead, it seems that Sulzberger merely 
instructed Birchall to "lay low" for a couple of weeks, perhaps 
an indication of the publisher's own weakness. In addition, 
Sulzberger may not have taken more severe steps against Birchall 
to avoid further weakening the Berlin bureau: Enderis was not a 
long-term solution and the acclimatization of a new 
correspondent under the conditions in Germany would have been 
very difficult, especially in cultivating news sources. Ochs's 
veto of Joseph Shaplen in 1930 and the ensuing problems it 
caused for the Berlin bureau now came back to haunt the paper.
Nor did it appear that Sulzberger was able to exert any 
influence on James or Ogden. Despite the wave of criticism, the 
Times refrained from publishing an editorial response. 
Moreover, the fact that James too had failed to inform the 
publisher did not seem to disrupt his career. He remained the 
paper's managing editor until his death in 1951, despite the 
fact that he made no secret of his lack of regard for 
Sulzberger, testimony to the power of seniority.
The larger importance of this episode, however, lay in 
Birchall' s explanation concerning the broadcast as well as his 
less controversial dispatches. Some of Birchall's optimism was 
sincere, rooted in his belief that Hitler genuinely wanted to 
bring tranquillity to Germany. 'I knew that Hitler really 
desired to stop this racketeering and was about to take [the 
necessary] action, so it seemed to me that a little cheery 
optimism might be well based', he reflected. 920 Moreover, in
920Birchall to Sulzberger, 21 March 1933,. James Papers, Ibid.
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Birchall's opinion, taking a rosy view offered benefits which 
could not have been reaped by taking a pessimistic position. 
If, on the one hand, he argued, 'Hitler had succeeded, my news 
would have been excellently timed; if, on the other hand, he 
reasoned, 'Hitler did not succeed, my optimism would not be 
misplaced because it would show up my dispatches as coming from 
a correspondent who wanted to be as optimistic as he could'.921 
Birchall thus was suggesting that the credibility of the Times, 
as well as his own, would be enhanced by taking a positive 
stance regardless of the outcome; in short, he believed that he 
had placed the paper in a win/win situation. That taking such 
a view would require the correspondent to minimize or suppress 
facts to the contrary, hence providing an inaccurate picture of 
the situation in Germany, did hot seem to cause him immediate 
concern.
Beyond this complex rationale, there was a simpler, though 
even more disturbing reason behind the Nazi-friendly broadcast. 
Unbeknownst to the public, Birchall belatedly informed 
Sulzberger, 'I conceived the notion of making [the broadcast] a 
bait for a real interview with Hitler, one which I have been 
vainly seeking'. 922 In Birchall's defence, it is worth repeating 
that by this time reporters in Germany were desperately 
scrambling for news sources and access to the Regime, beyond 
that of the Reich Propaganda Ministry. Birchall may have felt 
that "buttering up" the Nazis was the only way to continue to 




seemed to disregard the larger obligation of journalistic 
honesty.
For Birchall, the CBS episode marked a watershed in both his
reporting and personal view of the Nazis. Whether as a result
of his disillusionment with Hitler (Birchall believed that 'the
movement had gotten away from him' 923 ) or an attempt to regain his
credibility, Birchall upon his return, wrote eloquent pieces
which excoriated the Regime, particularly for its anti-semitic
policies. One day after his candid letter to Sulzberger,
Birchall wrote James that, in fact, the 'forebodings [of other
observers were] justified' and acknowledged the possibilty of a
future 'mass slaughter1 of Jews (though he thought this unlikely
because he believed that other nations would intervene
militarily). 924 He also earned the high praise of his anti-Nazi
contemporaries and even earned a Pulitzer Prize in 1934. Within
the bureau, Birchall courageously resisted pressure from the
Nazis and the pusillanimous Enderis to fire a young Jewish
office worker named Bolgar as a show of good faith towards the
Regime. In July he wrote Sulzberger,
Are we editorially and personally to speak for freedom and 
then, for the sake of a slight profit, to give the lie to 
all our protestations by yielding to the pressure of these 
miserable fanatics? Are we to go back upon our own people? 
And what would become of this quite decent lad who has been 
helping us to the best of our ability to fight our battle? 
Some of this I have endeavoured [unsuccessfully] to impart 
to Mr. Enderis with Such emphasis that the good Lord would 
give to me.925
923Ibid.
Birchall, "Memorandum on Anti-Semitism in Germany", 22 March 1933,
Ibid.
925Birchall to Sulzberger, 10 July 1933, Sulzberger Papers, NYT Archive.
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Whereas Birchall showed no concern that he was sacrificing 
his objectivity when he was contributing tenuously—rooted 
optimistic pieces, he became distraught that he was doing so in 
his criticisms of Hitler’s government; so much so that he asked 
Sulzberger to release him from his post. On 30 April he wrote 
the publisher:
I wish to get out of Berlin as soon as possible. The fact 
is that I am sitting so close to this thing that I am 
beginning to feel my whole sense of perception getting 
warped to say nothing of my sense of humor getting lost... 
I find myself writing sermons instead of news... even though 
I know that it isn't my job to save the world. However, I 
assure you that ho decent man can sit here in close to this 
thing for long without becoming in a sense a crusader for 
freedom, decency and the rights of the weak. But I want to 
get away before this crusading spirit kills my news sense —  
I even taste Nazis in the beer.926
But Birchall remained in Berlin to the outbreak of the Second
World War, in part because he felt that 'the job is more
interesting than any prolonged festivity could be' and because
of the impact that his departure would have on the calibre of
the Berlin bureau, which he quipped 'functioned none too well in
normal times'. 927 As for the future of Germany, Birchall was
prophetic. Less than two months after telling America that the
accession of Hitler was no cause for alarm, he wrote,
I can assure you that there isn't the faintest doubt that 
[the Nazis] are getting ready to go after all they desire by 
force if it isn't given to them voluntarily. And their 
appetite will grow upon concessions. If they last, we are 
going to have 1914 all over again —  only worse. That in 
and of itself is enough to stir up any decent man with a 
memory, [my italics]928




A little over six years later, Germany invaded Poland; the 
world would never be the same again.
Conclusion
Though the degree of consensus varied from period to period 
and event to event, one is struck by the remarkably high level 
of uniformity in the mainstream American press's coverage of the 
demise of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler. 929* 
Although many publications mischaracterized Hitler as a 
monarchic reactionary or as a fascist, akin to Mussolini, they 
correctly recognized that he was, indeed, a malevolent figure. 
Hitler's Nazis were often described as unstable extremists and 
after their assumption of power generally were depicted by the 
American press as ruthless bullies who preyed upon the innocent 
and violated the rules of fair play.
However, the alarm about Hitler was probably muffled because 
many mainstream American journalists consistently minimized the 
prospects for, or consequences of, Nazi success. Although the 
reasons for this are not altogether clear, several factors come 
to mind. An overwhelming majority of publications cited in this 
study regarded the Nazi Party as an amateurish, and even 
somewhat risible political operation. This was partly because 
of the legacy of the botched Beer Hall Putsch —  indeed, it 
really did appear that the Nazis 'were better fitted for a comic
929*As pointed out in the introduction, it is difficult, (as well as 
risky) to make sweeping generalizations about US press coverage of 
the Weimar Republic's decline and the rise of Adolf Hitler. After 
all, there were thousands of American publications in existence in 
the 1920's and 1930's and examining a sufficient cross section of 
them may well be impossible. Moreover, not only were there 
variations within the press's coverage of Germany but the archival 
analysis presented in this study also reveals a variety of factors 
behind the reporting itself. Thus, it is necessary to proceed with 
great care in this conclusion.
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opera stage, than a serious effort to overthrow the Weimar 
regime'.930
The mainstream American press also underestimated the Nazi 
threat because it discounted the effectiveness of the Party's 
campaign messages on the grounds that they were irrational. 
Journalists concluded that the Nazi constituency was comprised 
primarily of young people and women, claiming that they were the 
only segments of German society which were vulnerable to the 
Party's emotional appeal. Many American publications declared 
that the "average German", on the other hand, was immune to such 
lures because he was rational and self-disciplined.
This assessment of the "German character" seemed to be at the 
root of the American press's corresponding overestimation of the 
viability of the Weimar Republic. Repeatedly, American 
journalists either asserted or implied that Germans were 
inclined naturally to support parliamentary democracy. This 
essentially baseless theory may have blinded journalists to the 
reality that popular support in Germany for the Weimar Republic 
throughout the 1920's and early 1930's was tenuous at best. 
This was clearly evidenced by their "positive spin" on the 
Reichstag and Presidential election results of the 1924-1932 
period. Instead, some publications, most notably the New York 
Times, often cited (and misrepresented) electoral statistics to 
reinforce their claims of Republican stability.
American journalists may have been also lulled into thinking 
that the Weimar Republic was stronger than it actually was 
because it had endured a succession of political and economic 
crises. What they seemed to miss was that although the Republic
930NYT editorial, 10 November 1923.
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survived attempted coups, hyperinflation and even the Great 
Depression, it did not emerge unscathed. The political and 
economic chaos of the early 1920's and 1930's, combined with the 
stabilization crisis of the mid and late 1920's, served to erode 
Weimar's base of popular support. Perhaps their omission could 
be traced partly to the fact that American correspondents in 
Germany were based in Berlin, an SPD stronghold, where support 
for the Republic was greater than in the rest of the country.
The American press's underestimation of the Nazis must also 
be seen in light of its overestimation of the ability of 
Weimar's leaders, particularly Hindenburg, to keep Hitler from 
gaining power. In fact, so strong was the press's faith in 
Hindenburg that many American journalists failed to question his 
judgment in appointing Hitler as Chancellor; some even praised 
the move. And although most American journalists realized their 
folly soon after, it took publications such as the New York 
Times and the Christian Science Monitor much longer to recognize 
the full import of Hindenburg's decision.
However, most American journalists began to question the 
viability of Weimar as a result of the Nazi electoral 
breakthrough in the 1930 Reichstag elections. Hindenburg's 
presidential victories over Hitler in March and April 1932 
provided only a momentary cause for hope. The Nazi victory in 
Prussia and Briining's dismissal soon afterwards finally 
convinced most American journalists that the Weimar Republic was 
finished and that an authoritarian government in the Bismarckian 
mold was in the offing.
* * *
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After 1930 the general consensus of editorial opinion among 
the New York Times. Chicago Daily News and Chicago Daily Tribune 
about Weimar's future also began to break down. Both the Daily 
News and the Tribune grew far more pessimistic about the 
situation in Germany in 1931 and 1932, with the latter 
suggesting that a monarchic restoration was inevitable. The New 
York Times, on the other hand, appeared unmoved by the alarming 
turn of events in Germany.
Although the political and economic difficulties faced by the 
Republic exercised varying degrees of influence on the opinions 
of the New York Times, Chicago Daily News and Chicago Daily 
Tribune, the divergence of views among the three newspapers 
after 1930, as well as the consensus which preceded it, were due 
largely to the internal dynamics within each news organization. 
Moreover, that this was true of these politically and 
journalistically diverse publications suggests that the 
assessments provided by exclusively product-driven press 
perception studies are inadequate in addressing the deeper 
questions of causation.
The control of German news presentation in the New York 
Times, Chicago Daily News and Chicago Daily Tribune often 
depended upon the influence of individual journalists within the 
bureaucratic framework of their respective news organizations. 
Had circumstances afforded Carroll Binder the opportunity to 
shape news and editorial policy of the Chicago Daily News at an 
earlier date, it is very likely that Edgar Mowrer's realistic 
appraisals of Germany would have made their presence felt in 
both his own dispatches and on the paper's editorial page. 
Similarly, had Walter Strong lived past 1931, it is highly
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probable that with Charles Dennis at the helm, the Chicago Daily 
News would have gone the way of the New York Times, presenting 
rose-coloured views of Germany with little basis in fact. In 
addition, Robert McCormick's autocratic control of the Chicago 
Daily Tribune facilitated his fluctuating editorial stances in 
1925 and early 1933. His overseas correspondents also found 
themselves at his mercurial whim. If McCormick felt that a 
particular story did not warrant a detailed account or prominent 
display, it did not receive it, as in the case of the omission 
of Sigrid Schultz's excellent dispatches on the Hitler treason 
trial. Finally, after Adolph Ochs's withdrawal from the day-to- 
day operation of the New York Times each of the paper's 
departments began functioning as autonomous units whose heads 
were accountable to no one. Hence, the Times's decentralized 
management structure was an essential precondition for both the 
publication of Rollo Ogden's editorial views and Frederick 
Birchall's CBS radio speech ploy.
The ideologies and traditions of the Chicago Daily News, 
Chicago Daily Tribune and New York Times also had an impact on 
each paper's German coverage. In the case of the Tribune, for 
instance, McCormick's rabid anti-Communism was probably at the 
root of his 4 February 1933 editorial which praised Hitler for 
his initial suppression of the Left. The Daily News's long­
standing practice of refraining from publishing overseas news on 
the front page survived two changes of publisher. And the 
Times's propensity for employing dispassionate, yet 
unimaginative correspondents manifested itself in the form of 
Guido Enderis, whose reporting from Germany was at best, 
undistinguished.
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It is also important to recognize the influence that business 
and market considerations had on the tone and tenor of each 
paper's German coverage. The Tribune tended to "hype" stories 
on civil unrest and monarchic intrigues, partly because 
McCormick and Schultz believed that those features sparked the 
interest of local readers. During the Lawson and Strong years, 
Chicago Daily News management took exception to many of Edgar 
Mowrer's dispatches, in large measure because of the objections 
of the paper's German-American readership. Finally, the 
attempts by the New York Times to avoid being thought of as 
America's Jewish newspaper was reflected in the underplaying of 
anti-semitic episodes and in its hiring decisions —  the far 
more capable Joseph Shaplen would probably have been Wythe 
Williams's replacement in the Berlin bureau, had the former not 
been a Jew.
* * *
Implicit in the arguments put forth in this study is the 
notion that a number of American journalists saw themselves as 
something more than just objective recorders of events. Rather, 
they appeared to believe that they could influence events in the 
political arena from the periphery, much like a home team's fans 
at a football game. The Chicago Daily News's 1924 effort to 
promote the Dawes Plan, with the hope of undermining Robert 
LaFollette's presidential aspirations, can be seen as an 
outgrowth of this thinking.
Irrespective of what journalists themselves thought, it is 
difficult to measure how much of an influence their reporting 
actually had on American public opinion, since nationwide
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polling did not begin until 1935. However, logic dictates that 
the analyses of newspapers and magazines helped shape American 
public opinion since the printed press was the primary source of 
European news during the 1920's and early 1930's (radio was 
still in its infancy). Moreover, it is probably safe to say 
that the relative impact of the New York Times, Chicago Daily 
News and the Chicago Daily Tribune on nationwide opinion was 
probably greater than that of other publications because of 
their large-scale syndication services. This was particularly 
true of the Times, which was widely read by America's political 
and financial elite.
More certain is that American correspondents who had been 
based in Germany in the 1920's and 1930's influenced American 
public opinion decades later. The impact of the Nazi experience 
on them was profound; when war broke out, many journalists 
including Frederick Kuhn and Edgar Mowrer joined US intelligence 
services and enthusiastically supported the anti-Hitler effort. 
More importantly, after Germany's defeat in 1945 their anti­
totalitarianism was directed towards the Soviet Union. This 
generation of American correspondents later became among the 
staunchest anti-Communists in the late 1940's and 1950's.931 
Their ability to mobilize American public opinion against its 
former wartime ally was a necessary precondition for Marshall 
Aid and NATO, as well as for McCarthy ism and intervention in 
Vietnam. Hence, some roots of the Cold War could be traced to 
the experience of a group of young newspapermen and women who 
had reported from the chaos which was Weimar Germany.
931For an interesting discussion of this long-term consequence, see 
Heald, Vistas, pp.226-234.
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